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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relation between the normative structures brought to bear on the 
evaluation of life and the way in which the coming-into-being of living organisms is 
fundamentally understood. It provides a new analysis and critique of the standard concept of 
‘flourishing’ in neo-Aristotelian meta-ethics, by uncovering the underlying interpretation of 
organismic becoming on which it relies, and showing how the turn to a ‘constructivist’ 
conception of development in contemporary biological theory both disrupts this underlying 
metaphysics, and provides resources for re-thinking flourishing on a fundamentally different 
basis. The central claim is that we should turn from a view in which life is given a form to 
fulfil, and becoming is the process of its fulfilment, to one in which living is the process of 
creating a way in the world, as life goes along. 
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Preface  
 
I’d like to say a little here about the roots of this thesis. As an undergraduate I became 
fascinated with the idea that traditional philosophical questions are transformed by the 
evolutionary worldview. In this light, many previously rigid boundaries and dualisms cease to 
be fixed in heaven and become merely abstractions from the ongoing flow of living change of 
which we are part. From this I gained a strong sense of the embeddedness of the human in 
living nature, and of the possibility – even necessity – of ontological continuity between the 
organic and the supposedly unique human realms of experience, value, purpose, rationality, 
and so on.1 
At the same time, perhaps in search of solid ground, I became attracted to species-universalist 
theories of value, such as those of Martha Nussbaum and Philippa Foot, both of whose work 
features heavily in this thesis. I was attracted by their ability to talk plainly about the human 
as a thoroughly natural being, and at the same time to assert a set of universal ‘human 
goods’.2 Their work encourages a comfortable sense that certain things – certain capacities, 
activities, bodily structures, ‘ways of living’ – just are essential to a flourishing human life, 
for any human, given the fact of their being this certain kind of living thing. Perhaps this 
plain-speaking, apparently naturalistic approach is justified? After all, natural history has 
shaped us in particular ways, just as it has shaped all living beings. Humanity may be part of 
an ongoing process of change – the descendants of previous forms of life for which different 
things mattered, and no doubt the ancestors of similarly alien forms of life to come – but we 
can, surely, stand back and look at our nature as it currently is, as at a ‘still from the moving 
picture of evolution’, to paraphrase Foot.3 This snapshot would give us an image of the 
human form of life as it is now, the ‘natural design’ of the species at this stage in 
                                                          
1 In these connections I have been heavily influenced by the work of Hans Jonas (e.g. 2001 [1966]: Ch 2); John 
Dewey (e.g. 1910: Ch 1; 1917; 1929 [1925]); and more recent work that expands on ideas of this sort, such as 
the philosophical school of enactivism (e.g. Evan Thompson 2007; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991); and the 
work of my undergraduate dissertation supervisor, Lenny Moss (e.g. 2009). This work is an important 
background to my thinking in this thesis, although it does not feature explicitly to a great degree. 
2 See e.g. Nussbaum 2000a; 2006; 2011; Foot 2001. 
3 Foot 2001: 29. 
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evolutionary history. And this ought to be significant for the normative self-understanding of 
individual participants in that form of life, whether or not it is, on a grander scale, ultimately 
transient.  
The problem that eventually led me beyond this picture was not that human life is not stable 
enough at an appropriately limited trans-generational timescale to abstract such a snapshot, 
but that such a snapshot would not be a snapshot at all, but would contain a plurality of 
variations, perhaps as many as there are individual humans. Although there are contingent 
limits to the forms of life that can be coherently lived in any particular case, nature does not 
prescribe a determinate proper shape to life within these limits. Simply put, humans (and 
other organisms) can live in many different ways, and different things can matter for them in 
different ways. Thus it is perfectly possible to imagine a form of human life in which any 
purportedly ‘universal’ feature is either not present, not possible, or not important. In the end 
it was consideration of development, not just evolution, that drove me to this conclusion.4 I 
turned to this topic hoping to attach some concrete significance to the idea of this species-
general ‘natural design’ that we could abstract from the process of evolution. Instead it 
became apparent that the ongoing flow of living change is a reality not just at the trans-
generational scale, but at the individual as well. The radical context-sensitivity and plasticity 
of developmental processes, as well as the active participation of the organism in its own 
becoming, means that living beings are not given a model to follow, but can make themselves 
in flexible and plural ways.  
And who are we to say what life ought to make of itself? There is a darker side to the 
humanist dream of identifying a common core that unites us. Any image of ‘the human form 
of life’, however general, is built on the principle of demarcating ‘us’ from the ‘other’, the 
properly human from the defective, the malformed, the monstrous – something to be 
maligned, even eliminated. This logic is crucial to the stigmatisation and ‘dehumanisation’ at 
the heart of some of the worst episodes of human history.5 Thus, I came to see universalist 
notions of ‘human flourishing’, even the well-intentioned, as not only metaphysically and 
biologically flawed, but potentially poisonous, ethically and politically. Concerns of both 
                                                          
4 In particular the work of Susan Oyama (e.g. 2000a [1985]; 2000b; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001); Richard 
Lewontin (e.g. 2000a [1998]); Lenny Moss (e.g. 2003); and my secondary PhD supervisor John Dupré (e.g. 
2012). 
5 See e.g. the work of David Livingstone Smith (2011; 2016), and Maria Kronfeldner (2016). 
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these sorts motivate my endeavour to re-think the notion of ‘flourishing’ in this thesis. The 
work as a whole is an attempt to hold on to the idea that our existence as living beings is 
crucial to understanding ourselves, and even for structuring the conceptuality of normative 
thinking, but to do so in a way that embraces the picture emerging from contemporary 
biology of living as an unscripted, relational, and exploratory process, one that finds its own 
way in the world, not only across evolutionary time, but also over the course of each 
individual’s becoming. And it is an attempt to affirm the sense of living nature as a realm of 
rich possibility and creativity that arises from this picture. 
The resulting thesis is an experiment in ‘interdisciplinary philosophy’. It dwells in an in-
between space where more neatly defined areas of thought meet each other. The biggest 
weakness of this work, I am sure, is that in seeking to address a number of different fields at 
once I end up exploring none of them to an adequate depth, at least not to a depth required to 
do justice to the weight of some of the claims I want to make. I hope that its superficiality is 
counter-balanced to some extent by a measure of originality. 
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Epigraphs 
 
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work 
prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according 
to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing. 
– J. S. Mill, On Liberty (1991 [1859]: 66) 
 
But life is action [praxis] and not production [poiesis]. 
– Aristotle, Politics (2009 [c. 350 BC]: I.2: 6, trans. Jowett, B.) 
 
Darwinism, more than any other doctrine responsible for the now dominant evolutionary 
vision of all reality, turns out to have been a thoroughly dialectical event. This becomes 
increasingly visible as its teachings are philosophically assimilated. Whatever their success so 
far, all contemporary revisions of traditional ontology [must start …] from the conception of 
being as becoming, and in the phenomenon of cosmic evolution look for the key to a possible 
stand beyond the old alternatives. 
– Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life (2001 [1966]: 58) 
 
If it is better to travel than to arrive, it is because travelling is a constant arriving, while 
arrival that precludes further travelling is most easily attained by going to sleep or dying. 
– John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (1922: 82) 
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Synopsis  
 
This thesis explores the relation between the normative structures brought to bear on the 
evaluation of life and the way in which the coming-into-being of living organisms is 
fundamentally understood. It provides a new analysis and critique of the standard concept of 
‘flourishing’ in neo-Aristotelian meta-ethics, by uncovering the underlying interpretation of 
organismic becoming on which it relies, and showing how the turn to a ‘constructivist’ 
conception of development in contemporary biological theory both disrupts this underlying 
metaphysics, and provides resources for re-thinking flourishing on a fundamentally different 
basis. The central claim is that we should turn from a view in which life is given a form to 
fulfil, and becoming is the process of its fulfilment, to one in which living is the process of 
creating a way in the world, as life goes along.  
Standard neo-Aristotelian conceptions of flourishing understand the good in terms of 
fulfilment of a proper form, essence, or nature. Via the work of neo-Aristotelians such as 
Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson, and Martha Nussbaum a connection with the philosophy 
of living organisms becomes apparent. These ‘properness’ conceptions of flourishing are 
naturalised by the assumption of a particular metaphysics of living phenomena as such, one 
centred on interpreting the process of organismic becoming (ontogeny, development) as a 
kind of poiesis – process that is productive of an end-state, the form of which is prescribed by 
a pre-given transcendent model. Seen through this lens becoming is the ‘unfolding’ or 
realisation of the being’s proper or essential form, and life is evaluable in terms of the norms 
determined by this form.   
Understood in this way, the standard neo-Aristotelian ‘properness’ concept of flourishing is 
an ‘organic concept of the good’ – a way of taking up an image of ‘living’ as conceptual 
ground for thinking ‘living well’. This thesis provides a critique of this nexus of thought, 
arguing that the poietic metaphysics of life is inadequate to the reality of organismic 
becoming that it attempts to capture, and ought to be rejected. In this way the logical 
connection assumed by certain neo-Aristotelians, between the phenomena of life as such and 
the normative logic of the properness concept, is severed.  
However, instead of severing the conceptual relation between ‘life’ and ‘flourishing’ 
altogether, this thesis also articulates a way to positively re-frame this relation. It proposes re-
14 
 
thinking flourishing as an organic concept of the good by means of an alternative 
metaphysics of organismic becoming, one instead centred on the logic of praxis – process 
that is performative of that which it creates, the form of which emerges immanently from the 
process itself. Seen through this lens becoming is the improvisational and creative process of 
‘finding a way’ in the world, and life is evaluable in terms of the norms that emerge from 
within this process, as well as in terms of the performance of this ongoing process itself. On 
this basis an alternative concept of flourishing – as ‘self-creativity’ – is proposed, and some 
of its implications outlined.   
This double-movement is achieved by means of an interpretive engagement with 
contemporary biological theory. It is argued that the contemporary turn to a ‘constructivist’ 
conception of development – in which organismic form and functionality is not inscribed in a 
pre-given plan such as a ‘genetic programme’, but is contingently and continually constructed 
within each organism’s unique ontogeny – provides resources both for overcoming the 
poietic and affirming the praxic interpretation of organismic becoming, and thereby for re-
thinking the structure of the concept of flourishing in the way proposed.   
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Introduction 
 
1. Locating the subject-matter 
1.1. Political thought and the question of human flourishing 
The question of flourishing is important not just for how we relate to and evaluate our own 
lives and those of others, but also how we conceive the aims of social and political action. 
The majority of political philosophy in recent decades, at least in the Anglo-American world, 
has revolved around the concept of social justice. Thinkers in this field have attempted to 
articulate what justice demands of social organisation if it is to treat people equally and fairly, 
with a particular focus on the distribution of resources, rights, and power between individuals 
in a society. For John Rawls, who is largely responsible for this focus, justice is “the first 
virtue of social institutions”,1 and is thus the first question of political philosophy.  
A key assumption of this thesis is that whether or not justice is the first virtue of social 
organisation it is certainly not the only such virtue, and that a similarly important end on 
which a polity might set its sights is the quality of life of its inhabitants. That is, social policy 
ought to be concerned not only with setting up the relations between individuals ‘fairly’, but 
also with creating conditions that enable those individuals to live well, to flourish. To put this 
in a more general way, political action ought to aim not only at ‘the right’, but also ‘the 
good’. 
It may well be that we cannot, in fact, address one issue without addressing the other. It may 
be, for example, that a decent human life cannot be had outside of conditions of social justice, 
or at least that there is some positive relation between the two. Or, it may be that we cannot 
even understand the concept of social justice itself without some conception of the human 
good; perhaps, say, because a polity can only be just if it ensures to all of its inhabitants the 
conditions for a certain level of quality of life.2 Nonetheless, these are distinctions worth 
making, in part because theorising about social justice has tended to focus on a somewhat 
                                                          
1 Rawls 1971: 3. 
2 This is the view of Martha Nussbaum (e.g. 2006; 2011), whose approach to the question of what this quality of 
life consists in is discussed in this thesis (in particular Chapters I, II, and IV). 
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abstract notion of social organisation – i.e. the “basic structure of society”, to quote Rawls 
again3 – that is, one taken largely in abstraction from the actual shape and quality of real 
people’s lives. Insofar as this is the case, it has paid attention only to how the system is ‘set 
up’, and not to how life actually goes within it. This thesis is motivated by the intuition that 
the latter is a distinct area of concern for political thinking, whether it is one that resides 
outside of the question of social justice altogether, or is itself necessary for giving a fully 
satisfactory answer to that question. Either way, the question of what it is for life to go well 
or badly, and how social structures might enable or hinder this, ought to be of concern. 
In this thesis I do not weigh in on the issue of the relationship between the right and the good, 
or between social justice and human flourishing. Rather, the issue at stake is the concept of 
flourishing itself. Furthermore, although different ways of understanding this concept lend 
themselves more easily to certain approaches to social policy and political action than to 
others, the main purpose of this thesis is not to make any such proposals explicitly. In these 
senses, although I take its contents to be pertinent to political thinking in a number of ways, 
the thesis itself is not primarily a work of political philosophy. It is a conceptual exploration 
of ‘flourishing’, focused on elucidating and analysing the assumptions and forms of thought 
that can structure this value concept, and inform the way it is taken up in political and social 
thinking.  
 
1.2. ‘The good’ and/not morality 
Before going further, it is also important to distinguish exploration of the concept of 
flourishing from certain kinds of specifically moral enquiry. For a start, in asking what it is to 
live well, or to live a ‘good life’, I am not asking what it is to ‘be a good person’, in the sense 
of having morally virtuous or righteous character. The primary sense of ‘the good’ at hand 
here is, for want of a better term, a prudential one: what an individual’s ‘own good’ consists 
in.4 This term is not a perfect one because it can suggest an overly narrow sense of ‘self-
interest’, one that excludes, e.g., beneficent action towards others, or moral virtue in general. 
This is not my intention: it could be that one’s own flourishing itself involves cultivating 
                                                          
3 Rawls 1971: 3. 
4 See Griffin 1988: Ch 4 on the distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘prudential’ perfectionism; and Hurka 1993: 17-
18 for a similar distinction. 
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moral virtue, whatever one means by that. For instance, it could be that there is a constitutive 
relation between one’s own good and particular modes of social relationality, such that the 
quality of one’s being would be intrinsically impoverished or diminished if capacities for 
righteous action and sound moral judgement were not developed.5 I do not mean to preclude 
any such possibility. 
Another way in which this is not a specifically moral enquiry is that it is not my intention to 
engage in positive moral theorising, in the sense of attempting to prescribe rules for how one 
should act in particular situations, or to identify specific inter-personal rights and obligations. 
The good in the ‘prudential’ sense is no doubt an important consideration within most moral 
reasoning of this sort, but reasoning about the good and the bad is not the same as moral 
reasoning in this sense.6 For example, we might judge about some individual – say, a 
convicted rapist languishing in solitary confinement – that certain changes would improve 
their quality of life, would enable them to live more richly or fully, etc. But, at the same time, 
we might judge that in this case it would be wrong of us to afford them that benefit, that, as it 
were, it would be wrong to cause some good. The latter judgement incorporates notions of 
desert, right, justice, and so on, that are distinct from the question of flourishing as I take it 
here. Although, as I say, it may well be that the latter always enters into the structure of moral 
reasoning in some way. As with the question of the relation between the right and the good in 
the political context, certain ways of conceiving flourishing may lend themselves more easily 
to certain positions over others in this domain as well, and inferences about the shape of 
moral reasoning may well be drawn from the position I take in this thesis, but such claims are 
not the primary intention.  
 
1.3. The good as ‘flourishing’: the neo-Aristotelian context 
By raising the question of the good using the word ‘flourishing’, as opposed to, say, 
‘happiness’, or ‘utility’, I already gesture towards a particular philosophical orientation. This 
thesis begins from sympathy with a general way of addressing the question of the good that is 
                                                          
5 A view of this sort is defended by neo-Aristotelians such as Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson (see e.g. 
Foot 2001; Thompson 2008), whose thinking on the more general concept of flourishing, but not specifically on 
that of moral virtue, is discussed in this thesis (in particular Chapters I, II, and IV). 
6 See Griffin 1988 for similar points (especially Ch 4, 69-70). 
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found, amongst others places, in contemporary ‘neo-Aristotelian’ approaches to ethics and 
political thought.7 It is best introduced in opposition to the utilitarian doctrine that the 
intrinsically desirable and undesirable is identifiable with subjective experiential states, in 
particular that pleasure and satisfaction constitute the good, and pain and dissatisfaction the 
bad.8 In contrast, the basic jumping-off point which I share with neo-Aristotelian meta-ethics 
is that the good has primarily to do not with the content of one’s feelings but with the form of 
one’s life. It has to do with the how of living – how life goes as a whole, the way in which it 
is lived.9 
To affirm a view of this sort, construed in such a general way, is not necessarily to spurn 
pleasure itself. We need not preclude the possibility that feeling satisfied or taking pleasure in 
experience can be important parts of one’s flourishing, just as acting virtuously may be 
similarly important. Rather, the idea fundamentally in dispute here is that of identifying the 
‘goodness’ of a life with the quantity of a particular kind of state aggregated or accumulated 
over the life. In the neo-Aristotelian view, the good is not identifiable with a kind of state or 
property, but relates to the form or character of one’s living existence more generally, 
encompassing the many possible dimensions of activity and experience that constitute how 
                                                          
7 There is another broad area of research that the term ‘flourishing’ might be taken to suggest – the modern 
movement of ‘positive psychology’ (see e.g. Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi 2000). Although there are certain 
over-lapping concerns with research in this area, this thesis is not about the psychology or practical science of 
‘how to live well’, but about the conceptual structure of the idea itself, as it is employed in a particular area of 
philosophy, and how, as I argue, it should be approached differently. I also note that in ‘positive psychology’, 
the term ‘flourishing’ is often associated primarily with ‘positive subjective experience’. For reasons that will be 
explained in a moment, this connection has the potential to set us off on the wrong foot here. 
8 I use the term ‘utilitarianism’ somewhat loosely here, to refer to this theory of the good and the bad. I could 
instead have used the term ‘hedonism’, or even ‘welfarism’, which has the same meaning in the work of 
Amartya Sen, to be discussed in a moment (see e.g. Sen 1980 [1979]: 205, 212; 1999: 58-59). In using this term 
here do not mean to refer specifically to a moral theory, e.g. that right action is that which maximises pleasure 
over pain. 
9 A number of philosophical perspectives in recent decades have done much for the popularity of neo-
Aristotelian approaches to questions of the good, either by framing prudential value or moral theory in terms of 
a conception of human flourishing, or by giving the idea a central place in political philosophy, and even 
economic theory. For introductions to (various versions of) this approach to issues of prudential and moral 
value, see e.g. Griffin 1988: Ch 4; Hurka 1993: Ch 1. See also the school of moral philosophy known as ‘virtue 
ethics’ that has grown out of work such as Anscombe 1958; MacIntyre 2007 [1981]; 2009 [1999]; Foot 2001; 
Thompson 2008. And for examples of work that brings conceptions of flourishing into the realm of political, 
social, and economic theory, see also e.g. Nussbaum & Sen 1993; Sen 1999; 2009; Nussbaum 2000a; 2006; 
2011; Skidelsky & Skidelsky 2012. 
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that being is in the world.10 The utilitarian identification of the good-property with pleasure 
or satisfaction, or ‘positive hedonic states’, is just the most common version of the former 
idea, and a common foil for those who wish to affirm some version of the latter, more 
complex, notion. For instance, the contrast with utilitarian thinking is one of the key starting 
points for what has become known as the ‘capability approach’. This is a contemporary 
theoretical perspective, derived primarily from the work of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum, for dealing with normative issues in political, social, and economic thought, such 
as the characterisation of wealth, poverty, social development, and the aims of political 
action.11 This perspective, in particular Nussbaum’s version of it, is one of the key reference 
points for ‘neo-Aristotelian’ approaches in this thesis.12  
There are two main kinds of objection raised by Sen and Nussbaum against a utilitarian 
concept of the good, and in favour of a broader notion of ‘flourishing’. These are worth 
looking at briefly. The first trades on intuitions about human beings as objects of ethical 
concern, and argues that the utilitarian view is too narrow and passive; the second highlights 
                                                          
10 It is common to point out that Aristotle’s term for the human good, eudaimonia, is better translated as 
‘flourishing’ or ‘living well’ than ‘happiness’, the latter being misleading given the commonplace use of 
‘happiness’ to denote a positive subjective state of some sort (e.g. Cooper 1975: 89-90 (fn 1); Reeve 2014: 30-
32; Kraut 2016: §2; Nussbaum 2005a: §§2-3; Sen 1990: 56 (fn 3)). As Aristotle puts it in Nicomachean Ethics 
(NE), I.4: 1-3: “[most people] conceive ‘the good life’ [eu zen] or ‘doing well’ [eu prattein] to be the same thing 
as [eudaimonein]”; also NE I.8: 4: “the [eudaimon] man [is] one who ‘lives well’ [eu zen] or ‘does well’ [eu 
prattein]” (c. 340 BC, trans. Rackham 1934 – Rackham translates eudaimonia as ‘happiness’, but notes (in a 
footnote to I.4: 2) that Aristotle “does not interpret it as a state of feeling but as a kind of activity”). This 
indicates the Aristotelian heritage in the very general approach to the question of the good outlined here. I would 
like to stress at this point that although various aspects of this thesis employ Aristotelian concepts, nothing in 
particular of the argument hangs on my expounding a correct exegesis of Aristotle himself. That is, the question 
of whether the particular ideas presented as ‘Aristotelian’ were truly Aristotle’s own is not directly relevant to 
the validity of the things said about, or the uses made of, these ideas here. 
11 See e.g. Nussbaum & Sen 1993; Sen 1999; 2009; Nussbaum 2000a; 2006; 2011; Robeyns 2011; 2013. The 
capability approach has had a major impact in certain fields of philosophy and many other areas of academia, 
but has also had an important influence in the political world, notably in relation to the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and its annual ‘Human Development Reports’. These have in turn inspired 
the undertaking of national capability-based studies of quality of life in many countries (see Nussbaum 2011: x-
xi, 15-16). For more general information on the capability approach and examples of its academic and political 
reach, see the website of the Human Development and Capability Association (HDCA) (https://hd-ca.org/), and 
the journal that it publishes, the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities. 
12 The other key reference point is some of the thinking of Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson in relation to 
general concepts of life-evaluation, which I shall introduce in the next sub-section. Foot, for example, similarly 
rejects the pleasure/contentment view of the good life, in favour of a theory that connects the good with the 
shape and content of one’s activities and ways of being (e.g. 2001: 85-88).  
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some intuitive problems with identifying quality of life with satisfaction of subjective 
preferences.  
Regarding the first, the accusation is that the utilitarian view has an impoverished conception 
of the human subject, one that reduces the living individual, in the words of Nussbaum, to a 
mere “container of sensations”.13 It neglects, or treats as insignificant, the fact that human 
subjects are not merely pleasure and pain sensors, passive and isolated from the world, but 
are active and embodied beings, beings that carry on in the world through active engagement 
with it, that exist through their ways of ‘doing and being’ in the world. As Sen puts it (using a 
phrase borrowed from Aristotle), the human subject is a form of “life in the sense of 
activity”.14 The thought is that this more agential, enactive, view of the human subject ought 
to frame our approach to the human good, such that we see it as concerned with the quality 
and scope of the capacities, activities, and ways of being that compose the whole of one’s 
living existence, rather than (simply) the content of certain subjective states of experience.15 
Quality of life, on this view, relates to what one is able to do and be, to one’s ‘capability’ 
(hence the ‘capability approach’).  
The second objection, revolving around examples that highlight the problem of so-called 
‘adaptive preferences’,16 has to do specifically with the tendency of some utilitarian 
perspectives to identify value with the satisfaction of subjective preferences, or for practical 
purposes to simply defer to subjective appraisal as authoritative in matters of life-evaluation. 
The concern with this approach is that, due to the flexibility of subjective appraisal, it has the 
potential to neglect much else that could be significant to people’s flourishing, e.g. by 
pushing the conditions of their life outside the purview of possible criticism. This is because a 
person’s preferences and desires tend to reflect their existing horizons of expectation, rather 
than necessarily what is or could be good in their life. By simply deferring to individual 
preference we can severely limit the evaluative scope of our analysis. The examples with the 
                                                          
13 Nussbaum 2005a: 174. 
14 Sen 1993: 46; 1999: 73; 1990: 43. The phrase is taken from Aristotle NE I.7: 13 (trans. Ross 2009). 
15 On the intrinsic significance of activity in a proper account of the good, over and above mere states of 
pleasure, etc., see e.g. Nussbaum 2000a: 72-73; 2005a: §§2-3; 2011: 55-56; and Sen 1993: 46-47; 1990: 44.  
16 See e.g. Sen 1999: 62-63; 2009: Ch. 7; 1980 [1979]: 214-215; Nussbaum 1988: 154-155; 1992: 230, 235-236; 
2011: 54-55. 
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most intuitive force relate to cases of deprivation or oppression. For instance, a woman 
trapped in the psychological domination of an abusive relationship may have ‘adapted’ to 
view her situation as normal or necessary, despite the fact that her husband restricts her 
activities outside the house, bans social interaction, and prevents her from exploring new 
ways of living.17 She may have restricted her desires and aspirations to match the limits 
imposed on her, and thus – this is the key – may be no less subjectively satisfied with her 
position than a woman on the next street who has a much richer range of possibilities for 
living her life. Are we then to say that their lives are equally good? The intuition is that, on 
the contrary, simply looking at their comparable level of subjective satisfaction glosses over 
much that is relevant to an understanding of their respective quality of life, such as the 
different conditions, capacities, and opportunities that characterise their lives.18 
It also leaves us with an impoverished understanding of what it is to improve quality of life. 
On this view we can improve a life in two ways: either by making it easier for existing desires 
to be satisfied, through a change in conditions; or by constricting the person’s expectations 
and aspirations themselves, i.e. changing their desires to ones that are easier to satisfy. For 
this sort of utilitarian political ethics, the suppression of aspirations should in fact be just as 
worthy an aim for public policy as the better satisfaction of existing desires. It might even be 
the superior option, insofar as it could achieve a given level of satisfaction more efficiently. 
And either would be better than trying to enrich the opportunities that people have, since 
there can be no intrinsic value in expanding horizons of possibility per se. On the contrary, 
doing so could even make satisfaction harder to achieve.  
The capability approach takes these to be fatal limitations of utilitarian approaches, and 
therefore argues that we ought to embrace a wider view of the good that takes into account 
what people are actually able to be and to do, what forms of life are open to them. 
So far I have presented the notion of flourishing in an extremely general way, where others 
would no doubt have allowed it to take on a more determinate shape, such as by indicating 
some particular way of understanding and evaluating the ‘form of one’s living’. This 
                                                          
17 Examples highlighting the deprivation of women are common in this literature, whether women as a 
demographic group within particularly patriarchal societies, or individual cases of, as Sen puts it, “hopelessly 
subdued housewives” (1999: 63). See also Nussbaum 1988: 154-155, 175; 1992: 235-236. 
18 I address the notion of ‘adaptive preferences’ again in III:3.4 and IV:4. 
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generality is deliberate: the structure of the concept of flourishing is precisely what is at stake 
in this thesis. At the current level of generality, I begin from sympathy with this basic 
element of the neo-Aristotelian approach. In particular I affirm the intuitions behind the 
capability approach, that we need to expand our notion of the good beyond the passive 
utilitarian “container of sensations” picture, and to encompass the notion of “life in the sense 
of activity” that Sen appeals to; and that the ‘adaptivity’ of subjective preferences means we 
cannot understand the good simply in terms of satisfaction of subjective preferences. 
However, when it comes to giving the concept of flourishing more determinate shape, the 
standard way of doing so in neo-Aristotelian thinking faces some challenges of its own, both 
ethical/political and biological/metaphysical. I shall now introduce this standard neo-
Aristotelian concept of flourishing, which provides the immediate object of critique in this 
thesis, and in the following section turn to some of these areas in which it faces challenges, 
and outline the ways in which this thesis responds to them. 
 
1.4. Flourishing as fulfilment of form: ‘properness’ of life in neo-Aristotelianism 
The standard tactic of neo-Aristotelianism is to present what it is for an individual to flourish 
in terms of some idea of the form of life that is proper to them, usually what is intrinsic to the 
‘nature’ or ‘essence’ of their species. Nussbaum’s version of the capability approach, for 
example, adopts such a tactic in response to the aforementioned problem of ‘adaptive 
preferences’. She argues that, in order to gain some evaluative purchase with regard to quality 
of life, we have to first specify which beings and doings (which ‘functionings’, in the 
terminology of the capability approach) constitute, in themselves, what it is for a human 
being to live well. The way in which we ought to determine this, she argues, is by asking 
ourselves a special kind of evaluative question: “Getting the list of functionings that are 
constitutive of good living is a matter of asking ourselves what is most important, what is an 
essential part of any life that is going to be rich enough to count as truly human.”19 That is, it 
is “a question about whether [the functioning in question] is so important that a creature who 
lacked it would not be judged to be properly human at all”.20 In other words, when we ask 
ourselves what is ‘good’ (for a human), we ought to be asking ourselves what makes a human 
                                                          
19 Nussbaum 1988: 175 (my italics). 
20 Nussbaum 1988: 177 (my italics). 
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life properly human, what makes it a well-formed exemplar of the human type. Since 
Nussbaum’s entrance into this debate in the late 1980s she has published various versions of 
a list of functionings that, she proposes, outline the basic “shape of the human form of life”,21 
i.e. the functionings that are essential for a human life to count as flourishing, qua human life. 
A recent version of the list comprises the following general categories: (length of) life; bodily 
health; bodily integrity; use of senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; 
affiliation (with others); (positive relationships with) other species and nature; play; and 
control over one’s environment.22  
What interests me most here is not the particular content of any such list, but the form of 
normative thinking that underlies approaches such as this. Characteristic of this thinking is a 
particular normative logic, evident in the way the list is constructed. It is a logic of better and 
worse fulfilment of form. That is, flourishing is understood as a matter of realising the ways of 
being and doing that constitute the individual’s ‘proper’ form of existence. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ 
are concepts of correspondence with proper form, and living well is thus living properly, 
living in accordance with the standards of this form. I call this the ‘properness’ concept of 
flourishing (see Chapter I).23 In species-properness versions, the form in question applies to 
the individual in virtue of their being a token of a species type, and describes proper 
                                                          
21 Nussbaum 1995b: 76. 
22 Nussbaum 2011: 33-34. Each of these categories is further specified by sub-categories of particular 
functionings, to varying extents.  
23 I could perhaps have called this the ‘perfectionist’ or ‘essentialist’ concept of flourishing, but have opted for a 
neologism in order to gain more semantic control over the idea. Although I will also use these terms at times, 
there are a number of ways they can be problematic or misleading. For example, although ‘essentialism’ is a 
term that Nussbaum has herself used to describe her approach (e.g. 1992; 1995b: 63), she seems to have 
dropped this label in recent years, usually in favour of ‘universalism’. Despite this, the underlying normative 
logic – the concept of flourishing as fulfilment of essential components of a species form – has remained much 
the same in her work over the years (for recent examples see e.g. 2006: 346-352, 362-366; 2011: 161-162; on 
this general continuity see also Clark 2002: 74-75; 2013). Furthermore, ‘essentialism’ is sometimes associated 
simply with a way of classifying objects according to their natural kinds, without necessarily implying 
normative standards (see also II:2 and IV:2). Similarly, Nussbaum avoids the term ‘perfectionism’, I think, 
because she does not purport to provide a “fully comprehensive” account of the human good (e.g. 2006: 352), 
but only a list of necessary aspects for human flourishing – i.e. it is not necessarily a vision of the completely 
perfect human life. However, her approach bears marked similarities to some who do adopt this term (e.g. Hurka 
1993, who also does not claim to describe the fully perfect human life). Due to this controversy I also avoid this 
term as a general title for the idea in question. It is also worth noting that both of these terms are often seen as 
tied to analysis at a species level. This is not the only possible version of what I call ‘flourishing as properness’. 
For example, in I:2.2 I describe how the same logic can also be manifested in a particular kind of individualist 
theory of flourishing. 
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manifestation of that species type. The idea of a species form thus entails (or contains) a 
species norm, a set of normative standards or imperatives to which all individual members, 
qua members, are subject.  
‘Living well’, for a human, thus means living properly as a human. It means, at the very least, 
being and doing the things without which the individual in question “would not be judged to 
be properly human at all”, according to some idea of ‘the human form of life’.24 This way of 
framing human flourishing is a particular case of a more general understanding of life-
evaluation in relation to all living beings. What it is for any living being to flourish is, at 
heart, “for that being to persist and flourish as the kind of thing it is”,25 for it to live and act 
according to that species’ form of life”, i.e. the “life characteristic of [its] kind”.26 
The context for Nussbaum’s use of the species-properness idea is normative political and 
social theory, and more recently certain environmental and conservational issues.27 But we 
can grasp hold of the logic of this particular concept of flourishing in abstraction from these 
contexts, and we can also see it at work in other contexts. For example, very much the same 
way of giving shape to the notion of flourishing can be found in the philosophy of fellow 
neo-Aristotelians Philippa Foot and Michael Thompson. The context in this case is a theory 
of the status of moral virtues and vices. 
Their view is that judgement about moral character has the same normative logic as that 
which I have just identified in Nussbaum’s thinking – it concerns whether the individual in 
question fulfils, or fails to fulfil, their ‘life-form’ – the way of being that is proper to them 
qua member of a species.28 Judgement about virtue and vice in human character is a special 
case of this more general mode of evaluation, which, they also argue, characterises the good 
and the bad in relation to living beings as such. And, importantly, this general mode of 
evaluation has this particular logic because of its living subject-matter. The concept of 
flourishing as fulfilment of proper form is taken to be a logical consequence of the fact that 
                                                          
24 Nussbaum 1988: 177.  
25 Nussbaum 2006: 349 (my italics), see also 362-366. 
26 Nussbaum 2011: 162. 
27 On the latter see e.g. Nussbaum 2017. 
28 Foot 2001; Thompson 2008. Nussbaum has addressed moral virtue in a similar way (see 1993). 
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the objects of evaluation are the phenomena of life as such.29 I am not concerned here with 
the Foot/Thompson view as a theory of moral virtue, but rather with this more basic and 
general concept of flourishing that they invoke.  
My particular interest is in the way that this concept of flourishing is taken to follow from the 
fact that its subject-matter is living beings – evident in all of Foot, Thompson, and Nussbaum 
(to various degrees implicitly or explicitly) (see Chapter II). I am interested in the fact that, in 
this sense, the concept of flourishing as properness in these thinkers functions as what I call 
an ‘organic concept of the good’, a way of structuring normative thinking about life through a 
particular apprehension of living phenomena as such. The focus of analysis in this thesis is on 
the assumptions about the living world that underlie and inform this philosophical framing. 
The particular nexus of thought at work in the ‘properness’ perspective, understood in this 
way, is the primary object of critique in this thesis, and also provides the foil against which 
an alternative perspective is developed. 
In Section 3 I shall say more about the rationale for this approach, and the philosophical 
method I adopt, but first I shall address a couple of areas in which neo-Aristotelian theories 
of flourishing have faced challenges from critics, and outline the ways in which this thesis 
responds to or expands upon these issues. This will thereby introduce the core arguments of 
this thesis, as well as indicating more specifically some of the areas of scholarship to which 
this thesis is a contribution. 
 
2. Challenges for thinking ‘flourishing’, and responses of the thesis 
2.1 Ethical/political concerns 
Neo-Aristotelian theories of flourishing have faced criticism from many quarters, much from 
an ethical and political perspective. Concerns have been raised, for example, about whether 
theories based on a universal species norm can give adequate space to individual and cultural 
diversity, and whether they can give due recognition to autonomy, freedom, and respect.30 I 
have sympathy with much of this criticism.   
                                                          
29 See Foot 2001: Introduction, Ch 2; Thompson 2008: Chs 3 and 4; Hacker-Wright 2009. 
30 For various examples of the sorts of criticism to be mentioned here, directed specifically at Nussbaum or the 
Foot/Thompson approach, see e.g. Antony 2000: 31-35; Arneson 2000: 46-52; Clark 2002: 73-76; 2013; Okin 
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Diversity in ways of living across cultures, and plurality of individual needs, abilities, and 
values, present a prima facie difficulty for philosophies that appeal to species-universal 
normative standards. The concern is that in attempting to determine values common to all we 
are in danger of abstracting away from important differences, and undervaluing, or even 
undermining, individual and cultural autonomy. For more or less any particular functioning, 
no matter how apparently common in the human species, it is possible that there are some for 
whom it is either not a possibility, not important in their particular way of living, or even 
positively disvalued. There are various things that our theory may be taken to say about such 
people, by implication, that might be cause for concern, either for the attractiveness of our 
philosophy of the good in general, or for its potential political ramifications. For example, it 
might commit us to saying that these people are incapable of living a worthwhile life, at least 
in certain respects; that they are a ‘defective’ or lower kind of human being, or indeed ‘not 
human’ at all; or that they are simply wrong about the way of life best for them, no matter 
how their particular conception of the good arose. At a social/political level, the potential for 
implications such as these to validate stigmatising and discriminatory attitudes, and even 
repressive action, has been raised by many commentators.31  
At a meta-ethical level this approach sets limits on the diversity of ways of being that can be 
understood as genuine parts of a life lived well, regardless of circumstance and context, and 
encourages a general insensitivity to individual particularity. Anything that seems to lie 
                                                          
2003: 293-297; Wolf 1995; Glackin 2016; Sugden 2006: 33-41; Begon 2015; 2017; Dela Cruz Bernabe 2006. 
For related criticisms of appeals to ‘human nature’ etc., not specifically directed at the neo-Aristotelianisms 
discussed here, see e.g. Hubbard 1990; Kronfeldner 2016. 
31 Problems of this sort are particularly relevant to an assessment of Nussbaum’s capability approach, because 
she insists that her ‘proper species functioning’ approach to quality of life is compatible with liberal principles 
such as neutrality about conceptions of the good, toleration of difference, and respect for individuality and 
autonomy. In multiple works over recent decades she has attempted to reconcile these two sides of her 
philosophy (e.g. 1992; 1998, 2000a: 41-59; 2011: Ch 5; 2014). In this thesis I mostly address Nussbaum’s 
concept of flourishing in isolation from this other side of her work. A previously projected ‘Part 3’ of this thesis 
was to address explicitly the question of the compatibility between species-essentialist concepts of flourishing 
and liberal political theory, focusing on Nussbaum’s arguments (and ultimately finding them wanting, despite 
her best intentions, for reasons similar to those just mentioned). It was also to argue that a version of the 
capability approach based on my proposed ‘self-creative’ concept of flourishing could do better at overcoming 
these issues. However, for want of space, ‘Part 3’ has been cut from the final version (although various parts of 
Chapters I-IV point towards its main claims). This does not affect the overall coherence of the thesis because 
this final part was to be extrinsic to the arguments developed in Parts 1 and 2. 
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outside of the norm must either be analysed as a sub-variation of a more general ‘proper’ way 
of living, or be seen as straightforwardly pathological.  
There is therefore little room for the idea that there might just be a plurality of ways for 
humans to live well, some perhaps fundamentally inconsistent others, without some deeper 
level at which they are really all fulfilments of the same species essence. Also, there is little 
room for the idea that the freedom to figure out one’s ‘own way’ in life, even if this diverges 
from the norm, could itself be a valuable thing. A basic motivation for this thesis is that I do 
think we should make room for these ideas in our philosophy of the good. This is something I 
do via my proposal for an alternative concept of flourishing, as ‘self-creativity’ (see Chapter 
III). On this view, in contrast with the properness concept, the norms relevant to evaluation 
within an individual’s life are contingent on the particularity of that individual’s context and 
history, and intrinsic value is also attributed to the power to create one’s own way of being 
through free and open interaction with the world.  
This positive proposal provides a way to think flourishing that neutralises many of the 
concerns just outlined, and in this way the thesis can be seen as a contribution to this area of 
debate. However, in terms of criticism of the standard neo-Aristotelian ‘properness’ 
perspective, these ethical/political concerns will for the most part remain in the background.32 
This is because the majority of the thesis takes up a different theme, focusing on issues that 
arise from a biological point of view. 
 
2.2. Flourishing and the question of biology: central arguments of the thesis 
Neo-Aristotelian approaches to ethics have also faced a number of biologically-oriented 
criticisms. As I discuss in Chapter IV, these criticisms tend to claim that neo-Aristotelianism 
either relies on flawed views about biology (e.g. various sorts of species essentialism), or that 
the way its advocates derive normative claims from ‘natural facts’ ought, when biology is 
properly understood, to validate views that they themselves would not endorse (e.g. that the 
                                                          
32 A particular exception to this is III:3.3, where I consider some implications relating to issues of disability and 
identity. 
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criterion of the good is genetic replication).33 As a result, discussions of the philosophy of 
‘flourishing’ in relation to biology tend to be sceptical. That is, they tend to draw negative 
conclusions with respect to the prospects for a theory of flourishing informed by biological 
understanding. Interestingly, defenders of neo-Aristotelianism tend, in a certain way, to agree 
with this outlook. They commonly respond to these sorts of criticism by denying that they 
derive norms from biological or otherwise empirical facts in the first place. All of Nussbaum, 
Foot, and Thompson, for instance, deny in various ways that their conceptions of the good are 
‘based on biology’ – the suggestion being that criticisms from a biological perspective are 
therefore generally misplaced.34   
The primary contributions of this thesis are to this general area of debate, concerning the 
possible philosophical relations between ‘flourishing’ and biological understanding. There 
are two main lines of argument in this regard, one negative, one positive.  
The negative line of argument is a new addition to the critical side of this debate. It provides 
a critique of the properness concept of flourishing by means of a critique of its underlying 
assumptions about living phenomena as such. I argue that, in the neo-Aristotelian thought 
considered here, the properness concept functions as an ‘organic concept of the good’ by 
assuming a particular ‘metaphysics’ of the living being.35 This metaphysics apprehends living 
beings as given a proper form to fulfil, given a model or set of standards designating the way 
they are ‘meant to be’. Living as a process of coming-into-being is thus given the task of 
movement towards fulfilment of that form, towards realisation of essence. I label this 
metaphysics poietic due to its interpretation of organismic becoming (ontogeny, 
development) as a form of poiesis, as a process undergone for the sake of producing or 
realising a pre-specified end-product. This metaphysics acts to ‘naturalise’ the properness 
                                                          
33 For bio-oriented criticisms along these and related lines, see e.g. Lenman 2014: §4.1; Kitcher 1999; 
FitzPatrick 2000; Millum 2006; Andreou 2006; Woodcock 2006; 2015; Lewens 2015: Chs 4 & 10; Odenbaugh 
2017; Glackin 2016. 
34 Nussbaum 1992; 1995a: 122-123; 2000b: 118-119; Foot 2001: 29, 32 (fn 10), 40 (fn 1); Thompson 2008: 79; 
2004. See also various forms of this defence in Hacker-Wright 2009; Lott 2012; Woodford 2016. 
35 I use the word ‘metaphysics’ in this context to mean simply a basic conceptual framework that organises 
experience and understanding of a subject-matter (see also 3.3 below). The metaphysics of living beings as 
objects of understanding is the conceptual or interpretive lens through which they are apprehended qua living 
things. This can combine a mode of representation and evaluation in the same framework, as do the perspectives 
I consider in this thesis.  
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concept of flourishing; it presents its normative structure as simply a reflection of the logic of 
living phenomena as such. However, as I argue in Chapters V and VI by means of an 
interpretive engagement with contemporary biological theory, this poietic metaphysics of life 
is inadequate to the reality of organismic becoming that it attempts to capture, and thus ought 
to be rejected. This engagement with biological theory therefore acts to sever the implicit 
logical connection between the phenomena of life as such and the normative logic of the 
properness concept, which, as mentioned above, is presupposed as necessary by the neo-
Aristotelian views considered here, given the subject-matter of organic life. I therefore argue 
that this perspective on flourishing cannot, and should not, be naturalised in the way they 
suppose that it can. 
But, surely all this is irrelevant, because, as just mentioned, defenders of this view tend to 
reject ‘biological’ criticisms as misplaced? Indeed they do, but this does not make my 
critique irrelevant. In fact, this argument can be made even if we allow that the neo-
Aristotelian ‘not based on biology’ response, mentioned above, is legitimate. This is because 
this response (and many of the criticisms that provoke it) primarily concerns the issue of the 
content of their particular conceptions of the good, which they deny is derived 
straightforwardly from biological/empirical facts. As far as the argument of this thesis is 
concerned, I grant that this response is valid, and thus also that many of the common 
biologically-oriented criticisms neo-Aristotelians face are, as they tend to say, talking past it 
in certain ways (see Chapter IV). However, there is a more fundamental level at which this 
perspective is, in a certain sense, ‘based on biology’. That is, as just explained, the way in 
which, not any particular content, but the form of the basic concept of flourishing that they 
employ is naturalised by assuming a particular way of apprehending the phenomena of life as 
such (more on this in 3.1 below). Given this, the question of how we ought to understand 
organic phenomena, and whether the particular metaphysics assumed here is necessary, or 
even conceptually adequate to its object (life), is indeed pertinent to an assessment of the 
coherence of the properness concept of flourishing. And this is a question in which biological 
theory has a legitimate role to play (see also 3.3 below). 
The second main line of argument in relation to this area of debate is more positive. It is that, 
whilst the properness concept of flourishing is undermined by biological considerations, this 
needn’t mean that the philosophy of flourishing in general has nothing to gain from an 
engagement with biological theory, or rather that such an engagement need be entirely 
negative. I argue that, as well as de-naturalising the properness concept, this strategy of 
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bringing to the surface the conceptual interplay between the metaphysics of life and the 
normativity of ‘living well’ can also provide a way to accomplish a positive re-thinking of 
flourishing as an ‘organic concept’. I develop an alternative perspective from within this 
conceptual space, one which organises it in a different way, informed by a different view of 
organismic becoming. And, as with the negative argument, this conceptual re-organisation is 
achieved by harnessing intellectual resources provided by an engagement with contemporary 
biological theory. 
In contrast to the poietic metaphysics assumed by the standard neo-Aristotelian view, this 
alternative perspective begins from an apprehension of organismic becoming as a form of 
praxis – improvisational and creative process, the ‘product’ of which is constituted by its 
performance. Seen through this lens becoming is the immanent process of ‘finding a way’ in 
the world through interaction with contingent circumstances, not movement towards 
fulfilment of a transcendent form or essence. From this shift in our interpretive perspective on 
living phenomena as such, a different framing of the normative structures brought to bear on 
the evaluation of life is proposed, which I label flourishing as ‘self-creativity’, mentioned 
above. On this view, life is evaluable not in terms of its better or worse realisation of an 
essence, but in terms of the norms that emerge as relevant to it from within the organism’s 
particular process of becoming, contingent on its contextual relations and unique ontogenetic 
history. It also entails the intrinsic evaluability of the performance of this ongoing process 
itself, in relation to which I propose a concept called ‘self-creative freedom’: the extent of the 
openness and richness of one’s power to explore the possibilities for doing and being in the 
world, and to shape one’s life through responsive interaction with this space of possibility. 
This is a parameter of flourishing constituted by the capacities of the individual and the 
conditions within which they live. 
This double-movement – away from one way of drawing the relation between ‘life’ and 
‘flourishing’, and towards another – is presented in Part 1 simply as a proposal based on the 
contrast between the poietic and the praxic metaphysics of becoming.36 In Part 2, this 
interpretive shift is motivated more fundamentally, through an internal critique of modern 
biology. It is argued that the contemporary turn to a ‘constructivist’ conception of 
development – in which organismic form and functionality is not inscribed in a pre-given 
                                                          
36 The distinction between poiesis and praxis employed in this thesis is derived from Aristotle’s original 
distinction, but also extends the meaning of the two terms in certain ways (see II:3). 
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plan such as a ‘genetic programme’, but is contingently and continually constructed within 
each organism’s unique process of ontogeny – provides resources both for overcoming the 
poietic, and affirming the praxic, interpretation of organismic becoming, and thereby for re-
thinking flourishing as an organic concept of the good in the way proposed.37 
 
3. Rationale and method 
3.1. ‘Life’ and the good: exploring the significance of organic facticity 
Why remain within this space? Why seek to re-think flourishing in relation to the biological? 
Why, for the sake of a theory of the good, ask anew the question of our understanding of the 
living world, as opposed to simply not asking it at all? A number of basic assumptions 
motivate this approach. 
With regard to the question of the human good in general, I start from an apparently trivial 
assumption. This is that human beings are living organisms. Whatever qualities and 
capacities we might associate with the human, they exist as part of the human as a living 
entity, as a phenomenon of life, and we ought to apprehend them as part of this context. An 
assumption of this sort is, I take it, accepted at some level by most (except perhaps the most 
ardent idealists or dualists), and it strikes a particular note of common sense within modern 
self-understanding, for which the evolutionary worldview has, as Hans Jonas put it, 
“abolished the special position of man” as the unique site of transcendence of the domain of 
organic nature.38 Humanity is embedded within the world of living nature; it is one realm of 
being within an inter-related and constantly changing web of life, rather than, for example, a 
separate rung on the eternal ‘chain of being’, between animals and angels.39 I call this 
assumption – the fact of our being living beings – the assumption of human ‘organic 
facticity’. In light of this assumption, our understanding of what it is to be human, and what it 
is to be a particular individual, are rightly intertwined with how we understand what it means 
                                                          
37 My main point of reference for developmental constructivism is the work of Susan Oyama (e.g. 2000a [1985]; 
2000b; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001). The proposal to use the contrast between poiesis and praxis to interpret 
the turn from the neo-preformationist ‘genetic programme’ perspective to developmental constructivism has 
also been made by Christophe Rehmann-Sutter (2006), from whom I borrow some elements of my analysis. 
38 Jonas 2001 [1966]: 57. See also Moss 2009: 103-104. 
39 On the latter idea see Lovejoy 1960 [1936]: 189-195. 
32 
 
to say that the human being is an organism, and that human becoming is organismic 
becoming. This thesis is specifically and deliberately an exploration of the possibilities for 
evaluative understanding of ourselves given the assumption of this intertwining. It is an 
exploration of the possible significance of our organic facticity for the normative structures 
we bring to bear on evaluation of our lives. Just because one way of articulating this 
significance fails, does not mean that there are not other more promising ways of doing so. 
Another basic assumption that I begin from has to do with the relation between living 
phenomena and value in general. The assumption is that ‘organisms have norms’.40 That is, 
there is something it is to benefit or harm a living being; things can be good or bad for an 
organism; there is something it is for a living existence to go well or badly, and improve or 
deteriorate. This is not the case for inanimate objects. One can scratch, chip, or break a rock, 
or one can protect it from such damage, but neither action can be bad or good for the rock 
itself: it has no norms of its own. The rock may be valuable for us, or another living being, in 
which case we might say that it can be evaluated derivatively. E.g. we might appreciate its 
shape or colours, and wish for these to remain untarnished, or value it instrumentally, as a 
means to some extrinsic end. But ‘intrinsic’ evaluation of the sort relevant to living beings 
simply doesn’t make sense for this kind of object.41 This claim about intrinsic norms 
attaching to living beings as such need not assume conscious appraisal of value by the 
organism. If a tomato plant is deprived of sunlight and water, then providing it with these will 
more than likely benefit it as a particular living being, whether or not the plant is in any sense 
consciously aware, or appraises this benefit as a benefit. The organism’s world, and its own 
states and activities, have ‘parameters of significance’ for the organism qua living being, they 
can matter in relation to its being in the world. Conscious appraisal introduces a particular, 
and more complex, level of mediation between the organism and the significances of its 
world, but is not the foundation of significance itself, it is not what makes something good or 
bad per se.  
One way of looking at the strategy of this thesis – of considering the conceptual relations 
between the interpretation of organismic becoming and ‘living well’ – is as a way of 
                                                          
40 For related views, and various ways of interpreting the meaning of this claim, see e.g. Jonas 2001 [1966]; 
Moss & Nicholson 2012; McLaughlin 2001: Ch 9; Nussbaum 2006: Ch 6. 
41 On the distinction between intrinsic or categorical, and instrumental or hypothetical, value, see Foot 2001: 26-
27; Thompson 2008: 75. 
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answering the question of where these ‘norms’ or ‘parameters of significance’ come from. 
What is the genesis of norms in relation to an organism’s being? In particular – at least, this is 
how I address the question – what is the relation between the process by which an organism 
comes into the world, and the particular norms that are relevant to it? Are they in some sense 
given to the organism, prior to development, as ends to be fulfilled and standards to be met 
via this process (part of the ‘properness’ concept); or are they constructed within this process, 
and contingent upon it (part of the ‘self-creative’ concept)? I compare these ways of 
understanding the genesis of norms in Chapter III. 
To return to the general assumption of human organic facticity, one of the most general 
attractions of the notion of ‘flourishing’ itself is that it seems to embrace this orientation as 
significant from the start. In a certain sense it always already contains a reference to our 
being as living beings, insofar as it sees the good as having to do with the form of one’s life, 
with the character of one’s living. It presents ‘the good’ not as a concept of feeling happy, or 
having certain things, but as one of living well. The category of the living as such is, then, in 
a basic sense implicated in the concept of flourishing. This makes it an appropriate way to 
articulate an understanding of the human good, given the assumption of human organic 
facticity. 
We can see this very basic ‘intimation of the living’ reflected in the particular neo-
Aristotelian theories I have introduced here. For example, in their rebuke of the utilitarian 
subject as passive pleasure-sensor, Nussbaum and Sen affirm the active or agential over the 
passive, the animate over the inanimate, and in this sense the living over the inert.42 The 
human subject, they stress, is a subject of “life in the sense of activity”: our approach to 
questions of human value ought to embrace human existence as a kind of living activity. This 
is part of the reason why the capability approach emphasises an evaluative space constituted 
by capacities for ‘doing and being’ in the world. Susan Wolf has also noted the reference to 
organic facticity in this orientation, calling it a “partly biological” picture of the human 
subject, one which contains “a complex, organic ideal, in which the ability to exercise 
                                                          
42 For more indications of Nussbaum’s thinking in this context see e.g. Nussbaum 2000a: 72-73; 2005a: §§2-3; 
2006: 159-160, 356-366; 2011: 127, 157-163; 2017; and Bendik-Keymer 2014; 2017.  
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physical powers and realize physical capabilities is not artificially separated from or 
denigrated in comparison with intellectual and spiritual ideals”.43  
We can also see, even more emphatically, this orientation towards the human-as-organism in 
the thinking of Thompson and Foot. Thompson also emphasises that which is implicit in the 
Nussbaum/Sen critique of utilitarianism. He presents the neo-Aristotelian conception of the 
human subject as a concrete form of life, as opposed to, for example, the Kantian idea of an 
abstract rational ego.44 And, for Thompson, the agency of the human subject is derivative of 
its existence as a living being, meaning that a proper comprehension of human action, will, 
reason, as well as other capacities, requires that they be seen as specific forms of living 
activity and process.45 He even speculates that “an appeal to notions of life and organism and 
life-form would seem to be implicit in all departments of ethical thought”.46  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, Thompson and Foot are explicit that their stance on moral 
virtue and vice is informed by the assumption that the relevant objects of evaluation are living 
beings. As Foot says, “moral judgement of human actions and dispositions is one example of 
a genre of evaluation itself actually characterized by the fact that its objects are living 
things”.47 The basic orientation towards life as such is therefore taken to have implications 
for the forms of thought brought to bear on questions of flourishing more generally. 
As explained above, the primary object of critique in this thesis relates precisely to one of 
these (apparent) implications, evident in Foot/Thompson and Nussbaum in various ways: that 
the ‘organic facticity’ of the subject-matter carries with it the presupposition of a certain kind 
of normative logic – properness according to a life-form – which is taken as the appropriate 
mode of evaluation for living phenomena as such, and thus as the natural way to structure the 
concept of flourishing. Footian philosopher John Hacker-Wright summarises this 
presupposition well: 
                                                          
43 Wolf (1995: 106). 
44 Thompson 2008: 7-8. 
45 Thompson 2008: 27-30. 
46 Thompson 2008: 27 (my italics). 
47 Foot 2001: 4. 
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[G]rasping something as an organism requires us to situate the organism against its species 
or life-form. […] The existence of a life-form is presupposed whenever we identify 
anything as an organism. […] [T]o identify something as an organism is ipso facto to look 
at it from [this] normative standpoint; and this is (logically) before developing any 
empirical theories of the organism.48 
The last part of this statement alludes to the common denial, mentioned above (2.2), that 
empirical/biological claims are the basis for the particular content of a conception of species 
life-form. Neo-Aristotelians deny that understanding of what is proper to a species is simply a 
matter of statistical generalisations about a population, or is derived from theories about 
evolutionary history, for example. And, as mentioned, I grant the validity of this response 
here. However, regardless of how this content is actually derived, what this statement also 
highlights is the way in which the form of what I call the ‘properness’ concept, the particular 
normative logic of this concept, is nonetheless presupposed by apprehending the organic as 
such in a particular way, as something that inherently demands the logic of judgement-
according-to-a-proper-form. Simply “grasping something as an organism” requires that we 
“situate [that] organism against” what we understand to be its proper way of living qua 
member of its kind.  
Flourishing as properness, as seen in the neo-Aristotelian cases discussed here, is in this sense 
what I have called an ‘organic’ concept of the good: a way of providing structure to 
normative thinking by taking up the living as a basic conceptual resource. I postulate that the 
particular metaphysical lens through which life is taken up in this approach – centred on the 
interpretation of becoming as poiesis, as I argue – lies at the root of much of what is 
problematic, both ethically and metaphysically, in standard neo-Aristotelian theories of 
flourishing. And, as mentioned above (2.2), it is inadequate to the reality of organismic 
becoming, as I argue through engagement with contemporary biological theory. 
However, I do not think that rejecting this particular way of framing the relation between 
‘life’ and ‘flourishing’ requires that we expunge from meta-ethical thinking the appeal to the 
organic tout court. I think that to reject altogether the idea of taking up human organic 
facticity as a way to shape the normative structures we bring to bear on life-evaluation would 
be to throw out the baby with the bathwater. What I share with the neo-Aristotelian thinkers 
                                                          
48 Hacker-Wright 2009: 310-311 (my italics, apart from “ipso facto” and “before”). See also Lott 2012. 
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discussed in this thesis is the underlying embrace of life as such as a ground for thinking 
flourishing – the attempt to think flourishing as an organic concept of the good. What I reject 
is the particular way in which they go about it. I argue that we ought to go beyond the 
limitations of the properness concept not by denying the sense of life at the heart of the 
notion of flourishing, but by thinking again about the role that it plays in our normative 
conceptuality. We ought to explore the possibility of taking up the living as conceptual 
ground for life-evaluation in a different way. That is, we ought to re-think flourishing as an 
organic concept of the good. In Section 4 below I outline the argument that follows in the 
chapters of this thesis. But first I shall make some comments about philosophical method. 
 
3.2. Interpretation and understanding 
As I have suggested, I attempt to think across a number of traditional disciplinary divides in 
this thesis. In doing so I employ an ‘interpretive’ method, the basic assumptions of which 
derive from the traditions of phenomenology and hermeneutics, as well as some related 
traditions such as philosophical pragmatism. The fundamental starting point is that 
experience of the world, insofar as it is integrated into understanding, is always shaped by 
interpretation, it is always mediated by the particular concepts and perspectives through 
which the subject attempts to make sense. In other words, there is no such thing as ‘direct’ 
experience or ‘unmediated’ knowledge of the world. 
These statements require some qualification, since they could be misleading. One might take 
them to imply that the interpretive facticity of human experience erects a kind of fundamental 
barrier. In other words, to achieve true knowledge, genuine understanding, or direct 
perception, one would have to transcend this facticity – break out of one’s station as a 
particular, concrete being whose engagement with the world is always from a particular 
perspective and structured by the particularities and significances of its existence and 
experience.49 To truly know the world would be to have access to it from what Thomas Nagel 
called a ‘view from nowhere’.50 This feat, unfortunately, is impossible for limited beings like 
                                                          
49 On this sense of ‘facticity’ (parallel with but not the same as what I called ‘organic facticity’ above), see 
Heidegger’s 1923 lectures, Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity (1999 [1923]), many of the core ideas of 
which were later subsumed into Being and Time (2010 [1927]). See also Grondin 1994: 93-95. 
50 Nagel 1986. 
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us, at least in this life. All that we can ever achieve, alas, is a series of ‘views from 
somewhere’. Thus we are resigned to the kind of scepticism that led from Locke and Hume to 
Kant: we have access only to appearances of the thing, appearances shaped by our concepts, 
never to ‘the thing in itself’.  
The meta-philosophical method of this thesis emerges precisely from a critique of this 
sceptical ‘barrier’ analysis. The hermeneutical solution to this sceptical aporia is in fact a 
dissolution of it, achieved via rejection of the false dichotomy that lies at its heart: the 
contrast between having experience or understanding of something merely from a particular 
perspective, and having access to it absolutely – free of perspective, and free of the action of 
conceptualisation. Against the background of the ideal of absolute knowledge, to admit the 
interpretive nature of human experience is to restrict it to a fundamentally limited form. The 
contrast is a mistake because the notion of the absolute at play here is a paradoxical one, an 
empty or self-defeating ideal. What would it be to make sense of something without 
integrating it into some framework of conceptualisation? What would it be to experience 
something from a ‘nowhere’? This phrase of Nagel’s perfectly embodies the contradiction of 
the absolute: to be a ‘view’ at all is to be a view from somewhere. Or, alternatively, to be 
‘from nowhere’ is to thereby cease to be a view. ‘Nowhere’ does not signify some special 
place, from which an absolute point of view, over and above all of our merely particular ones, 
can be taken up. It signifies a lack of place: the view from nowhere is no view at all. The 
sceptical conclusion of the ‘barrier’ analysis of our interpretive facticity only makes sense by 
assuming the ideal of the absolute point of view to be meaningful in the first place, which it is 
not.  
This argument, so far, entails negation of the ‘absolute’ side of the absolute/particular 
dichotomy, but it also suggests the method for overcoming it, and its sceptical implication, 
altogether. This task is completed by recognising that far from being a contingent barrier to 
experience of the world, the particularity and facticity of the subject is rather the very 
condition of its possibility. To have a ‘perspective’ is not to have a fundamentally inferior 
kind of view; it is necessary to having any kind of view at all. Making sense of something by 
conceiving of it in some particular way is not a level of understanding that we are regrettably 
limited to by virtue of being unable to grasp the world ‘directly’; it is part of what it is to do 
any ‘grasping’ at all.  
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The recognition that the interpretive constitution of understanding is precisely that which 
enables any understanding at all is central to Heidegger’s taming of the ‘hermeneutic circle’, 
and to the philosophical hermeneutics to which it gave rise, primarily through the work of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer.51 A form of this move can also be traced back to Hegel’s overcoming 
of Kant’s epistemology. For Hegel, in the words of Stephen Houlgate, “our categories do not 
keep us at one remove from the structure of things; rather, they are the very preconditions 
which give us access to the structure of things. Our categories do not confine us within the 
alleged limits of human experience; they equip us to see and understand what is”.52  
 
3.3. Science, metaphysics, and normative thinking 
This is relevant for how this thesis approaches the understanding of science, and attempts to 
bring it into relation with ostensibly disparate fields. From this point of view, questions to do 
with knowledge about the empirical evidence of science and questions to do with how it is to 
be interpreted are not separate issues. There is no simple apprehension of ‘the facts’, on top 
of which a layer of interpretation might added, say for poetic effect. The facts do not give to 
us a single way of being understood. Understanding as such involves an activity of grasping, 
embedding in wider conceptual relations, and making sense of the facts in some particular 
way.53 And, as just explained, this is not to collapse into scepticism; it is, on the contrary, to 
acknowledge the interpretive constitution of understanding per se. Therefore, the metaphors 
and conceptual frameworks through which science is both expressed and absorbed are 
directly relevant to a discussion of the science itself, as well as to consideration of the ways in 
which it can help us think through wider issues.54 
                                                          
51 See Heidegger 2010 [1927]: §32; Gadamer 1993 [1960]: 293, 262, 375-376; Grondin 2002: 46-47; 1994: 111-
112. 
52 Houlgate 2005 [1991]: 5-6. 
53 My view here is also influenced in part by epistemological traditions in the philosophy of science such as 
those stemming from Kuhn’s notion of the embeddedness of science in theoretical ‘paradigms’ (Kuhn 2012 
[1962]) and Hanson’s notion of the ‘theory-ladenness’ of empirical observation (Hanson 1965 [1958]).  
54 For related work on the integral role of metaphor in concept formation, that structures both everyday 
experience and scientific understanding, see e.g. Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Keller 2002: Pt 2; Konopka 2002; 
Nicholson 2014b: 162-163. 
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In discussing different possible ‘metaphysics’ of living phenomena in this thesis – such as 
those derived from the central contrast between poiesis and praxis – I refer to different 
possible basic conceptual frameworks, or ‘interpretive lenses’, through which experience and 
understanding of this subject-matter can be organised and integrated in different ways. These 
different perspectives shape particular ways of making sense of and responding to the living 
world, such as by bringing certain structures of evaluative judgement to bear on it (more in 
this in a moment).55  
Frameworks of this sort can organise understanding about a subject-matter across ostensibly 
separate fields of inquiry and thought, and highlighting these connections can help us draw 
implications across such (apparent) boundaries. For example, as I argue here, a poietic 
metaphysics of life underlies both the standard neo-Aristotelian concept of flourishing and 
(see Chapter V) the ‘neo-preformationist’ conception of development implied by a number of 
concepts dominant in modern biology, such as the ‘genetic programme’. By uncovering the 
way in which the contemporary turn away from this view, to a ‘constructivist’ conception of 
development, involves a shift in framing from the logic of poiesis to that of praxis, we can 
show how the background metaphysics of the neo-Aristotelian properness perspective is not 
simply given by the phenomena of life as such, and moreover, as the argument for 
constructivism shows, neither is it conceptually adequate to this subject-matter (see Chapter 
VI).  
This alludes to an important point: that the choice between metaphysical frameworks is not 
simply arbitrary. I have already explained why affirming the fundamentality of interpretation 
does not commit one to scepticism. Neither does it imply that all interpretations are ‘equally 
valid’ with respect to some particular phenomenon. Interpretations can be more or less 
adequate to the subject-matter they help us make sense of, they can accommodate its various 
aspects more or less coherently, and bring phenomena into relation with each other in more or 
less integrated and unified ways. The ‘adequacy’ of a metaphysics to its object of 
understanding is something we can only make judgements about from within the ongoing 
process of making sense of the world, in the sense that there is, as above, no 
presuppositionless point of view from which we could assess correspondence absolutely. But 
this does not mean that we are completely at sea when it comes to affirming the validity of 
                                                          
55 See also Rehmann-Sutter 2006; 2008; 2010. 
40 
 
one way of understanding over another. There is a dialectic between observation and 
interpretation through which one set of concepts and metaphors can show up as insufficient to 
accommodate the reality as we encounter it, and can give way to other ways of making sense 
of that reality. 
This dialectic is precisely that which I see as driving the debate between neo-preformationism 
and developmental constructivism in contemporary biology. As I argue in Chapter VI, the 
primary argument for the constructivist position is one of conceptual adequacy to the subject-
matter, organismic becoming. The neo-preformationist concept of the genetic programme can 
frame development with a certain degree of coherence, and it has provided a productive 
model for empirical enquiry in many areas. But it has a limited capacity to accommodate the 
growing recognition of the importance of plasticity and context-sensitivity in ontogenetic 
processes. For example, observations revealing the indeterminacy of relations between 
genetic structure and phenotypic ‘product’, and the multiple levels on which processes of 
developmental construction occur, put pressure on the neo-preformationist view by shifting 
what I call the ‘burden of conceptual justification’ onto it. 
Engagement with biological theory is crucial, I believe, for gaining a proper view of the 
possibilities for thinking ‘flourishing as an organic concept’. This is not because I think 
science can by itself provide answers to philosophical questions, not least to ethical ones. It is 
rather because, firstly, whether we like it or not, the understanding of science helps to 
structure the conceptual milieu within which we think about such questions, by shaping our 
understanding of ourselves and the world around us.56 And secondly, as long as our 
philosophical thinking engages scientific theory with a critical awareness of the different 
interpretive possibilities that emerge from it, we can make use of this mutual interaction 
between science and self-understanding without our thinking being over-determined by some 
particular empirical or theoretical doctrine.   
Similarly, in making critical use of scientific theory in this thesis I do not purport to be 
deducing ‘normative implications’ from straightforwardly ‘brute fact’ empirical claims. 
Rather, I address the empirical realm of biology from the perspective of metaphysical 
frameworks in which certain kinds of normative structuring are already entailed. Just as 
                                                          
56 On the role of biological science in shaping self-understanding and ethical/political reasoning (and vice 
versa), see e.g. Barker 2015; Meloni 2016; Barnes & Dupré 2008: Chs 5, 7 & 8; Lewontin 1991; Rehmann-
Sutter 2008, 2010. 
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“grasping something as an organism” in one particular way (in terms of a proper life-form, 
becoming as poiesis) requires us to presuppose a certain kind of normative standpoint as 
appropriate,57 grasping the organic in a different way (in terms of praxic process, for 
example) can lay down a different kind of structuring for the activity of life-evaluation (see 
Chapters II, III and VI). What is at stake in the engagement with biological theory here is the 
relative adequacy of these different points of view for our attempts to make sense of the 
reality of organismic becoming itself, as just discussed. This in turn has implications for the 
philosophical coherence of the corresponding ways of framing ‘organic’ concepts of 
flourishing. But there is no simple line of deduction from ‘fact’ to ‘value’. Conceptual 
relations are drawn here in a way that is always already mediated by modes of interpretation 
in which the appropriateness of different ways of evaluating is also implicated. Through the 
interpretive dialogue that I develop here between the philosophy of flourishing, the 
metaphysics of becoming, and biological theory, I hope to provide an example of how to 
have this kind of dialogue in a sensitive, sophisticated, and constructive way. 
Another way to see the status of the relations drawn in this thesis between biological theory 
and the structuring of meta-ethical categories is in terms of a distinction between explanation 
and understanding. Scientific reasoning is typically concerned with explaining a target 
phenomenon. It wants to know why something exists, or how something happens. On the 
other hand, what I am primarily concerned with in this thesis, with respect to the phenomena 
studied by biology, is the significance of different ways of understanding these phenomena. 
By this I mean something broader and more fundamental than explanation; the alternative 
metaphysics of life discussed are different ways of ‘looking at’ the phenomena of life and the 
becoming of living beings, different ways of grasping what kind of things these phenomena 
are, not specifically ways of explaining why or how they exist, or occur in the way they do. 
This sort of distinction might, in fact, be drawn in order to undermine the attempt to involve 
biological theory in a discussion of concepts of flourishing at all. A defender of the neo-
Aristotelian approach of thinkers such as Foot and Thompson might oppose my very project 
by arguing that, a) their concept of the species ‘life-form’ is not intended as an explanation of 
why individuals of a species live the way they do, but rather a way of understanding, e.g., 
what it means to be a human or a giraffe, and what it is to live well or badly as one; and b), 
                                                          
57 Hacker-Wright 2009: 310-311 (my italics). 
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biological theories about organismic form and development, on the other hand, are 
constructed primarily for the purpose of explaining these things. Therefore, looking at the 
latter cannot help us to assess the former, nor to advocate a different kind of approach.   
I do not deny either of premises a) and b) here, but I do deny the conclusion. Whilst scientific 
theories might be intended primarily as tools for explanation, they are not independent of the 
wider frames of understanding through which we apprehend the phenomena being explained. 
The concepts employed in some explanatory theory can validate and enforce, or disrupt and 
undermine, different such frames. For example, the neo-preformationist concept of the 
genetic programme, even if intended as simply part of an explanation of development (and 
heredity, evolution, etc.) also brings with it a particular way of understanding what kind of 
things organisms are, and what kind of process their coming-into-being is. As mentioned, I 
argue that it validates a poietic conception of living phenomena, which contains a particular 
normative logic. The neo-Aristotelian ‘properness’ concept does not specifically rely on a 
particular explanation of organic forms, not least in terms of genetic programmes (see V:2.5, 
5), but it does depend on this more fundamental metaphysics, and if there are independent 
reasons from within biological theory for rejecting this perspective, and taking up another, 
then this has implications for the coherence of the standard neo-Aristotelian approach, as an 
‘organic’ approach to meta-ethics. 
Indeed, I argue that there are such reasons (Chapter VI). They are best expressed by what I 
call the ‘constructivist turn’ in contemporary biological theory. Much like the neo-
preformationism it replaces, the constructivist perspective is primarily intended as an 
approach to explanation in biology, yet it, too, is more than this. Through the various 
concepts it employs it also constitutes a more or less unified way of looking at, making sense 
of, understanding what kind of things organismic being and becoming are. Specifically, I 
argue, it is best understood as involving a fundamental re-framing in terms of the logic of 
praxis. As mentioned just now, the main argument for taking up this perspective, at least in 
the context of biological theory, is conceptual adequacy to the phenomenon, and part of this 
is the ability of the theory to explain phenomena more fully and coherently. But taking up 
this conceptual aspect shift has significance beyond just the way we go about explaining, and 
I am primarily interested in it here for this reason, and not specifically as a way of explaining.    
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4. Chapter summary 
In Part 1 (Chapters I-III) I describe the two concepts of flourishing at stake in this thesis – 
‘properness’ and ‘self-creativity’ – and show how they represent two opposing ways of 
constructing an ‘organic’ concept of the good. I do this by connecting them with alternative 
ways of apprehending living phenomena as such, centred on alternative ‘metaphysics’ of the 
coming-into-being of living organisms – as poiesis and as praxis. 
In the first chapter I outline in more detail the properness concept of flourishing, firstly in an 
abstract way, and then illustrate it through discussion of Nussbaum’s ‘proper species 
functioning’ framework, and the parallel concept of species ‘life-forms’ in Foot and 
Thompson, arguing that the normative logic contained in both is fundamentally the same. I 
also show how the basic idea of living well as fulfilling one’s proper form, or realising one’s 
essence, is not necessarily tied to the species level, but can also be expressed in various other 
ways, including as a kind of individualism, in which flourishing involves living in accordance 
with one’s ‘true self’ qua individual. 
In Chapter II I make explicit how the properness concept, as seen in the neo-Aristotelian 
approaches of Foot/Thompson and Nussbaum, functions as an ‘organic’ concept of the good, 
and introduce the analysis of organismic becoming in terms of the distinction between poiesis 
and praxis. Each of these thinkers – to various degrees implicitly and explicitly – presents the 
properness concept as a logical consequence of the fact that the objects of evaluation are 
living beings. Life as such is taken to entail the logic of properness as the appropriate mode of 
its evaluation. This presupposition, I argue, relies on the assumption of a particular 
metaphysics of living beings. I connect this metaphysics with certain meanings of 
‘essentialism’ and ‘teleology’, and then introduce the poiesis/praxis distinction as a further 
way of understanding it, characterising the view of life underlying the properness concept as 
poietic, due to the conception of becoming as poiesis that it implies. The chapter closes with a 
discussion of some further aspects of Nussbaum’s philosophy of flourishing in which we can 
see the underlying poietic metaphysics of life coming to the surface more explicitly. 
Chapter III begins from a proposal, to take up an interpretation of becoming as praxis, and 
construct an alternative ‘organic’ concept of flourishing on this basis, in contrast with the 
nexus of thought outlined in the first two chapters. I firstly elaborate a praxic conception of 
organismic becoming, and then outline the corresponding perspective on flourishing that I 
label ‘self-creativity’. I illustrate this alternative approach by means of an interpretation of J. 
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S. Mill’s ethics of ‘self-development’ and an outline for a version of the contemporary 
‘capability approach’ based on this perspective. I then draw out some implications of taking 
this perspective in relation to certain issues to do with disability, individual identity, and the 
problem of so-called ‘adaptive preferences’. 
Part 2 (Chapters IV-VI) addresses the question of the philosophical relations between 
‘flourishing’ and biological understanding, using the conceptual framework set out in Part 1. 
By means of an interpretive engagement with contemporary biological theory I argue that the 
most coherent picture we have of the becoming of living beings is one that rejects the poietic 
and affirms the praxic metaphysics of life. Therefore, the interpretive lens assumed by the 
properness concept of flourishing is not a necessary part of a proper apprehension of living 
phenomena as such. On the contrary, it is inadequate to the reality of organismic becoming, 
and, furthermore, a conception of life that reflects the logic of praxis emerges as superior. 
The shift in metaphysical perspective on organic phenomena proposed in Chapter III is 
thereby validated, and the particular re-thinking of flourishing constructed from this basis 
attains a more fundamental grounding and motivation. 
The main purpose of Chapter IV is to acknowledge some existing ‘biological’ critiques of 
neo-Aristotelian meta-ethics, and show how the argument of this thesis approaches this 
critical task in a different way. Neo-Aristotelians of the sort discussed here tend to respond to 
bio-oriented criticisms by denying that their theories are ‘based on biology’ in the first place, 
suggesting that such criticisms are generally misplaced. I grant to them the general validity of 
this response, but argue that my line of attack survives this concession. This is because this 
response (and many of the criticisms that provoke it) primarily concerns the issue of how the 
content of particular conceptions of the good is derived, with regard to which neo-
Aristotelians are justified in their various ‘not based on biology’ rebuttals. However, as 
argued in Chapter II, the form of the basic concept of flourishing in this approach is, in a 
certain sense, ‘based on biology’, in that it relies on the assumption of a particular 
metaphysics of life (that I characterise as poietic). Biological considerations are relevant to 
the question of the validity of this underlying metaphysics, and therefore to the philosophical 
coherence of this particular ‘organic’ approach to flourishing. It is at this level of analysis that 
the subsequent engagement with biological theory takes place. 
The final two chapters of this thesis reveal how the conflict between poietic and praxic 
metaphysics is currently playing out within the arena of contemporary life science, 
45 
 
particularly in relation to the understanding of ontogeny. In Chapter V I show that the 
dominant conception of ontogeny in modern ‘neo-Darwinian’ biology, revolving around the 
neo-preformationist concept of the ‘genetic programme’, expresses a poietic metaphysics of 
life. It represents ontogeny as a process aimed at realisation of a pre-given plan, in a way that 
parallels the assumptions about living being and becoming underlying the properness 
concept, and naturalises the same basic normative logic. The neo-Aristotelians considered in 
this thesis do not specifically rely on any particular theory about genetics in order to bolster 
their theories, but they do share with this perspective in modern biology an underlying poietic 
metaphysics. Therefore, the specific kinds of biological theory analysed in this chapter are 
not necessary for understanding the neo-Aristotelian properness concept per se, but are 
necessary background to the story to be told in the final chapter, about how we can harness 
resources from within contemporary biological theory for grounding a fundamentally 
different way of thinking ‘flourishing’.   
In Chapter VI I argue for the ‘constructivist turn’ in developmental biology, and show how 
embracing this, in opposition to the neo-preformationist conception of ontogeny, involves a 
fundamental shift in perspective from the poietic to the praxic conception of organismic 
becoming. Developmental constructivism, which is motivated as a way of accommodating 
the importance of plasticity and context-sensitivity in developmental processes, sees organic 
form and functionality as the unique product of each life course, as emergent from the 
contingent history of interactivity that is the organism’s particular ontogeny. On this view, 
living being is continually constructed and re-constructed through the ongoing process of 
organismic becoming, a process which reflects the immanent creativity and reflexivity of 
praxis. Although it emerges from critique of a particular understanding of genetics, the 
constructivist turn involves more than just a change in how we understand the ontological 
status of the genome; it undermines the notion of becoming as a poietic process of essence-
realisation altogether, and thereby disrupts the metaphysical ground for the normative logic 
of properness, when conceived as an ‘organic’ concept of the good. I show how, as well as 
doing this negative work, embracing the constructivist framing of life in terms of praxis 
provides specific intellectual resources for re-thinking flourishing in the way proposed in 
Chapter III.  
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Part One  
Two Concepts of Flourishing 
 
Introduction 
In this first part I describe the two concepts of flourishing at stake in this thesis – ‘properness’ 
and ‘self-creativity’ – and show how they represent two opposing ways of constructing an 
‘organic’ concept of the good. I do this by connecting them with alternative ways of 
apprehending living phenomena as such, centred on alternative ‘metaphysics’ of the coming-
into-being of living organisms – as poiesis and as praxis. See the table in III:4 for direct 
comparison of the two perspectives contrasted in Part 1. 
  
47 
 
Chapter I 
Flourishing as Properness 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I outline the concept I call ‘flourishing as properness’, and give some 
illustrations of the idea. This concept is characterised by a particular normative logic, based 
on the notion of better and worse fulfilment of form. That is, flourishing is understood as a 
matter of realising the ways of being and doing that constitute the individual’s ‘proper’ form 
of existence. Good and bad are primarily concepts of correspondence with proper form, and 
living well is thus living properly, living in accordance with the standards of this form. On 
this view there is a transcendent relation between ‘the good’ and individual existence – the 
good stands outside of and gives normative imperatives to concrete becoming. And in this 
sense the individual is seen as normatively heteronomous with respect to its good. This 
structure of normative thinking is present in an aspect of Nussbaum’s version of the 
capability approach, and in Foot and Thompson’s analysis of flourishing in terms of species 
‘life-forms’. Other versions are also possible, such as a particular kind of individualist 
approach to the good. 
 
1. The logic of properness 
Before elaborating, a little ground-clearing is needed. It is helpful to divide our topic into two 
components, two target areas for conceptualisation that can help categorise a philosophical 
perspective on flourishing. These are what I call, firstly, a notion of being-well1 and, 
secondly, a notion of becoming-well. The main purpose of this distinction is to distinguish a 
synchronic and structural concept of the good from a diachronic and processual concept of 
the good. That is, to distinguish evaluation of the current structure of a being’s existence, 
relating to notions of attained form and functioning, from evaluation of living conceived as a 
                                                          
1 I use ‘being-well’ rather than ‘well-being’ deliberately, in order to distance this discussion from the common 
use of the latter term to refer to subjective or psychological happiness. As outlined in 0:1.3, the concept of 
‘flourishing’ in the neo-Aristotelian context has to do with the form of one’s life, with the way that life goes as a 
whole, not simply with the way it is subjectively felt or appraised.  
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process rather than an end-product; or to distinguish what it is for a life to be good or bad at 
any particular point from what it is to become well or badly. We will see that these two 
components relate to each other in different ways depending on the perspective taken up. 
I shall now give an abstract description of the properness concept in relation to these two 
components. Firstly, being-well. The structure of this concept is, on this view, one of 
realisation or fulfilment of a form, essence, or ‘nature’ that is given to the individual being. 
This pre-given essential form prescribes certain ends and norms to the being’s existence. A 
life is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in proportion to the attained properness of the life in question, i.e. the 
extent to which it realises proper form and proper functioning. Being-well as properness can 
be seen as a particular concept of ‘harmony’, that is, harmony as correspondence between 
concrete life and proper form. The opposite of being-well, what we might call being-badly, is 
a concept of disharmony in this regard, ‘defectiveness’, or deviation from the way one is 
meant to be.  
The particular good of an individual, the content of their being-well, is understood as 
determined transcendently. By this I mean that the being’s essence is logically prior to their 
becoming in the world, and is independent of that becoming; it is given to the individual, and 
is unaffected in its content by the being’s concrete existence. An implication of this is that, 
since the source of the norms by which one’s flourishing is defined is transcendent in this 
sense, the individual is understood as fundamentally normatively heteronomous – the 
ultimate ground or authority regarding the determination of intrinsic value stands outside of 
the perspective of their particular existence. 
Secondly, becoming-well – the good in relation to living as process rather than attained 
structure. In the concept of properness, this notion is straightforwardly derived from, and is 
subordinate to, that of being-well. Since flourishing is essentially fulfilment of proper form, 
becoming registers as an object of evaluation merely as movement towards or away from this 
fulfilment – it is evaluated simply in terms of its ends and outcomes. Thus becoming-well is 
successful movement of this sort; it is change or process through which the features of one’s 
proper form and functioning are developed and expressed. Becoming-badly, as we might call 
the opposite of this, is living which moves away from or fails to achieve properness of form 
or functioning.  
Take any particular element of a life – a bodily form, capacity, activity, social relation, 
environmental condition, etc. We might ask: Is this a ‘good thing’ or a ‘bad thing’? Would its 
49 
 
introduction be an ‘improvement’ or ‘worsening’ of quality of life? These sorts of evaluative 
questions can be addressed in a couple of key ways within this schema. The issue can be 
divided, broadly-speaking, into either: a) a matter of being-well – of whether the object of 
evaluation constitutes part of that individual’s proper way of being, or is on the contrary a 
defect with respect to this; or b) a matter of becoming-well – of whether it constitutes a 
movement towards, or better enables, the achievement of properness, or rather leads towards 
defectiveness in some way. From a social or political perspective, the conditions of human 
life that we ought to promote, insofar as the human good is an end in view, are those which 
enable people to live properly, to live according to their proper form. 
This gives a rough outline of the normative logic and general value concepts that compose 
what I call flourishing as properness. (See III:2 for a corresponding outline of the proposed 
‘self-creative’ concept, and III:4 for direct comparison in the form of a table.) Clearly, any 
particular version of this perspective could give much more detail regarding the relationships 
between these components. For example, it seems possible for some state or activity to be a 
genuine part of an individual’s good in terms of its being-well, and yet also for it to lead to 
defectiveness in other areas. Or, vice versa, it might constitute a defect in one area, yet enable 
greater properness in some other respect. A more detailed elaboration would need to have 
some answer to the question of relative weighting between these aspects (even if that answer 
is that no such weighting can be determined in general). Furthermore, I have so far said 
nothing about content with regard to particular conceptions of the good, only about the form 
of normative thinking that this perspective employs. Particular uses of the properness 
perspective will likely involve claims about what exactly constitutes the essential features of, 
e.g., a human life per se, or even some particular human life. But the general logic itself need 
not be tied to any specific such elaboration. 
 
2. Illustrations 
2.1. Species-properness in Nussbaum, Foot, and Thompson 
We can, however, give examples of this logic at work. Perhaps its most common 
manifestation is that found in various contemporary neo-Aristotelian approaches which 
define flourishing in terms of the essence or nature that belongs to the individual qua member 
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of a particular species of living being.2 The content and philosophical role of the ‘species 
essence’ can be conceived in various ways, some more and some less expansive. It might 
refer specifically to some characteristic capacity that is deemed unique to the species in 
question, such as the notion of the human as the specifically rational being, for example.3 
This might then be taken to define the ‘highest’ mode of existence for that species, or its 
‘ultimate end’. Or we might appeal to a more inclusive notion of the overall shape and 
content of the life that is good for any particular token of a species type – not restricted to 
features unique to that species, but including everything deemed ‘essential’ to living well as a 
specimen of that species – e.g. what constitutes its proper bodily form, health and 
physiological good functioning, kinds of experiential and cognitive capacity, modes of 
interaction with other beings, and so on. I focus on the latter kind of idea here, since it is 
more general, although the two share a similar structure. In either case the idea of a species 
form, variously defined, entails a species norm, some normative standards or imperatives to 
which all members, qua members, are subject. And in either case this perspective involves 
the idea that the process of living is given the task of growing into, moving towards 
fulfilment of, its proper form. In the human case, living has the task of realising the 
essentially human form, of becoming properly human.4 
The first key example I shall draw on is an aspect of the foundations of Nussbaum’s version 
of the ‘capability approach’. Nussbaum’s thinking on this topic is complex, and I stress at the 
outset that I am deliberately isolating just one particular aspect of it here, as a way to 
illustrate the idea I am calling flourishing as ‘species-properness’. Her thinking has also 
changed in various ways over the three decades she has been writing about the capability 
approach, yet this theme, in its general outline, has remained central.5 As briefly outlined in 
0:1.4, Nussbaum argues that in order to adequately address certain social and political 
questions we have to ground our thinking in a conception of human flourishing, one which 
                                                          
2 Aside from the thinkers to be discussed here (Nussbaum, Foot, and Thompson), variations on this approach 
can be found in the work of neo-Aristotelians such as Thomas Hurka (e.g. 1993: Ch 1, Pt 1), and Rosalind 
Hursthouse (e.g. 1999: Pt 3). 
3 As in Aristotle’s famous ‘function argument’ for the idea that human flourishing consists in rational activity 
performed well (NE I.7: 9-16). 
4 This normative idea of the ‘species essence’ is quite different to another use of the term, relating simply to 
classification. I discuss this difference more in II:2 and IV:2. 
5 See also Clark 2002: 74-75; 2013. 
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stands above subjective desires and preferences. Over several decades she has developed a 
list of the kinds of being and doing – or ‘functionings’ – deemed to be essential to human 
living well. The various functionings that comprise this list include, to pick some at random, 
‘being able to move freely from place to place’, ‘being able to use the senses’, ‘being able to 
have attachments to things and people outside ourselves’, ‘being able to laugh, to play, to 
enjoy recreational activities’.6 She has used this conception of the good as the basis for a 
theory of social justice, arguing that the justice of a polity requires it to, as best as possible, 
provide its citizens with the ‘capability for’ the proper human functionings up to a certain 
basic level. And she has used it for a perspective on social assessment and development, in 
which the categories of human functioning provide indicators for measurement of quality of 
life in a society.7  
Of particular interest here is the basic concept of flourishing that lies behind these approaches 
to political/social theory, specifically the normative logic that frames how Nussbaum presents 
the list of human functionings. That is, the sense in which these functionings are deemed to 
be part of human flourishing; the way she expresses what it means for a functioning to be 
‘good for’ a human. She presents it as a conception of what is essential to living a ‘properly’, 
‘truly’, or ‘fully’ human kind of life. The goods of living well, for the human species, thus 
refer back to an idea of what is essential to or characteristic of ‘the human form of life’ as 
such. 
                                                          
6 Taken from Nussbaum 2011: 33-34. Strictly speaking we should get rid of the ‘being able to’ locutions for 
these to be examples of the functionings on the list. Nussbaum’s list is often presented as a list of capabilities-
to-function, rather than functionings (as exemplified by the wording of these examples). This is usually due to 
the context – a theory of social justice in terms of minimal citizen entitlements, and a corresponding approach to 
social policy aims. For various reasons the ends in sight for these specifically political purposes are capabilities, 
not actual functionings. I.e. social policy should aim to make people capable of the essential functionings, but 
stop short of forcing them to function properly. However, strictly speaking, human flourishing in Nussbaum’s 
philosophy does not simply consist in being able to fulfil the functionings in question, but in actually doing so. 
Although she occasionally slips into describing the good human life specifically in terms of capabilities (e.g. 
2000a: 74, 82; 2006: 161-162), or is plainly ambiguous on the matter (e.g. 1998: 317), she confirms this 
interpretation elsewhere (e.g. 2000a: 71-72, 76, 87; 1998: 321). It is also the most coherent interpretation, 
because the fact that these particular functionings are deemed to constitute the human good explains the specific 
content of the list of capabilities employed in a political context, the list of things it is the proper aim of social 
policy to enable. See also III:3.2. 
7 Regarding this list and some of its social/political applications see e.g. Nussbaum 2000a: Introduction, Ch 1; 
2006: Ch 1; 2011: Chs 2 and 3. She also presents the list as embodying a list of fundamental entitlements for all 
humans, and in this way as a kind of human rights theory (see e.g. 2006: 78). 
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To illustrate the reasoning involved: the way in which we are to determine the content of this 
list, she argues, is by asking ourselves a special kind of evaluative question: “Getting the list 
of functionings that are constitutive of good living is a matter of asking ourselves what is 
most important, what is an essential part of any life that is going to be rich enough to count as 
truly human.”8 That is, it is “a question about whether [the functioning in question] is so 
important that a creature who lacked it would not be judged to be properly human at all”.9 
Or, as she tends to put it in more recent work, an existence which lacked something on this 
list would be judged “not a life worthy of human dignity”.10 We would deem such a life to be, 
as it were, ‘beneath’, or ‘other’ than, the kind of life appropriate for a human being, a 
deviation from proper form. The list thus aims to both describe the basic “shape of the human 
form of life”,11 and thereby to provide universal criteria for evaluating the intrinsic quality of 
individual human lives.12  
Nussbaum contends that, beyond all the individually, culturally, and historically particular 
diversity, there exists, at a greater level of generality, some “way the human being essentially 
is”, meaning that we can therefore construct a “more or less determinate account of the 
human being [which] divides its essential from its accidental properties”.13 This is clearly 
                                                          
8 Nussbaum 1988: 175 (my italics). 
9 Nussbaum 1988: 177 (my italics). 
10 E.g. Nussbaum 2006: 78. 
11 Nussbaum 1995b: 76. 
12 Nussbaum has developed this conception in numerous books and articles over the last three decades. See in 
particular 1988; 1992; 1993; 1995a; 1995b; 1998; 2000a; 2006; 2011. A number of details should be noted. 
Firstly, that she doesn’t see this as a fully comprehensive, or necessarily complete, account of the human form of 
life, but an account of some necessary conditions for a human’s life to be a ‘properly human’ one at all, and, by 
extension, to be a good human life: “A life that is not even human at all is, a fortiori, not a good human life” 
(Nussbaum 1995a: 118). Secondly, she stresses that the content of the list is “open-ended” and revisable (e.g. 
2006: 76), a claim designed to preclude objections that she sees the human good as something fixed or eternal. 
My critique does not rely on such objections. Any particular list of essentials can be given, and we can even 
allow that what is essential can change over historical time. What is of interest here is the implied relationship 
between the individual and whatever content is posited for the species form at any time, due to the transcendent-
normative status of the form itself in relation to particular individuals, as tokens of their type. (This point is 
reflected in Part 2 with regard to the implicit understanding of biological phenomena in neo-Aristotelianism: its 
fundamental role is in grounding a concept of flourishing as form-fulfilment, rather than in giving that form any 
particular content. See in particular IV:5.) 
13 Nussbaum 1992: 206, 207 (my italics). 
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intended as an appeal to some matter of ‘objective fact’ – at least in the sense that it refers to 
a reality that stands outside of individual particularity and subjective preference. Indeed, she 
talks in places of the possibility of being more or less correct in our general description of the 
human essence.14  
However, it is a ‘fact’ of an unusual sort. Nussbaum denies that the notion of ‘human nature’ 
or ‘humanness’ at play is one that can be discovered from a purely ‘external’, value-free, 
empirical standpoint. Rather, it is ‘internal’ to the self-understanding of human beings, and is 
also explicitly normative.15 The species ‘form’ is something that entails (or contains) an 
ought-to-be, that says what is good, rather than simply a set of empirical facts about human 
existence as it is.16 As she puts it in 2006’s Frontiers of Justice, “the notion of human nature 
in my theory is explicitly and from the start evaluative, and, in particular, ethically 
evaluative: among the many actual features of a characteristic human form of life, we select 
some that seem so normatively fundamental that a life without any possibility at all of 
exercising one of them, at any level, is not a fully human life, a life worthy of human dignity, 
even if the others are present”.17 Note that the notion of ‘essence’ or ‘nature’ here is not that 
of a set of properties that define kind-membership per se; rather the human essence defines 
what is essential to being a human well, given that one is already understood as a member of 
the human kind.18 
                                                          
14 See Nussbaum 2005b: 179 in which she says it is important to endorse “unequivocally a definite list of 
capabilities” that relate to the good of all humans generally, even though any particular list we might give 
“might be wrong in detail” – thus implying that a correct list is possible, even a detailed one. See also 1993: 
159-160, in relation specifically to the specification of the moral virtues, where a similar position is espoused. 
Here she even goes as far as to draw an analogy between progress in scientific knowledge (of the nature of 
thunder) and “progress towards greater correctness” in understanding of ethical concepts, an analogy that seems 
to rely on a commitment to the truth conditions of ethical claims being at least to some extent independent of 
our judgement, an ontological position even more extreme than she takes at the start of her 1992 paper on 
human essentialism. It should be pointed out, however, that in both 1993 and 1992 she seems by the end of the 
articles to have somewhat weakened the philosophical positions she sets out to defend, largely in response to 
certain objections, without, it seems to me, making these manoeuvres properly explicit. 
15 On this internal/external distinction, see in particular Nussbaum 1992; 1995a. 
16 See Nussbaum 1988: 174-175; 1992: 206-208; 1995a: 94-95; 2000a: 83; 2006: 181-182, 347. 
17 Nussbaum 2006: 181 (my italics, apart from “evaluative” and “ethically evaluative”). 
18 I return to this point, and the different meanings of ‘essentialism’, in II:2 and IV:2.  
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Let’s try to make the status of these ideas clearer. The normative criteria of ‘proper human 
functioning’ apply to all human individuals in virtue of their being members of the human 
kind. What exactly it is that renders one a ‘member of the species’ in the first place is not 
entirely clear in Nussbaum, but the most consistent interpretation seems to be: one counts as a 
member of the human kind if one is born of human parents and has the innate potential for “at 
least some of the most important” human functionings.19 One’s life counts as properly 
human, and thus as flourishing to at least a minimal extent, in virtue of achieving the 
functionings on the list up to a certain threshold level. In other words, insofar as one is a 
member of a particular kind of living being one is thereby subject to a set of standards, which 
constitute what it is to be a token of that type well, and this constitutes at a basic level what it 
is for one to live a flourishing life.20 So, for example, not ‘being able to move freely from 
place to place’, or not ‘being able to use the senses’ in some way, will be necessarily and 
intrinsically bad things for any human being, and – this is the key to the logic of properness – 
the sense in which they will be ‘bad’ is that they will make that existence less human, they 
will make it a less-than-fully-realised example of humanness.  
                                                          
19 Nussbaum 2006: 187-188, see also 38, 181, and 432 (fn 18). To clarify: simply being born of human parents 
is not sufficient to count as a member of the species. Individuals with very extreme mental impairments, such as 
anencephalic infants, or those in permanent vegetative states, are not human at all, “but a different form of life” 
(2006: 187). Someone who enters a permanent vegetative state, or develops extreme senile dementia, at some 
point in their life is “a (former) human being” (2006: 181; see also 2000a: 73). Such cases involve the absence 
or “death of anything like a characteristic human form of life” (2006: 181). The exact borderline here is not 
entirely clear. Note also that she sometimes seems to define “existence as a human being” in terms of “the very 
birth of a person into the human community” (2006: 285). It’s not entirely clear what this means, e.g. whether it 
means the same as being born of human parents or not. Note also that at 2006: 285 there seems to be a 
suggestion that this (whatever it means) is seen as a sufficient condition of being a member of the species, 
whereas, as I have just said, elsewhere the innate properties/potentials of the individual also play a role in 
distinguishing the human from the non-human (e.g. 2006: 181 and 187, where simply being born of human 
parents is clearly not sufficient to make one a member of the human species). Beyond these details, what is clear 
is that the ‘species form’ that one falls under as token, and which provides normative imperatives to one’s way 
of living, is not simply determined by the species one belongs to on straightforwardly ‘biological’ definitions of 
the term ‘species’, e.g. in terms of reproductive, phylogenetic, or genealogical relations in a population. In short, 
being Homo sapiens is not sufficient for being a member of the human kind (see also IV:2). Note also that if one 
needs to have innate potential for some of the “most important” human functionings, then even bare kind 
membership involves some normative judgement for Nussbaum (see also IV:2). For more on the status of these 
‘innate potentials’, see II:4. 
20 Variations on this way of defining flourishing, in relation both to humans and to other species, can be found in 
Nussbaum 1988: 147-155, 170, 175-177; 1992: 207-208, 214-215, 220; 1993: 243-248, 266-267; 1995a: 90-95, 
122; 1995b: 72-76, 80-85; 1998: 317; 2000a: 71-76; 2006: 69-81, 180-181, 346-352, 362-366; 2011: 161-162.  
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Thus we can see the elements of what I’ve called the ‘properness’ concept in this aspect of 
Nussbaum’s philosophy. What makes some way of living ‘good’ for a particular human is 
that it is part of what makes one’s life “count as truly human”. Being-well for a human is, at 
base, a matter of ‘being a human properly’, of realising the human form or essence through 
one’s concrete existence. By implication, becoming-well is a matter of developing towards 
fulfilment of the standards of proper human functioning. For any particular individual, the 
content of their good – what it is for them to live well – is therefore determined 
transcendentally, in the sense defined above. That is, it is something they are subject to as 
token of a type; it is something given to them rather than something determined from within 
their own living existence. With respect to the essential elements of the good, at least, the 
individual is fundamentally heteronomous. 
The properness concept of flourishing is also central to a view developed by fellow neo-
Aristotelians Foot and Thompson. Whereas Nussbaum primarily employs this idea to 
conceptualise the aims of political action and the standards of social justice, Foot and 
Thompson use it to theorise about the status of judgements of moral character in humans.21 
Their view sees moral virtue and vice as types of ‘natural goodness’ and ‘natural defect’. 
They argue that human action and character are aspects of living existence, just as 
physiological processes and bodily structure are, and that their evaluation ought to be 
understood accordingly. That is, judgement about moral character ought to be seen as having 
the same logic as the form of thinking that is appropriate to evaluation of living phenomena 
in general. The normative logic assumed in relation to this subject-matter has the same basic 
shape as that we’ve just seen in Nussbaum – it concerns whether the individual in question 
fulfils, or fails to fulfil, the way of being that is proper to them qua member of a species, what 
they call the species ‘life-form’.22 It is, again, this underlying concept of the good, and the 
way in which it is understood and presupposed, that is of interest here. 
As with Nussbaum, the imagining of an essential ‘form’ plays the role of determining a 
‘norm’ – imperatives, standards, criteria of success – to which individuals of a type are seen 
as subject. Thompson’s work can help us understand in more detail the perceived relation 
between ‘form’ and ‘norm’ in this thinking, and the logic of ‘proper’ and ‘defective’ it 
                                                          
21 Foot 2001; Thompson 2008. 
22 See Foot 2001: Chs 2, 3, 6; Thompson 2008: Ch 4; 2004. 
56 
 
entails. This logic, he points out, is contained in a certain kind of proposition, which he calls 
‘natural-historical judgement’.23 Natural-historical judgements have the structure of the 
generalised statements often found in field guides or nature documentaries, such as ‘The 
horse is a four-legged animal’ or ‘The mayfly breeds shortly before dying’, or put slightly 
differently, ‘Horses are four-legged animals’, ‘Mayflies breed shortly before dying’. They 
appear to have a straightforwardly descriptive sense, composed of subject and descriptive 
predicate. And Thompson does in some sense understand them to be matters of fact, 
statements which can be true or false.24  
However, they are not simply descriptive; they also contain a normative standard.25 This is 
because the subject of such propositions is not an empirical individual or collection of 
empirical individuals.26 It would be a conceptual mistake, for instance, to enquire in response 
to such propositions, ‘Which horse is ‘the horse’?’, or ‘Which mayflies do you mean by 
‘mayflies’?’. The propositions themselves are not claims about any particular horses or 
mayflies, nor about all, or even most, horses or mayflies (not all horses have four legs, and 
most mayflies do not breed at all). The subject of natural-historical judgements is instead 
what Thompson calls a ‘life-form’. This is a special kind of subject. A species’ life-form is 
“how creatures of this kind live”.27 The horse life-form, for instance, is realised in an 
individual horse’s life when that life goes properly, as it is supposed to, for that kind. True 
natural-historical judgements are statements of fact about a species’ life-form, supposedly. 
These facts can be understood, Thompson says, by taking up what he calls “the standpoint of 
‘inner design’” in relation to a living being.28 
                                                          
23 See in particular Thompson 2008: Ch 4.  
24 See e.g. Thompson 2008: 68-69, 72-73. 
25 At least, they do in the sense that Thompson understands them (as ‘natural-historical judgements’). It is 
debatable whether this is in fact the best way to understand the generalised statements found in field guides, for 
example. It is also perfectly plausible to see these simply as devices for identifying biological species, which 
give descriptions, usually statistically normal descriptions, in order to aid this task (see Lewens 2015: 44-46, 
54-55; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 7-8). 
26 Thompson 2008: 68-73. 
27 Foot 2001: 28. 
28 Thompson (2008: 13), citing Hegel. 
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Exactly what kind of thing, or kind of reality, is the “inner design” that corresponds to the 
word ‘life-form’ is not entirely clear. For our purposes this doesn’t matter too much. 
Whatever ‘reality’ is meant to constitute the life-form, the important point is that assuming 
this interpretive perspective to be a necessary part of understanding living beings as such 
brings with it a certain kind of normative logic (see also II:1). The way the horse life-form is 
determines how individual horses ought to be; true natural-historical judgments about the 
horse life-form imply imperatives and standards of evaluation for particular horses. The kind 
of evaluation in question is that of a horse’s intrinsic or categorical ‘goodness’ (as opposed to 
its instrumental or hypothetical value). That is, the implied imperatives relate to horses, not 
qua tools of human action, or dependent in some other way on the ends of others, but qua 
horses.29   
The normative implications for any particular horse of the statement ‘Horses are four-legged 
animals’ can be expressed in a number of ways. As Thompson puts it: “for example, “[That 
horse] ought, as far as its merely being a horse goes, to be four-legged,” or “It is supposed, 
by its mere horse-nature, to be four-legged,” or “It ought, considering just what it is, to be 
four legged”.30 In the words of Foot, “it is the particular life form of a species of plant or 
animal that determines how an individual plant or animal should be”.31 By comparing the 
actual lives of individuals to their species forms, we are able to judge the individual “to be as 
it should be or, by contrast, to a lesser or greater degree defective in a certain respect”.32 In 
this way of thinking, no particular individual need ever have actually manifested all aspects 
of the life-form successfully in order for these claims to be true – as Thompson puts it, 
“nobody’s perfect”.33 
For these thinkers it is this ‘organic’ structure of evaluation that frames the general question 
of flourishing, quality of life, etc.34 Foot again: “To flourish is here to instantiate the life form 
                                                          
29 See e.g. Foot 2001: 26-27. 
30 Thompson 2008: 75 (italics in original). 
31 Foot 2001: 32 (my italics). 
32 Foot 2001: 34 (my italics). See also Thompson 2008: 80-81. 
33 Thompson 2008: 72. 
34 As with Nussbaum, I must stress here that I am deliberately isolating just one aspect of the much more 
complex and nuanced thinking of Foot and Thompson, in order to illustrate the way of approaching issues of 
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of [one’s] species”; the intrinsic value of a being’s particular capacities and faculties has to 
do with what “fits a living thing for the instantiation of the life form of its species”; this 
fitting-to-form and instantiation-of-form is what “counts as the good of a living thing”.35 
Clearly, again, we see here what I have called the concept of flourishing as properness: 
being-well is, at root, a matter of fulfilling one’s proper form, of living according to the 
transcendent imperatives it entails. Any particular living being, upon coming into existence, 
is given a set of ends towards which they ought to develop; their becoming is to be evaluated 
in terms of success or failure with respect to these ends. 
I put it that Nussbaum’s claims regarding the “way the human being essentially is”,36 or the 
“shape of the human form of life”,37 are best understood as a variety of natural-historical 
judgement, as defined by Thompson.38 This helps us understand how these apparently 
descriptive claims about human life in general can at the same time be taken to imply 
normative imperatives and standards for individuals. It is because they are not intended as 
facts about the human species qua collection of empirical individuals, but rather descriptions 
of an idea of the human ‘life-form’, in the Thompsonian sense (equivalent to words such as 
‘essence’ and ‘species nature’ in Nussbaum).  
As mentioned above, the life-form is an ‘essence’ not in the sense of a set of properties that 
define kind-membership per se, but rather that constitute what it is to be a proper or good 
exemplar of a kind. It is an ‘essence’ in the sense of defining how the individual is meant to 
be, given what they really are.39 They are also, therefore, not claims about what is universal, 
unique, or even statistically normal, among a biological species such as Homo sapiens, but 
                                                          
life-evaluation that I’ve called the logic of properness. This, as I have shown, is indeed a basic theme that runs 
through these thinkers, but it by no means provides a comprehensive outline of their philosophies. 
35 Foot 2001: 91-92. 
36 Nussbaum 1992: 206. 
37 Nussbaum 1995b: 76. 
38 Bendik-Keymer has also interpreted Nussbaum’s thinking in precisely this way (Bendik-Keymer 2017: 342). 
Nussbaum has assented in general to his treatment of her work in this paper (Nussbaum 2017: 319), although 
she has not specifically responded to the alignment with Thompson and Foot, to my knowledge. 
39 See also Oyama 2010: 411 for this definition of essence. 
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are, from the start, claims about how a human life goes when it goes as it is supposed to, 
when it realises what is essential to proper humanness.40  
 
2.2. Individual-properness  
In the cases discussed so far, the individual’s ‘proper form’ is something given to them in 
virtue of their species, like a set of expectations prescribed to members of a club, that define 
what it is to be an exemplary member of that club. However, the properness concept of 
flourishing can be expressed in other ways. It is also possible, for example, to express it in an 
individualist fashion.41 This view would understand living well with reference to a ‘true self’, 
an essential nature or proper form that attaches to the being qua particular individual. This 
would be, like the species life-form, something that logically precedes the individual’s actual 
becoming in the world, and prescribes ends transcendently. On this individual-properness 
view, in contrast with that of species-properness, being-well is fulfilling one’s true 
individuality, and becoming-well the process of developing towards this self-realisation. This 
development could possibly involve some form of self-discovery, some process of revealing 
one’s innate and true self, in order that it can be properly realised. Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
expressed such a view, saying that 
[a]side from the nature common to the species, each individual brings with him at birth a 
distinctive temperament, which determines his spirit and character. There is no question 
of changing or putting a restraint on this temperament, only of training it and bringing it 
to perfection.42 
A view of this sort is also to be found – at least according to one interpretation – in some of 
the ethical and political thinking of John Stuart Mill. In the third chapter of On Liberty, Mill 
argues for a vision of the good life in terms of “self-development”, or “the free development 
of individuality”.43 As John Gray reads him, Mill rejects human species perfectionism of the 
                                                          
40 These points will be important again in II:2 and IV:2. 
41 Hurka also notes this possibility, as a version of what he calls ‘perfectionism’, although himself rejects an 
ethics based on this idea, in favour of a species-level perspective (1993: 14-15). 
42 Quoted in Hurka 1993: 14 (my italics). See also Hinchman 1990: 764-765.  
43 Mill 1991 [1859]: 69; 63. 
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sort I have just described, but he maintains a form of individual perfectionism: the idea that 
each individual “has a quiddity or essence which awaits his discovery”, in Gray’s words.44 
Mill uses this idea as part of his argument for political expansion of individual liberties, and 
social openness to diversity, eccentricity, and “experiments of living”.45 The idea is that 
through greater diversity in possible ways of living, people are better able to flourish – 
meaning, in this case, better able to uncover and live in accordance with their particular 
individual essences. Richard Arneson also seems to expound this interpretation of Mill’s self-
development ethics: “One might hold with Mill that what is good for a particular individual 
depends on her nature, and individual natures differ. […] Mill adds that our individual 
natures are not transparent to ourselves, so we have to go through a process of discovery 
involving experiments in living, self-observation and self-culture, and general knowledge 
acquisition to learn about our nature and our good. Hence we need wide individual 
freedom”.46 A different interpretation of Mill, for which I think there is good ground, instead 
reads him in terms of the concept of flourishing that I call ‘self-creativity’. I present this 
alternative interpretation of Mill’s ethics of self-development in III:3.1. 
We can imagine yet other ways that the properness concept could be employed, besides either 
the species or individualist varieties. For instance, to pitch the location of the relevant 
‘nature’ or ‘essence’ below the level of species, one might attempt to invoke an idea of the 
individual’s gender, family, nationality, or ethnicity, or, to go above the level of species, their 
genus (such as Homo), class (such as mammal), etc. It is uncommon for philosophers to 
theorise the good in terms of any of these categories, although there is nothing in the very 
idea of properness-according-to-an-essence, to prevent one from doing so.47 We could even 
understand the individual as having essences on multiple levels, and their flourishing as 
defined in terms of all these aspects of their ‘nature’. For example, I might think that my own 
good lies in fulfilling the life-form ‘mammal’, the life-form ‘human’, the life-form 
                                                          
44 Gray 1996 [1983]: 73 (my italics), see also 79-86. 
45 Mill 1991 [1859]: 63. 
46 Arneson 2000: 42-43 (my italics). 
47 This observation is, in fact, the basis for some criticism of species-properness views. The objection is that 
theorists who appeal to this idea cannot explain what is especially significant about the species such that it 
uniquely constitutes the level at which essential functioning is to be identified. See for example Copp & Sobel 
2004: 536; Lewens 2015: 54. 
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‘Caucasian’, the life-form ‘male’, and realising my own particular ‘true self’ as well. The 
purpose of stressing this multiplicity of possibilities is to clarify that the target idea here is not 
just ‘species essentialism’, but rather a particular mode of evaluative thinking about life that, 
whilst indeed evident in many philosophies that appeal to species-level norms, is itself 
expressible in multiple ways. 
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Chapter II 
Properness and the Metaphysics of Becoming 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I firstly make explicit how the logic of properness, as seen in the neo-
Aristotelianisms presented in the previous chapter, functions as an ‘organic’ concept of the 
good – a way of structuring normative thinking through an understanding of the category of 
living phenomena as such. In the thinking of Foot/Thompson and Nussbaum the assumption 
that the subject of evaluation, in speaking of flourishing, is a living being is taken to entail the 
logic of properness as the appropriate mode of evaluation. This presupposition, I argue, relies 
on the assumption of a particular ‘metaphysics’ of living beings, in order for it to be 
‘naturalised’. After considering some other ways of characterising this metaphysics (Section 
2), I introduce a different language for this task, the distinction between poiesis and praxis 
(Section 3). I label the metaphysics in question poietic, because of the interpretation of 
organismic becoming as poiesis that it contains. In the final section I illustrate this through 
discussion of Nussbaum’s notions of ‘basic capabilities’ and ‘human development’. This 
chapter sets out the interpretive framework within which an alternative way of thinking 
flourishing will be proposed (Chapter III), and within which the discussion of biological 
theory in Part 2 will be brought into relation with the analysis of concepts of flourishing in 
Part 1. 
 
1. Life and the presupposition of the logic of properness 
Whenever we evaluate some object we implicitly commit ourselves to the claim that the 
particular form of thought structuring our evaluation is appropriate to the object in question, 
that it brings the object into view in a way that represents it adequately. So, for example, 
when I judge that my toaster is broken, in that it fails to do what it is designed to do (i.e. toast 
bread), I commit myself to the claim that evaluation in terms of success and failure with 
respect to design is an appropriate form of thought to bring to bear on that object. In 
particular, I commit myself to an understanding of the object in question, such that it is in fact 
a product of design, and indeed that it is designed to toast bread. It would be relevant to the 
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validity of my judgement about that object in front of me were someone to point out that it 
was not in fact a toaster at all, but rather a pile of stones, or a dead badger. My observation 
that it doesn’t toast bread would still be true, but my judgement that it is therefore a bad or 
defective toaster would be invalid. 
Similarly, when we make claims about the intrinsic quality of a living existence in terms of 
properness-according-to-an-essence (which, as it happens, has some structural similarities 
with the artefact/design case, because they are linked by the notion of poiesis – see Section 3 
below), we implicitly commit ourselves to the view that this mode of thought is appropriate 
to this kind of object, that the logic of properness grasps living as an object of evaluation in 
the right kind of way. We therefore assume the validity of some particular way of 
understanding ‘living itself’, an understanding that makes this logic appropriate. In the case 
of Foot and Thompson this implicit commitment is made explicit. It is one of the basic 
premises of their argument that moral virtue also be understood in terms of life-forms. The 
argument can be reconstructed as follows:  
P1. Living phenomena as such demand a mode of evaluation in terms of properness 
according to a life-form;1   
P2. Human action and character, the subjects of moral judgement, are aspects of the human 
as a phenomenon of life;2  
C1. Therefore evaluations of moral character “share a conceptual structure” with 
evaluation of living in general: “moral judgement of human actions and dispositions is one 
example of a genre of evaluation […] characterized by the fact that its objects are living 
things”;3 
C2. Therefore the conceptual structure appropriate to evaluation of moral character is also 
the logic of properness.4 
It is the first premise of this argument, and the particular understanding of living being and 
becoming that it relies on, that interests me here. The orientation towards the human-as-
                                                          
1 See Foot 2001: Introduction, Chs 2 and 3; Thompson 2008: Chs 3 and 4; also Hacker-Wright 2009; Lott 2012. 
2 See e.g. Thompson 2008: 27-30; Foot 2001: 3-4, 5. 
3 Foot 2001: 5, 4, see also 27. 
4 See e.g. Foot 2001: 38-40, 43-44. 
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organism – what I call the assumption of human ‘organic facticity’ (see 0:3.1) – is clearly 
taken to involve the presupposition of the normative logic of properness. Living existence as 
such is seen as requiring that it be grasped within this conceptual structuring. As Footian 
philosopher Hacker-Wright puts it: “[G]rasping something as an organism requires us to 
situate the organism against its species or life-form. […] The existence of a life-form is 
presupposed whenever we identify anything as an organism”; and, taking this perspective on 
an organism “is ipso facto to look at it from a normative standpoint” – the particular 
normative standpoint I have called the concept of flourishing as properness.5 Thompson, at 
points, even seems to define the living as that which is subject to a life-form. A living 
organism, he says, “is whatever falls under a species or ‘bears’ a life-form”.6 And, he claims, 
if one were to lose the ability to interpret individual organisms in terms of life-forms, then 
one would “lose […] the capacity to experience things as alive” at all; “every thought of an 
individual organism as alive is mediated by thought of the life-form it bears”.7 The 
properness logic is therefore presupposed as the appropriate mode of evaluation insofar as the 
subject-matter, life, is apprehended in a particular way, as subject to a given ‘life-form’ that it 
‘bears’. (For elaboration on Thompson’s argument for this ‘presupposition’ – Premise 1 
above – see Appendix at the end of this chapter.) 
The assumption that the logic of properness is made necessary by the nature of living 
phenomena as such is also evident in Nussbaum’s thinking, although it is not quite as 
explicit.8 We can see it most clearly via some recent work in which she has extended the 
capability approach beyond the human domain as a way of framing ethical issues to do with 
non-human life.9 She argues that the basic motivations behind the capability approach to 
human flourishing are not specific to the human case – they are not unique to a special 
concern for the human good – but begin in an understanding of living beings as such. She 
advocates the view, which she attributes to Aristotle, that “all of nature is a continuum, and 
                                                          
5 Hacker-Wright 2009: 310-311 (my italics). See also Lott 2012. 
6 Thompson 2008: 76-77. 
7 Thompson 2008: 77 (my italics) and 81 (my italics). See also Lott 2012: 353, 374. 
8 It is also apparent in Hurka’s perfectionist theory (see 1993: 14-18). 
9 See Nussbaum 2006: Ch 6; 2011: 157-163; 2017. See also Bendik-Keymer 2014; 2017 for discussion. 
65 
 
that all living creatures are worthy of respect and even wonder”;10 that “there is something 
wonderful and worthy of awe in any complex natural organism”.11 To have ‘wonder’ at the 
living is to see that there is something it is for every living being to flourish or thrive, or to be 
damaged or inhibited in their activity of living. This, for Nussbaum, is to recognise a sense in 
which living beings have ‘dignity’, a dignity which can be upheld through respectful 
treatment or violated through domination.12 “Wonder at living beings”, Nussbaum asserts, 
thus contains “a wish for their flourishing” – “an ethical concern that the functions of life not 
be impeded [and] that the dignity of living organisms not be violated”.13  
Nussbaum’s ‘biocentrism’, as Jeremy Bendik-Keymer labels this orientation,14 seems to have 
two central motivational elements. Firstly, ‘wonder’, ‘awe’, and ‘respect’ towards the living 
arise from a recognition that, as with the human subject (see 0:1.3, 0:3.1), living beings in 
general are not merely passive streams of sensation, but are first and foremost loci of “life in 
the sense of activity”, to borrow a favourite phrase of Sen’s.15 They are loci of capacities for 
doing and being in the world; and their good lies in the cultivation and expression of life in 
this sense. For Nussbaum, the dignity of living agency is due to its “active striving”,16 its 
“striving toward flourishing”.17 This ‘striving’ is an expression of power or vitality which 
manifests itself to degrees and in diverse ways throughout organic nature.18 Secondly, 
                                                          
10 Nussbaum 2006: 328, see also 348. 
11 Nussbaum 2006: 94. 
12 Nussbaum 2006: Ch 6; Bendik-Keymer 2014: 175-180. 
13 Nussbaum 2006: 349, 348. 
14 Bendik-Keymer 2014. 
15 Sen 1993: 46; 1999: 73; 1990: 43. The phrase is taken from Aristotle NE I.7: 13 (trans. Ross 2009). As an 
aside, it is interesting to note that in affirming “life in the sense of activity”, Sen probably did not intend to 
appeal to something about organic life in general (but rather only human life). However, I suggest that we can 
see Nussbaum’s thoughts on non-human life as drawing out something that has been implicit in the capability 
approach at least since Sen first used this phrase. The capability approach is in this sense based on a positive 
affirmation of life as such, understood in a particular sense: as something which acts and ‘strives’, which exists 
through doing, and has a ‘good’ in relation to this. 
16 Nussbaum 2011: 31. 
17 Nussbaum 2017: 317. 
18 See e.g. Nussbaum 2006: 94, 337-352; 2011: 157-163; 2017. See also Bendik-Keymer 2014: 176-180, 189-
190; 2017. It should be noted that Nussbaum tends to focus specifically on animal life in her discussions, life 
which is sentient and mobile. This is usually because the context is the question of justice in relation to non-
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alongside this general appeal to living as an active process – and this is the important point 
for the current discussion – Nussbaum also consistently frames the notion of flourishing 
within the concept of proper fulfilment of a species form. For example, it seems that the 
ethical concern arising from wonder at a living being is not merely a desire that the being’s 
activity “not be impeded”, but also involves “the idea that it is good for that being to persist 
and flourish as the kind of thing it is”.19 More specifically, in order to flourish each creature 
needs “the opportunity to live and act according to that species’ form of life”, i.e. the “life 
characteristic of their kind”.20 Thus the kind of life towards which any living being ought to 
strive, because it constitutes what it is for them to live well, is given by a life-form idea under 
which the individual falls as token. For Nussbaum, as for Thompson’s theory of ‘natural-
historical judgements’ (see I:2.1), an idea of “the species plays a role in giving us a sense of a 
characteristic form of life that ought to be promoted”.21 The motivations behind Nussbaum’s 
‘biocentric’ ethics thus seem to arise from two ways of apprehending phenomena of living 
nature as objects of evaluation. On the one hand, there is a sense of wonder at a living being 
as a fount of activity and power. On the other, this vitality is apprehended as structured 
according to a pre-given form that prescribes a proper shape to its expression.22 The latter 
                                                          
human life, and she deems these capacities necessary conditions of considering an organism to be an object of 
justice or injustice. Bendik-Keymer (2014; 2017) has convincingly argued that, although she has been 
ambiguous at times, Nussbaum’s notion of living dignity, derived from ‘wonder’ at living ‘striving’, is deeper 
than this, and extends to all of life, with the question of justice relating to the demands of specific kinds of 
dignity that come from sentience and self-movement. Nussbaum now seems to assent to this interpretation 
(2017: 319). She notes, for example, that “when we think about what it is for humans to strive and flourish, it is 
stunted and obtuse not to think about animals and biological striving more generally” (2017: 320 (my italics)). 
19 Nussbaum 2006: 349 (my italics), see also 362-366. 
20 Nussbaum 2011: 162. 
21 Nussbaum 2011: 161 (my italics). 
22 I believe, in fact, that there is a fundamental tension between these two aspects of Nussbaum’s biocentrism. 
The former motivates a basic respect for the power of life to immanently determine its particular way of being 
through its own active becoming, an idea also affirmed in the foundations of my ‘self-creative’ concept of 
flourishing (see Chapter III). The latter, on the other hand, seems to subordinate this particularised power to a 
transcendent normative structure that determines its ‘proper’ and ‘defective’ expression. I will not discuss these 
internal issues of Nussbaum’s philosophy any further here. The previously projected Part 3 of this thesis, now 
cut for want of space, was to discuss this tension further and relate it to a similar tension that arises from her 
attempt to reconcile the notion of proper human functioning with certain liberal political principles. These 
matters are extrinsic to the point here, which is that the logic of properness is seen to be a logical corollary of 
taking living phenomena as such as objects of evaluation. 
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element is what grounds the presupposition, explicit in Foot/Thompson, that the domain of 
the living carries with it the logic of properness as its appropriate mode of evaluation. 
The presupposition of the properness logic in relation to living phenomena therefore relies on 
a particular way of apprehending the category of living itself, one in which this logic is taken 
to be simply a reflection of the nature of this category as such. The ground of this 
presupposition is the following ‘metaphysics’ of life: living beings are given a proper form to 
fulfil, a form which provides a model or set of standards which the life in question is to 
follow, designating the way it is ‘meant to be’. Living as a process of coming-into-being, as 
becoming, is thus given the task of movement towards fulfilment of that form, towards 
realisation of essence. (Or, as I shall put it in Section 3, becoming is understood as poiesis.) 
We can see how this metaphysics entails the logic of properness: since ‘being’ is given a 
proper form, therefore being-well is fulfilment of that form; and since ‘becoming’ is given the 
task of movement towards that fulfilment, becoming-well is thus the successful carrying out 
of this task, it is developmental movement towards properness of being. In this way this 
metaphysics of the living ‘naturalises’ the properness concept of flourishing; it renders it a 
necessary part of the evaluative apprehension of living phenomena in general. In this way, 
flourishing as properness, as seen in the neo-Aristotelian cases discussed here, functions as an 
‘organic’ concept of the good: it is a way of taking up the living as a conceptual resource for 
structuring normative thinking about life. 
A characteristic of this ‘metaphysics’ of life is that it packages together both a mode of 
representation and a mode of evaluation. It is an integrated way of looking at, apprehending, 
and interpreting the living as something that determines the structure of normative judgement 
that is appropriate to it. I do not question the validity of thinking through such a metaphysics 
per se, in fact I allow the possibility that something of the sort might even be a necessary part 
of the way we make sense of the world in general. What I do question is the necessity of the 
particular way of interpreting the living that underlies ‘flourishing as properness’, as seems 
to be assumed by the thinkers discussed so far. Furthermore, as part of my argument for an 
alternative perspective on flourishing, I shall propose a different way of framing 
apprehension of the living as such. This alternative will similarly package together a general 
representation and a structure for evaluation, and can thus be seen as an alternative 
‘metaphysics’ to counter the one just outlined. The next two sections discuss some different 
ways of talking about the metaphysics behind the properness concept, and lay some 
groundwork for the shift in interpretive perspective that I propose. 
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2. Biological essentialism(s), teleology of proper form 
We can call this metaphysics of life by a number of names. We might, for example, call it 
‘biological essentialism’. It certainly seems closely related to the ‘essentialism’ that many 
psychologists and ethnographers have identified as a common feature of ‘folk biology’ about 
species membership and organismic development.23 Experimental evidence in these fields 
suggests that people tend, as Tim Lewens puts it, to be “intuitive essentialists” about biology; 
that is, they tend to  
regard each living kind as having some sort of underlying internal nature, which is itself 
causally responsible for the appearance of typical features of the kind in question. These 
essences are hidden: they can fail to manifest themselves properly even when they are 
present. They are teleological, in the sense that they are oriented to some end state that 
may not in fact appear. […] These essences also have normative implications, in the sense 
that they specify proper and improper developmental outcomes in virtue of their 
teleological orientation.24  
Insofar as the metaphysics I have identified sees organisms as having essences or life-forms 
given to them, which define their being-what-they-are-properly, it can be aligned with 
biological essentialism of this sort. It can also be called ‘teleological’ in the above 
(transcendent) sense – the life-form prescribes teloi to development, end-goals given to the 
organism towards which it is to aim, but which it can fail to realise. And, certainly, both of 
these terms capture the implicit normative structure that emerges from this separation of 
concrete existence and underlying essence: life-forms “specify proper and improper 
developmental outcomes”, ways that development ought to go if it is to go properly. We can 
therefore call this ‘teleological essentialism’. 
However, I would like to introduce another language with which to characterise this 
metaphysics, because there are certain connotations of ‘essentialism’ in biology that could 
over-determine the metaphysics of life I refer to, or mislead us in certain ways. For example, 
                                                          
23 See Gelman & Hirschfeld 1999; Gelman 2003; Linquist et al 2011; Medin & Ortony 1989: 183-186; Lewens 
2015: 52; Smith 2016: 422-423. 
24 Lewens 2015: 52. Lewens also points out that Foot and Thompson use the language of ‘folk’ biological 
essentialism to strengthen the intuitive appeal of their view (52-53). 
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we have said nothing so far about the extent to which the life-form/essence is “causally 
responsible”, as Lewens puts it, for developmental outcomes (assuming that this means 
efficient and material causation; in talking of teleology we have, of course, implied formal 
and final ‘causation’)25. It is worth noting in relation to this that the essentialism we are 
interested in here is not the same thing as biological determinism.26 The essence gives ends to 
development but, as Lewens notes, these “may not in fact appear” – i.e. the essence is not 
causally sufficient for its own successful realisation. This possibility of disparity between 
essence and appearance is, in fact, a crucial condition of the normative logic at work here – if 
something happens deterministically or inevitably then it makes no sense to say either that it 
should or should not happen. In general, since biological ‘essentialism’ is often understood in 
a causal, or otherwise explanatory, way,27 the term could be taken to say more than we need 
to at the moment. 
We have also said very little so far about whether the life-form might be ‘internal’ or 
‘external’ (or even about what these might mean – In what sense? In relation to what?). A 
number of different views on this matter could be compatible with the general metaphysics of 
life that I have identified so far (see Section 4 below for one way of viewing the life-form as 
‘internal’ to the living being).  
Furthermore, I have stressed that the essences to which organisms might be seen as subject 
need not be related only to species membership.28 Since biological essentialism is often 
associated with ideas of species-level form, the term could also unnecessarily restrict our 
characterisation of the metaphysics in question. Furthermore, there is another kind of ‘species 
essentialism’ which it is worth distinguishing from the metaphysics I have outlined here (I 
alluded to this distinction in relation to Nussbaum, in I:2.1). This ‘essentialism’ is a way of 
classifying objects into kinds according to ideas of the defining properties that all members of 
                                                          
25 In keeping with modern convention, I avoid using the language of causation in relation to teleology and goal-
oriented phenomena. 
26 I return to this point in V:2.6, in relation to the interpretation of genetics. 
27 See also Gelman & Hirschfeld 1999; Medin & Ortony 1989: 184. 
28 This is, in fact, reflected in the literature on ‘folk essentialism’. Whilst the essentialist way of thinking seems 
to be particularly prominent in relation to species membership (see Atran et al 1997), it is also notably present in 
relation to other categories, such as personality, gender, and race (Gelman & Hirschfeld 1999). 
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a kind necessarily manifest.29 The species-properness view of life is primarily concerned with 
the normative question of what it is to live well, given that one is member of living kind, not 
with what it is that constitutes kind-membership in the first place (see also IV:2).  
The language I want to introduce helps to avoid over-determining the subject in these ways. 
Moreover, it allows us to focus in particular on the way in which we understand organismic 
becoming, the process of development, growth, and change that an organism undergoes 
across time. This is important. One of the reasons that the classificatory form of species 
essentialism doesn’t capture the normative thinking in question here is that it suggests a too-
static view of organisms, one that treats them simply as objects with (or without) certain 
essential properties, and classifies them into kinds on this basis. The normative dimension of 
teleological essentialism derives, as I just mentioned, from an ontological separation between 
essence and appearance, proper form and concrete existence. And this, I believe, is made 
intuitively plausible in the case of living beings by the essentially processual character of the 
subject-matter. Imagine a molecule (in the way it is often presented, as a static 3D model 
composed of balls and rods). If a molecule with two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom 
loses a hydrogen atom, it goes from being water to being hydroxide. Its concrete structure 
determines what it (essentially) is; the two cannot come apart. It would be eccentric at best to 
claim that the subsequent molecule was really still a molecule of water, but one that was 
failing to exhibit its proper features, one that had become in the wrong sort of way. But living 
beings do not simply pop into existence, remain in some static form for some time, and then 
pop out of existence again. Life becomes; it is constituted by a process of growing-into and 
carrying-on in the world. Because living beings are processes of growth and change the 
essentialist mode of understanding is better able to posit a separation between imagined static 
essence and the organism’s concrete structure as it becomes through time. My goat Billy has 
not developed eyes. Nonetheless, I can still look at him and imagine that he is, in essence, 
something that does have eyes (because ‘Goats have eyes’, as a Thompsonian natural-
historical judgment might put it). It’s just that his outer appearance has not properly 
manifested what he, qua goat, is really or essentially like. I can take up “the standpoint of 
                                                          
29 See e.g. the ‘natural kind essentialism’ that follows Kripke (e.g. 1980 [1972]) and Putnam (e.g. 1975: Chs 8, 
11, and 12). The application of this kind of thinking to biological taxa is the subject of much criticism in modern 
biological theory (see e.g. Sober 1980; Dupré 1981; 1986; 1998; 2012: 73-74; Hull 1986; Lewens 2012; 2015: 
Ch 4). I elaborate on this, and on the reasons why it can be misleading to identify neo-Aristotelian species-
properness views with it, in IV:2. 
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‘inner design’” in relation to him,30 and imagine what he would look like if he had turned out 
the way he is meant to be, as I understand it. From this point of view, organismic becoming is 
understood as aimed towards actualisation or fulfilment of proper form. In the case of Billy, it 
has failed. 
 
3. Poiesis and praxis: a different language for the metaphysics of 
organismic becoming 
In order to focus on the significance of the way in which living as a process of becoming is 
understood I shall discuss the metaphysics of life using a language that distinguishes kinds of 
activity or process: the distinction between poiesis and praxis. This section lays out the 
meaning I attach to these terms. 
Aristotle used these terms to refer to two different kinds of human activity.31 In his usage, 
poiesis, often translated as ‘making’ or ‘production’, is activity which is done for the sake of 
an end beyond the activity itself. Praxis, often translated as ‘doing’ or ‘action’, is activity 
which is done for its own sake, the end or fulfilment of which is the performance of the act 
itself. The archetypal case of poiesis for Aristotle was the fabrication of artefacts. Building a 
house, for example, is aimed at the production of something outside the process of building – 
i.e. the finished house – and its value is derivative of the value of this end; it is to be 
evaluated in terms of its finished product. In contrast, musical performance, an example of 
praxis for Aristotle, is not done for the sake of some end-product that the performance brings 
about, but rather the performance constitutes its own ‘end’; it is done for its own sake, and it 
is to be evaluated in terms of the qualities of the performance itself.32 
The language of poiesis and praxis has been interpreted and put to use in multiple ways.33 My 
use of it will relate to Aristotle’s, as just described, but will have a wider application, in that I 
                                                          
30 As Thompson (2008: 13) puts it, citing Hegel. 
31 See Aristotle NE I.1: 2-3, VI.2: 5, VI.4, VI.5: 1-4; Magna Moralia (MM) II.12: 3 (trans. Rackham 1935). 
32 Aristotle uses house-building and flute-playing as examples of poiesis and praxis respectively (MM II.12: 3). 
33 For various interpretations of its meaning in Aristotle’s thinking, see e.g. Broadie 1991: 202-212; Kraut 1989: 
200-203, 213-217; Sherman 1989: 113-117; Charles 1984: 64-67; 1986. See also the use of this distinction in 
modern phenomenology, starting with Heidegger’s early reading of Aristotle (e.g. 2009 [1924]: §17cγ), its 
development into political theory by Arendt (1998 [1958]; see also Bernasconi 1986; Villa 1996), and in a 
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shall use it as a way to interpret living process more generally (not specifically human 
activities). Furthermore, as I shall explain in a moment, the meaning I attach to it will in a 
certain way go beyond Aristotle’s own use of the terms, and incorporate a conceptual aspect 
drawn out in the work of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. Given this specification, I 
shall use the distinction to label alternative interpretive lenses through which to understand 
phenomena of organismic life, based on the way in which becoming is understood within 
them. The essentialist metaphysics just identified behind the properness concept of 
flourishing I shall call poietic, after the interpretation of becoming as poiesis that it contains. 
In Chapter III I outline a praxic conception of organismic becoming, an idea to be motivated 
more fundamentally later, via discussion of biological theory (Chapter VI).  
The way that I go somewhat beyond Aristotle in my use of this language is best explained 
first of all through the notion of poiesis. In Aristotle’s particular use of the terms, it seems 
that poiesis is defined simply in terms of the separation of process and end; poiesis is activity 
done for the sake of bringing about some product or state of affairs beyond itself. Aristotle 
says, “he who makes something always has some further end in view: the act of making 
[poiesis] is not an end in itself, it is only a means, and belongs to something else”.34 And: 
“while production [poiesis] has another end than itself, this is not so with action [praxis], 
since good action or well doing [eupraxia] is itself the end”.35   
However, whether intended by Aristotle or not, the separation between process and end in 
poiesis implies another dimension, which is not quite explicit in Aristotle’s description. It 
implies that, as well as the process being completed in some end beyond itself, the form of 
that end is in some way given to the process, as the end towards which it is to aim. One 
cannot act towards some end without already having an idea of the particular end towards 
which one acts; the form of the end must in some sense be pre-conceived. This is brought out 
most clearly in the experience of artefact production, Aristotle’s archetype of poiesis. In 
making my new wardrobe, for example, I do not just act in order to bring about some end-
product, but in order to bring about a particular kind of end-product, with a particular 
                                                          
slightly different way by Habermas (as cited in Canovan 1983; see Canovan 1983 on the influence on Habermas 
of Arendt’s use of poiesis/praxis). 
34 NE VI.2: 5 (trans. Rackham 1934). 
35 NE VI.5: 3-4 (trans. Peters 1906). 
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structure that fulfils particular roles, and so on. At least, I do so when I go about making the 
wardrobe properly, qua process of wardrobe-making. The pre-conception, or design, that 
prescribes ends to the making can be more or less detailed and explicit: I might have only a 
rough idea of end structure, or I might have a detailed blueprint or even a set of instructions 
written down (literally pre-scribed)36 giving plan to the process as well as form to the end. 
Insofar as the process is aimed at realisation of an end, some pre-conception or pre-
designation37 of that end also exists, logically prior to the process of its realisation.  
Thus poiesis is not simply, as Aristotle seems to present it, instrumental to something beyond 
itself, but is also, as it were, the instrument of something given in advance of itself. It is the 
middle term between design and product, the process of translating the former into the latter. 
I stipulate that I intend to invoke both dimensions of this picture in using the term. 
The conceptual structure of poiesis is easily taken up and projected beyond its source in the 
experience of intentional human making. This is something highlighted by Arendt in her 
analysis of poiesis in The Human Condition.38 She focuses on the pre-designational aspect 
just outlined, and uses this to argue, following Heidegger, that the phenomenological roots of 
Platonic idealism lie in the experience of artefact production – the experience of homo faber, 
man-as-maker.39 Because the idea of the thing to be made, which guides its production and 
determines its proper form, logically precedes and is independent of the reality of the product 
itself, it has a “quality of permanence” in relation to the changeable and perishable material 
things made from it.40 This, Arendt argues, was the inspiration for Plato’s theory of eternal 
                                                          
36 It is interesting to note the etymology of our normative word ‘prescription’ from the notion of something 
being ‘written before’. The verb ‘to prescribe’ comes from the Latin prae, ‘before’, and scribere, ‘to write’, 
making praescribere: “write before, prefix in writing; ordain, determine in advance” 
(https://www.etymonline.com/word/prescribe).  
37 Another interesting etymological connection exists between ‘design’ and ‘designate’. Both derive from the 
Latin verb designare, “to mark out, devise, choose, designate, appoint” 
(https://www.etymonline.com/word/design). 
38 Arendt 1998 [1958]. 
39 Arendt 1998 [1958]: 141-143. For Heidegger, it is our phenomenological relation to production of things, and 
to the things made, that has provided the dominant conceptual structures of Western metaphysics at least since 
Plato. For an analysis of the place of this reading of poiesis in Heidegger, and its influence on Arendt, see 
Bernasconi 1986: 111-114, 117-118, 120.  
40 Arendt 1998 [1958]: 142. 
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eidoi, which stand outside the changeable material world and in-form the objects within it 
(living things included), the ultimate source of which is the transcendent craftsman of the 
cosmos, or demiurge.41 In her words: “The one eternal idea presiding over a multitude of 
perishable things derives its plausibility in Plato’s teachings from the permanence and 
oneness of the model according to which many and perishable objects can be made”.42 In 
other words, on this interpretation Plato generalised a conceptual framework that derives 
from the human experience of poiesis into a fundamental theory of reality. Arendt notes that 
“although Plato used his theory to express quite different and perhaps much more 
“philosophical” experiences, he never failed to draw his examples from the field of making 
when he wanted to demonstrate the plausibility of what he was saying”.43  
Whether or not Arendt and Heidegger’s thesis on the origins of Platonic idealism is 
exegetically accurate, what this analysis reveals is the close correspondence in conceptual 
structure between the notion of poiesis and metaphysical perspectives that separate pre-
designated form or essential being from worldly becoming.44 For this reason the concept 
provides a helpful tool for understanding the structure of thought involved in these kinds of 
perspectives, including, I argue, the basic assumptions about living beings that underlie the 
properness concept of flourishing (to which I return in the next section). 
As it happens, the notion of poiesis that we find reflected in essentialist thinking is itself a 
somewhat idealised vision of the concrete activity of making things. Making as it is actually 
gone about is rarely simply the translation of idea into product. Rather it interacts with the 
contingencies of material context, and proceeds to various degrees improvisationally, through 
experimental interventions within and sensitive response to the ongoing flow and friction of 
material reality. Out of this activity eidoi are derived as abstractions, and abstractions which 
can change with the making as much as they can give ends to it, as in the way a sculptor has 
                                                          
41 Plato’s famous ‘theory of Forms’ is found in several places, including Republic Bks V-VII (c. 380 BC, trans. 
Jowett 1973) and Parmenides (c. 360 BC, trans. Jowett 1973). On the concept of the demiurge, see Timaeus (c. 
360 BC, trans. Bury 1929). 
42 Arendt 1998 [1958]: 143. 
43 Arendt 1998 [1958]: 142. For example, in Bk X of Republic, “Plato himself explains his doctrine by taking 
“the common instance” of a craftsman who makes beds and tables “in accordance with [their] idea”, and then 
adds, “that is our way of speaking in this and similar instances”” (Arendt 1998 [1958]: 142 (fn 7)). 
44 I make critical use of this correspondence in Chapter V, in discussing the ‘Platonic’ character of certain 
dominant metaphors in modern biological theory. 
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to adapt their fore-sight of the finished sculpture in response to the particularities of the block 
of stone or wood they are interacting with.45 
However, this merely helps clarify what it is that I intend to refer to by using the language of 
poiesis: not all of the complex realities of concrete acts of making, but the stripped-back, 
idealised picture just described – poiesis as transition from model to product, eidos to telos. 
And, I define praxis in contrast with this picture. 
Now to summarise the poiesis/praxis distinction as it is meant here. As mentioned, the 
poietic is aligned with both conceptual aspects of the idealised picture of making just 
described. A process is poietic to the extent that it takes place for the production of an 
end beyond itself, and to the extent that it takes place according to a pre-given 
determination of the form of that end. A fully poietic interpretation of a process 
combines both aspects, and will conceive it as normatively subordinate in a double 
sense, in relation to both poles of this eidos-telos metric. It conceives of it as merely for 
the sake of its outcomes, and sees the norms by which these outcomes are to be 
evaluated – and therefore also by which the process is itself to be evaluated – as given 
to it, transcendent of the process itself.  
The meanings I attach to the term praxis are not quite as tightly linked as the two 
aspects of poiesis, but are nonetheless derived by contrast with these aspects. Firstly, 
following Aristotle’s meaning mentioned above, one way a process can be praxic is if it 
is, in some sense, done ‘for the sake of’ the process itself, rather than for some 
separable end-product; e.g. if, like a musical performance, it constitutes that which it 
creates. Regarding this sense of the term, a praxic process will be evaluated in terms of 
the qualities of the activity itself, not derivatively in terms of the state of a further 
product. Secondly, there is a sense derived by contrast with the pre-designational aspect 
of poiesis. A process is praxic in this sense to the extent that it does not have a 
transcendent plan to follow, but instead creates its path immanently, within the process 
itself; like, e.g. improvisational activity. Insofar as the process generates some ‘product’ 
(whether constituted by or separable from the process), the process is praxic in this 
                                                          
45 The fact that concrete acts of making do not for the most part reflect the idealised vision of poiesis as 
transition from fixed idea to finished product is a recurring theme in the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold (e.g. 
Ingold 2011: 4-6; 2015a: Ch 23; 2013; Ingold & Hallam 2014: 1-3). See also a similar remark in Oyama 2000a 
[1985]: 37. 
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second sense insofar as the form and identity of that which is created is emergent from 
the creative process itself. Similarly, instead of the norms for the product’s evaluation 
being pre-given by a transcendent determination of proper form, they will be contingent 
on the process of its creation. Regarding this dimension of the distinction we might say 
that a poietic process is the slave of the eidos, employed to realise that eidos in the 
world, whereas, conversely, in praxis the product is the child of the process, and neither 
are normatively beholden to a pre-scribed model. A fully praxic interpretation of a 
process will combine both aspects. Firstly, it will see the process as immanently 
creative of its product, as determining its form and identity as it goes along, and will 
see the norms relevant to an intrinsic evaluation of that product as contingent on its 
particular process of creation. Secondly, it will also see the process as in some way 
constitutive of the ‘end’ for which it takes place, as constitutive of its own fulfilment, 
and thus as evaluable in terms of the performance itself, rather than (just) in terms of 
that which it creates.  
The table below summarises the ways in which this distinction is being drawn here. 
 Poiesis Praxis 
Dimension 1: 
Relation between the 
process and its ‘end’, 
its ‘for the sake of 
which’ (the original 
Aristotelian 
dimension): 
Separate: the end is 
achieved in a 
state/product beyond 
the process itself. 
Reflexive: the process 
constitutes that which 
it creates / is ‘for its 
own sake’. 
Dimension 2: 
Relation between the 
process and the 
form/identity of that 
which it creates: 
Transcendent: a 
proper form for the 
product is prescribed 
by a prior and 
independent 
model/plan (eidos). 
Immanent: the form 
of that which is 
created emerges from 
the process of its 
creation. 
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To summarise, the 
process is… 
Productive and 
planned 
Performative and 
improvisational 
Normative structure 
implied: 
Product and process 
evaluable in terms of 
the eidos. 
Norms relevant to the 
‘product’ contingent 
on its process of 
creation; process itself 
evaluable ‘for its own 
sake’. 
As I shall explain in a moment, the different aspects of either of these concepts need not 
always be found together in particular cases. For the rest of the thesis, however, these 
subtleties will not be so important. I use this distinction to identify two general 
metaphysical lenses through which organismic becoming can be interpreted, and the 
various perspectives and ideas I analyse through this framework will be treated as either 
‘fully poietic’ or ‘fully praxic’, i.e. as invoking both aspects of their respective concepts 
of process.  
The different aspects of the poietic and the praxic, as I define them, pick out different 
possible characteristics or aspects of activity, and need not always to be found together 
exclusively. Some illustrations will help to explain this. Firstly, it is clear that some 
activities can have both poietic and praxic aspects with respect to Dimension 1 – they 
can be both aimed at a further end and done for their own sake.46 For instance, many 
crafts, such as pottery or Japanese cuisine, although completed in the production of a 
separate end, are often done as much for the sake of the activities themselves, which 
can embody a beauty or joy of their own, as they are for the sake of the items they 
produce.47 On the other hand, take activities such as musical or dance performance, the 
ends of which are for the most part reflexive, constituted by the performance itself. 
Particular performances can nonetheless also take place in order to produce a separate 
product, such as an audio recording of the performance.  
                                                          
46 See also Kraut 1989: 213-217; Broadie 1991: 205. 
47 See also Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 316. 
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Secondly, some processes can have both poietic and praxic aspects with respect to 
Dimension 2, regarding the distinction between transcendent designation of form and 
immanent creativity. For example, as noted above, most making is not purely poietic in 
this sense. The sculptor rarely simply copies a pre-given model into material reality. 
Rather the making is to various degrees a process of figuring out the form being made 
as the making goes along. ‘What are you making?’, we might ask of a sculptor scraping 
away at a lump of wood. ‘I’m not sure yet’, they might respond, ‘but it’s beginning to 
look like a bird. Maybe that’s what it will be’. Or, less extremely, they might have set 
out to make a bird, but without a pre-conception about how exactly it ought to look – 
whether it ought to have a long or short beak, talons or webbed feet, and so on.  
Furthermore, some processes can be praxic in one sense and poietic in the other. 
Musical or dance performances, even if performed entirely for their own sake, are often 
also directed by a score or choreography, which they are to follow if they are to be 
good examples of the particular piece. They thus contain a poietic element, in virtue of 
the prior determination of a proper shape for the performance. They are praxic in 
Dimension 1 but, at least partly, poietic in Dimension 2. The improvised sculpture in 
the previous paragraph provides a converse example. 
Cases might also be described in which these ambiguities are expunged, cases which 
can act as archetypes of pure poiesis or pure praxis, in the senses specified. Regarding 
the former, take automated fabrication of artefacts. The production line of the 
mechanised factory and the modern technology of 3D printing provide vivid 
illustrations. These productive processes are merely transitions between design and 
end-product. The proper forms of the products to be made are conceived in advance, 
through the preparatory work of the product designer and factory architect, or the 
programmer of the printing machinery; and the processes of production are merely 
necessary phases in the realisation of the intended forms. 
A converse archetype is provided by live improvisational music and dance. The 
performance of an improvised jazz solo, for example, is not scripted. It is something 
that gains shape through the interplay between the soloist’s experimental expressions 
and the activity of the rest of the band (and even the audience). The performance is 
constructed through a process of continuous exploration of, and responsive negotiation 
with, the changing musical situation. As well as being performed for its own sake, 
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exactly what it is that is performed emerges from the activity of performance itself. As 
Miles Davis is purported to have said, “I’ll play it first, and tell you what it is later”. 
The performance is creative of that which it expresses, rather than merely a re-
presentation of something pre-conceived; it gains a particular form and identity in 
virtue of the unique process by which it comes into being. What it is for that particular 
solo to ‘go well’, qua that unique expression, is not something that can be subordinated 
to a set of criteria describing ‘how solos of that sort are meant to go’. Whether some 
particular note or phrase ‘works’ or not, whether some overall line of play creates a 
coherent response to the situation, and so on, can only be grasped from within the 
particular process of creative expression. 
It might be objected that, even in these cases, my descriptions simplify realities that are 
in fact more complex. This may be so, but, again, I am trying to highlight opposing sets 
of conceptual structures through which processes can be interpreted, and for this 
purpose, these simplified descriptions suffice as helpful archetypes. 
 
4. Becoming as poiesis: innate potentials and ‘human development’ in 
Nussbaum 
I shall refer to poietic and praxic metaphysics of life as different ways of conceiving the 
ontology of living beings as such, in virtue of the general interpretation of organismic 
becoming that is privileged within them.48 The metaphysics of life underlying the properness 
concept of flourishing, what I earlier called ‘teleological essentialism’ about biological 
entities, can now also be characterised as poietic in this sense. It is based on the idea that 
living beings as such are given a proper form (they ‘bear’ a life-form, in Thompson’s 
language), and therefore that living as a process of becoming is movement towards fulfilment 
of that form, or is its progressive realisation. The general idea of developmental process 
assumed is one of transition between pre-given model and concrete realisation, and in this 
sense becoming is seen as undergone for the sake of this realisation. As I explained above 
(Section 1), this interpretation of becoming, which I now call poietic, is implicit in the ‘life-
form’ theory of Foot and Thompson and the ‘proper species functioning’ theory of Nussbaum 
                                                          
48 The idea of poiesis and praxis as two ways of interpreting ontogeny has been outlined explicitly by Rehmann-
Sutter (2006), whose work in this connection I shall draw on again in Chapters V and VI. 
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(which I take to be fundamentally the same in the relevant respects – see I:2.1). I shall now 
highlight a particular way that Nussbaum explains this idea of flourishing, in which we can 
see the underlying poietic metaphysics of life coming to the surface more explicitly.  
Nussbaum doesn’t see her list of ‘human functionings’ as merely an aspiration, simply an 
abstract ideal that human lives ‘should’ aim at. The list is also described in another way, one 
which gives it some organic flesh, as it were. She also presents the content of the list as 
corresponding with a set of innate potentials – what she calls ‘basic capabilities’ – that in 
some sense exist within the human individual as a concrete living entity.49 ‘Basic capabilities’ 
have a double significance for Nussbaum. First of all they are part of what defines species 
membership per se; i.e. part of what determines the life-form one is subject to.50 As I 
mentioned in I:2.1, one counts as a member of the human species, for Nussbaum, if one is 
born of human parents and has the potential (basic capability) for “at least some of the most 
important” human functionings.51 Secondly, and most importantly for the present discussion, 
having the innate ‘basic capability’ for some essential functioning is part of what makes it a 
good thing to realise that particular functioning. The sense in which this is the case reveals 
the poietic interpretation of development particularly vividly. We can see this by looking 
more closely at the way she describes basic capabilities.52 
Firstly, basic capabilities are not fully serviceable abilities. For example, no human infants 
are born actually able to use language. Rather they are “innate powers”, “innate equipment”, 
or “innate faculties” for the development of such abilities.53 Secondly, as this language itself 
                                                          
49 On ‘basic capabilities’ in general, see Nussbaum 1988: 166-170; 1992: 228-229; 1995b: 88-89; 2000a: 83- 84, 
100; 2006: 278, 285, 346-347, 361; 2011: 23-24. In the literature on the capability approach, this can be 
something of a confusing term, since it does not mean the same thing in Sen’s writing. Sen uses ‘basic 
capabilities’ to refer to the capabilities to satisfy certain elementary, or ‘basic’, needs such as the need for food, 
water, and shelter. See also Robeyns 2013: 417 on these two different uses of the term. 
50 For more on this meaning of ‘species membership’ see IV:2. 
51 Nussbaum 2006: 187, see also 38, 181, 187-188, 432 (fn 18). 
52 In this section I present the notion of basic capabilities as Nussbaum did from at least 1988 until the early 
2000s. In some more recent work she has downplayed this idea, largely, it seems, because she has chosen to 
change the role it plays in her theory of political entitlements (see Nussbaum 2006: 7, 186-195, 347). This 
change doesn’t matter for our purposes – I am again isolating a particular aspect of her work for the sake of 
illustrating an idea. 
53 Nussbaum 2011: 23-24. 
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suggests, Nussbaum is not talking merely about the necessary conditions for particular 
developmental outcomes. Of course, any ability – physical, intellectual, artistic, or whatever 
– will require certain physiological resources or structures to be present at the start of life, 
from which these abilities may develop, in interaction with appropriate context, etc. But basic 
capabilities are something more than this: they are also teleological states, in that they have 
as ends the achievement of particular functionings through the being’s development. 
Following her interpretation of Aristotle, Nussbaum says that basic capabilities are states 
whose “very being makes forward reference to functioning”.54 They are “needs for 
functioning: […] they are there and in a state of incomplete realization. They are conditions 
that reach towards, demand fulfilment in, a certain mode of activity”.55 These conditions are 
unaffected by the particularities of the individual’s actual life-history, and they don’t need to 
be subjectively felt as needs in order to prescribe proper ends to life: even if “a person […] 
has been taught, in circumstances of deprivation, not to want the functionings in question […] 
there is [nonetheless] in that person right now a condition that demands that functioning as its 
fulfilment”.56 Having a basic capability and not actualising it is a bad thing; it means one’s 
life fails to achieve something essential to it. Basic capabilities that are not realised in their 
appropriate activity will be “cut off, fruitless, incomplete [..,] only in a shadowy way even 
themselves”.57 They, and presumably the individual that has them, will be “like actors who 
never get to go on the stage, or a musical score that is never performed”.58 “If functioning 
never arrives on the scene, they [will be] hardly even what they are”.59   
We saw in I:2.1 that Nussbaum’s list of human functionings is presented as a list of things 
essential for living a ‘fully human’ kind of life, a list of the ways of being that constitute a 
normative idea of humanness. In this abstract sense, an individual’s becoming is seen as 
given a set of ends that they ‘should’ develop towards, that are not determined by their 
                                                          
54 Nussbaum 1995b: 88. 
55 Nussbaum 1988: 169. 
56 Nussbaum 1988: 169. 
57 Nussbaum 1988: 169. 
58 Nussbaum 1992: 228; 1995b: 88. 
59 Nussbaum 1992: 228-229; 1995b: 88. 
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development, but independently constitute the “form of life that ought to be promoted”.60 
That is, the content of the good is determined transcendentally, prior to and independently of 
that to which it applies. In the notion of basic capabilities, the givenness of proper form takes 
on a more concrete and organic character. What it means to ‘have’ this essence has something 
to do with one’s ‘innate’ constitution. The proper species functionings are “innate”, prior to 
development – given “by nature”,61 as she has put it at times – and thus exist (or rather 
‘subsist’ – in potentiality rather than actuality)62 within the individual as a concrete living 
entity from the start of life. That is, the content of the species life-form is seen as embodied in 
the innate constitution of individual tokens of the species, in the form of innate teleological 
states. Note that the fact that these states are seen as ‘internal’ to the concrete living 
individual – literally ‘within’ them as living bodies – does not affect their ‘transcendent’ 
status: they are still given to the process of becoming as meant-to-be-realised states that 
define the proper form of the fully-developed individual, and are unaffected by the 
individual’s particular history. This is a vision of the transcendent embodied in the concrete, 
rather than merely an abstract ought-to-be. This is certainly one way of fleshing out 
Thompson’s suggestion that we think about an organism’s life-form by taking up “the 
standpoint of ‘inner design’” in relation to it.63 
Thus, for Nussbaum at least, part of what makes ‘proper human functioning’ good is that it is 
the fulfilment of teleological states within oneself. It is not good to fulfil the human form just 
because that is ‘what humans should be like’, but as a token of the human kind you have 
these ends within yourself, which create a kind of internal need for their fulfilment: “there is 
in [you] right now a condition that demands that functioning as its fulfilment”.64 She argues 
that these two senses in which certain functionings are good are connected: “Capability-needs 
                                                          
60 Nussbaum 2011: 161. 
61 E.g. Nussbaum 1988: 166. 
62 On the distinction between existence and subsistence, see Yagisawa 2014: §3.1. I am using the term 
‘potentiality’ in this instance in Bergson’s sense of ‘positive possibility’: as “something ideally pre-existent” or 
“pre-existence under the form of an idea”, like a “phantom awaiting its hour” that is “realised by an acquisition 
of existence”. This is as opposed to ‘possibility’ in the ‘negative’ sense, as mere “absence of hindrance”. See 
Bergson 1992 [1930]: 101-102. 
63 Thompson 2008: 13. 
64 Nussbaum 1988: 169. 
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are important because of the value of the functionings in which they naturally terminate; 
functionings are valuable, in part, for the way in which they realize [basic] capabilities. We 
cannot and should not prise the two apart”.65 
Nussbaum’s concept of human development is thus a vivid illustration of the poietic 
interpretation of organismic becoming.66 Development, when it goes well, is the concrete 
unfolding and realisation of these inner meant-to-be states, and is itself undergone for the 
sake of this achievement. Illustrative of both of these aspects is Nussbaum’s description of 
child development. Children are seen “as beings who exist in a state of incomplete fulfilment 
of their natures”;67 and the aim of their growth into adults is to become properly human.68 She 
argues that the especially tragic nature of a child’s death, before reaching maturity, lies in the 
fact that “her activities of growth and preparation for adult activity now have lost their point”, 
they have not achieved their end-goal.69 The deceased child will be like an artefact half-made, 
or as she suggests, “like [an actor] who never get[s] to go on the stage, or a musical score that 
is never performed”.70 Nussbaum also invokes this general idea of becoming in an interesting 
play on words that draws a connection between two senses of ‘human development’ – 
meaning either the goal of a certain field of international political/social action or the 
                                                          
65 Nussbaum 1988: 169. 
66 Foot and Thompson do not talk explicitly of organismic development in terms of ‘innate potentials’ aimed at 
a specific realisation, but the poietic metaphysics of becoming, aside from being implicit in the life-form idea 
itself, is also suggested in some of their language. To take one example, when explaining how natural-historical 
judgements are not statistical generalisations (see I:2.1), Thompson says that “although ‘the mayfly’ breeds 
shortly before dying, most may-flies die long before breeding” (2008: 68). It is noteworthy that he says “die 
long before breeding”, rather than simply “never breed”, or “die without breeding”. In what sense do they die 
before breeding? There is no breeding that comes afterwards! This suggests the assumption that ‘breeding’ is in 
some sense already fore-seen in the individual, subsisting as a meant-to-be waiting to be realised. The 
individual’s development is aimed towards this end, although in most cases the process ceases before it reaches 
its projected fulfilment. For some related examples, see the end of the Appendix below. 
67 Nussbaum 1988: 166. 
68 See also Ingold’s description of the idea of ‘humanization’, in which “there’s some notion of what being 
human is, and an idea that, perhaps small children, when they come into the world, are not quite human – yet. 
And so they have to be humanized, they have to be given this essence of humanity that turns them into human 
beings. […] It eventually will become human, and that is the process of humanization” (2015b; see also 2015a: 
Chs 22-23). 
69 Nussbaum 1995b: 88 (my italics). 
70 Nussbaum 1992: 228; 1995b: 88. 
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ontogeny of a human individual: “The idea of innate equipment [basic capabilities] does […] 
play a role in the Human Development Approach. After all, the term “human development” 
suggests the unfolding of powers that human beings bring into the world”.71 
Bendik-Keymer has also identified this sense of development as ‘unfolding of form’ in 
Nussbaum’s ‘biocentric’ ethics. As mentioned above (Section 1), this is an ethical attitude 
that begins in ‘wonder’ at living nature, and centres on the notion of dignity in the ‘striving’ 
of living beings. He attempts to describe the character of this ‘striving’ from which dignity 
emerges. As we might expect, given Nussbaum’s consistent framing of flourishing within the 
logic of proper species form, his descriptions also often return to the idea just outlined, of a 
movement towards realisation of innate essence: “the dignity seen in […] being alive comes 
from […] having a special order that “unfolds” toward an end”.72 The dignity of a living 
being, he suggests, comes from its development being teleological, in the sense of the term 
described in Section 2 – as having ends designated to its process of becoming 
transcendentally (even if embodied or represented ‘internally’). And this grounds the 
normativity of the logic of properness: as Bendik-Keymer puts it, for a living being to have a 
teleology is for it to “have a way that their life is supposed to go when it is healthy”, 
determined by its species form; and this teleology “explains what is good for them”.73  
Nussbaum does not offer an opinion on the physical or physiological constitution of the 
internal and innate states she calls ‘basic capabilities’. She does not, for example, appeal to 
genetics as the basis for them. However, this would seem an obvious avenue down which 
someone might think to go regarding this issue. I argue in Part 2 that a popular conception of 
genetics (as ‘programme’) does indeed invoke the poietic view of organismic becoming. I 
also argue that the ‘constructivist’ turn in developmental biology undermines this view and 
motivates a radical change in perspective on organismic becoming (to one that invokes a 
logic of praxis), with implications for neo-Aristotelian ‘properness’ conceptions of 
flourishing, whether or not they explicitly appeal to claims about genetics.   
                                                          
71 Nussbaum 2011: 23 (my italics). The ‘Human Development Approach’ is another name for the capability 
approach, as applied to issues of social development (2011: x). 
72 Bendik-Keymer 2014: 179 (‘dignity’ italicised in original). In a parenthesis at the end of the cited sentence he 
seems to identify the notion of ‘unfolding towards an end’ with that of ‘active striving’. 
73 Bendik-Keymer 2017: 342 (my italics). He cites Thompson and Foot in this connection. 
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Appendix: Thompson on apprehending the organic as such, and the 
ground for presupposing the logic of properness 
What do Thompson et al mean when they say that apprehension of an organism, qua 
organism, requires implicit reference to its ‘life-form’? And, why do they take this to 
necessitate the transcendent logic of properness for intrinsic evaluation of an individual’s 
existence? In an attempt to answer these questions in more detail I shall now discuss further 
some of the exposition Thompson gives of his ‘normative naturalism’.74 I shall offer some 
critical responses as we go along, responses which are separate from, but complement, the 
main line of criticism outlined in later parts of the thesis. This will also help to highlight the 
metaphysics of life (which I have labelled poietic) underlying the properness concept of 
flourishing. 
Let’s start with what Thompson calls ‘vital description’.75 A vital description is a claim about 
a particular living individual of the sort ‘This organism has wings’, ‘This organism is 
currently digesting food’, or even simply about a particular region of space-time, of the sort 
‘There is digestion going on here’, ‘What we see here is an example of reproduction’, etc. 
Vital descriptions, which apply uniquely to living phenomena, are a sub-set of the form of 
judgement that predicates of particular subjects instances of generic kinds of property, 
process, or activity. We might also, for example, make a claim about This lump of iron that 
‘Oxidation is occurring on its surface’. Thompson argues – rightly, I believe – that vital 
descriptions are different to this sort of purely physical description. What distinguishes vital 
descriptions is that in order to make these kinds of judgements it is not enough just to look at 
the physical constitution of the phenomena or events in front of us; we need also have an 
understanding of how these phenomena ‘fit together’ with other aspects of the life of the 
organism in question, an understanding of the functional relations that constitute its ‘way of 
living’ as a whole.   
To elaborate: If we know, of any physical object, that it is losing electrons to its surrounding 
medium, then we can describe it as undergoing the process of oxidation – this process is 
                                                          
74 This is the label he gives to his position in the 2004 paper ‘Apprehending Human Form’. 
75 See Thompson 2004: 51-54; 2008: Ch 3: §§2-3. 
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defined simply by its physical constitution. However, in living beings, physically identical 
structures or processes can amount to different vital phenomena, and the same kind of vital 
phenomenon in different organisms can be constituted by physically diverse structures or 
processes.76 For example, mitosis, the process of cell division in which two genetically-
cloned daughter cells are produced, may, as Thompson puts it, “be happening here, under the 
microscope, in an amoeba; and there in a human being. In the first case, an event of this type 
will of course be a phase in a process of reproduction – one of the forms of generation 
available to that kind of thing. But in the case of the human it will rather be a part of growth 
or self-maintenance; reproduction is another matter, and has another matter, among 
humans”.77 I.e. one physically-defined process, mitosis, falls under two different vital 
descriptions, reproduction and self-maintenance, in different organismic contexts. Simply 
looking at the physical details of the phenomenon in question will not tell us what roles it 
plays in the wider patterns of living activity of which it is part, and will therefore leave us 
none the wiser regarding what it is, qua vital phenomenon. For a converse example take 
respiration. In dolphins it usually involves inhaling oxygen in the form of gaseous air through 
a hole in the top of their heads, but in sharks it usually involves the absorption of oxygen 
dissolved in liquid water passed through gills – two physically diverse processes that 
nonetheless count as part of the same kind of vital phenomenon.  
To expand on the previous example: If, whilst exploring an area of ocean, we were to come 
across an organism that, say, looked much like a dolphin, was living in the water, and had 
what looked like a blow hole on top through which air was periodically being sucked in, we 
might well assume that we were looking at a process of respiration, similar to the usual 
dolphin variety. However, suppose that, on closer inspection, we discover that this air is not 
being exploited for oxygen, but actually being funnelled to a cavity in the rear of the body, 
out of which it can be fired in powerful bursts, propelling the animal forwards, perhaps 
giving it the extra speed needed to catch a particular kind of prey. (Suppose also, if you like, 
that oxygen is instead absorbed from the water via filaments on the outer surface of the 
animal’s body.) Taking into account these relations between the phenomenon in question and 
                                                          
76 Paraphrased from Thompson 2004: 64. 
77 Thompson 2008: 55. 
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the organism’s activities, we would likely change our description such that the air-sucking we 
observe is understood as part of a process of propulsion, rather than one of respiration. 
In short, in describing a living organism – qua organism (nexus of vital phenomena) as 
opposed to qua collection of merely physical properties and processes – we thereby make 
implicit reference to a certain kind of ‘wider context’.78 This ‘wider context’ is (what we 
understand to be) the functional inter-relations constituting the way in which the organism in 
question goes about existing and acting in the world, the how of its life. This is one sense that 
we can give – and Thompson does give – to the term ‘life-form’. In this thesis I have no 
quarrel with this notion, as I have expressed it here so far. Indeed, I appeal to broadly the 
same idea, for example, in Chapter III when discussing the development of an internally-
coherent ‘way of being in the world’, and also in IV:3 when discussing the meaning of 
‘function’ in neo-Aristotelian naturalism as a concept of ‘organisational functionality’.  
However, there is another level of meaning attached to the term ‘life-form’ in 
Thompson/Foot et al, a meaning for which I reserve use of this specific term throughout the 
rest of this thesis, and which is one of the primary objects of its critique. In this usage, the 
word ‘life-form’ is always, explicitly or implicitly, prefixed by the word ‘proper’. A 
particular individual’s life-form, in this sense, is not that concrete nexus of relations which 
we find out about when investigating the particular functional knitting-together of activities 
and structures in that organism’s life. Rather, it is (what is understood to be) the proper shape 
of this functional knitting-together, the way in which that organism’s activities and structures 
are supposed to relate to each other (independently of how they actually do so, or how that 
organism actually lives). This is conceived as something given to the developing organism 
qua ideal model for its life, in virtue of the ‘kind’ of being that it is, providing normative 
standards for all members of that kind alike. The perspective on life-evaluation that I have 
called ‘flourishing as properness’ – characterised by a mode of evaluation that measures 
concrete existence against an idea of proper form independent/transcendent of it – is based on 
this idea, this sense of ‘life-form’. Thompson takes this properness logic to be a necessary 
part of the apprehension of life as such – to be contained within, for example, the exercise of 
vital description just outlined.79 I disagree; this shift to a higher conceptual gear is certainly a 
                                                          
78 Thompson uses this phrase ‘wider context’, which is borrowed from G. E. M. Anscombe (1981: 85-87). 
79 See e.g. Thompson 2004: 52. 
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tempting and apparently ‘natural’ movement, but is a leap without sufficient justification. It is 
the perceived necessity of this conceptual link that I attempt to disrupt through discussion of 
the ontology of organismic becoming later in the thesis (Chapters III and VI in particular), 
but I’ll take a different run at it here. 
How does Thompson make this turn, from the first sense of ‘life-form’ to the second? And 
does it have sufficient grounds? Let’s return to our jet-propelled quasi-dolphin – call him 
(this particular being) ‘Skipper’. After discovering this remarkable creature, and learning 
about his particular way of being (his form of life in the first, concrete sense), we will likely 
look around for more creatures of similar description. Let’s suppose, first, that this search is 
successful; we find many more creatures that look very much like dolphins, except that they 
too engage in the unusual modes of propulsion and respiration mentioned above.80 We have 
thus discovered a number of similar individuals that, at least in certain relevant respects, 
‘share in’ the same way of living as our original specimen Skipper (this is tautological – we 
identify them as ‘similar’ on this very basis).  
We decide to declare the discovery of a new species, and name it ‘the jet dolphin’. When 
writing the encyclopaedia entry for this new species we will provide certain general 
descriptions. We might well put them in the following sort of way: jet dolphins have ‘air-
intake holes’ of a certain size, in a certain place on the back of their heads; high-pressure 
expulsion nozzles at a certain location on their lower back; oxygen-filtering filaments on 
various parts of their surface; they are able to propel themselves and respire in particular 
ways by means of these features; they eat a particular kind of fast-moving fish, and so on. 
These statements have the same grammatical form as what Thompson calls ‘natural-historical 
judgements’ – the form ‘Species S has/is/does X, Y, Z, etc.’ (see I:2.1). A complete set is the 
‘natural history’ of a particular kind.81 Thompson is right that these are statements of a 
peculiar sort: They are, in some sense, based on our empirical experience of concrete 
individuals, yet they are not, strictly speaking, descriptions of any particular individuals, nor 
                                                          
80 For a parallel thought experiment, about the discovery of a new species of jellyfish, see Thompson 2004. In 
my own version of this story here I roughly follow Thompson’s narrative, but at the same time try to distinguish 
the different possible interpretations of the processes of discovery and description in question: Thompson’s, in 
which the leap to the normative logic of properness is carried through; and mine, in which this is put in question. 
81 A somewhat confusing term, since, it seems, the history of our object of study has little to do with our 
description of it, at least directly. Thompson is appealing to the older sense of ‘natural history’ as an exercise in 
atemporal classification. 
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are they necessarily statistical averages (it could be that, as a statistical fact, most jet dolphins 
die as infants, without having developed the rear expulsion nozzle at all). They are pitched at 
a certain level of abstraction from the actual individuals we are grouping together under this 
label, such that what we are actually describing is an idea of ‘the jet dolphin’ as a coherent 
holistic form of life – an archetype pieced together from experience of various individuals, to 
which those individuals may correspond to greater or lesser degrees.82 
What really matters is how we interpret this exercise in ‘natural history description’, and 
what other kinds of intellectual operation we take it to justify or imply. In particular – and 
this is where I part ways with Thompson – do we see the general archetype we have 
described as merely the product of our own creative abstraction; or do we understand our 
statements as (to various degrees of accuracy) corresponding with some essential reality 
shared by all ‘members of the jet dolphin kind’? For Thompson it is the latter: For any living 
individual there is a “system of true natural-historical judgements” which describes the 
(proper) life-form of that individual’s ‘kind’.83 Furthermore, do we then take this general 
description as merely a helpful guide – constructed perhaps for the sake of aiding 
identification in the field; or, qua description of essential reality, do we see it as providing us 
with normative standards against which the quality of life of particular individuals is to be 
judged? For Thompson, again, it is the latter: The ‘natural history’ that we have described 
“[articulates] the ideal, standard or perfect operation of a bearer of this kind of life”.84 
Here we get to the crux of the issue, as I see it. It is one thing to bring together experience of 
a number of similar individuals, and to abstract from their overlapping patterns of activity 
and structure a general idea of ‘the’ form of life that they share, which we can accept is only 
to degrees accurate of any particular individual. This exercise of abstraction, outwards from 
particular to general, is very useful, probably necessary, for communication and learning 
                                                          
82 I leave it ambiguous exactly how this process of abstraction and piecing-together of a ‘general idea’ actually 
works, because, in Thompson, it is ambiguous. He tells us only things like, “At some point in the gathering of 
this storm of experience [of a set of similar individuals], condensation will occur. You will find yourself with a 
new object of explicit and independent thought: [the life-form of a kind of living being]. […] But your 
increasingly abundant experience as you study these [organisms] will put you in a position to frame certain 
distinctive general judgments as well. These judgments will not be about individual[s] taken singly or en masse, 
but, we might say, directly about the newly conceived life form itself” (Thompson 2004: 48). 
83 Thompson 2008: 72 (my italics). 
84 Thompson 2004: 55. 
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about the living world. But it is quite another thing, and not implied by the first, to take these 
general descriptions as constituting (perhaps because we think them to have identified the 
content of an essential reality of some sort) an ideal model for those individuals, and any 
others we take to be members of the kind in question – a standard that describes how their 
lives are supposed to go.  
This exercise of idealisation and transcendent evaluation, in which the general description is 
reified as an ideal and turned back towards the particular as a means of its judgement, is an 
interpretive leap that must be made independently, and is not implied by the exercise of vital 
description itself. As discussed earlier, to engage in vital description we must indeed look to 
the ‘wider context’ of the how of existence of the organism in question. However, we need 
not understand this in relation to an idealised model against which it is itself to be judged. For 
example, we can establish that the phenomenon in front of us is one of reproduction, without 
implying judgement as to whether this particular instance of reproduction is a ‘proper’ or 
‘defective’ one given the kind to which this organism belongs.85 Note that, above, when we 
first discovered that Skipper’s air-sucking activity is not in fact part of a process of 
respiration but actually one of propulsion, we did so without making any claim as to whether 
this is the way that Skipper is supposed to propel himself, or to use that hole in his head, etc. 
That is, we made no (transcendent-normative) judgement as to whether this individual is a 
properly-formed or defective example of some general kind (in fact, we made no judgement 
about his ‘kind’ at all, except if we take this to mean simply that we described the form of life 
that he, in fact, inhabits). This shows that, for vital description, what it is crucial to have in 
mind is not, in fact, an idea of the proper species form of the individual in question, but rather 
a generic understanding of terms like ‘respiration’, ‘propulsion’, ‘digestion’, and so on, such 
that we can identify these as certain kinds of functional relationality across physically diverse 
organismic contexts.86  
To emphasise the contingency of the intellectual transition from description/abstraction to 
idealisation, let’s return to the moment when we set out to look for other examples of the 
strange jet-propelled creature we had discovered. After having observed this one individual, 
                                                          
85 Thompson, on the contrary, claims that these two kinds of description/judgement are mutually dependent 
(2004: 52). 
86 Thompson doesn’t seem to consider the importance of these sorts of generic understanding to vital 
description. 
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Skipper, we were able, as we have seen, to describe the internal functionality that constitutes 
his form of life, his way of doing things like moving himself, respiring, hunting food.87 
According to Thompson’s argument, we should also (at least in theory) be able to move into 
that higher conceptual gear and say whether Skipper is a more or less perfectly formed token 
of a newly discovered kind of animal, or is in fact a defective or deformed example of some 
other kind, say the bottlenose dolphin. For Thompson, although answering this question may 
be difficult in practice – at least until we have seen other examples of the new kind, if it be 
such, and abstracted an idea of its proper form – it is nonetheless a meaningful question.88 
Now, our search for other specimens can go one of two ways. The first we have described 
already: we discover a number of creatures with similar forms of life to Skipper, and bring 
them together under a new kind-name. Our original specimen can then – if we buy 
Thompson’s turn to the logic of ideal form – be judged a more or less perfectly realised token 
of its kind.89 Let’s suppose that, in this scenario, we come to judge Skipper to be a mightily 
well-formed – flourishing – jet dolphin. Lucky Skipper. On the other hand, it might be that 
our search fails to find any other similar organisms. Perhaps, let’s say, we also learn that 
Skipper is the offspring of some ‘normal’ bottlenose dolphins, and the only such case to 
develop in the way he has. Now, assuming that this fact of genealogy renders Skipper a 
                                                          
87 We might also, I would argue, generate some normative understanding of ‘better’ and ‘worse’ in this context. 
Rather than comparison between concrete existence and an idea of perfect form, our evaluative judgement 
would gain traction primarily by focusing on change over time and its impact on the internal coherence of 
Skipper’s life. If we come back later and find that a pollutant has inflamed our new friend’s air-intake hole, 
frustrating its efforts to catch its favourite kind of fish, we could judge this a bad thing, on the basis of our 
understanding of the ends and needs particular to this individual being. Our judgement would primarily be 
framed by concepts of enhancement or disruption of internal harmony, rather than correspondence-or-not with 
independent form. I attempt to further articulate this (immanent) evaluative logic in the next chapter, so will not 
elaborate here (the purpose of this appendix being to gain a deeper critical understanding of Thompson’s 
thinking). 
88 For example, during his story about the discovery of a new kind of jellyfish (‘the umbrella jelly’), Thompson 
notes: “When you thought, of the first specimen you sighted, that it was a cross jelly, you thought it was 
woefully deformed. And if it had been a cross jelly, it would have been woefully deformed. But now, with 
further observation, you can see that that original specimen was quite sound, except perhaps for a few broken 
tentacles. It is just that it belonged to a different kind, and was thus subject to a different standard” (Thompson 
2004: 55, see also 48). 
89 I would argue that, if we wanted to, we could make that leap even having only observed one specimen: we 
can look at it and imagine that, say, its fins are not the length they are supposed to be, according not to the 
standards of a kind we are familiar with, but one for which this is so far the only token. 
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‘member of the bottlenose kind’,90 on Thompson’s logic we must therefore conclude that, as 
it turns out, he is actually “woefully deformed”.91 Woe to be Skipper. 
Note the radical opposition of these two evaluative conclusions. What is it that brings us to 
such different judgements? Is the life of Skipper itself actually any different in the second 
case than it is in the first? No. Rather, on Thompson’s logic, the evaluative conclusion we 
draw depends entirely on how we interpret the situation vis-à-vis Skipper’s membership of a 
‘kind’. The relation between our vital description of the internal functionality of his life and 
our judgement about his level of flourishing (as properness) is in this sense entirely 
indeterminate. This, I think, gives the lie to the supposed logical link that Thompson draws 
between the former and the latter. 
The flip-side of this, as I see it, is that the difference between these two judgements has 
nothing at all to do with the actual quality of life of Skipper himself – concerning, e.g., his 
ability to satisfy needs, to pursue goals, the richness of his experiential interaction with the 
world, etc. In the transition from seeing Skipper as a well-formed jet dolphin to seeing him as 
an unfortunate, mal-formed freak of a bottlenose, nothing has changed with Skipper himself, 
only with his metaphysical relation to a supposed ideal form. At this point, even if we still 
think the conceptuality of ideal form is unavoidable in our cognitive dealings with life, we 
nonetheless seem to reach something of a normative brick wall, in the face of which I can 
only protest: perhaps that just doesn’t matter, and it shouldn’t be part of our concept of 
flourishing. 
To summarise: Thompson maintains that the mode of evaluation in which the two above 
judgements take place – which I call the logic of properness – is a necessary part of the 
apprehension of life as such, and the fundamental basis of any evaluative understanding of 
living beings. On the contrary, I argue that there neither seems to be a necessary logical 
connection between vital description and the logic of ideal form, nor does it seem that the 
                                                          
90 The question of what exactly it is that renders one a ‘member of a kind’, for Thompson, is really key to these 
issues. Unfortunately, he does not give us an answer, apart from the tautological one that to be member of a kind 
is to bear a (proper) life-form, to which one’s life may correspond to greater or lesser degrees. As I explain more 
in a moment, he seems to assume that this ‘bearing’ of life-form is simply given to individuals – in some sense 
inherently, or innately – and that this notion of ‘being born into a kind’ is intuitive enough not to require 
explication.  
91 Again, see Thompson on the possibilities for interpreting the unusual jellyfish specimen (2004: 55, 48). 
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latter, in itself, gives us any real normative traction in the task of life-evaluation. Although 
the logic of properness is, no doubt, a common way of thinking, and often eminently difficult 
to extricate oneself from, I maintain that it is not contained within the apprehension of living 
beings as such, and nor is it essential to taking an evaluative perspective on living existence. 
So, aside from what has already been discussed in this appendix, what is it that underlies 
Thompson’s (and similar thinker’s) presupposition that a life just is something that has an 
ideal model given to it, which it is its intrinsic aim to realise? I do not have a full answer to 
this question, but as a partial answer I return to the following theme. As I have argued at 
various points in this chapter (and do so again in Chapters V and VI), I think that we can 
identify, as an essential component of this way of interpreting the organic realm, a particular 
way of understanding life-across-time as a process of growth and development. This 
interpretation sees development as what I call a poietic process – progressive movement 
towards, and for the sake of, realisation of a pre-given model.  
This is implicit in the fact that – however Thompson understands the conditions determining 
the ‘kind’ one belongs to, and therefore one’s proper form of life – this kind-determination is 
clearly something ‘given’ to the individual independently (transcendently, as I would put it) 
of their actual concrete existence, as opposed to something created within the process of 
becoming itself.92 What this pre-givenness might actually demand of organic reality is 
unclear. We have seen above (II:4) how Nussbaum provides one way of making this notion 
more determinate, by combining it with an idea of ‘innate potentials’ that provide teloi to 
development. Thompson doesn’t appeal to this notion explicitly, but he does make some 
remarks about developmental process that suggest a similar picture. For example, he notes 
that “[T]he idea of a life form, as something atemporally describable [as an ‘ideal’], and as 
something at least potentially borne by many individuals, seems to be contained in the idea of 
life as a process that unfolds in time”.93 We get a clearer sense of the poietic character of this 
                                                          
92 For example: “A species or life-form of course determines a class of individuals, its bearers” (2008: 60) – that 
is, rather than the individuals themselves having anything to do with determining their form of life. The analogy 
Thompson draws between ‘bearing’ a proper life-form and being a speaker of a particular language (e.g. 2004: 
52-54) might, in fact, be taken to suggest the contrary – that one’s form of life is actually (as I argue in this 
thesis) something developed in relation to the contingencies of one’s concrete context, analogous to the learning 
of a language. However, I get the feeling that this is actually one place where, for Thompson, the language/life-
form analogy breaks down, precisely because of this. 
93 Thompson 2004: 64-65 (my italics). This specific notion of development as ‘unfolding’ will be addressed 
again in various places in Chapters III, V, and VI. 
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‘unfolding’ elsewhere, when he claims that among our natural-historical judgements about a 
kind will be descriptions of “the characteristic developmental ‘story’ of the egg or seed, 
saying, for each stage, ‘what happens next’, until we come to the mature form” – that is, 
when applied to individual cases, saying ‘what is supposed to happen next’, if this instance of 
organic becoming is to ‘go well’ qua token of what it essentially is – an ideal story that 
“might, of course, only be “realized” in a tiny fraction of the individuals of that kind”.94 We 
can read these statements either as identifying the poietic conception of development as the 
reason for the notion of ideal life-form and the associated properness logic, or just as 
identifying the mutual implication between these ideas. Either way, the question of the 
ontology of becoming provides a window onto the metaphysics of life at stake in this view, as 
an essential part of it. It is through this window that I attempt to climb by means of the central 
arguments of this thesis. 
  
                                                          
94 Thompson 2008: 72, see also 80, 41-42, 43. 
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Chapter III 
Flourishing as Self-Creativity 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I propose an alternative way to think flourishing as an organic concept of the 
good, in contrast with the nexus of thought developed over the previous two chapters. That is, 
as with the properness concept, the concept of ‘flourishing as self-creativity’ proposed here 
can be understood as a way of taking up an image of the living as ground for normative 
thinking. However, it is one that emerges from interpreting organismic becoming as a form of 
praxis, in opposition to the poietic metaphysics identified in the previous chapter. I firstly 
introduce this alternative way of interpreting becoming, in order to ground the concept of 
flourishing as self-creativity (Section 1). I then outline the elements of the proposed concept 
(Section 2). In Section 3 I illustrate this alternative approach by means of an interpretation of 
J. S. Mill’s ethics of ‘self-development’ and an outline for a version of the contemporary 
‘capability approach’ based on this perspective. I then draw out some implications of taking 
this perspective in relation to certain issues to do with disability, individual identity, and the 
problem of so-called ‘adaptive preferences’. 
 
1. Becoming as praxis: finding a way in the world 
The properness concept finds its naturalisation in a poietic interpretation of the living being: 
to live is to be given a proper form, a design for life which the organism is supposed to 
reflect. Living as a process of coming-into-being thus has the task of movement towards 
fulfilment of that form, towards concrete realisation of essence, and is for the sake of this 
realisation. At this point I invite us to consider a change of perspective.1 What would it be to 
apprehend life through the interpretive lens of praxis, instead? I suggest the following (taking 
the two dimensions of praxis outlined in II:3 in reverse order).  
                                                          
1 At this point, this change of perspective is simply a proposal that emerges from exploring the contrast between 
poiesis and praxis as two ways of interpreting organismic becoming. The rhetorical purpose of Chapters V and 
VI is to motivate this shift more deeply, via an engagement with biological theory regarding the nature of 
ontogeny. 
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Firstly, like a creative improvisation, we will see the process of coming-into-being as 
immanently creative of its ‘product’, the individual life in question. The individual’s 
particular way of being, its identity, form and functionality, norms and needs, and so on, are 
not prescribed to it by a transcendent ‘nature’ or ‘life-form’ that it bears (there is no such 
thing), but are emergent from within the process of its becoming. In this sense we will see 
organismic becoming as a ‘self-creative’ process; as the process of finding a way in the 
world, of figuring out a particular way to live, as life goes along, in interaction with the world 
in which one becomes.2  
This means that how the particular life fits together and ‘works’ as a whole (to the extent that 
it does) is contingent on the particularities of the life in question, and on what is made of the 
situation in which the being finds itself during the course of its history. It depends on what 
shape its particular activity of ‘finding a way’ in the world takes. But this doesn’t mean that 
‘anything is possible’, or that life can be made any way one wants it to be. All lives (just as 
all improvisations) are to various degrees constrained and shaped by given resources and 
circumstances, both ‘internal’ and ‘external’, and by the ways they can be integrated. Another 
way to put this: the individual’s parameters of significance – what matters to it, and the way 
in which it matters – must be understood in relation to the individual context. However, this 
also does not mean that norms are determined by a power of individual choice that stands 
outside of the contingencies of life. Rather they emerge immanently, from within the ongoing 
interaction of a living being with its situation. The ‘self’ in ‘self-creative’ is not to be 
understood as a pre-formed transcendent subject that re-produces itself, or fashions a 
reflection of itself in the world. This would be to fall back into the logic of poiesis. The 
creativity of the process of becoming and the ‘self’ that is created are, in the praxic view, 
related to each other reflexively, or dialectically. 
Secondly, like a musical performance, we will not see becoming as simply the limited 
process by which its ‘product’, the being of the individual life, is brought about as an end-
state separable from the process itself. Rather, the individual’s being is continually in the 
process of being constituted by its becoming. Whereas the poietic view sees the becoming of 
a living being as a circumscribed process of transition between starting point and realisation 
of finished form, the praxic view sees it as an ongoing activity of exploration and negotiation 
                                                          
2 I borrow the specific idea of life as the process of “finding a way” in the world from Ingold (2011: 4). 
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with the world, through which form is continually created and re-created. This process does 
not have a point of ‘completion’, apart from the final termination of activity that comes with 
death. The living individual is understood as always embedded in the process of creating, 
sustaining, and adapting its particular way of being in the world. Thus, from this perspective, 
‘becoming’ corresponds with the whole of a living existence, rather than simply a period of 
‘maturation’ in which the organism unfolds into its true form.3 
This briefly outlines a certain way of orienting ourselves towards the living. It is what I have 
already called a ‘metaphysics’, by which I mean a basic conceptual framework that organises 
experience and understanding of a subject-matter – life, in this case. As with the metaphysics 
underlying the properness concept (see II:1), the praxic view packages together a mode of 
representation and a mode of evaluation. The way we represent what the subject-matter is 
gives a certain structure to the task of evaluating, of making judgements about the good and 
the bad in relation to, this subject-matter. If we embrace this way of conceiving ‘living’, how 
will our concept of living well be structured? How will we approach questions of quality of 
life and the conditions of flourishing?  
As just indicated, on one level we will understand what it is for life to go well or badly as 
contingent on the course of the life in question, as emergent from how the particular life finds 
its way within particular circumstances. On another level, this perspective invites us to see 
becoming as in some sense ‘for its own sake’. That is, we will see it as more than just a 
means to a further end, but as intrinsic to life itself, essential to that which we are attempting 
to think normatively about. So, we will want to articulate some way of considering becoming 
as intrinsically evaluable, in terms of the performance of the process itself rather than just its 
‘outcomes’. I shall now present ways of elaborating both of these ideas. 
 
                                                          
3 This is one of the reasons I primarily use the more open term ‘becoming’ in this thesis where I could perhaps 
say ‘development’. The term ‘development’ itself suggests, via its etymology, a notion of circumscribed 
unfolding of a pre-existent but latent form, as in the development of a photographic image. ‘Develop’ is the 
opposite of ‘envelop’, which comes from the French en – ‘in’ – and voloper, a verb of uncertain origin (possibly 
Celtic), usually meaning to ‘wrap up’, ‘cover’, or ‘fold up’ (https://www.etymonline.com/word/envelop); so ‘de-
velopment’ is the uncovering, unwrapping, or unfolding of something (see also: 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/development). For the same point in relation to organismic ‘development’ 
(also called ‘ontogeny’ in biological theory), see Lewontin 2000a [1998]: 4-5; 2000b: xii. 
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2. Flourishing as self-creativity 
The concept to be proposed here, which I label flourishing as ‘self-creativity’, or a ‘self-
creative’ perspective on flourishing, is more complex than the properness concept, mostly 
due to the reflexive and immanent logic of praxis that it invokes. It can also be decomposed 
into notions of being-well and becoming-well, but the relationship between the two elements 
is not quite as straightforward as in the properness framework.  
To summarise: This perspective sees the parameters of being-well as particular to the 
individual, but not in the sense that each of us has a normatively pre-given form to fulfil qua 
individual (a ‘true self’). Rather, being-well is being in a way that is internally harmonious 
given the contingencies of the individual’s particular life-history and the parameters of 
significance that emerge from their ongoing process of becoming. The evaluation of 
becoming, and change in general, has two different dimensions. Firstly, we can talk about 
some change to the states of the being or its world as constituting an ‘improvement’ or 
‘worsening’ of quality of life in terms of enhancement or deterioration of immediate being-
well. Secondly, by taking up the view of becoming as an ongoing praxis of finding a way in 
the world, we can evaluate an individual’s existence in terms of how well they are able to 
engage in this process itself, not just for the sake of some good that might result from it, but 
‘for its own sake’, as part of what living is. I propose that we think about life-evaluation in 
this respect using a concept I call ‘self-creative freedom’ – the power a being has to explore 
their possibilities for living, and to shape their own way of being from within this space. 
From a social or political perspective, the conditions of human life that we ought to promote, 
insofar as the human good is an end in view, are those which benefit people’s particular 
being-well, and those which enhance their self-creative freedom. These are inter-related in 
various ways. 
Let’s elaborate. Firstly, being-well – living well from a ‘static’ point of view. In terms of 
content, the norms relevant to evaluating ‘how things are’ with a being at some point in time 
are contingent on the history and context of the individual life itself – norms are determined 
immanently rather than transcendently, in this sense.4 The individual is thus, in a certain 
                                                          
4 I am aware of a number of similarities between the perspective I advocate here and the work of Gilles Deleuze 
on the concepts of immanence in life, and the distinction between immanent evaluation and transcendent 
judgment (e.g. 2001; 1983 [1962]), but I do not draw upon him explicitly here because this connection is 
something that I need to explore more, and hope to do so in future work. 
99 
 
sense, normatively autonomous – the norms relevant to the being ‘come from itself’, rather 
than coming from a source outside of itself.5 As mentioned just now, in relation to the self-
creativity of praxis, this does not mean that just anything can be part of the good of any 
particular being. For a start, I think a general limit is placed on this in relation to the way in 
which something can be ‘part of one’s good’. In terms of structure, one’s immanently 
determined ‘way of being’ needs to make sense as a whole; the different aspects of a life need 
to fit together coherently. Living has the task of figuring out ‘what works’ given the 
contingencies of the particular life, just as the musical improvisation has to create some 
coherent expression in interaction with the musical situation, or as the sculptor must figure 
out what can be made through negotiation with the material on which they work.  
This suggests a notion of ‘harmony’ at the heart of the self-creative concept of being-well, 
but in a different sense to that found in the properness conception. In the latter, being-well 
has the structure of correspondence between life and essence – things are ‘well’ with an 
individual insofar as they are in harmony with the standards of their proper form. In the self-
creative perspective it is a matter of internal harmony between the parts of the being’s 
existence as a whole. If things are ‘well’ with them the elements of their life – their 
capacities, ends, needs, and so on – are in actively sustained relations of coherence and 
mutual support with each other.6 The bad is, in part, a concept of internal disharmony or 
incoherence with respect to the life’s whole way of being in the world. These are no doubt 
matters of degree. 
This shows we can think the idea of ‘living in accordance with one’s good’ without implying 
a relation of correspondence between life and transcendent essence. On this view it is about 
                                                          
5 I use ‘normative autonomy’ in two, connected, ways. Firstly, to refer to the basic fact that – given the view of 
becoming-as-praxis – the norms relevant to a particular life emerge from within that life itself, as opposed to 
being prescribed to it in advance. Secondly, beyond this basic reflexivity I see the autonomy to determine one’s 
parameters of significance as a matter of degree entailed within what I call ‘self-creative freedom’, to be 
explained shortly.  
6 The idea of a ‘life-form’ in Foot/Thompson, and the equivalent in Nussbaum, involves a similar idea of 
‘internal coherence’, as I elaborate in IV:3 in relation to the issue of organismic functionality. However (see also 
IV:3), there is a major difference between the role that this idea plays in their (species-properness) theories and 
the use of it being made here. In the species-properness view, the species life-form is understood as having an 
internal coherence or organisational harmony in itself, and the good of the individual lies in their life 
corresponding with this model. In the self-creative view, the good (being-well) of the individual involves their 
living in accordance with an internally coherent way of being in the world, but it does not demand that the way 
that they actually do live corresponds with an idealised model of life prescribed ‘by nature’. 
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relations of fit within the life as a concrete whole – are these relations positive, coherent, 
mutually supportive, or are they negative, contradictory, in conflict? This implies that 
evaluation of some element of a life cannot be done in isolation from the context of the rest of 
that life. We cannot say, for example, that some particular bodily form, capacity, or activity is 
simply good for the individual, or its absence simply bad – perhaps because, e.g., we deem it 
part of the list of things essential to the human type, and thus necessarily good for all humans 
– however it might relate to the rest of their life. What makes it good or bad is precisely its 
particular relationality within the life as a whole. 
Contrast this with the species-properness view. In a field guide to mammals we might find 
the statement ‘Horses are four-legged animals’. On Thompson’s way of reading such 
statements, as ‘natural-historical judgements’ (see I:2.1), any particular three-legged horses 
are therefore ‘defective’ in this respect. Their flourishing is necessarily reduced, in this sense, 
since ‘having three legs’ is an inherently bad (improper) thing for any horse. On the self-
creative view this is not the case; the normative significance of the bodily form in question 
depends on the particular life and its context. Imagine a horse with three legs born into a 
human society that has an important mythology surrounding the number three. This horse is 
hailed as a sacred being and pampered all of its life. It is given the best food, allowed to mate 
with its pick of the stable, and has its every need catered for. The other horses, the plain old 
four-leggers, are forced to toil in the fields, pulling ploughs until they collapse from 
exhaustion and die young. On the whole, this horse’s having three legs stands in positive 
relations with the rest of its life, as it has come into being. It has a particular quality of life 
that is not only consistent with the bodily form that the Thompsonian view sees as a ‘defect’, 
but is even dependent on it. One could just as easily imagine circumstances in which realising 
some supposedly ‘proper’ form would, from the immanent point of view, relate to the life as 
a ‘bad’.7 We cannot assume a particular world in which the being becomes, prior to our 
judgement about what will be better and worse within its life.8 
                                                          
7 Thompson says that finding an individual to be wanting in comparison with its proper species form, and thus 
to be ‘defective’, “supplies an ‘immanent critique’ of [the individual]” (2008: 81). Unless we mean very 
different things by ‘immanent’, this is wrong. Evaluation of a particular by comparison with a general standard 
is not judgement ‘from within’ the perspective of, or on the terms of, that which is being evaluated (what I 
would understand by ‘immanent judgement’). On the contrary, it is what I would call ‘transcendent’ judgement 
– judgement of some particular by reference to some standard independent of itself.  
8 Which is exactly what Foot does. In her view, what counts as ‘excellence’ and ‘defect’ in an individual is 
explicitly “relative to the natural habitat of the species”, and remains the same even if the actual context of the 
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It is worth stressing that the emphasis on individual particularity does not mean that the good 
of every individual must be different in some way from all others, or that being-well is to be 
found in some way of being unique. It is perfectly possible, indeed highly likely, that lives 
which develop in interaction with similar physiological and environmental conditions, will 
develop similar parameters of significance; that similar things will matter in similar ways for 
them. Furthermore, this perspective can be perfectly compatible with the proposition that 
there are indeed, at some level of generality, goods that are universal for all members of a 
species, things that play positive roles in the lives of all actual human beings, for example. It 
is compatible with this as long as we acknowledge that such a proposition, if true, is true 
contingently, as an a posteriori or empirical matter, not as an analytic fact that follows from 
the individuals in question sharing in a common essence.  
For these reasons, certain kinds of empirical generalisations – about the statistically normal 
needs of members of a biological species, about what is usually considered healthy or 
pathological, or about things that tend to make human lives meaningful, for example – can 
indeed play legitimate roles as useful practical guides regarding what it is likely to be for any 
individual to flourish, given only certain general information, such as their biological species 
(or, say, their socio-cultural context). We intuitively feel that it is worse for an eagle to be 
unable to fly than it is for a tortoise. And rightly so; we have good grounds for the 
expectation that this particular in-ability will be worse for any particular eagle than any 
particular tortoise. But, on the view being presented here, our intuition is not a good one 
because we have latched onto a truth about their respective essences, but because it is very 
likely to be correct in any particular case, given the likely presence of many other statistically 
normal needs and life-conditions, with which the capacity for flight tends to ‘fit together’ in 
the case of eagles, but bears no such relations of mutual dependence in the case of tortoises. 
We might even incorporate such generalisations into our political reasoning about the kinds 
of things that public action ought to aim at. ‘Given that X is usually an important part of the 
lives of humans, it is likely that enabling X to be achieved will be beneficial to most 
                                                          
life in question is very different (2001: 34). Aside from the difficulty of saying what constitutes a being’s 
‘natural’ environment, this presents an internal problem for her theory. It implicitly admits that context is 
essential for determination of normative significance in life, yet, by assuming a particular context as the world in 
relation to which an individual’s norms are to be defined, it abstracts the individual from its relations with its 
actual world, the one in which its norms ought to be understood if one is to gain any real understanding of the 
particular case. See also Oyama’s critique of the naturalistic ethics of Mary Midgley (Oyama 2000a [1985]: 
102-106). 
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humans’, we might reason. Fine. But this is a very different thing from taking species 
membership to entail a set of normative standards, an idealised model that determines what 
the flourishing of an individual must involve, given their species.  
This highlights the fact that the alternative ‘concepts of flourishing’ I am addressing here are 
not claims about which norms will be part of some being’s ‘good’, but claims about the 
genesis of those norms. The difference between the two concepts can be seen in terms of how 
they understand the relation between the process by which a living being comes into the 
world, and the norms that are relevant to it. For the properness perspective, they are given ‘by 
nature’ to the organism prior to its becoming, determining ends to be fulfilled via this 
process. For the self-creative perspective they emerge within this process, and are contingent 
upon it. I also do not claim to be providing a method for determining the content of an 
individual’s being-well, except to say that knowledge in this regard will increase in 
proportion with depth of awareness regarding the individual’s particular context and history. 
In this respect, the individual themselves will often be the best guide regarding their 
parameters of significance, at least in an immediate respect. And thus for many practical 
purposes deferral to individual preferences will be reasonable. However, this is not the same 
as saying that subjective preferences define what is good and bad, nor that they are 
completely infallible in this regard (see 3.3-3.4 below for elaboration). 
So, if the shape and content of being-well is determined within the process of becoming, 
rather than given to it as an ideal model, then what is becoming-well? This notion is also 
more complex than in the properness conception. It has two dimensions. The first is really 
just an extension of what has already been said. It evaluates change in general as 
improvement or deterioration in terms of immediate being-well. Does a change in conditions 
better enable the individual to live according to their particular way of being, as it stands, or 
does it prevent this, or disrupt the internal relations between the parts of their life in some 
way? If the sacred horse in our previous example were to sprout a fourth leg, its actual being-
well would likely be hugely reduced. I.e. what would be seen on the species-properness view 
as necessarily a movement towards greater flourishing would, on the contrary, entail decline 
in overall quality of life. This element of the perspective does, in one respect, reflect the 
structure of the properness notion of becoming-well, in that it evaluates processes of change 
simply in terms of their outcomes.   
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However, this perspective also allows us to grasp the becoming of life in a way that is 
entirely different from the logic of properness: as evaluable not only in terms of ‘outcomes’ 
achieved along the way, but in terms of the ongoing performance of the process itself – in 
some sense ‘as its own end’, or ‘for its own sake’. The reason for this is that in the praxic 
view of life the process of becoming is intrinsic to life itself. It is the ongoing process of 
creating and sustaining a way in the world, as life goes along, and continually constitutes the 
life that it creates (rather than simply producing a finished product beyond itself). Since this 
ongoing praxis of ‘finding a way’ in the world is part of what living as such is, then our 
concept of living well ought to contain some notion of what it is to do this well. 
The question of flourishing becomes, in part: What is it to live well, when ‘living’ denotes 
finding a way in the world, from within particular circumstances, as life goes along? What is 
it to engage in the self-creative praxis of life well or badly? What kind of evaluative concepts 
can we bring to bear on this idea? What it can’t mean is successfully uncovering the pre-
determined proper way for one to be – in the sense that doing a jigsaw puzzle well is figuring 
out how it is supposed to fit together – since this would be to reduce it to achievement of 
correct outcome, i.e. the logic of poiesis. Consider instead the praxic analogy of exploring a 
city, when there is no place in particular that you have to get to, or route that you have to 
follow. You just want to ‘find your way around’, to ‘get to know’ the place, to explore it for 
the sake of exploring it. The extent to which you can do this well depends on a certain 
relation of openness between you and the city. It depends on the city’s openness to you – if 
many of the roads are closed off then the possibilities for exploration are much reduced. And 
it depends on your openness to the city, on your capacity to respond to and actively engage 
with opportunities and experiences that the city offers up. These two aspects cannot really be 
separated – for example, a road is only really ‘open’ to you if you are capable of travelling 
down it. 
I propose that we think about evaluation of becoming in a similar way, in terms of the 
openness and richness of the individual’s living praxis in this sense. The main measure of 
becoming-well in this sense is what I call ‘self-creative freedom’ – the extent of the power an 
individual has to explore a space of possibility, and to shape their own way of being in 
interaction with this. Becoming, regarded as ‘for its own sake’, is ‘good’ to the extent that it 
is gone about in conditions of self-creative freedom. Certain changes to conditions and 
capacities will expand this freedom, others will contract it. The enhancement of self-creative 
freedom is not just good because it might better enable one to figure out the best ‘outcomes’; 
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it is intrinsically beneficial, from the point of view of becoming-well as a good-in-itself. 
Freedom in this sense is directly relevant to quality of life, in that greater freedom enables 
living more fully or thoroughly, in the sense of ‘living’ captured by the praxic conception of 
organismic becoming. It enriches one’s ongoing activity of finding a way in the world.  
To elaborate: The richer one’s ‘space of possibility’ – the range of ways of being and doing 
available to the individual – the greater the scope for exploring and experimenting with life, 
and thus the greater the power to reflexively or autonomously construct a coherent way of 
being and live in accordance with it, since it means a wider palette of elements from which 
life can be constructed. In this sense, possibility or opportunity is itself a dimension of the 
good. Widening of possibility increases freedom to explore, and this enhances the power to 
shape one’s own life. This freedom is not an on/off property, either possessed or not, but is 
something that can be expanded or contracted through the being’s changing situation and 
constitution – through its resources, physical and cognitive capacities, environmental 
conditions, social structures, and so on. As with the city-explorer, we can see this expansion 
and contraction in terms of the being’s openness to the world or in terms of the world’s 
openness to the being, but these are really two aspects of one relation.9  
This relation of openness, and the self-creative freedom it corresponds with, is constituted in 
different ways, and to different degrees, across the living world. In the (statistically normal) 
human context, certain intellectual, rational, and creative faculties enable degrees of 
autonomous self-creativity that are beyond the usual limits of most other living beings (that 
we know of). As I make clearer in Chapter VI, these ‘human’ capacities should be seen as 
peaks on a continuous and variable field that spreads across the living world. I.e. the category 
of ‘freedom’ relevant to this dimension of life-evaluation is not something that uniquely 
attaches to human mind, separating it from the rest of the living world, but exists to degrees 
across that world, grounded on the basic reflexivity of organismic becoming. In this way this 
notion of freedom – one’s ‘space of possible becoming’ – can form part of the conceptual 
                                                          
9 This idea is loosely based on Heidegger’s concept of ‘world openness’ or the ‘disclosedness’ of the world (e.g. 
Heidegger 2009 [1924]: §9b; 2010 [1927]: §§28-29, 12). And, in its correspondence with a notion of power 
(power-to rather than power-over another), it is influenced by the Spinozan notion of potentia existendi, the 
‘power of existing’ of a living being (see e.g. Deleuze 1981; Buzaglo 2003; Zuolo 2004; Steinberg 2013). These 
are two connections I would like to develop further in future work. 
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apparatus through which we evaluate things as various as the educational systems available to 
human children to the size of the pot in which a plant can spread its roots.10 
As with the properness perspective, in order to address the issue of whether some particular 
element of a life (condition, capacity, opportunity, etc.) is a ‘good thing’ or a ‘bad thing’ we 
can look at it in a number of ways. At one level: Does it constitute part of their living, or does 
it enable them to live, according to their particular coherent way of being-well? Does it 
contribute to internal harmony, or does it disrupt relations of mutual support between 
elements of their life? And, at a different level: Does it constitute an enrichment of the 
individual’s space of possibility? Does it enhance their opportunities for exploration and 
engagement with the world, and their power to shape their way of life within this, or does it 
constitute a restriction on the activity of living in this sense?  
Relations between these dimensions of the good can be complex, and there can be conflicts 
between them. For example, some change to a life might constitute an expansion of self-
creative freedom, but at the cost of disrupting the individual’s particular way of being, as it 
has been constructed and established up to that point (see 3.3 for an example). As with the 
                                                          
10 A tangential aside: Is it better, in itself, to be a worm or a human? On the properness view there is no way of 
answering this question. The only sensible evaluative question is whether one is a good or bad whatever-one-is 
(see also Lott on Foot’s view (2012: 366)). An implication of this, I think, is that it is better to be a properly-
living worm than a defective human. On the self-creative view, the answer is more complex. Strictly in terms of 
being-well it agrees with the properness view: it is better to be a worm whose state of being is currently good – 
whose capacities, opportunities, and needs fit together in a positive way given the particularities of the being and 
its context – than a human whose life is bad in this sense. The worm’s life is a least more ‘fortunate’ than the 
human’s in this particular sense (see Nussbaum 2006: 192 for the properness equivalent of this claim, 
comparing a disabled human with a chimpanzee with “typical species abilities”). But this is only a very limited 
view of flourishing. Most Homo sapiens have capacities for interaction with the world that constitute a space of 
possibility in relation to the ongoing activity of becoming that is vastly enriched in comparison with the average 
worm. Insofar as this is the case, this perspective would consider the (statistically normal) human condition 
intrinsically better than that of the worm: it has a greater power of living in this sense, is ‘more alive’ to the 
world. Mill makes a comment, perhaps throw-away, but nonetheless profound, that having what he calls the 
‘human faculties’ is a “privilege” (1991 [1859]: 64). As I interpret him (see 3.1 below), this is because, from the 
standpoint of life in general, they generally enable of a comparatively more expansive suite of powers for the 
exploration of life, and thus greater self-creative freedom. This is different to saying that cultivating the ‘human 
faculties’ is good (for humans) in that they are part of being-properly-human (i.e. Mill’s belief about the value 
of the ‘human faculties’ is not dependent on a species-properness logic). I note that Nussbaum herself affirms 
something similar at one point, saying that it is “plausible for a comprehensive ethical view to judge that some 
activities and pleasures are “higher” and some “lower”, some lives richer and some more impoverished; [e.g.] 
that it is better to live as a chimpanzee than to live as a worm, were that choice of lives a coherent thought 
experiment” (2006: 361). This seems to take us outside of the species-properness logic that she consistently 
affirms as fundamental elsewhere; it cannot be made sense of given only this logic. This is another example of 
some of the basic tensions that run through Nussbaum’s thinking, which I will not discuss further here.   
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properness concept, what I have indicated here is the bare conceptual bones of a way of 
framing the notion of flourishing. The precise way in which these elements are to be 
weighted relative to each other is open to elaboration in different ways, and I will not tie the 
general perspective down to any particular way of dealing with conflicts of these sorts (nor to 
the necessity to deal with them at all at a theoretical level).  
 
3. Illustrations and implications 
3.1. Mill on individuality: the self-creative interpretation 
Clearly the self-creative perspective is not compatible with meta-ethical views that treat 
species essences (or any other greater-than-individual essences) as sources of intrinsic 
normative standards. It is an inherently individualist approach, in that it sees the good as 
something particular to each individual living being.  
However, when it comes to what exactly this means, we can also distinguish it from an 
individualist version of the properness approach, such as was outlined in I:2.2. On that view, 
the individual good relates to an innate and transcendent ‘true self’, metaphysically parallel 
with the idea of the species essence. Insofar as ‘exploration’ of the possibilities of life is 
valued on this view, it is as a means to the uncovering of this true self, in order that it can be 
fully realised. I.e. becoming is evaluated simply in terms of movement towards proper 
(individual) being: it is more a concept of flourishing as ‘self-discovery’ than ‘self-
creativity’. On the praxic view of becoming, there is no such pre-designated proper self. 
Furthermore, in the self-creative concept of flourishing that arises from this, one’s power to 
explore life, and to shape it from within, is also seen as intrinsically evaluable, as we have 
just seen.  
We can illustrate the difference between these two individualist perspectives by returning to 
the philosophy of John Stuart Mill. In I:2.2 I presented Mill’s ethics of ‘self-development’ as 
a representative of the individual-properness view, or, rather, I referred to one interpretation 
of Mill in this way. It is also possible (and, I believe, more correct)11 to interpret this aspect 
of Mill’s thinking as representing a version of the self-creative perspective on flourishing.  
                                                          
11 Although, exegetical accuracy is not the point here; I am using an interpretation to illustrate an idea. 
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Mill’s political theorising in On Liberty is a response to what he saw as a growing “despotism 
of custom” in modern society.12 This is the tendency for life to be dominated by passive 
conformity to externally imposed norms; it is the “tendency of society […] to fetter the 
development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony 
with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own”.13 
He sees this as a malady in society, and in response he advocates, as was mentioned in I:2.2, 
a wide extension of political liberties and social toleration of difference. He sees these 
measures as a way of structuring society so that “individuality [can] assert itself” through 
“experiments of living”, through the expansion of people’s ability to explore and critically 
engage with a rich diversity of ways of being.14 
As well as resulting in a loss to society at large of the benefits of original thought and 
diversity of perspectives, Mill sees the fettering of individuality to be directly detrimental to 
people’s flourishing.15 When social conformity dominates, he says, “there is wanting one of 
the leading essentials of well-being”, “one of the principle ingredients of human happiness”.16 
What is “wanting” is what he calls “the free development of individuality”.17 It is this that he 
                                                          
12 Mill 1991 [1859]: 78. 
13 Mill 1991 [1859]: 9. 
14 Mill 1991 [1859]: 63. See also Mill’s Chapters on Socialism: “human nature should have freedom to expand 
spontaneously in various directions, both in thought and practice; [and] people should both think for themselves 
and try experiments for themselves, and should not resign into the hands of rulers, whether acting in the name of 
a few or of the majority, the business of thinking for them, and of prescribing how they shall act” (1976 [1879]: 
745-746). 
15 In On Liberty Mill argues for both the instrumental value of individuality to society and its intrinsic value as 
part of human flourishing. This distinction between these arguments can be seen in the way he explicitly turns to 
the instrumental form of argument, after having made his case for seeing it as intrinsically valuable: “I might 
here close the argument: what more can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human 
beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? [...] Doubtless, however, these considerations will not 
suffice to convince those who most need convincing [because those dominated by conformity can’t see the 
intrinsic value of individuality; see Mill 1991 [1859]: 63, 68]; and it is necessary further to show, that these 
developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped” (71 (my italics)). He later reminds us of the 
difference between the two arguments (75). 
16 Mill 1991 [1859]: 63. See also: “The evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by the common 
modes of thinking, as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any regard on its own account” (63). 
17 Mill 1991 [1859]: 63.  
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sees as one of the prime beneficiaries of his proposals to expand social liberty, toleration of 
diversity, and so on.  
How are we to understand this “free development of individuality”, and the sense in which it 
is part of flourishing? On the individual-properness interpretation the content of one’s 
‘individuality’ is in some sense pre-given, and becoming, as the process of uncovering and 
expressing this, is therefore, as just mentioned, primarily valued for the sake of the end goal 
of proper self-realisation. The problem with this reading is that a) it neglects the immanent 
and active character of individuation in Mill, and b) it doesn’t recognise the intrinsic value he 
places on freedom in this process.  
Firstly, (a), the properness interpretation doesn’t fully bring out the sense in which Mill sees 
becoming-well not merely as movement towards fulfilment of a particular individuality, but 
rather as, to repeat, the “free development of individuality”. Much of what he says suggests 
that an ‘individuality’ is not something we all simply have, and which we either succeed in 
living in accordance with or not. Rather it is something that must be cultivated within the 
individual life itself. As mentioned just now, he sees the despotism of social conformity as 
the “tendency of society […] to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the 
formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to 
fashion themselves upon the model of its own”.18 The italicised comments show that Mill 
sees individuality as something that emerges within the life in question, as immanent to its 
becoming – at another point he even says that “individuality is the same thing [as] 
development”.19 It is not a static form with a given content, but is emergent within the 
process of individuation. This quotation also shows that he stresses the active involvement of 
the individual being in the formation of their individuality – people can “fashion themselves” 
(but ought not to do so by simply following the model dictated by society). In other words 
Mill’s ethics of ‘self-development’ involves the notion of the immanent generation of the 
individual’s ‘own way’ of being through their activity in the world, reflecting the praxic view 
of becoming.20 
                                                          
18 Mill 1991 [1859]: 9 (my italics). 
19 Mill 1991 [1859]: 71 (my italics). 
20 It must be admitted that Mill is ambiguous on these issues. There is textual evidence on either side of the 
interpretive divide I am setting up here, although certain elements of his thought do strongly suggest the more 
radical interpretation of self-development as self-creativity. On the one hand, for example, a person “is said to 
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Secondly, (b), the extent to which the process of individuation is gone about well has, for 
Mill, to do with the extent to which it is gone about freely, in the sense of what I have called 
self-creative freedom: the power to explore the possibilities of being, and to ‘figure life out 
for yourself’ through this. Becoming-well is seen in terms of the extent to which 
individuation is open and autonomous, as opposed to narrow in scope or constrained by 
outside forces. This is the reason that certain social and political measures such as extending 
liberties and promoting toleration of diversity, can benefit human flourishing directly. They 
can expand individual spaces of possibility, and thus enhance the freedom within which 
individual becoming takes place. This is also why, for Mill, life is lived better if you do not 
simply follow the model dictated by society. To live by “conform[ing] to custom, merely as 
custom”, does not exercise one’s powers of exploration and evaluation to any great degree.21 
Mill sees the ‘free development of individuality’ – the open and active ‘figuring out’ of how 
best to live, and the freedom of “pursuing our own good in our own way”22 – as part of what 
it is to live well, not just as an instrument to living well.  
In short, to understand Mill’s concept of flourishing it is important to stress both the “free 
development of individuality”, and the “free development of individuality”. This makes it an 
                                                          
have a character” if his “desires and impulses [and presumably his faculties/powers, and his ‘understanding’ – 
see 1991 [1859]: 66] are his own”, and what it is for these to be “his own” is for them to be “the expression of 
his own nature” (67 (my italics)). This might be taken to support the properness interpretation, according to 
which one’s ‘nature’ is an innate individual essence subsisting independently of development, which is 
actualised to greater or lesser extents in the person’s concrete existence. However, Mill also allows for a 
different interpretation of this. For example, when discussing the dangers of social ‘despotism’ he argues that 
people can become “bowed to the yoke” through passive conformity “until by dint of not following their own 
nature, they have no nature to follow” (68). This seems to suggest something more radical, since an innate 
‘nature’ in the sense of an essence independent of concrete becoming could not be ‘lost’ in this way, it would 
just remain hidden. We could make sense of this by saying that Mill sees ‘following one’s nature’ to be in part a 
process of creating and defining one’s ‘own good’, rather than simply a matter of achieving transcendent 
correspondence with an essential good, in the properness sense. The freedom of this process can be expanded or 
diminished, empowered or suppressed, and this dimension of evaluation is directly relevant to the question of 
flourishing. 
21 Mill 1991 [1859]: 65. Mill does not say that you have to reject custom in order to freely develop individuality, 
nor that you have to find some way of being different. Rather, for Mill, it means not accepting models of life or 
rules of conduct uncritically, without investigation, deliberation, or reflective evaluation.  
22 Mill 1991 [1859]: 17. This cultivating and following of our ‘own way’ is, for Mill, “the only freedom which 
deserves the name” (17). 
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expression of the self-creative concept of flourishing, as opposed to the properness concept, 
even a thoroughly individualist version.23 
Furthermore, we can see Mill’s understanding of human flourishing as motivated by, or 
reflected in, an interpretation of life itself as a creative praxis, rather than a poietic unfolding 
of pre-given form. He says, in a line quoted as an epigraph to this thesis, that “[h]uman nature 
is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but 
a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the 
inward forces which make it a living thing”.24 To be living, it seems, is to be involved in the 
task of “growing and developing” one’s existence as richly as possible, “on all sides”. And 
human flourishing is identified here with this image of living, explicitly in opposition to the 
poietic one of ‘building after a model’. Elsewhere he suggests an identification of self-
creative flourishing with a sense of ‘life’ as an intensive quantity:25 “In proportion to the 
development of his individuality, each person [… has] a great fullness of life about his own 
existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is 
composed of them”.26 The being that becomes-well – actively, openly, autonomously – has 
“more life” or a greater “fullness of life” than the being which has its possibilities and 
capacities restricted. A bird in a cage has a narrow power of living, in comparison with a bird 
in the forest (all else equal); in the sense Mill invokes here, there is ‘less life’ about its 
existence. 
This calls us back to the fact that the self-creative concept of flourishing, as I have presented 
it here, is an alternative way of taking up a conception of the living in relation to the human 
good, an alternative way of embracing the assumption of human ‘organic facticity’ as ground 
for evaluative thinking (see 0:3.1). Instead of thinking ‘living’ as unfolding of form, and 
‘living well’ as realisation in this regard, we start from an image of ‘living’ as an ongoing 
process of the creation of form, and think ‘living well’ in terms of the extent to which the 
                                                          
23 For exegeses of Mill that come to conclusions similar to my own see e.g. Hinchman 1990; Downie 1966. 
24 Mill 1991 [1859]: 66. 
25 See Deleuze 1981 on the distinction, drawn from Spinoza, between extensive and intensive quantity – the 
former referring to a material quantity, the latter a degree of power. 
26 Mill 1991 [1859]: 70 (my italics). By ‘units’ and ‘mass’, Mill is referring to individuals and the human race as 
a whole, respectively. 
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being engages in this process freely (becoming-well seen from a praxic perspective), and the 
extent to which their life accords with the parameters of significance that emerge from this 
process (being-well). This point of view is much more complex and context-sensitive, and 
makes evaluation much more difficult. But perhaps life-evaluation should be difficult, 
because life is complex and context-sensitive. 
 
3.2. The capability approach from a self-creative perspective 
It is also possible to present a version of the contemporary capability approach in terms of the 
self-creative concept of flourishing. As discussed in Chapter I, Nussbaum ties her version of 
the capability approach to the logic of species-properness. However, this framework is not a 
necessary part of the approach in general. At its most general, it merely aims to orient ethical 
and political thinking towards a particular ‘informational focus’. It argues that questions of 
flourishing or quality of life should be addressed in terms of what people are able to do and 
be in their lives.27 In other words, it emphasises an evaluative space defined in terms of 
people’s capabilities – their capacities for doing and being in the world, their ‘positive 
freedom’ in relation to functionings.28 This is what Mozaffar Qizilbash helpfully calls the 
‘thin’ version of the capability approach.29 To go beyond this, and provide some theoretical 
framework for evaluating particular capabilities or functionings, would be to construct a 
‘thick’ version. 
A species-properness approach, such Nussbaum’s, is one way of doing so. To evaluate the 
quality of some being’s existence we ask which functionings constitute their proper species 
                                                          
27 See e.g. Nussbaum & Sen 1993: 2; Sen 1990: 43-44; 1993: 29-32; 1999: 10, 18, 75, 293-295; 2009: 19, 231-
238, 270; Nussbaum 2000a: 70-77; 2011: 18, 24-25. On the notion of the ‘informational focus’ or 
‘informational base’ of a normative theory, see also Sen 1999: 18-21, 54-59; 2009: 231-238. 
28 ‘Positive freedom’ is more than mere ‘negative’ freedom, as in lack of impediment. One is positively free to 
do something to the extent that one is actually capable of doing it (it is a power-to notion). It depends on 
whether one has appropriate faculties/skills and is situated in appropriate conditions, and so on; not simply on 
whether there is a lack of external agency preventing one from doing it – i.e. not simply whether one has 
negative freedom in this sense. Negative freedom is, no doubt, a necessary condition of positive capability 
freedom, but is not sufficient for it. See Nussbaum 2011: 65-66; Sen 2009: 282, 304-309; 2002: 586-587. See 
also Berlin 1969 [1958]: 121-172, although it should be noted that Berlin’s original meaning, especially of the 
term ‘positive liberty’, was somewhat different and more complex than the basic notion of capability-to that is 
being employed here. 
29 Qizilbash 2011: 28-29. 
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life-form, and then we compare the individual case with the standards of this universal model. 
On this view it is, strictly speaking, the set of proper species functionings that constitute the 
good, and we evaluate the individual’s capability – their space of possible doing and being – 
derivatively, in terms of the properness or defectiveness of the functionings that are 
possible.30 The value of some particular being-able-to is derived from the value of the what-
one-can-do, as its condition of possibility. For various reasons Nussbaum thinks that action at 
the social/political level should not aim to make people ‘function properly’, but only to create 
the conditions that make it possible to do so, if they so choose.31 I.e. political ends are limited 
to ‘capabilities not functionings’. Improvement and deterioration of capability is the enabling 
or closing off of elements of proper functioning. Whether people go on to actually realise 
proper functioning is not for public policy to determine. 
The self-creative perspective offers a different way of constructing a ‘thicker’ version of the 
capability approach. On this view, firstly, the functionings that are important to an 
individual’s being-well will not be understood as given, qua intrinsic goods, by a fact of 
species membership. They will depend on the internal relationality of an individual’s life, and 
their history of becoming. This means that, at a theoretical level, this version of the approach 
will actually remain ‘thin’ with regard to the content of human being-well, at least insofar as 
it will offer no determinate list of proper functionings a priori. As mentioned above (Section 
2), this doesn’t mean that statistical generalisations about how members of a species tend to 
live cannot be useful guides, but just that such facts don’t imply necessary normative truths 
about all members of a species. 
Secondly, we will evaluate an individual’s space of capability in a different way. As with the 
properness view, we will at one level be concerned with it as a means to fulfilling valuable 
functionings. However, because of the intrinsic value the self-creative concept places on 
freedom in the process of becoming itself, and the direct significance of the expansiveness of 
                                                          
30 See footnote 6 in I:2.1 regarding some complexities of the interpretation of Nussbaum on this issue.   
31 A key reason for this is in fact one of the items on the list of human functionings – practical reasoning, which 
involves choosing which functionings to actually fulfil in the rest of your life. This complicates matters, but 
doesn’t change the fundamentals, because although it is especially important in her schema, it doesn’t override 
the intrinsic value of the other proper functionings (see e.g. Nussbaum 1988: 181-182; 1995a: 110-120; 2000a: 
72, 82). 
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one’s space of possibility in this regard, we will also value the richness of capability 
intrinsically, that is, independently of the value of the specific things one can do.32  
Let’s take an example to compare approaches. Is person P able to have sexual satisfaction? 
For the properness view: If yes, then good, because having sexual satisfaction is part of what 
it is to have a properly human life.33 If no, then bad, because P will lack this aspect of the 
human good. For the self-creative view: If yes, and this is positive within their particular 
parameters of significance at time of asking, then good, because they are able to fulfil this 
aspect of their being-well. Also, whether it matters to their immediate being-well or not, then 
good, given that it entails a space of possible exploration of life that is richer than if they 
were unable to have sexual satisfaction at all. If no, then potential negatives on both counts, 
although for someone for whom sexual relations or gratification have no place in their being-
well (as is the case for many asexual people, for example),34 the lack of a richer space of 
possible future becoming, in this respect, will be of minimal significance. The relative 
importance of these aspects will also vary depending on whether we are talking about 
someone who has just gained the capacity for sexual satisfaction, has just lost it, has always 
had it, or has never had it. See 3.3-3.4 below, for elaboration on this way of evaluating 
abilities and inabilities, and the implications for how we approach the issue of ‘adaptive 
preferences’. 
We can also make comparisons in terms of how political or social action would be justified 
by each approach. On the species-properness version, public justification always ultimately 
comes down to the affirmation of some conception of the ‘properly human life’. We might, as 
Nussbaum does, place certain limits on the ways in which this kind of life can be ‘promoted’ 
by social/political powers, but the species-essentialist value judgement always ultimately 
grounds our motivations, by providing a conception of essential life-form. On the self-
creative version we will remain theoretically neutral on the intrinsic value of particular ways 
                                                          
32 Although, the full evaluation of any particular capability will also take into account the value of the 
corresponding functioning. The point here is that, qua constituent of becoming-well, an expansion of possibility 
is, all else equal, a good thing. If we only take up the properness perspective, then we can only evaluate a 
capability in terms of the value of the corresponding functioning; we cannot attribute value to the scope of one’s 
capability in itself. 
33 At least, according to Nussbaum’s list (2011: 33). 
34 For information on asexuality see e.g. the website of the Asexual Visibility and Education Network (AVEN): 
https://www.asexuality.org/?q=overview.html.  
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of being and doing per se. But as I’ve said, we may be able for some practical purposes to 
operate based on generalisations about what is valuable in most kinds of human life. More 
positively, however, we will advocate social interventions based on whether they create 
conditions that widen the scope of people’s self-creative freedom, their power to explore 
diverse ways of living and thereby find their way in the world autonomously. In some cases, 
policy recommendations from either point of view might well end up looking quite similar. 
For example, both might promote educational systems that cultivate critical thinking, or free 
access to art galleries. But even if some course of action would be ostensibly the same on 
either view, the way in which we justify it might differ, and this is itself a politically 
important matter, because it reflects the privileging of different value commitments, and can 
imply judgements about people’s lives and values in different ways. 
A capability approach constructed from the self-creative perspective would in certain ways 
end up looking more like Sen’s version of the approach than Nussbaum’s. Sen has repeatedly 
resisted calls to tie the approach down to a general list of the most valuable functionings, or a 
determinate account of the relative ‘weights’ of different functionings, particularly via the 
strategy that I call species-properness.35 He has concerns that appealing to a view of human 
nature, “with a unique list of functionings for a good human life” will render the capability 
approach “tremendously overspecified”, and that adopting such a view could undermine the 
“deliberate incompleteness” of the capability approach.36    
There are a number of reasons for this “deliberate incompleteness”. The most basic normative 
reason, I think, is that Sen sees the shaping of one’s own life within conditions of freedom as 
an intrinsic aspect of flourishing itself, in a similar way to the self-creative concept of 
flourishing. In response to the view that freedom is valuable only as a means to fulfilling 
good functionings, Sen says: “That line of reasoning is often driven by the view that life 
consists of what really happens […]. There is a bit of an oversimplification here, since our 
freedom and choices are parts of our actual lives.”37 In other words, “in assessing our lives, 
we have reason to be interested not only in the kind of lives we manage to lead, but also in 
                                                          
35 See e.g. Sen 1993: 46-49; 1990: 43; 2005b: 157-159; 2009: 241-243. Sen re-affirmed this position during his 
key-note lecture, ‘On Specification and Measurement’, at the 2016 HDCA conference, saying that over-
specification in this regard was a worse fate than under-specification for the approach. 
36 Sen 1993: 46-49. 
37 Sen 2009: 235 (my italics). 
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the freedom that we actually have to choose between different styles and ways of living. 
Indeed, the freedom to determine the nature of our lives is one of the valued aspects of living 
that we have reason to treasure”.38 Thus, as I said above, one’s space of capability is not 
evaluable simply in terms of the particular functioning ‘outcomes’ it enables, but also in 
itself, as the space within which we explore the world, figure out what is good and bad, and 
shape our lives in relation to this (although Sen tends to reduce this all to a rather narrow idea 
of ‘choice between options’). The richness and openness of one’s space of capability has a 
direct bearing on one’s becoming-well in this respect, measured by the extent of ‘self-creative 
freedom’.  
 
3.3. Disability and identity 
Many people have physical and psychological constitutions which render their lives to 
various degrees closed off from certain of the ‘human functionings’ found on Nussbaum’s 
list. For example, many are blind, deaf, or lack the use of other sensory or emotional 
capacities included in the list; many people with Asperger syndrome or other forms of autism 
have difficulty engaging with others in certain ways, creating attachments, and thus fully 
achieving the functioning of social affiliation; and many have conditions which prevent 
bodily mobility, reproduction, certain forms of play, and many other kinds of activity deemed 
essential to a human life according to ‘the list’.39 These sorts of cases can help highlight the 
differences between a species-properness version of the capability approach and a self-
creative one. 
                                                          
38 Sen 2009: 227 (my italics). This highlights the fact that Sen’s view is closer to a self-creative concept of 
flourishing than an individual-properness one, in which freedom is good only as a means to realising one’s 
essential individual identity. One might attempt the latter interpretation of Sen, but I do not think it holds up. 
Part of what he sees as of value in capability freedom is the power to determine what ways of being really are 
important in our lives through engagement with the world and the activities of judgement. He does not see this 
power as valuable merely as a means to uncovering what is already truly authentic to ourselves. See in particular 
Sen’s discussion of the role of choice and reasoning in the constitution of individual identity, as opposed to the 
idea that identity is simply ‘discovered’ (2005a: 349-352). 
39 See e.g. Nussbaum 2011: 33-34. 
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The implications of the species-properness approach are relatively straightforward. In any of 
these cases, the inability40 in question is intrinsically bad, and what makes it bad is that it 
constitutes a deviation from proper form. These peoples’ lives are not ‘fully human’. They 
have something essential missing, and thus cannot be said to be flourishing.41 Furthermore, 
gaining the ability in question would necessarily make their life better, because it would make 
it more fully human.42  
There is an issue discussed in the philosophy of disability that is particularly problematic for 
this approach. This is that many of these supposedly ‘defective’ people would not agree that 
their condition is a bad thing in their lives, or that ‘curing’ it would make their life better. 
Many such people, especially when they have grown up with their condition, genuinely 
regard it as a constitutive part of their identity, or as integral to their particular way of being 
in the world, and do not see themselves as ‘incomplete’ because of it. For reasons like this, 
                                                          
40 I say ‘inability’ rather than ‘disability’ so as not to beg the evaluative question – ‘disability’, I assume, implies 
negative judgement about an inability. Thus, not all inabilities need be disabilities. The issue at stake here is 
when, why, and in what way we ought to treat an inability as a disability. 
41 Nussbaum sometimes claims that, on the contrary, her approach does not imply that people with these sorts of 
inability are cut off from a flourishing life: e.g. “we owe [respect] to people with mental impairments as fully 
equal citizens who are members of the human community and who have the ability to lead a good human life” 
(2006: 190 (my italics)). However, the implication of her conception of human functioning – with each 
component seen as essential to a “fully human” life, and thus to a good human life (see e.g. 2006: 181) – is 
precisely this.  
A defender of Foot/Thompson might also object that a bodily ‘defect’ like deafness does not make one less than 
‘fully human’ because, for these thinkers, this is a defect of our animal nature, not our specifically human 
nature, which consists in excellence of the rational will (see e.g. Foot 2001: 40-44; Thompson 2004: 58-60) 
(thanks to Edward Skidelsky for raising this point). To clarify, I do not mean to purport that these thinkers take 
the sense of hearing to be specific to the human good, part of what distinguishes humans from other animals, as 
it were. Rather, the discussion here only imputes the view that, for a human being taken as a whole, deafness is 
inherently a defect. ‘Taken as a whole’, the good of the-life-of-a-human can include properties/capacities, such 
as the sense of hearing, that are also part of the good of other animals (see also the beginning of I:2.1). So, by 
‘less than fully human life’ I here mean only ‘less than a good-life-for-a-human’, which can include both things 
specific to the human good and things that are not. In short, as long as the species-properness view in question 
takes the sense of hearing to be an essential feature of the kind of life proper to the species in question, then, I 
take the implication to be, a deaf individual of that species is inherently defective, or has an inherently less-than-
proper life, given what they essentially are. It is the issue of inherent defect in general that is at stake here, not 
whether that defect involves a lack of something specific to the kind in question. 
42 See e.g. Nussbaum’s comments on the condition of Sesha (a young girl with cerebral palsy (2006: 96)): “[I]f 
we could cure her condition and [thus] bring her up to the capabilities threshold, that is what we would do, 
because it is good […] for a human being to be able to function in these ways” (2006: 193 (my italics)). (Aside: 
the reason it is good to be able to function in the ways Nussbaum is referring to is because it is good to function 
in these ways – see footnote 6 in I:2.1.) See also Begon 2017. 
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many deaf people, for example, reject the suggestion that their lives would be improved if 
they had their condition ‘cured’, as do many people with forms of autism such as Asperger 
Syndrome. Their lives have a particular internally coherent structure which they have grown 
into, and in which they are at home. Often, for instance, they have developed particular ways 
of being-with-others that are atypical but essential, as they see it, to who they are and how 
they live – see for example the communicative world of the deaf community. What it is for 
these people to live well, they claim, is perfectly compatible with, or even dependent on, their 
particular atypical states of being.43 
Species-properness approaches have great trouble taking such self-understandings seriously, 
as long as the conception of the human good at play deems these people’s lives inherently 
‘sub-standard’ in some way. The implication is that at some level they must simply be 
mistaken in their self-understanding; they just don’t realise that their lives would just be 
better if they didn’t have these conditions (see also next sub-section, on the notion of 
‘adaptive preferences’).44 
If we feel that this approach neglects something of importance in the self-understanding of 
such people, or even fails to respect their autonomy and individuality, then I think the self-
creative approach can do somewhat better. Firstly, this view certainly does not deny that the 
kinds of inability mentioned above are, in general, capable of being detrimental to an 
individual’s flourishing. If they create disharmony within their lives, e.g. by preventing the 
fulfilment of other important aspects of their being-well, then they would be considered bad 
in this respect. However, in taking this perspective we will not pre-judge the matter in the 
way the properness approach does. We will at least see it as possible for the condition in 
question to form a genuinely positive part of the individual’s being-well, in the kinds of way 
just mentioned. So, this approach will at least not dismiss these claims a priori, as simply 
failures by the individuals in question to understand their good properly. 
At the same time, however, we will also not take the individual’s subjective appraisals or 
preferences as infallible, or defer to them as absolutely authoritative regarding what is, or 
would be, good and bad in their life. The self-creative perspective recognises that the shape 
                                                          
43 See e.g. Cooper 2007; Glackin 2016: Begon 2017; 2018. See also information on Asperger Syndrome on the 
website of the UK National Autistic Society: http://www.autism.org.uk/about/what-is/asperger.aspx. 
44 See also Begon 2015; 2018; Glackin 2016. 
118 
 
of one’s being-well is capable of change, since it is the product of the ongoing process of 
figuring out one’s way in the world, and it sees this process as neither entirely determined by 
circumstance, nor simply controlled by the choice or judgement of the individual. On top of 
this, it includes the dimension of self-creative freedom into the parameters of flourishing. 
This means that if some change in life would constitute an empowering enrichment of the 
conditions within which the individual goes on finding their way in the world, this would be 
understood as in itself a good thing, independently of its significance for the individual’s 
more immediate being-well (although this doesn’t mean that this intrinsic good would 
automatically outweigh any negative effects of the change in other respects – I’ll give an 
example in a moment). 
Given these complications, let’s examine the case of the deaf person – call him ‘Joel’ – who 
is deeply convinced that his deafness is integral to his identity, and that his life would not be 
improved by its removal (a feasible medical option in many cases, and increasingly so). The 
self-creative perspective acknowledges a range of possibilities.  
Firstly, it is possible that Joel is right. The transition to hearing could, all things considered, 
be detrimental to his quality of life. Most likely this will be the case if his deafness is so 
integral to the internal harmony of his existence that, were it removed, his ability to flourish 
in many other important activities and relationships would collapse. Like a body that rejects 
an organ transplant, he may be unable to integrate the new capacity into the functional whole 
of his life in a positive way. Thus, even if the acquisition of hearing otherwise constitutes an 
enrichment of Joel’s openness to the world, and an enhancement of self-creative freedom in 
this particular respect, this benefit would be won at the loss of much more. The transition to 
hearing would be a ‘shock to the system’ more destructive than empowering. Importantly, 
this could turn out to be the case even if the individual had predicted that their life would be 
improved by gaining hearing, and had specifically desired the change. 
Secondly, whilst we are able to appreciate how Joel’s self-evaluation could indeed highlight 
something deep and important about his particular good as it stands, we will also not preclude 
the possibility that he turns out to be wrong about the impact of a transition to hearing. If it 
opens up his life to a richer space of activity and experience, and can be integrated into a 
newly re-arranged coherent way of being without fundamental disruption, then we would 
consider it a positive change. New experience can bring genuinely novel change to our 
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perspective on what is good, and Joel may even come to believe that his view of things had 
previously been too narrow.  
In short, whereas species-properness approaches lend themselves to somewhat black and 
white conclusions about issues of disability/inability, the approach advocated here introduces 
a few much needed shades of grey. We are not forced to commit to an abstract categorisation 
of any particular functioning as in itself either a good or bad thing.45 The ultimate point of 
reference is always the dynamic of the individual context and its particular parameters of 
significance, which cannot be subordinated to some idea of what is proper, normal, or natural 
for the kind of being in question. In instances where the transformation from deafness to 
hearing does turn out to be an improvement of life, a Nussbaumian species norm would turn 
out to have been a good guide. But it would be so by accident, as it were. 
One might respond to this discussion as follows. Okay, so some people who happen to have 
atypical conditions, e.g. deafness, might be better off staying as they are than ‘going normal’, 
but isn’t it still the case that these people would have been better off if they’d never been deaf 
at all?46 This claim is interpretable in a couple of ways. On one interpretation it requires 
playing fast and loose with the notion of individual identity in a way that renders it 
meaningless. On another interpretation there is a limited sense in which the self-creative 
perspective could agree with it, as a general statement about the value of hearing over 
deafness, but even this turns out to require assumptions about context that preclude drawing 
categorical normative conclusions from it. 
Firstly, if we take this claim as it stands, as a counterfactual claim about how someone’s life 
would have been if they’d never been deaf, then it faces a deep conceptual difficulty 
regarding the way it treats the identity of the individual referred to. Given that, in the 
examples discussed just now, the individuals in question are in part defined by their deafness, 
that it constitutes part of who they are, then the ‘they’ we claim would have been better off 
having never been deaf would not be the same individual if this were the case, so the 
comparison becomes very difficult to make. One of the implications of the praxic view of 
becoming is that there is no essential core to the being’s identity that can be abstracted from 
                                                          
45 For a detailed discussion of some of the different possible factors involved in answering the question ‘Can it 
be a good thing to be deaf?’ that comes to a similarly non-categorical conclusion, see Cooper 2007.  
46 Thanks to Edward Skidelsky for raising this difficult question with me. 
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the particular history of their existence; their ‘nature’ is the immanent product of this history. 
The more deeply the state of being that we are attempting to evaluate is bound up with the 
very identity of the individual for whom we are attempting to assess its value, the more 
meaningless this counterfactual claim becomes. To illustrate this point in a different way: I 
often think that I would like to have lived on the Left Bank of the Seine in the 1920s, that this 
would have been a good life for me. Am I right or wrong in this judgement (assuming, that is, 
that my romanticised idea of this moment in history is even accurate)? A little reflection 
shows that this is hardly a meaningful question at all. The ‘me’ that I imagine cavorting about 
in absinthe bars with Hemingway and Picasso is a being whose very identity is bound up with 
having grown up in rural Britain around the turn of the twenty-first century. The question of 
whether, had ‘I’ lived in Paris in the 1920s, this would have been a good life for ‘me’ relies 
on intellectual gymnastics that render the question itself meaningless. If I had lived in 1920s 
Paris, I wouldn’t have been me.47 
But perhaps we should take this claim in a different way, not as a counterfactual about any 
life in particular but as a general claim about the value of hearing over deafness. The 
perspective advocated in this chapter allows for a limited way of affirming this claim. As 
stated, this perspective holds enhancement of self-creative freedom to be in itself a good 
thing. From this point of view, given the assumption that hearing constitutes a comparatively 
richer space of possibility and openness to the world than deafness, then we would say it has 
a positive value over deafness, at least in this respect. So, one might reply, have I admitted 
that hearing is in itself better than deafness? No. Although the assumption involved here does 
seem a natural one to make, this is because we take for granted the presence of a whole set of 
‘normal conditions’ that generally enable hearing to constitute a greater scope for 
engagement with the world than deafness. These conditions do not come for free with the 
sense of hearing. Imagine that the world was suddenly subjected to a constant high-pitched 
noise, perhaps due to some meteorological phenomenon, that gave all but the deaf crippling 
headaches and vastly reduced their ability to act in and experience the world in many other 
respects. Under these conditions we would no longer assert of one of our deaf associates that 
they ‘would have been better off having never been deaf’, even in the restricted sense of 
being able to explore and engage with the world more openly. There is no ‘hearing’ and 
                                                          
47 I can conceive of being a time-traveller, and travelling back to this period as who I am now, but this is not 
analogous to the case at hand. 
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‘deafness’ that we can evaluate as things ‘in themselves’, in isolation from actually existing 
living beings in interaction with particular circumstances in the world. Although we can make 
generalisations about the value of different states under ‘normal’ conditions, this does not 
provide ground for categorical evaluations, not least ones that attach value based on an idea 
of what is inherently proper for members of a species type.  
 
3.4. From ‘adaptive preferences’ to ‘restrictive horizons’ 
Part of the reason Nussbaum introduces her universal conception of human functioning is to 
avoid certain intuitive problems that arise if we simply defer to subjective preferences when 
evaluating life-conditions. The kinds of case usually cited in this context are ones of 
domination or oppression – e.g. slaves worn down into willing compliance, or “hopelessly 
subdued housewives”48 – in which, we feel, someone’s declared contentment with their life is 
more indicative of a way of psychologically coping with their situation than a genuine 
reflection of their flourishing. By deferring uncritically to subjective appraisals or preferences 
we fail to recognise that expectations and aspirations can be ‘adapted’ to cope with bad 
circumstances, and we are left with no way of criticising those circumstances themselves, no 
way of saying what makes them bad. Also, our understanding of improvement of life is 
restricted simply to the better satisfaction of existing preferences. (See also 0:1.3.) 
I think there are important concerns highlighted by these sorts of case, and that they do 
indeed mean that we should not simply defer to subjective appraisals as absolutely 
authoritative in matters of life-evaluation. However, I do not think, as Nussbaum seems to, 
that acknowledging this requires swinging to the opposite extreme of asserting a universal list 
of things that are in themselves good for all humans qua human. The implication of this 
response is to imply that anyone whose preferences don’t match up with our conception of 
the human essence is simply mistaken about their good. This has its own problems. It 
effectively excludes these voices from quality of life assessment, which, as we saw above 
with people like Joel, has the potential to neglect important nuances in the issue.49 The 
                                                          
48 Sen 1999: 63. 
49 Others have also expressed concern that the essentialist framing of ‘adaptive preferences’ can fail to respect, 
and even lead to real restrictions of, individual autonomy, because it licences excluding the voices of those 
deemed to have simply a mistaken point of view (e.g. Sugden 2006; Antony 2000: 24-25; Clark 2013: 179-181; 
Glackin 2016: 318-323; Begon 2017). The view I am presenting here, in which immediate preferences are not 
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discussion of the previous sub-section shows how the self-creative perspective can avoid the 
problems of uncritical deferral to subjective preference whilst overcoming the limitations of 
the species-properness response. 
From the self-creative perspective, the central matter of concern highlighted by the kinds of 
case often said to reveal ‘adaptive preferences’ is not that the individual’s circumstances have 
forced them into the wrong kinds of preference, but that these circumstances represent major 
restrictions on their self-creative freedom. What we will find perturbing about these cases is 
not simply that, e.g. the subdued housewife has no inclination for something that might, as it 
happens, improve her life (say, social affiliation beyond the home). The deeper issue will be 
the conditions within which her particular preferences have arisen, and within which she 
continues to live. We will be concerned with the openness of her space of possible 
exploration of the world, with her freedom to engage in what Mill called “experiments of 
living”.50 Our primary object of criticism will therefore not be her preferences per se, but the 
situation they are a response to.  
Importantly, we will stress that, through the enhancement of this space of freedom itself, her 
quality of life could be improved in a way that goes above and beyond simply the better 
satisfaction of existing preferences. As a result of this it could well be that her particular way 
of getting along in the world is in turn transformed through engagement with a richer set of 
possibilities, and that her subjective appraisal of what is good in life changes with this. 
However, we will not primarily be concerned with what it is that she comes to express 
preference for, but rather with the extent to which those preferences are formed under 
conditions of self-creative freedom.  
The notion of ‘adaptive’ or ‘adapted’ preferences, at least when framed in terms of species 
essentialism, brings to mind some set of ‘non-adapted’ preferences for all the right and 
properly human things, preferences which arise naturally as long as they are not warped by 
                                                          
seen as infallible, but nonetheless it is the particularity of the individual context that is the proper ground of 
evaluation, ought to allay some of these fears. See Sen’s reply to Sugden (Sen 2006: 87-94), which points in a 
similar direction in certain ways, and also Qizilbash 2006.  
50 Mill 1991 [1859]: 63. 
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external influence.51 This makes no sense on the praxic view of becoming. Every individual’s 
way of being and conception of the good emerges from an ongoing interactive negotiation 
with contingent circumstances. All preferences are, in this sense, ‘adapted’.52 On this view, 
we should be less concerned with identifying ‘adaptive preferences’ than with identifying 
‘restrictive horizons of possibility’.  
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, on this view the ultimate point of reference in 
matters of life-evaluation is always the immanent dynamic of the individual context. This 
means that we will not neglect the particularities of individual lives or exclude the voices of 
those with atypical ways of being from reasoning about quality of life. In questions of being-
well in particular – what matters for the immediate harmony of one’s form of life at time of 
asking – subjective preferences will often be relatively reliable guides.  
However, this does not mean that we will understand subjective preferences as either 
definitive or infallible regarding what is or could be good in someone’s life. We will never 
defer to the declared preferences of the individual uncritically, especially with respect to 
evaluation of some way of being which they lack the capability to explore – whether due to 
constitution or external restriction. But even when our subjective appraisal of different 
possibilities is formed under conditions of relatively diverse and open experience, our own 
good is not necessarily transparent to us, and nor are the processes of development it can 
undergo entirely under our control. Enhancement of capability in some area of life in which a 
lack had not previously registered as dissatisfaction, might yet open access to a positive good 
hitherto not perceived, in such a way that it becomes integrated into the individual’s 
particular way of being-well. Furthermore, this perspective will always assert that the 
opening up of possibility, and the increase in freedom this represents, has a distinct value of 
its own, whether or not the corresponding functioning becomes positively integrated in this 
sense. 
Therefore, by taking the individual life as the ontological ground of the norms relevant to it 
we are not forced to treat subjective appraisal as absolutely authoritative. And by 
                                                          
51 This bears an interesting structural similarity with the essentialist/neo-preformationist conception of 
biological development, in which proper phenotype is seen as unfolding from an inner plan as long as external 
conditions do not force it off course (discussed in detail in Chapters V and VI). 
52 For a similar point see Begon 2015: 243; and related comments in Barker 2015: 97-98. 
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acknowledging the intrinsic significance of the dimension of self-creative freedom we have a 
way to criticise and evaluate the conditions through which one finds a way in the world, 
above and beyond the question of existing preference satisfaction. In this way the self-
creative perspective can remain sensitive to the dangers of uncritical deferral to subjective 
preferences whilst also rejecting the need to resort to a species-essentialist approach that can 
end up neglecting the unique perspective of the individual.  
 
3.5. A note on ‘individualism’ 
The way that the self-creative concept affirms individual particularity doesn’t imply a view of 
becoming as something that happens best in isolation from others – it doesn’t mean that 
development of individuality must occur through opposition to others, or even independently 
of social interaction altogether. On the contrary, relationality in general is already assumed as 
part of the notion of becoming as praxis, and this can include inter-personal affiliation, social 
identification, enculturation, and so on. Equally, however, one’s particular way of being is 
not seen as simply ‘imprinted’ by external circumstance, but rather as constructed through 
ongoing interaction with context. So this view implies neither a crude idea of individual 
autonomy as independent control over one’s life, nor a simple ‘social determinism’ (see 
related discussion in VI:2.5, 3.3). 
Also, the ‘individualist’ status of the self-creative perspective does not imply a privileging of 
selfish or egoistic goods. Most, if not all, people cannot imagine a good life that is lived apart 
from community association, reciprocity, even positive altruism towards others. These things 
are part of what it is for them to live well. They are essential to how they get along in the 
world, and even positive ends around which much else in their life is organised. The sense in 
which it is ‘individualist’ is, as described, that it treats the individual context and particular 
history as the ontological ground of the norms relevant to evaluation of life, rather than, say, 
the species essence. 
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4. Table: Two concepts of flourishing 
 Flourishing as properness Flourishing as self-creativity 
Inspired by… Poietic interpretation of organismic 
becoming. 
Praxic interpretation of 
organismic becoming. 
Being-well Being in state of correspondence 
between concrete life and transcendent 
form; i.e. ‘properness’ or ‘proper 
functioning’. 
Content determined transcendently. 
Being in state of internal 
harmony between elements of 
the life, e.g. capacities, 
activities, needs, ends. 
Particular ‘own way’ of being-
well determined immanently. 
Being-badly Lack of fulfilment of transcendent 
form; ‘improperness’, ‘defectiveness’. 
Lack of internal coherence; 
conflict, tension between 
elements of life. 
Becoming 
evaluated in 
terms of 
outcomes 
Movement towards/away from 
properness. Change that produces 
greater properness/reduces ability to 
achieve properness. 
Change that enhances/disrupts 
ability to live in own 
immanently defined way.  
Becoming 
evaluated in 
terms of the 
process itself 
[N/A] Expansion/contraction of self-
creative freedom: power to 
explore a space of possibility, 
find one’s way in life openly. 
Individual 
understood as… 
(Primarily) normatively heteronomous 
(subject to transcendent 
prescriptions/standards for the life-
form it ‘bears’). 
Normatively autonomous 
(immanent/reflexive 
determination of own norms) – 
to different degrees. 
Social/political 
aims… 
Create conditions which enable people 
to live properly, fulfil proper form. 
Create conditions which enable 
people to be-well in their 
particular way, and those which 
enhance self-creative freedom. 
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Part Two 
The Question of Biology 
 
Introduction 
In Part 1 I contrasted two ways organising the conceptual space between ‘living’ and ‘living 
well’. I outlined two opposing normative frameworks for approaching the evaluation of life, 
and related these to two contrasting metaphysics of organismic being and becoming. A 
poietic metaphysics underlies the presupposition of the properness concept of flourishing, as 
seen in the neo-Aristotelian views presented in Chapters I-II. In a parallel but different way, 
the self-creative concept is developed by re-framing the becoming of life as a form of praxis.   
The question of how we ought to understand the being and becoming of living organisms, is 
therefore pertinent to the coherence of these alternative perspectives, when grasped in this 
way, as ‘organic concepts of the good’. And this is an issue in which biology, the scientific 
study of living phenomena, has a legitimate role to play. What resources can we garner from 
an engagement with biological theory for consideration of this issue? Does biology give us 
reason to embrace one metaphysical view over the other? Does it show one perspective to 
bring organismic becoming into view more adequately than the other? Part 2 considers these 
questions through an interpretive engagement with biological theory, and argues that, for 
reasons internal to this domain, we should indeed take up the shift from a poietic to a praxic 
interpretation of becoming proposed at the start of Chapter III. 
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Chapter IV 
Neo-Aristotelianism and the Question of Biology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter can be read as an extended aside from the main narrative of the thesis, but it also 
provides important groundwork for the argument of Part 2 as a whole, qua attempt to criticise 
neo-Aristotelian thinking ‘from a biological perspective’. Before turning to an explicit 
discussion of biological theory, it is important to address some existing debate on the relation 
between biology and neo-Aristotelianism, and to clarify where the argument of this thesis 
stands in relation to this. This serves a strategic purpose. In recent years, a number of 
biologically-oriented criticisms have been levelled at neo-Aristotelianisms of the sort seen in 
Chapters I and II. In response to this defenders usually deny that their theories are ‘based on 
biology’ in the senses assumed. This suggests that criticisms from a biological perspective are 
therefore generally misplaced, or bound to ‘talk past’ their targets. Thus, it might be asked, 
am I not heading towards a dead-end by considering the significance of biological thinking 
for theories of flourishing at all?  
My answer to this concern is the following. Firstly, as far as the argument of this thesis is 
concerned I grant to neo-Aristotelianism that many of the common bio-oriented criticisms it 
faces are indeed talking past it. They attribute to it kinds of reliance on the biological that, it 
is reasonably argued, are not the case. The assumption of the most common lines of criticism, 
which I discuss below, is that the content of particular normative claims about species good is 
straightforwardly derived from empirical claims about biological reality in one way or 
another. Neo-Aristotelians reasonably respond that judgements about species norms are not 
derived in this way, but are ‘normative all the way down’, and thus in certain ways immune 
to things like empirical ‘counter examples’. However, the question of how this content is 
derived is not the level at which my critique is pitched. The deeper and more interesting way 
that the approach in question does, in fact, ‘rely on biology’ relates to the form of the concept 
of flourishing which is employed, within which any particular conception of species good 
might be affirmed. It is at this level of analysis that I have already identified the role of a 
poietic metaphysics of life in naturalising the properness concept, and at which I shall 
continue to address the issue in the remainder of Part 2.  
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Thus, I allow that much of the bio-oriented criticism directed at neo-Aristotelianism has 
tended to talk past it, and that defenders thus have reasonable grounds to reject it. However, 
this does not mean that biology is entirely irrelevant to the coherence of the approach, rather 
that for a critical perspective informed by biology to have purchase it needs to address it at a 
more fundamental level. 
 
1. Facts and values 
First of all, a general philosophical issue. In considering the validity of attempts to draw 
normative criteria from claims about the ‘nature’ of one’s species, an obvious place to begin 
is the question of whether an illegitimate leap from ‘facts’ to ‘values’, or from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, 
has been committed. It seems that the neo-Aristotelian views I have outlined invite such an 
objection.1 They begin from descriptions of, e.g., ‘the human species’, and from these they 
derive prescriptions to which individual humans are supposedly subject. However, this 
general line of criticism can be something of a red herring. The central reason for this is that 
the descriptions in question, the claims about ‘nature’ or ‘the species’ from which they begin, 
are understood to be ‘normative’ from the start (and so productive of normative implications 
for individuals). As discussed in I:2.1, these descriptions – which Thompson calls natural-
historical judgements – are not empirical descriptions of any individual or group of 
individuals. In particular, they are not claims about empirical universality or even statistical 
normality. Rather they are claims about the so-called ‘life-form’ of a species – the way a 
being’s life must go for it to be a good token of some living type, for it to be an exemplary 
instance of the species. For example, the fact that most mayflies do not breed at all is no 
refutation of the generalised life-form claim that ‘mayflies breed shortly before dying’; nor 
can one refute the claim that ‘horses have four legs’ by pointing out that some only have 
three. These ‘counter-examples’, for the neo-Aristotelian, simply refer to defective examples 
of the mayfly and horse types; life-form judgements describe how the individuals of a type 
essentially are, to which their concrete reality may or may not conform, and in this sense 
describe how they, as concrete particulars, should be. No particular individual need ever have 
                                                          
1 Thompson acknowledges the likelihood of this challenge (2008: 31). 
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actually manifested all aspects of the life-form successfully in order for these claims to be 
true – as Thompson puts it, “nobody’s perfect”.2  
This situation is reflected in Nussbaum. As also discussed in I:2.1, Nussbaum denies that her 
view derives conclusions about what is good for an individual of some species from an 
‘external’ empirical standpoint. Rather, we are invited to consider what the ‘proper 
functionings’ of the human species are, what activities and ways of being are essential to 
being ‘truly’, ‘properly’, or ‘fully’ human. This cannot be determined simply by looking 
dispassionately at humans as they are – it is, from the start, a form of value-laden judgement. 
No doubt, making this sort of judgement requires observational experience of the species in 
question, human or otherwise, in order to construct a representation of their ‘proper’ or 
‘characteristic’ way of life. But the judgements themselves, which supposedly discover the 
content of this way of life, are more than simply a statistical aggregation of empirical 
experience.3 Given these clarifications, the general objection that this perspective simply 
moves from (value-free) facts to normative claims somewhat misses the mark: the view is not 
‘based on biology’, or otherwise empirical facts, in this sense. 
 
2. Essentialism and species universality  
Another potential red herring, related to the preceding, has to do with criticism of a particular 
kind of ‘species essentialism’. In II:2 I aligned the metaphysics of life underlying the 
properness concept with what I called ‘teleological essentialism’, focusing on the notion that 
organisms are given ‘essences’ which define their being-what-they-are-properly, which 
specify the proper teloi of their development. This metaphysics allows us to imagine a 
separation between the concrete life of the organism and its underlying essential reality, and 
thus creates space for the normative logic of proper and defective (realisation of essence). I 
then introduced the poiesis/praxis distinction as a way to characterise this metaphysics, partly 
in order to avoid certain other connotations of ‘essentialism’. One such, much discussed, 
variety of ‘essentialism’ in biology provides a way of classifying organisms according to 
species membership. The idea is that each biological species (defined in terms of genealogy 
                                                          
2 Thompson 2008: 72. 
3 Lott 2012 clarifies this matter very well. 
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or reproductive relations)4 is characterised by a cluster of properties that are universal to all 
members and sufficient to distinguish them from other species. This classificatory form of 
‘species essentialism’ is not the same as the poietic/teleological essentialism just described; it 
is worth clarifying this in order to distinguish the argument of this thesis from another 
potentially misleading line of criticism.  
There is a general consensus in modern biology that essentialism about species classification 
is untenable, because the actual and possible variation within a biological species need not 
follow these strict essentialist guidelines.5 Whether for any given population there are in fact 
some universal and distinctive properties is first and foremost an empirical question, the 
answer to which seems usually to be negative in relation to biological species.6 But the 
deeper point is that biology gives us no reason to assume that the answer should be positive. 
The temptation to assume this ‘classificatory’ species essentialism is sometimes taken to be a 
remnant of what Ernst Mayr calls ‘typological’ thinking – a pre-Darwinian philosophy of 
nature which accounts for the diversity of species by reference to an ideal reality of distinct 
type-essences underlying the material world, and accounts for variation between individuals 
of a type as the more or less perfect realisation of their shared essence.7 As Mayr puts it, this 
ideal reality is composed of “a limited number of fixed, unchangeable “ideas” underlying the 
observed variability, with the eidos (idea) being the only thing that is fixed and real while the 
                                                          
4 That is, according to the common ‘biological species’ definition, or related variants based on genealogical 
relations and reproductive isolation (see e.g. Mayr 1976 [1957]; Richards 2008). I will not go into detail about 
the various possible ‘biological’ definitions of species; the main point here is to distinguish any such definition 
from strictly morphological definitions (which could, in many cases, make species essentialism true by 
stipulation, although it would probably end up dividing most taxa into many more ‘species’ than common 
biological definitions do). 
5 For various elements of this anti-essentialist consensus, see e.g. Mayr 1959; 1982; 1992; 1995; Sober 1980; 
Dupré 1981; 1986; 1998; 2012: 73-74, Ch 16; Hull 1986; Kitcher 1999; Lewens 2012; 2015: Ch 4; Sterelny & 
Griffiths 1999: 7-10. 
6 See Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 7-8. 
7 Typological thinking might make classificatory species essentialism ‘tempting’, as I say here, but they are not 
the same thing (see also Wilkins 2013). Rather, typological thinking is more closely related with (if not the same 
as) the ‘essentialism’ behind neo-Aristotelianism (‘teleological essentialism’, or the poietic view of becoming). I 
return to this point in a moment, and in Chapter V. 
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observed variability has no more reality than the shadows of an object on a cave wall, as it is 
stated in Plato’s allegory”.8  
Darwinian evolutionary science has undermined the idea that biological diversity is carved up 
in this way, separated into natural kinds with strict boundaries and defining features, 
determined by some underlying ontological unity within types. Species are “continually 
evolving clusters of more or less similar organisms”,9 and the boundaries we appeal to for 
classificatory purposes can blur into each other, both diachronically and synchronically. In 
modern biology, claims about the constitution of a particular species, e.g. the composition of 
‘human nature’, are justifiable only as statistical generalisations or abstractions from an 
empirically circumscribed population of individuals (e.g. the genealogical lineage labelled 
Homo sapiens), not as descriptions of some universal and/or distinctive properties that define 
species membership.10 If there does happen to be a cluster of properties across a biological 
species capable of fulfilling this role, that would simply be historical accident, and wouldn’t 
be able to carry the normative weight of a teleological ‘essence’ inherent in each individual.  
As it happens, I think the poietic view of life behind the neo-Aristotelian properness concept 
is a version of the kind of thinking that Mayr calls ‘typological’, and is undermined by 
modern biology for related reasons, as I argue in Chapters V and VI.11 However, I think the 
way to understand this, and to get at the reasons for rejecting the properness view, is not to be 
found by aligning neo-Aristotelianism with the classificatory species essentialism outlined 
just now. This specific objection is a red herring, as I shall now explain. 
Such an objection would go something like the following. The neo-Aristotelian approach to 
human flourishing assumes that there is a human nature/essence, in the sense of a set of 
properties universal to all Homo sapiens and distinctive of them as a kind, and that it is the 
human ‘essence’ in this sense that determines the content of the human good. This presents it 
                                                          
8 Mayr 1959: 2; see also Lewontin 2000c: 66-68. 
9 As Sterelny & Griffiths put it (1999: 8). 
10 This is what, in contrast to typological thinking, Mayr calls ‘populationist’ thinking, which he takes to be 
central to biology post-Darwin (see e.g. 1959; 1982; 1992; 1995). On the question of ‘human nature’ in 
particular, see Hull 1986; Dupré 1998; Kitcher 1999; Lewens 2015: Ch 4. 
11 However, to complicate things further, I think Mayr himself (along with other representatives of neo-
Darwinism) fails to live up to his proclamation of the death of typological metaphysics – it re-emerges in the 
context of developmental theory. I explain this in Chapter V. 
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with two main problems. Firstly, following the anti-essentialist consensus in biology, there is 
no such thing as human nature in this sense, and no reason to assume that there should be, so 
the view is based on flawed biology.12 Secondly, even if there does happen to be a set of 
universal and distinctive human properties, it doesn’t seem that this can give us normative 
claims of the sort expounded by neo-Aristotelian ethics. Such a move would face the general 
illegitimacy of moving from facts to values: just because all humans have some particular 
characteristics doesn’t mean it is good for them to have them (whatever we might take this to 
mean). More specifically, it wouldn’t make any sense to posit such characteristics as oughts 
for individuals of a given species, since manifesting these features is the basis on which we 
determine species membership in the first place. I.e. if one qualifies as a member of the 
human species, then one already manifests the properties that constitute the proposed 
conception of the human good, allowing no space for comparative evaluation of individual 
human lives, no space for better and worse cases of ‘being human’.13 Loss of some essential 
human property would simply imply that the individual ceased to be human at all, as with my 
example from II:2 about the water molecule that loses a hydrogen atom: it simply becomes 
hydroxide, rather than ‘defective water’.14  
This sort of objection would indeed present problems for the neo-Aristotelian view, if it 
understood that view aright. However, for the most part, it doesn’t. There are two main 
reasons for this. Firstly, the kind of neo-Aristotelian claims we have considered, about what 
                                                          
12 This interpretation and objection is central to Kitcher 1999 (in relation to Hurka’s ‘perfectionist’ approach), 
and is implied in the brief discussion of biological issues in Lenman 2014: §4.1. 
13 Dupré makes a similar point in terms of the (normative) notion of ‘normality’: “We cannot, of course, identify 
normality with possession merely of the essential properties of the kind to which something belongs, since that 
is a condition on being a member of the kind at all, normal or abnormal” (1998: 226). Kitcher makes related 
points at several places in 1999. 
14 This would be the case whether the properties that make up the proposed essence are ‘phenotypic’ 
(morphology, behaviour etc.) or ‘genotypic’, in the sense of properties of the genome itself. If we define a 
human being as an organism with a particular set of genetic structures, then it wouldn’t make much sense to say 
that the human good was contained in having these definitive structures, since all human beings would, by 
definition, already have them. A much more likely appeal to genetics would understand the genome as, in some 
way, defining the proper shape of the organism’s phenotype and developmental process. In this case, the good 
would be the realisation of the form specified by the genome, and the genome would constitute or reflect the 
being’s ‘essence’ in the sense of determining the way it is ‘meant to be’. This would be a different kind of 
biological essentialism to the classificatory variety being discussed here. It would, in fact, be a way of 
attempting to justify precisely the ‘teleological essentialism’ I have characterised as poietic. For this reason, this 
conception of genetics is central to the discussion in the following two chapters. 
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constitutes ‘proper humanness’, for example, are not strictly claims about what determines 
the classification of individuals as members of the human species per se. As mentioned in 
I:2.1 in relation to Nussbaum, judgements about the good of individuals in terms of species-
properness relate to individuals who are already classified as members of the relevant type. 
Their being so classified is a condition of their being subject to the imperatives of a particular 
life-form.15 Another way to put this: the objection assumes and attacks the wrong kind of 
‘essentialism’.16 The life-form ‘essence’ that unites all members of a kind is not the 
properties that determine membership of that kind in the first place, but the properties that 
they will succeed in manifesting if they fulfil the standards for members of that kind: it’s not 
about what’s essential for being a human per se, but what’s essential for being human 
properly. The objection is correct that essentialism about species classification is unable to 
provide a rationale for the kind of normative theory we are interested in, but this is not the 
same kind of ‘essentialism’ that the neo-Aristotelian view involves. The classificatory version 
imagines organisms as static objects and categorises them according to their actual features. 
This says nothing about the interpretation of processes of change and development, which is 
central to understanding the separation of concrete life and essential reality in the properness 
perspective (see II:2 again).    
This response is a special case of the more general response to accusations of fact-value 
fallacy, given in the preceding section: claims about life-forms are judgements about what is 
proper or appropriate for beings of a certain kind, not claims about the empirical constitution 
of any particular individuals, not least claims that all the individuals of some population share 
some distinctive features universally. Facts about actual and possible variation within a kind 
are not knock-downs against this view, since variation (read: better and worse realisation of 
proper form) is to be expected. This is the reason, on this view, that we can make evaluative 
judgements about the lives of individual beings at all. So, the first mistake of the objection 
being considered is that it assumes that neo-Aristotelian claims about a species ‘essence’ – 
                                                          
15 It is also worth noting that the normative implications in question are not only about the development of 
features that are distinctive of one’s kind, which would seem to be implied by the accusation that the approach 
begins from classificatory species essentialism. Species-properness ethics, at least of the sort I am considering 
(Nussbaum, Foot/Thompson), concerns the whole form of life of the kind, not just what (if anything) is unique 
to that kind. 
16 Odenbaugh makes a related point about Kitcher’s (1999) criticism of neo-Aristotelianism – it is off the mark 
because it assumes that the target is an “excessively strong form of essentialism” (2017: 1039). 
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about the content of a life-form – refer to some properties actually shared universally in the 
species. But the neo-Aristotelian view is not derived from empirical claims in this sense (it’s 
‘not based on biology’, in the sense of statistical descriptions of biological species). On the 
contrary, it is precisely the point of this view that not all beings subject to a particular 
essential life-form need realise all of its features in their existence.  
Even if we acknowledge this, however, we might still continue to labour under a second 
misunderstanding. This would be to think that a ‘kind’ in the neo-Aristotelian schema at least 
corresponds with some standard ‘biological’ demarcation of species, e.g. in terms of 
genealogical relations or reproductive isolation. This is not necessarily the case. This is 
another sense in which neo-Aristotelians can claim that their theory is ‘not based on biology’: 
an organism’s kind-classification, and thus the life-form it is subject to, is not determined 
simply by its location on the tree of life, as it were.  
Nussbaum, for instance, does not include all Homo sapiens as subjects of the human life-
form. Take the example of individuals with extreme congenital mental impairments, such as 
anencephalic infants. Instead of classifying them as radically ‘defective’ humans, she treats 
them as not part of the human kind at all, “but a different form of life”.17 One might take a 
different line to Nussbaum, and simply stipulate that all Homo sapiens are of the human kind. 
But one would then face the issue of explaining what it is about a genealogically-demarcated 
group that means all members ought to realise the same characteristic way of living. 
Nussbaum clearly recognises that the relations that constitute ‘biological species’ are not 
sufficient for the job of determining the normative life-form that an organism bears.18 For 
Nussbaum this seems to be because of the possibility of radical variation in constitution 
within any such group; thus she ties kind-classification in part to the ‘innate constitution’ of 
individuals, particularly whether they have teleological ‘potentials’ for the functionings that 
constitute the human life-form.19 As I argued in II:4, this appeal to innate teleology reflects 
the (poietic) conception of organismic becoming that, I claim, underlies the properness 
concept of flourishing. On this basis most Homo sapiens will, no doubt, be understood to 
have more or less the same proper form, due to the contingent similarities of their innate 
                                                          
17 Nussbaum 2006: 187. 
18 As does Thompson (2008: 58-60). 
19 As discussed in I:2.1 and II:4.  
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constitution, so for practical purposes the neo-Aristotelian will often be able to generalise and 
treat the human ‘kind’ as co-extensive with Homo sapiens. But there is no necessary 
correspondence between the latter and the former.20 It is worth noting that this separation 
between ‘kind’ and biological taxonomy is also another way that neo-Aristotelianism can be 
seen as ‘normative from the start’ – even the classification of an individual into a kind in the 
first place relies indirectly on judgement about the proper form of the kind in question, 
combined with, in Nussbaum’s case, an understanding of whether the individual is innately 
structured towards realising that form.21  
To summarise, objections against neo-Aristotelianism that appeal to some fact of empirical 
variation within a biological species can be rebutted by stipulating either that a) the 
differences in question render some members of that population simply ‘defective’ examples 
of the kind; or b) place them outside of the ‘kind’ in question altogether. In this way the neo-
Aristotelian view protects itself against general accusations of fact-value fallacy (because 
their idea of species ‘essence’ is normative from the start), and also against the more specific 
accusation that they draw normative implications from a classificatory form of species 
essentialism which is biologically untenable, and unable to provide grounds for normative 
imperatives even if true.  
 
3. Function and evolution 
Another major source of bio-oriented criticism, to which we again get the response that the 
neo-Aristotelian view is ‘not based on biology’ in the sense assumed, has to do with the 
concept of function. Foot and Thompson talk about species ‘life-forms’ not simply as 
collections of independent elements, but as coherent or integrated wholes. They use a notion 
of functionality to talk about the internal relations of a life-form.22 The features, activities, 
and capacities that compose the proper life-form of a particular kind – that constitute “how 
                                                          
20 I will not pursue further the question of whether and how neo-Aristotelians ought to draw lines between 
‘defective’ humans and beings subject to different life-forms altogether. This is because the more fundamental 
issue is whether biology justifies thinking about living beings in terms of the logic of essence-realisation at all. 
This is the focus of the next two chapters. 
21 It’s not entirely clear to me what determines kind-membership in this sense in the view of Foot/Thompson. 
22 See Foot 2001: Ch 2, especially 28-33; Thompson 2008: Ch 4, especially 77-78. 
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creatures of this kind live”23 – are all things that ‘play a part’ in that characteristic life, that fit 
together in some specific way.24 That is, they stand in functional relations to each other, in 
the sense of having “relations of dependence”25 as parts within the integrated whole of the 
life-form. They make particular contributions to the development, maintenance, or 
reproduction of the life-form itself, they constitute its ‘way of getting along’. 
This gives us some more detail regarding how the content of a species life-form is understood 
in the Foot/Thompson view. It doesn’t include just any features that we might deem ‘normal 
characteristics’ of a kind, but only those which stand in some relations of mutual dependence 
with each other, or with the continued existence of the life-form as a whole.26 To take Foot’s 
example,27 the noisy rustling of a tree’s leaves when it is windy might in some sense be 
‘characteristic’ of the kind of tree in question (i.e. to be expected, perhaps because it is a 
consequence of its proper development in other respects), but this noise-making (we assume) 
does not in any way feed back into “the ‘how’ of what happens in the life cycle of that 
species”.28 It is organisationally irrelevant with respect to the rest of the life-form of trees of 
this kind. Insofar as it does not ‘play a part’ in the tree’s proper life, the tree’s rustling ‘has no 
function’, in Foot’s sense of the term. On the other hand, the opening of colourful flowers 
when it is sunny plays a role, for many kinds of plant, in attracting pollinators, which 
contributes to other aspects of the life-form, such as its very reproduction. We can link 
natural-historical judgements such as ‘the iris has colourful petals’ and ‘the iris reproduces 
                                                          
23 Foot 2001: 28. 
24 Nussbaum has also expressed this aspect of the life-form idea. When comparing an individual that has its 
proper species functionings to one that is missing one of other of them, she says that the life of the former will 
have “an organic harmony about it, whether the animal is human or nonhuman: the various abilities [will] 
interlock in a way that is more harmonious than disharmonious” (2006: 192). Thus, she assumes that the 
components of the life-form of any species ‘fit together’ in a certain internally coherent way. The life of the 
properly-formed individual will, it is assumed, therefore reflect the internal “organic harmony” of the species 
life-form.  
25 Thompson 2008: 78. 
26 This specification was proposed by Foot as an amendment or clarification of Thompson’s earlier discussion of 
the life-form idea (e.g. Thompson 1995), as a way of specifying the particular normative significance of natural-
historical judgements (Foot 2001: 30). Thompson acknowledges this, and incorporates it into his own analysis 
(2008: 77-78). 
27 Foot 2001: 30, 33. 
28 Foot 2001: 32. 
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via insect pollination’ by understanding the relations of mutual dependence between the parts 
and processes referred to.29 These relations can be expressed in functional terms, e.g.: ‘The 
iris’s colourful petals function to attract insects’; ‘the attraction of insects plays a role in 
spreading pollen’, and so on.30 
To take another example, part of the way that the human life-form is enabled and sustained is 
through certain kinds of social relations. On this basis Foot and Thompson develop their 
theory that moral virtue be understood according to the same logic of judgement that is 
applicable elsewhere in life. The virtues of honesty and trustworthiness, for example, play 
roles in maintaining the integrity of certain forms of communicative and cooperative social 
relations through which humans live their characteristic kind of life – “we can’t get on 
without” the moral virtues.31 An individual with a disposition to lie and break promises is 
thus ‘defective’: they fail to realise behavioural characteristics that have functional roles 
within the human life-form, or, more strongly, such individuals may be positively mal-
functional in this respect – detrimental to the maintenance of aspects of the human life-form. 
Moral vice, according to Foot and Thompson, is in this sense a kind of ‘natural defect’ in 
humans, like having drab or un-opening flowers is in certain plants, or having no sting is in a 
bee. 
A number of critics of the Foot/Thompson approach have raised objections by latching on to 
their use of the language of ‘function’. The general idea uniting these objections is that a 
proper understanding of evolutionary biology undermines the neo-Aristotelian perspective, 
by showing that its approach to function in the living world is in some way misguided.  
A number of lines of criticism start from the idea that evolution reveals biological 
functionality to be aimed at the ultimate end of reproductive fitness, usually seen in terms of 
genetic replication, and that this undermines various elements of the neo-Aristotelian 
                                                          
29 See also Thompson 2008: 72: For any living kind there is a “system of true natural-historical judgments” that 
are internally related to the “totality” which is the life-form of the kind. Individual (true) natural-historical 
judgements are “out-takes from such an ensemble”. 
30 Thompson states that such inter-relations can also be described in ‘teleological’ terms, with linking phrases 
such as ‘in order to’, etc., but argues that such phrases do not introduce an element of intentionality into the 
relations (2008: 77-79). Whether we buy his argument or not, I do not think that such language – which 
certainly suggests intentionality – is necessary to express the notion of inter-related and reciprocally dependent 
systems of parts and processes (see also footnote 55 below). 
31 Quote from Foot 2001: 17, see also in general Ch 3. 
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normative perspective. For example, William FitzPatrick focuses on what he sees as a 
mistaken alignment in neo-Aristotelianism between ‘natural function’ and what is ‘good for’ 
the organism.32 Because biological functionality is supposedly aimed at reproductive or 
genetic fitness, rather than organismic welfare, this general alignment is false. Moreover, 
often the fulfilment of ‘genetic’ functions is positively bad for the welfare of the organism, in 
a straightforward sense to do with their health and survival.33 For example, a bee’s sting has a 
function in protecting the hive, and thus promoting the reproductive success of genetic 
relatives. Yet, fulfilling this function, for the individual bee, is fatal. Similarly, male elephant 
seals engage in violent competition for dominance, which often leads to serious injury for 
many individuals. This behaviour has a purely ‘genetic’ function as well; it is not for the sake 
of benefiting the elephant seals that engage in it. Thus neo-Aristotelians cannot ground claims 
about the organism’s flourishing in ‘natural facts’ about biological function, because the real 
facts about biological function are that individual welfare is not the general end of biological 
organisation, and many traits even have biological functions which are contrary to the 
individual’s own good. 
Similar arguments are made regarding the validity of deriving claims about moral virtue from 
natural functionality. Critics such as Joseph Millum and Jay Odenbaugh appeal to 
evolutionary biology in ways similar to the above, and argue that on this basis neo-
Aristotelianism either ends up being committed to repugnant moral implications, or it ought 
to reject the idea of deriving moral conclusions from biological function, in order to uphold 
moral intuitions.34 The objectionable implications can arise in various ways. For example, 
one might argue that a neo-Aristotelianism that understands biology aright must be 
committed to seeing reproductive fitness as the measure of moral virtue. For example, neo-
Aristotelians would only be able to claim that dishonesty is a moral vice if/when it is bad for 
reproductive fitness. Or it might be seen to imply that what most consider moral virtues are 
only really so if they have historically been adapted by natural selection for the general end of 
genetic replication. At the very least this makes virtue and vice contingent and instrumental 
                                                          
32 FitzPatrick 2000. See Lott 2012 for a summary and response. 
33 See e.g. FitzPatrick 2000: 62, 186; Lott 2012: 363-364. Lewens raises a similar objection (2015: Ch 10). 
34 Millum 2006; Odenbaugh 2017; see also a similar comments in Andreou 2006. 
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in a way that neo-Aristotelians clearly do not intend.35 Evolutionary biology seems to imply 
that the neo-Aristotelian either needs to give up on the idea that moral goodness is a variety 
of natural goodness, and vice natural defect, or radically revise their moral intuitions about 
right and wrong – because ‘nature’ seems to play by different rules. 
A number of kinds of response are available to the neo-Aristotelian.36 I will focus here on one 
of the key issues – the different concepts of function at play in these arguments. Neo-
Aristotelians tend to respond to this issue in the following way. ‘Evolutionary’ objections like 
the above either misunderstand the kind of ‘function’ concept that neo-Aristotelians are 
employing, or if they do understand it they falsely believe that evolutionary biology 
undermines its validity. This means that there is a certain amount of talking at cross purposes 
going on. I think they have good grounds for this response. 
The concept of function usually appealed to in these ‘evolutionary’ objections is an 
‘etiological’ one. Etiological accounts of function do not attempt to simply describe relations 
between parts of a system as it exists at any one time, but to ascribe to particular parts a 
‘proper function’, a role that the entity in question is really ‘for’. Specifically, etiological 
accounts define the proper function of an entity in terms of what explains that entity’s 
existence in the system.37 According to Larry Wright’s original definition of etiological 
function, ‘The function of X is Z’ “means (a) X is there because it does Z; (b) Z is a 
consequence (or result) of X’s being there”.38 For example, I might point at some part of a 
                                                          
35 See also Lott 2012: 360-361. 
36 For detailed responses to these and similar objections, see Lott 2012; Hacker-Wright 2009; Woodford 2016. I 
will not respond specifically to the issues about moral virtue and vice, since my primary subject-matter in this 
thesis is not this but the concept of ‘flourishing’ more generally (which may or may not include moral virtue – 
see 0:1.2). Another important response which I won’t consider in more detail relates particularly to the first 
objection – that evolutionary function is in conflict with the ‘welfare’ of the organism. The response is that the 
neo-Aristotelian concept of ‘flourishing’ is not necessarily the same as the kind of ‘welfare’ assumed in the 
objection in the first place. What constitutes flourishing in the sense of ‘being a proper exemplar of the species’ 
need not be ‘good for’ the individual in the narrower sense assumed (i.e. the objection begs the question about 
the content of ‘the good’). For example, for the individual bee, the neo-Aristotelian might say that what it is to 
live well, qua bee, involves having the capacity and disposition to act in a way that, in certain circumstances, 
would sacrifice the individual’s very existence. Foot uses this example to make roughly this point (2001: 35). 
See also Lott 2012: 357-358, 364-366; Hacker-Wright 2009: 313. 
37 See e.g. Wright 1973: 154-168; Garson 2011: 526-537. The term ‘etiological’ is derived from the Greek aitia 
for ‘cause’ or ‘reason’ (Garson 2011: 526; Boorse 2002: 65). 
38 Wright 1973: 161. 
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machine and ask the inventor, ‘Why is that there?’, and be satisfied with the answer, 
‘Because it makes it go faster’. Part X makes the machine ‘go faster’, and that explains why it 
is there in the machine – its capacity to produce this effect is the reason the inventor put it 
there. Thus the ‘proper function’ of X is ‘making it go faster’; that is what X is ‘for’.  
In modern biological theory a popular account of functionality in organisms understands the 
concept etiologically, by attributing the determination of biological function to a history of 
adaptation by natural selection. This is often known as the ‘selected effects’ account of 
biological function.39 A trait can have many kinds of ‘effect’, and can ‘contribute’ to the life 
of the organism in many ways, but what it is really ‘for’ is producing the effect that it was 
‘selected for’ in the history of the organism’s lineage, it is ‘for’ playing that role by virtue of 
which it is an ‘adaptation’. I.e. the proper function(s) of a trait is doing the thing(s) by which 
ancestors of that trait contributed to the differential reproductive fitness of ancestors of that 
organism, because this is what explains the part’s existence today, via its proliferation within 
the benefited lineage.  
As an extension of this view we can say that contribution to reproductive fitness (whether in 
terms of genetic replication or reproduction of offspring) – since this is ultimately what 
explains the current existence of all parts of an organism ‘with a proper function’ – is the 
“ultimate purpose” of all functional biological structure,40 is the over-arching organising 
principle in life. Hence the suggestion by some critics that, if Foot et al are serious in their 
appeal the notion of biological functionality, then reproductive success ought to play a central 
role in the derivation of their conceptions of species good.41 
Defenders of the Foot/Thompson view protest that a) the concept of ‘function’ in their claims 
about the constitution of life-forms is not an etiological one; and b) the concept they do use is 
                                                          
39 See e.g. Garson 2011: 530-537; Griffiths 1993; Godfrey-Smith 1994; Wright 1973: 159. 
40 George C. Williams uses the phrase “ultimate purpose” in this connection (Williams 1996: 43-44, 157) and 
the same idea is suggested by Richard Dawkins when he says that the preservation of genes is “the ultimate 
rationale for our existence” (1989 [1976]: 20). See also Pinker 1997: 42-44. 
41 Although the selected effects concept can be a useful heuristic in certain contexts, I think there are deep 
problems with it as a basic account of biological functionality, and with the notion of reproduction as an over-
arching purpose that emerges from it (for reasons similar to those expressed in McLaughlin 2001: 208-213; 
Lewens 2004). But this matter will not be discussed in this thesis – all that is needed here is to show that the 
Foot/Thompson approach is not simply another kind of etiological concept, and that the notion of function they 
do employ is independently valid. 
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an independently important one that is not undermined, and cannot be replaced, by etiological 
analysis.42 
Regarding a), they do not in any way tie ascriptions of function to what explains the existence 
of the thing being described. What they are interested in is not what explains why something 
exists, or why it is the way it is, but rather the role that it actually plays in the ‘way of life’ of 
a being currently in existence.43 A fortiori, their descriptions of functional relations within a 
life-form are not attempts to make claims about evolutionary history. Foot says that 
statements about a life-form are claims “about a species at a given historical time”; that they 
deal with “‘stills’ […] from the moving picture of the evolution of species”.44 Distinguishing 
her meaning from the selected effects (or adaptation) concept, she says: “To say that some 
feature of a living thing is an adaptation is to place it in the history of a species. To say that it 
has a function [in her sense] is to say that it has a certain place in the life of the individuals 
that belong to that species at a certain time”.45 As Micah Lott puts it, “[n]eo-Aristotelian 
judgments articulate the functional relations within a life form; they do not attempt to explain 
how the life form came to be as it is”.46 None of the thinkers I am considering deny the fact 
of evolution, nor the importance of natural selection in its explanation, but since their 
function claims are not etiological, they would also, as it happens, be consistent with other 
explanations of organic form, such as theological or intelligent design theories.47 
One might be tempted to respond that, despite these claims, the Footian notion of function is 
really an etiological concept, just one that specifies a particularly narrow time-frame for 
explanation, e.g. only paying attention to the life-cycle patterns of recent generations.48 I 
                                                          
42 For elaboration of these points, see Lott 2012; Hacker-Wright 2009; Woodford 2016. 
43 Or that was in existence at the time our natural-historical judgements refer to (see Thompson 2008: 65). For 
example, we might say that ‘The stegosaurus has spikes on its tail’, and ‘Stegosaurus tails spikes play a role in 
defence against predators’, without implying that there are currently any stegosauruses in existence. 
44 Foot 2001: 29. 
45 Foot 2001: 32 (fn 10) (my italics), see also 40 (fn 1). 
46 Lott 2012: 363, see also 358, 372; Thompson 2008: 79; Woodford 2016: 11, 14; Hacker-Wright 2009: 312. 
47 Both Foot and Thompson make this point explicitly (Foot 2001: 32; Thompson 2008: 79). 
48 In this way one might align it with specifically ‘modern history’ versions of selected effects accounts, which 
are a way of dealing with the fact that functionality changes over time by attributing the determination of current 
proper function just to the most recent action of natural selection on that trait (see e.g. Godfrey-Smith 1994).  
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think this would be to miss the point – they are very different concepts of function altogether. 
Let’s take an illustration. I still have an appendix; what is its function? There is a 
straightforward sense in which it ‘has no biological function’. That is, the modern human 
appendix is vestigial – it is something which currently plays no role in the organisation or 
maintenance of modern human organisms, even if ancestors of it did so in the lives of 
ancestors of modern humans (e.g. by helping to digest tough or fibrous kinds of vegetation), 
and were promoted by natural selection on that basis.49 That is, my appendix has no 
significant ‘relations of mutual dependence’ with other aspects of my organisation as a living 
being. This intuitive notion of ‘function’, according to which vestigial traits are features 
without function, has the same structure as that present in the Foot/Thompson idea of 
organisational relations within a species life-form. It is not an etiological concept. Employing 
an etiological concept, one could say that the appendix does ‘have a proper function’ – e.g. 
helping to digest tough vegetation, assuming that this capacity helps explain why we have 
appendixes at all – it’s just that it no longer fulfils that function. These are two different uses 
of ‘function’ language altogether, and it is not inconsistent to believe both that the appendix 
is vestigial in the first sense, and has a ‘proper function’ in the etiological sense.  
The concept Foot and Thompson appeal to is a generalised version of what Dan Nicholson 
calls the ‘organisational’ concept of function in biology, “according to which the attribution 
of functions to the parts of an organism is […] determined by the means in which each of the 
parts individually contribute to the realization of the systemic organization that generates and 
maintains them”.50 It is a concept that starts from a system of parts and processes that stand in 
                                                          
49 On the issue of vestiges in relation to selected effects concepts of function, see e.g. Garson 2011: 535. 
Regarding the human appendix, this is at least the standard story (Darwin relays it, for example (2010 [1871]: 
12-13)). Not everyone agrees that the human appendix has no current function – see e.g. Bollinger et al 2007 for 
a theory about its providing a ‘safe house’ for certain kinds of gut bacteria. But this is beside the point; for the 
sake of the example I am simply assuming that the modern human appendix is genuinely vestigial.  
50 Nicholson 2014a: 355; see similar approach in McLaughlin 2001. Note that this goes beyond both the 
etiological concept of function and the ‘dispositional’ concept, which has been its traditional opposite (see also 
Garson’s overview of what he calls ‘consequentialist’ theories of function (2011: 537-545)). The organisational 
account, continues Nicholson, “avoids the familiar problems with the two classical philosophical accounts of 
function: the etiological and the dispositional. The etiological account, grounding function in selected effects, is 
too narrow to accommodate function talk in areas of biology not directly concerned with historical explanations 
(such as physiology, development, and molecular biology), whereas the dispositional account, by interpreting 
any means–ends relation as functional, is too broad to discriminate genuine functions from other kinds of causal 
relations. The merit of the organizational account is that it explains why some traits are functional while others 
are not (like the etiological account), whilst focusing on current contributions of function bearers rather than on 
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relations of mutual dependence with each other and with the whole system, and has to do 
with internal coherence within the system, holistic integration, how the parts ‘fit together’. 
One would need to incorporate many levels of analysis, including evolutionary-historical, in 
order to give a full explanation of the structure of the system at any point in time, but this is a 
different matter to giving a description of the functional relations within it, which is what 
Foot/Thompson are doing by describing the species ‘life-form’ in functional terms. 
Regarding b), the organisational concept is a valid and important one for our understanding 
of living systems, and cannot be replaced by or reduced to etiological terms. Firstly, as just 
explained, the two concepts are not in competition over the same conceptual turf, but have 
different subject matters – the first, the relations of integration and dependence between parts 
of a system (‘how it works’); the second, why something exists as part of the system (‘why it 
is there’). Secondly, it is the former that is most pertinent in a number of important practical 
and theoretical domains, such as physiology and medicine. In these fields, the central issue is 
whether and how something currently plays an active role in the life of the organism in 
question. It is on this basis that, for example, appendectomies are usually considered safe (the 
dangers of the actual procedure aside). What we care about is not why the organ is there at 
all, but if it is doing anything of importance. Pointing out that the appendix has a ‘proper’ 
adaptive function is not evidence against removing it; it is not, in itself, medically relevant. 
There’s a joke in here somewhere. How about: A selected effects theorist walks into an 
operating theatre. ‘Stop the appendectomy!’ he cries. ‘That appendix does have a function, 
it’s for digesting tough leaves!’. 
To take another example of the precedence of the organisational function notion: when, in the 
early seventeenth century, William Harvey ‘discovered the function of the heart’ in 
circulating blood, he did not understand this as explaining the origin (not least the evolution) 
of cardiovascular systems, but rather as revealing ‘how they work’ in existing animal bodies, 
as disclosing some significant relations of integration between the activities of existing parts 
in the context of a whole.51 Evolutionary history might help us explain how the heart came to 
be the way it is, and this may well have a lot to do with the roles it currently plays in the life 
                                                          
their histories (like the dispositional account). For this reason, it appears to provide a rather promising means of 
coming to terms with the functional aspect of life” (Nicholson 2014a: 355).   
51 See also Garson 2011: 534. 
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of the organism, but the two issues are at least conceptually distinct, and the former cannot 
replace the latter. 
Neo-Aristotelians are therefore able to respond to certain ‘evolutionary’ objections that their 
conceptions of species good are, once again, not ‘based on biology’, at least not in the way 
appealed to in the objections. Neo-Aristotelian claims about ‘good functioning’ are not 
claims about origins or causal history; in particular, when they say that something is part of 
an organism’s proper species form, they are not saying specifically that it is an adaptation, 
nor that its function is in general determined by the logic of selection according to 
reproductive fitness. Moreover, since the organisational concept deals with a different 
subject-matter – one which is itself important in the life sciences – evolutionary etiological 
analysis does not undermine or subordinate the general kind of function concept used in the 
Foot/Thompson view. Thus, criticisms that employ etiological claims about bio-function in 
an attempt to push neo-Aristotelians into admitting the necessity for different content in their 
conceptions of the (e.g. human) good, either misunderstand the kind of ‘function’ concept 
that neo-Aristotelians are employing, or if they do understand it they falsely believe that 
evolutionary biology undermines its validity. 
At this point it is worth noting some similarities and differences between the Foot/Thompson 
notion of proper life-form and the perspective that I advocate in this thesis. The notion of 
organisational functionality we have just seen manifested in the context of the former is 
structurally very similar to the way I describe the character of ‘being-well’ in the self-creative 
perspective (III:2). That is, in terms of integrative coherence or internal harmony between 
‘parts’ of the life as a whole.52 Reflecting this, when I talk about organismic ‘functionality’ in 
the remaining two chapters I will also be invoking the organisational concept, unless 
otherwise stated. I have praised Foot and Thompson here for their use of the organisational 
concept of function in general. It calls attention to a mode of thought central to understanding 
                                                          
52 The correspondence is between being-well and functioning well, of course, not merely a description of the 
relations of dependence within a life – these relations can be fulfilled through the successful performance of 
component processes etc., or they can be unfulfilled, integration between parts can break down through some 
part failing to play a role through which the coherence of the whole is sustained, etc. The same logic applies in 
both organisational-functional understanding of physiology and in my concept of individual being-well, which 
is a more general application of the same idea.  
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living phenomena, and provides, as Peter Woodford puts it, an important “corrective” to the 
dominant focus on the etiological evolutionary concept.53  
However, the way they apply it is still problematic. The main problem – and the main way 
that my use of the idea differs from the Foot/Thompson use – has to do with the object that is 
being functionally described. The primary object of description in the Foot/Thompson view is 
not the actual ‘way of getting along’ of any particular organism, but that determined by what 
they call the species ‘life-form’ – a general model understood in abstraction from individual 
particularity and turned back on individuals as a transcendent standard, entailing normative 
criteria for those seen as falling under it, as tokens to its type (see I:2.1). However, 
organisational functionality should be understood, first and foremost, in relation to a 
particular concrete living system, i.e. as a description of what constitutes the internal 
coherence of an individual life. To quote Nicholson on this idea again: “In a way, it is the 
organism itself that adjudicates the ascription of functions to its parts according to how they 
help it meet its physiological needs and cope with its environmental surroundings”.54 As is 
explained in much more detail in Chapter VI, organisms can be ‘put together’ in many 
different ways. Research into plasticity and context-sensitivity is showing how the most 
coherent a picture of organismic becoming is one in which the being’s form and functional 
relations are established within its particular ontogeny, rather than somehow pre-designated 
as particular ends for this process to realise.  
We might well draw statistical generalisations about functionality within some set of 
individuals, e.g. a biological species – and our ability to do so more or less reliably is the 
basis of standardised medical practices, for example – but it is the concrete individual which 
is ontologically (and normatively) prior here, in understanding the determination of actual 
functional relations. On the Foot/Thompson view, it is instead the ‘life-form’ that 
‘adjudicates’ proper organisation in the individual: it presents individual organisms as falling 
under a transcendent model according to which their (proper) functional organisation is pre-
designated. Although they invoke the organisational concept of functionality in their 
description of this transcendent model, functionality in the organism is seen as subordinated 
to this, as having this model given to it as a representation of the functional organisation it is 
                                                          
53 Woodford 2016: 2. 
54 Nicholson 2014a: 355 (my italics). 
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supposed to manifest. I.e. the species life-form is understood as having an internal coherence 
or organisational harmony in itself, but the good of the individual lies in their life 
corresponding with this model.55  
Thus, according to the perspective advocated in this thesis, the Foot/Thompson perspective 
gets the ontological relationship between organismic becoming and form/functionality the 
wrong way round. In the self-creative view, the good (being-well) of the individual involves 
their living in accordance with an internally coherent way of being in the world, but it does 
not demand that the way that they actually do live corresponds with an idealised model of life 
prescribed ‘by nature’, as it were. This indicates how engaging with developmental biology 
can provide valuable resources for understanding the possibilities for conceiving flourishing 
as an ‘organic’ concept of the good. 
 
4. The fact/value dilemma revisited 
The various ‘not based on biology’ responses that we have seen here are designed to 
immunise neo-Aristotelians against a variety of bio-oriented criticisms, such as those that 
take facts about empirical variation in a biological species to undermine their claims about 
the content of a species essence, or those that attempt to push them into deriving conceptions 
of the good from ideas about evolutionary adaptation. As far as the argument of this thesis is 
concerned, I grant the legitimacy of these responses here, and thus also that many of the 
common bio-oriented criticisms neo-Aristotelians face are, as they tend to say, talking past 
them. 
However, before moving on it is worth discussing a general dilemma that arises as a result of 
this defensive strategy. This has to do with how far neo-Aristotelianism can immunise itself 
                                                          
55 Foot and Thompson also use the language of ‘teleology’ to describe the internal functionality of the life-form 
(e.g. Foot 2001: 32-33). I have avoided this language in the discussion of functionality here, primarily in order 
to avoid conflation with the way I have used the term earlier, referring to the general (poietic) characterisation of 
development as a process with ends fore-seen in a pre-given essence, towards which it aims. This kind of 
teleology is implied in the life-form view, when applied to particular individuals (see Chapter II) (and is in this 
respect parallel with Mayr’s notion of ‘teleonomy’ – see V:2.4). If one wants to use the term ‘teleology’ in the 
sense implied by Foot/Thompson – as a synonym for internal organisational functionality (whether that of an 
individual organism or a species ‘life-form’) – then that is fine. But it means something quite different in this 
application to the notion of teleological process that I invoked in the characterisation of the poietic metaphysics 
of life. See also Oyama’s critique of Mayr’s notion of teleonomy (2000a [1985]: 149-154), and her reading of 
‘goals’ in biology as functional relations in inter-dependent processes, subject to change (185-187). 
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against ‘empirical defeaters’ and still claim the mantle of ethical ‘naturalism’ (Foot and 
Thompson), or (in Nussbaum’s case) the claim to be giving an ‘objective’ account of human 
essence that can stand in authority over subjective preferences. Each time neo-Aristotelians 
dismiss empirically-grounded objections, they hang the content of their conceptions of the 
good more and more on independent normative judgement. The logical end-point of this is 
that, in Thompson’s words, it “seem[s] to cut our propositions entirely free of ‘the facts’”.56 If 
any inconvenient empirical fact can be rebutted as irrelevant in this way, then it is hard to see 
what is left of the ‘natural’ or ‘objective’ facts that they claim to stand upon. It seems that, 
e.g., ‘the proper human form’ can be anything we want it to be.57 
Let’s look at this dilemma firstly in terms of Nussbaum’s view, and the issue of intra-species 
variation as discussed in Section 2 above. Nussbaum introduces her approach to quality of 
life in order to counter the perceived problem of ‘adaptive preferences’ (see 0:1.3 and 
III:3.4). Nussbaum goes beyond Sen’s critique of utilitarianism by arguing that simply 
moving from a focus on pleasure/satisfaction to functionings will not counter the problem of 
adaptive preferences, because we will still have the question of which functionings are the 
most valuable, and which it is thus the proper aim of social policy to enable. If this question 
is also answered by simply asking the individuals whose good is in question which 
functionings they most value, then it is no better off than the utilitarian approach.58 We need, 
she says, “a procedure of objective evaluation by which functionings can be assessed for their 
contribution to the good human life”.59 The procedure she proposes, as explained in I.2.1, is 
to “[ask] ourselves what is most important, what is an essential part of any life that is going to 
be rich enough to count as truly human”.60 The idea is that this procedure is less susceptible 
                                                          
56 Thompson 2008: 72, see also 81. Although it does go beyond the facts about any particular individual or 
group of individuals, Thompson still insists that judgements about a life-form are capable of truth and falsity, 
that there are facts about life-forms to which they answer (e.g. 81). I think this idea is easily pushed into 
incoherence. 
57 This general line of criticism – presenting neo-Aristotelian ‘naturalism’ with a dilemma in which it must 
either accept the normative significance of certain inconvenient ‘biological’ facts, or accept that it is not really 
‘naturalism’ at all – is found in some of the critics I have already referred to (e.g. Kitcher 1999; Millum 2006; 
Andreou 2006; Odenbaugh 2017), and in some others (in particular Antony 2000; Woodcock 2006; 2015). 
58 Nussbaum 1988: 174-178. 
59 1988: 176. 
60 1988: 175. 
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to ‘adaptive preferences’ because it asks us to identify ways of human life that are valuable 
universally. 
Enter the criticisms of ‘human nature’ from within-species variation, which put in question 
the necessity, or even the existence, of a shared universal ground on which such a judgement 
might be made. If the response to this sort of threat is to retreat to a ‘normative all the way 
down’ position (or what Nussbaum calls ‘internal’ essentialism),61 then the claim to 
determinacy and objectivity is severely weakened. From this position, the line between mere 
‘variation’ and ‘deviation from proper form’ will be determined by the normative judgement 
of the proponent (see Sections 1 and 2 above), which means that the account of ‘proper 
human form’ will only be authoritative to those who already value the things deemed to be 
essential, or who can be convinced to value them.62 Thus we have still gained no secure 
ground above ‘subjective preference’ in the way Nussbaum hopes.  
This problem also exists for the Foot/Thompson approach, and again has to do with the 
derivation of content for claims about the species life-form. Even given the general validity 
of the organisational concept of function that they appeal to, they seem to face problems 
justifying the claim that the internal functionality of every member of a species ought to be 
organised in the same way.63 How are they justified in insisting, for example, that certain 
traditional moral virtues are a necessary part of the coherence of all human lives, by virtue of 
a shared ‘nature’? Some commentators, such as Chrisoula Andreou and Alasdair MacIntyre, 
have argued that based on this general idea of ‘how certain kinds of lives characteristically 
get along’ it is equally plausible that there is a plurality of ‘life-forms’ within the human 
species, some of which manifest contrary functional facts.64 Consider, for example, the 
cunning and manipulative liar, or talented free-rider. These kinds of people have a holistically 
coherent way of life, but one that involves taking advantage of the kinds of cooperative 
structures that make other people’s kinds of life possible. These are kinds of human life that 
                                                          
61 See also e.g. Nussbaum 1992. 
62 See in particular Antony 2000 on this point. For Nussbaum’s response see her 2000b: she accepts this point, 
but doesn’t seem to acknowledge the problem it presents for her attempt to identify ‘objective’ grounds for 
normative judgement, beyond subjective preference. 
63 See in particular Woodcock 2006; 2015. 
64 See Andreou 2006; MacIntyre 2002: 626-627. 
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(we assume) most would consider morally vicious, yet, given that they are internally coherent 
ways of ‘getting along’, of which moral vice is a part, then we cannot, as Foot/Thompson 
would wish, describe their vicious character traits as ‘natural defects’. These kinds of people 
might even be considered valuable for strengthening the cooperative social structures on 
which they are parasitic, because they make others more vigilant.65 Consider also my 
example of the sacred three-legged horse from III:2. The point of this was that the internal 
organisational functionality of its particular life was consistent with, even dependent on, its 
having what the neo-Aristotelian would deem a ‘defect’. They can’t justify the claim that the 
‘normal’ horse standards are relevant for this particular horse based simply on the idea of 
organisational functionality – the problem is explaining why the functional relations internal 
to the supposedly universal ‘species life-form’ ought to be re-produced in any particular 
individual. 
Yet defenders of Foot and Thompson can (and do)66 reject such ‘counter examples’. The 
general argument seems to be: if you think these kinds of case present alternative candidates 
for accounts of human/horse flourishing, then you simply have not grasped the content of the 
human/horse good. With a little reflection we are all supposed to see that these kinds of 
people simply are defective humans, and the sacred horse simply a defective horse; these are 
the facts, and they tell us what is good for the individuals in these cases, end of. What this 
ultimately comes to is the assertion that their normative intuition, about how a token of ‘the 
species’ ought to be, trumps all. In relation to the human/moral vice examples, Hacker-
Wright is explicit about this, and admits that the Foot/Thompson view is “counting on our 
recognition of certain moral norms to validate [the posited view] about the characteristic 
human life”, a position “that will no doubt sound to many readers decidedly non-
naturalistic”.67 Indeed. If so, then it seems that this view cannot also claim that it is ‘natural 
facts’ about ‘human life’ that validate the moral norms they advocate. 
This debate seems to lead to something of an impasse: regarding any putative content of the 
human form, critics can argue that empirical grounds for its universality are lacking, to which 
neo-Aristotelians respond that their affirmation of this particular content is not based on 
                                                          
65 This is MacIntyre’s point (2002: 626-627).  
66 See e.g. Hacker-Wright 2009: 317-319. 
67 Hacker-Wright 2009: 315 (my italics). 
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empirical grounds, but on an already-normative idea of the species essence. To the extent that 
neo-Aristotelians aspire to ‘objectivity’ or claims about ‘nature’, they invite such criticisms, 
but when faced with them it is always possible to retreat to a position in which they fall on 
deaf ears.  
 
5. Flourishing and the question of biology: from content to form 
For many, this impasse may well be sufficient reason to abandon any discussion of the 
relationship between neo-Aristotelianism and biology. If we take neo-Aristotelians at their 
word, then their theories are not ‘based on biology’ in any substantive sense, and so 
continuing this line of enquiry is futile. At one level, I think this is probably the case, or at 
least I grant it to the neo-Aristotelian for the sake of argument. However, to abandon the issue 
here would, I think, be to miss the more interesting level at which the properness concept of 
flourishing as such interacts with an underlying conception of biological reality. The lines of 
criticism discussed in this chapter all, broadly speaking, concern how the content of a 
particular conception of the good is derived. It seems to me that the deeper ‘question of 
biology’ in relation to neo-Aristotelian ethics relates not to the grounds for including 
particular content in one’s conception of species flourishing, but to the form of normative 
logic that characterises the general concept of flourishing employed, whatever that content. 
I have already outlined this underlying conceptual structuring, at least as revealed in the 
thought of Foot/Thompson and Nussbaum, in Chapters I and II. It is worth stressing here that 
allowing to neo-Aristotelianism the defensive strategy discussed above, of denying the 
derivation of particular norms from empirical claims and retreating to a ‘normative all the 
way down’ position, does not undo this earlier analysis: the structuring of the properness 
concept itself by the assumption of a metaphysics of proper living form etc. is independent of 
the issue of how content is derived. Hacker-Wright makes this explicit (see also II:1):  
[G]rasping something as an organism requires us to situate the organism against its species 
or life-form. […] The existence of a life-form is presupposed whenever we identify 
anything as an organism. […] [T]o identify something as an organism is ipso facto to look 
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at it from [this] normative standpoint; and this is (logically) before developing any 
empirical theories of the organism.68 
The last part of this statement alludes to the now-familiar denial that empirical/biological 
claims are the basis for the particular content of a conception of species life-form – 
understanding of what is proper to a species is not simply taken from statistical 
generalisations about a population or theories about evolutionary history, for example. 
However, regardless of how this content is actually derived – the issue on which the debates 
discussed in this chapter centre – what this statement also reveals is the way in which the 
form of what I call the ‘properness’ concept, the particular normative logic of this concept, is 
nonetheless presupposed by apprehending the organic as such in a particular way, as 
something that inherently demands the logic of judgement-according-to-a-proper-form. 
Simply “grasping something as an organism” requires that we “situate [that] organism 
against” what we understand to be its proper way of living qua member of its kind. This 
concept of flourishing is, as Scott Woodcock (a critic) puts it, “derived from a logical form 
that is presupposed when we categorise something as a living organism”.69 This is why, in 
Part 1, I focused on this more fundamental normative conceptuality, rather than on the 
content of any particular conception of the good.  
To summarise, it may be allowed that many of the biologically-oriented criticisms faced by 
neo-Aristotelianism are misplaced, at least at a certain level of analysis. Nonetheless, the 
logic of properness itself is seen as arising simply from the fact that the objects of evaluation 
are living beings. As I argued in Chapter II, this presupposition is naturalised by a particular 
understanding of living nature – what I call a poietic metaphysics of life. Therefore, the more 
fundamental question of whether the living world does in fact necessitate, or even support, 
the assumption of this metaphysics, is pertinent to the coherence of the perspective itself. And 
this is a question in which biological theory has a legitimate role to play. 
Thus, after this extended aside, we can return to the questions posed at the beginning of Part 
2 (Introduction), regarding the adequacy of different interpretations of organismic becoming 
for apprehending living phenomena as such, and regarding the resources we can garner from 
                                                          
68 Hacker-Wright 2009: 310-311 (my italics, apart from “ipso facto” and “before”). See also Lott 2012. 
69 Woodcock 2015: 20. 
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biological theory for addressing this issue. This is the level at which the remainder of Part 2 is 
pitched.  
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Chapter V 
Get with the Programme: Becoming as Poiesis in Modern Biology  
 
Introduction 
Over the remaining two chapters I argue for the following response to the questions posed at 
the beginning of Part 2: The most coherent picture we have of the becoming of living beings 
is one that rejects the poietic and affirms the praxic metaphysics of life. Therefore, the 
interpretive lens assumed by the ‘properness’ theories of Foot/Thompson and Nussbaum is 
not a necessary part of a proper apprehension of living phenomena as such. On the contrary, 
it is inadequate to the reality of organismic becoming, and, furthermore, a conception of life 
that reflects the logic of praxis emerges as superior. 
In making this argument I appeal to a theoretical perspective on ontogeny that has risen in 
prominence in recent years, which I refer to as developmental constructivism (see Chapter 
VI). This view sees organic form and functionality as the unique product of each particular 
life course, as emergent from the contingent series of interactions within a system of 
heterogeneous elements that constitutes the being’s particular ontogeny. The organic 
‘product’ – the organism’s form, structural/functional relations and norms, ‘ways of living’, 
and so on – is not prescribed in advance of ontogeny, but ‘constructed’ within the process 
itself. And this process is ongoing throughout life; there is no state of ‘completion’ in which 
the organism fully realises an essence, only the continuous generation and re-generation of 
living existence through multiple layers of interactivity. Developmental constructivism 
therefore sees the immanent creativity and reflexivity of praxis as central to the becoming of 
living beings as such.  
I return to this picture and the positive argument for it in the next chapter. But first, it is 
important to gain an understanding of the thinking that developmental constructivism 
attempts to overcome, since it is defined as much by what it opposes as by the positive 
picture of ontogeny that it presents. In this chapter I outline the main target of this perspective 
in the context of modern biological thought – the neo-preformationist concept of the genetic 
‘programme’, and related notions – and show how it is instead part of a poietic metaphysics 
of life. In Chapter VI I then outline the constructivist critique of this way of thinking, and 
argue that developmental constructivism presents the most coherent picture we have of 
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organismic becoming, and that this demands a general aspect shift in our apprehension of 
living form and process, from the poietic to the praxic.1  
How should we understand the status of the discussion of biology in these two chapters, in 
relation to my analysis of the conceptuality of ‘flourishing’ in Part 1? As follows: The 
significance of this theoretical dispute over the nature of ontogeny is that it shows the 
antagonism between poietic and praxic metaphysics of life to be playing out within the arena 
of contemporary life science. By disrupting the former, previously dominant, way of thinking, 
and opening up space for the latter, the ‘constructivist turn’ thereby provides a philosophical 
resource for the task of re-thinking the notion of flourishing as an ‘organic’ concept of the 
good, and provides ground for the kind of re-thinking proposed in Chapter III.  
As this suggests, as well as looking outwards from biological theory towards the concept of 
flourishing, the argument of these two chapters also provides an internal critique of modern 
biology. I shall outline this sub-narrative first. 
 
1. Darwinian biology: beyond ‘Platonism’? 
The question of the biological validity of what I have called the poietic view of life – the 
thinking present in the teleological essentialism of ‘folk biology’ (II:2), the Platonic dualism 
of transcendent eidoi and concrete appearance (II:3), and neo-Aristotelian life-form ethics – 
might seem straightforward. As mentioned in IV:2, modern biology tends to see itself as 
having jettisoned this sort of metaphysics due to the revolution in worldview precipitated by 
Darwin’s theory of evolution and the historicisation of species.2 As Mayr puts it, modern 
biology has shifted from ‘typological’ (or ‘essentialist’, or ‘Platonist’) thinking, in which 
variation between individuals of a species reflects the more or less perfect realisation of an 
eidos, to a ‘populationist’ view in which statistical generalisations can be abstracted from the 
actual composition of a population, but not essences inferred.3 The implication seems to be 
that the poietic dualism of essential form and concrete becoming, in-forming eidos and in-
                                                          
1 The conceptual alignment of constructivism/praxis and neo-preformationism/poiesis has also been articulated 
by Rehmann-Sutter (2006). 
2 See e.g. Mayr 1959; 1982: 39, 45-47, 87. 
3 See IV:2; Mayr 1959; 1982; 1992; 1995; also e.g. Sober 1980; Hull 1986; Lewontin 2000c: 66-68. 
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formed matter, no longer holds water. Thus, we might think, surely the metaphysical 
assumptions of the neo-Aristotelian concept of flourishing are an obsolete format for 
apprehending living phenomena?4  
Ultimately, the answer to this is yes: the idea of a transcendent ‘nature’ that prescribes proper 
form to individuals is undermined by our most coherent understanding of life. However, as I 
shall explain in this chapter, the story is not quite as simple as ‘Darwinian biology has buried 
Plato’. This is because modern biology (primarily in its dominant ‘neo-Darwinian’ 
incarnation)5 has failed to live up to this anti-essentialist self-image; it has in certain ways 
remained tied to a framework of understanding that it purports in general to have overcome. 
‘Species’ might have been historicised, and taxonomic classification correspondingly de-
essentialised (see IV:2), but due to the prominence of certain (poietic) concepts at the level of 
the individual, particularly the notion that ontogeny is the unfolding of a genetic 
‘programme’, “[b]iology remains in many ways obdurately Platonic”, as Richard Lewontin 
put it over thirty years ago.6 In the decades since, developmental constructivism and related 
approaches, which attempt to go beyond this conceptual framework, have moved from the 
fringes of theory to gain prominence in a number of fields of biology.7 However, poietic 
metaphors remain to a large degree embedded in both popular and scientific understanding.8   
Thus, as I argue, Darwinian biology is yet to fully complete its own revolution against 
Platonic essentialism; it is still in the process of articulating it.9 By providing a way to purge 
                                                          
4 Overviews of the question of biology in neo-Aristotelianism often present the issue as straightforward in more 
or less this way (see e.g. Lenman 2014: §4.1). 
5 By ‘neo-Darwinism’ I refer here to the school of thought, dominant in biology in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, that combines the early-century ‘modern synthesis’ of natural selection theory and Mendelian genetics 
with the dominant assumptions of molecular genetics, in particular the idea that biological inheritance is 
exclusively mediated by nuclear DNA (see Dupré 2012: 144 for more detail on this definition). The element that 
primarily concerns me in this and the next chapter is the idea that DNA contains coded ‘instructions’ for 
producing a particular phenotype, and thus ‘programmes’ development. This idea, if not a strict implication of 
neo-Darwinism in the above sense, is almost always promulgated alongside it. 
6 Lewontin 2000c: 67 (first published 1983); he has repeated the claim more recently (e.g. 2000a [1998]: 6-10). 
See also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 137, 159. 
7 See Chapter VI Introduction. 
8 See also Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 323-327. 
9 See also Lewontin 2000c: 66-68.  
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its lingering poietic tropes, and thereby render the thinking of modern biology coherent with 
its self-image, developmental constructivism represents an important moment in the 
advancement of Darwinian biology’s metaphysical revolution (see Section 3 below and 
VI:3.2). 
 
2. Genetics and the poietic view of life 
2.1. Genetic essentialism and the programme concept 
The rise in the twentieth century of molecular biology as the dominant arena for the study of 
life centred on the analysis of a certain macro-molecular structure found in the nuclei of all 
the cells in a living body: DNA. The full collection of DNA molecules in a cell, arranged into 
chromosomes, is called a genome. Genomes, as material objects, are causally involved in a 
number of processes, such as the production of proteins, and the specific sequences of 
nucleotides (molecular elements) in a genome, often understood as divided up into ‘genes’, 
can make important differences to the results of such processes. What is interesting for our 
present purposes is not so much the empirical detail of the processes in which DNA is 
involved – although I return to this in Chapter VI – but the structure of a certain popular 
mythology and “mystique” that has built up around DNA and the genome.10  
In this mythology the genome has come to represent an apparently materialistic version of the 
notion of the organism’s true ‘nature’ or ‘essence’ that I traced in various forms in Chapters I 
and II. The pinnacle of this popular mythology was reached in the rhetoric around The 
Human Genome Project (HGP), the late-century undertaking to sequence the full set of DNA 
nucleotides in a human cell nucleus. Walter Gilbert, an early scientific proponent of the 
project, prophesied in the early 1990s that upon its completion, we will have put “three 
billion bases of sequence […] on a single compact disc (CD), and one will be able to pull a 
CD out of one’s pocket and say, “Here is a human being; it’s me!”.11 This essentialist 
enthusiasm was amplified by the comments made by project leader Francis Collins and US 
                                                          
10 I borrow the term “mystique” from Nelkin & Lindee’s seminal sociological study “The DNA Mystique” 
(1995). 
11 Gilbert 1992: 96. 
157 
 
President Bill Clinton to mark the completion of a ‘rough draft’ of the human genome in 
2000:  
Today, we celebrate the revelation of the first draft of the human book of life. […] It is 
humbling for me and awe-inspiring to realize that we have caught the first glimpse of our 
own instruction book, previously known only to God. […] What more powerful form of 
study of mankind could there be than to read our own instruction book?12 
Today, we are learning the language in which God created life.13 
Thus, it seems, the secret to fulfilling the Delphic maxim ‘know thyself’ lies in revealing the 
content of this inner message.14 The genetic ‘book of life’ can tell us who we really are.15 
This ‘who we are’ can be read at an individual level: the genetic essence as secular equivalent 
of the soul, defining each individual’s true character, identity, and even destiny.16 Or it can be 
read at a species level: ‘the human genome’ as defining what it really is to be human, the 
fundamental nature that unites all individuals qua humans. Often it is both at once, as in 
Gilbert’s claim that the CD in his pocket will contain the essence of both “a human being” 
                                                          
12 Collins 2000. 
13 Clinton 2000. 
14 See the comments of Charles DeLisi, another key architect of the HGP: “[T]he quest for the type of 
knowledge that the [HGP] will generate has, in one form or another, been an integral part of our intellectual 
heritage for centuries. It recalls one of the three great precepts chiselled on the temple at Delphi and echoed two 
millennia later in Alexander Pope’s Essay on Man: [‘know thyself’]” (1988: 488). 
15 As well as increased knowledge of ourselves, another hugely important promise of the science of genetics is 
the possibility of increased control over ourselves. The vision of modern genetic technologies as giving us the 
power to cure diseases, decide the characters of our children, and even transcend the limitations of our ‘natural’ 
human condition, by re-writing the instructions of life itself, is animated in part by the very idea of the genome 
as essence (see e.g. Mauron 2002: 957). On this mythology rests much of both the confident aspiration (e.g. 
Bostrom 2003; Harris 2007) and moral repugnance (e.g. Kass 1998 and Sandel 2007, discussed in Lewens 2015: 
Chs 2 & 4; and Habermas 2003, discussed in Barnes & Dupré 2008: Ch 7) that can be inspired by advances in 
technology for genetic manipulation. The topics of genetic engineering, transhumanism, and so on, bring up an 
entire field of issues – philosophical, technical, moral, and political – that I am deliberately leaving to one side 
here. The relationship between these issues and different concepts of flourishing, or the good and the bad in 
general, is a question that I would like to pursue in future work. 
16 Or, perhaps a not-so-secular equivalent, as the Collins and Clinton quotes suggest (Collins is a Christian 
scientist who is explicit in his understanding of DNA as the ‘language of God’ – see Collins 2007). See Nelkin 
& Lindee 1995 for a plethora of illustrations of this modern ‘folklore’ of the genome as soul, essence of 
individual identity, and embodiment of fate; also Mauron’s (critical) analysis of the same idea (2001; 2002), and 
similar in Scully 2006; Rehmann-Sutter 2008; Oyama 2009; 2010.  
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and “me”.17 As well as representing our ‘true nature’ in these ways,18 the genome is seen as 
an “instruction book”, a set of commands for the proper manifestation of this nature in the 
concrete organism.  
Comments such as these might seem like lyrical flourishes added atop hard-nosed science in 
order to capture public imagination, and to some extent they are. But they are not simply this; 
the essentialism they express is in fact validated by the dominant language of modern life 
science. Of particular importance in this regard is the alignment of the genome with the 
concept of a ‘programme’, and some closely related notions such as ‘code’, ‘blueprint’, and 
‘information’, semantic/quasi-intentional concepts to which the genome seems well-fitted by 
the omnipresent depictions of it as a sequence of letters (As, Cs, Gs, and Ts). These 
informational metaphors were borrowed from computer science and communications theory, 
fields that were burgeoning around the time of the molecular discoveries of Francis Crick and 
James Watson in 1953, and DNA’s subsequent rise to fame.19 The first uses of the term 
‘programme’ to interpret genetic material came a few years later.20 This is the 
aforementioned Ernst Mayr, leading figure in neo-Darwinism, in 1961:  
The completely individualistic and yet also species-specific DNA code of every zygote 
(fertilised egg cell), which controls the development of the central and peripheral nervous 
                                                          
17 Gilbert 1992: 96. Incidentally, this ambiguity highlights a major flaw in the notion that what the HGP 
eventually published in 2003 was ‘the human genome’ (see ‘International Consortium Completes Human 
Genome Project’ (2003), non-authored article by the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI)). It 
published a ‘full’ genome, but this was not a sequence of nucleotides that is found in all humans, since there is 
much variation between individual genomes. It was actually composed by combining information from a 
number of different individuals. It was, at best, a potential human genome, although in reality, as Lewontin puts 
it, “a mosaic of some hypothetical average person corresponding to no one” (2000c: 155). 
18 And possibly in other ways (see 2.2 below). The ideas of species essence and individual identity are just the 
most common ways of understanding the genetic definition of ‘true nature’. 
19 On the history of these connections, see Kay 2000; Keller 2000: Ch 3; 2002: Ch 4; Peluffo 2015. 
20 It seems (see Keller 2000: 80, 159 (fn 11); Peluffo 2015) that this term was first used in print simultaneously 
by Mayr (1961) and Jacob & Monod (1961: 353-354). It was soon after elaborated more explicitly, e.g. in 
Jacob’s The Logic of Life (1993 [1970]: e.g. 1-10). Erwin Schrödinger’s popular book What Is Life? (1992 
[1944]) is a key example of even earlier use of informational and textual metaphors such as ‘code-script’ to refer 
to the contents of the cell nucleus (see Ch 2 in particular). Chromosomes, he claims, “contain in some kind of 
code-script the entire pattern of the individual’s future development and of its functioning in the mature state” 
(1992 [1944]: 21); see also Nicholson 2014b: 164.  
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systems, of the sense organs, of the hormones, of physiology and morphology, is the 
program for the behaviour computer of [an] individual.21  
And this is François Jacob, Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist, in 1970: 
Heredity is described today in terms of information, messages and code. […] What are 
transmitted from generation to generation are the ‘instructions’ specifying the molecular 
structures: the architectural plans of the future organism. They are also the means of 
executing these plans and of coordinating the activities of the system.22 In the 
chromosomes received from its parents, each egg therefore contains its entire future: the 
stages of its development, the shape and the properties of the living being which will 
emerge. The organism thus becomes the realization of a programme prescribed by its 
heredity.23 
Jacob also makes explicit the derivation of the programme concept from computer science:  
The programme is a model borrowed from electronic computers. It equates the genetic 
material of an egg with the magnetic tape of a computer. It evokes a series of operations 
to be carried out, the rigidity of their sequence and their underlying purpose.24 
These are typical examples of the language of the genetic programme; the notion that the 
chromosomes carry lines of coded information that instruct the development of the organism, 
and thereby specify the structural and behavioural properties it is to manifest when fully 
formed. The genome is seen as both a coded ‘instruction book’ for building the organism, 
and, implicitly or explicitly, as its ‘architectural plan’, a representation of the organism’s 
essential nature, and thus of the way it is meant to turn out in concrete reality.25 In this way 
the popular essentialist mystique around DNA is validated by the scientific use of the genetic 
                                                          
21 Mayr 1961: 1504 (my italics). 
22 I.e. the genome is not just a set of templates for specific proteins, but also the instructions for the coordination 
of their production and use in constructing the organism – i.e. a whole programme for ontogeny. See Jacob & 
Monod 1961 for a detailed exposition of this idea.  
23 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 1-2 (my italics). 
24 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 9. 
25 See also Dawkins 1989 [1976]: Ch 3. 
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programme metaphor, and related notions.26 27 As Oyama et al put it, “[o]nce an outcome is 
seen as an expression of the genetic information that controls development, it acquires a 
special status. It represents what the organism is “meant to be,” and deviations from it are 
misrepresentations of the true nature of the organism – its inner essence, which was conferred 
on it at the moment of conception”.28 
The programme concept has also been described as a modern version of ‘preformationism’ 
by some critics.29 Preformationism in its classical form, prevalent in debates about the nature 
of ontogeny in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was the theory that a fully-formed 
but miniature ‘homunculus’ of the organism was present in the zygote, which simply grew 
larger once placed in the appropriate conditions.30 The genetic programme conception can be 
seen as a neo-preformationism because, in the words of Lewontin, “there is no essential 
difference, but only one of mechanical details, between the view that the organism is already 
formed in the fertilized egg and the view that the complete blueprint of the organism and all 
the information necessary to specify it is contained there”.31 In the modern version, the 
organism’s ‘finished’ phenotype is not literally already there in miniature, but is there in 
essence, represented in informational form. And its ontogeny, rather than a literal physical 
unfolding, like the petals of a flower opening up, is the reading out of this coded information, 
                                                          
26 See e.g. Oyama 2000a [1985]: Chs 5-6; 2000b: 152-155; 2002; 2009: §§3.2.2-3.3; 2010: 406-407, 410-416; 
2011; 2016; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 3; Lewontin 2000a [1998]: Ch 1; Mauron 2001; 2002; Scully 2006; 
Barnes & Dupré 2008: Chs 7 & 8; Godfrey-Smith 2007: 113; Rehmann-Sutter 2008: 39; 2010. 
27 There is of course much more to the history of the ‘genetic’ or ‘hereditary’ substance as an informational 
representation of the organism’s essence. It goes back at least to Wilhelm Johannsen’s distinction between 
‘genotype’ and ‘phenotype’, the former meaning the “inner constitution” of the being, and the latter merely a 
perishable manifestation or appearance of this (‘phenotype’ was named after the Greek term phainein, ‘to 
appear’) (Meloni 2016: 60-62). For lack of space, historical matters such as this must unfortunately be side-lined 
here. 
28 Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 3. 
29 E.g. Lewontin 2000a [1998]: 5-7; 2000b: xii; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 4; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 28-31; 
Moss 2003; Noble 2006: 44; Dupré 2012: 237, 251; Nicholson 2014b. This connection has also been embraced 
by some supporters of the programme concept, e.g. Mayr 1982: 106. 
30 See e.g. Lewontin 2000a [1998]: 5-7. 
31 Lewontin 2000a [1998]: 6. 
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like the running of a computer directed by its programming.32 In development, as Mayr puts 
it, “the program is translated into […] individual organisms”.33 
Whether we call this view genetic essentialism or neo-preformationism its significance for 
our purposes is the same – it is a version of the metaphysics of life that I have labelled 
poietic. Over the remainder of Section 2 I shall highlight some of the key points I want to 
make in this respect. 
 
2.2. Genome as eidos 
The role played by the genetic programme in this picture reflects that of the eidos in the logic 
of poiesis, i.e. the pre-conceived idea, model, or design for the end-product to be made, the 
guide from which multiple copies – tokens of a type – can be produced (see II:3).34 At least, 
the genome is seen as a representation of the organism’s eidos, since it contains coded 
information about the organism’s proper development and phenotype.35 We can detail a 
number of conceptual parallels. These can be summarised by saying that the genetic 
programme has a transcendent relation to the organism and its becoming. By this I mean a 
                                                          
32 There is a disanalogy here between a computer programme and the notion of the genetic programme. A 
computer programme only controls the operation of a computer, it does not build the physical components of 
the computer in the first place. The genetic programme is primarily a way to understand an underlying set of 
instructions as directing the ‘production’ of the organism itself, the development of its form – a power not 
analogous to the computer programme. Although, in most versions of the genetic programme metaphor its 
power also extends to the ‘operation’ of the organism, to the control of functioning/behaviour. Jacob himself 
noted this disanalogy (1993 [1970]: 9); for a more critical view in relation to this point, see Nicholson 2014b: 
165. 
33 Mayr 1982: 827 (my italics). 
34 I combine two elements here: the image/model of the final product’s form and functionality – the ‘blueprint’ 
or ‘architectural plan’; and that which guides the process of its production – the ‘instructions’. Some might 
object that the Greek term for the latter should not be eidos but logos – see e.g. Zwart (2018: 35) for an analysis 
of the genetic programme as logos of the organism. Firstly, I have combined the two ideas here mainly in order 
to avoid the introduction of more terminology. Secondly, we can think of the conceptual role played by the 
genetic programme as both logos and eidos. They are connected, since the instructions (logos) for making 
something implicitly contains an idea (eidos) of the thing to be made, as the descriptions of the genetic 
programme cited above suggest, and as does Zwart himself (2018: 35).   
35 For the moment I shall ignore the distinction between the eidos itself and a representation of it. In Section 4 
below I discuss a version of the poietic view of development in which these two ideas come apart. 
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number of things: the eidos/programme is given to, is independent of, and has a normative 
authority over, the product/organism (see also I:1-2 and II:2-4).  
Let’s elaborate. Firstly, the eidos in the logic of poiesis is temporally and logically prior to 
the process of production. In genetic essentialism, the programme is inherited innately, ‘given 
by nature’, and is seen to constitute the identity of the individual organism as such. Secondly, 
the eidos is independent of, unaffected by, the product and its production. In genetic 
essentialism, the particular life-history and activity of the organism has no effect on the 
structure of its genetic essence.36 This is a conceptual necessity – it wouldn’t be much of an 
essence if its content was determined by the process of its expression.37 And it is also 
apparently confirmed by what is sometimes called the ‘central dogma’: that ‘information 
flow’ is one-way, from genome to organism, never vice versa.38 Thirdly, the eidos has a 
certain kind of normative authority over its product; it is the design of the product, it 
designates proper form to the product and ends to its production. In genetic essentialism, the 
genome carries ‘instructions’ and ‘architectural plans’, which the organism is supposed to 
follow and realise if it is to develop properly. These carry the same kind of normative 
significance, conceptually speaking. I expand on this point below (2.5). 
The genetic eidos can be imagined at a number of levels. The most obvious is the species 
level: that is, some specific genetic sequence or set of sequences shared by all members of a 
                                                          
36 See e.g. Jacob 1993 [1970]: 3; Mayr 1982: 56; Delbrück 1971: 54-55; Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 23. 
37 That is, the transcendence of the genetic eidos is integral to it as an idea. The fact that the developmental 
significance of genetic material is constructed in the process of ontogeny, and thus that the genome is not an 
essence/eidos, is the crux of the developmental-constructivist critique of the programme concept, elaborated in 
Chapter VI (see VI:1.3 in particular). 
38 The original version of the ‘central dogma’ of molecular biology, articulated by Francis Crick (1958: 153; see 
also 1970), was the specific thesis that DNA sequence can be used to specify the amino acid sequence of 
proteins, but the latter could not be used to specify DNA (nor other proteins, RNA, etc.). That is, there is no 
‘reverse translation’ of DNA from protein structure (see Meloni 2016: 195). However, the term is now often 
used more broadly, in the sense just mentioned, to mean that developmental information is in general 
transmitted from genome to organism, but never vice versa; that the genetic programme is sequestered from 
environmental influence in this regard (Meloni 2016: 194-195; Dupré 2012: 135, 251). It is this broader sense 
that I refer to here (see also 3.3-3.4 below and VI:1.3). (The term is also sometimes used to refer to the slightly 
different claim that germ-line DNA is unaffected by parental life-course, which, when combined with the neo-
preformationist assumption that the zygotic genome contains ‘all the information’ for the organism – often an 
implicit assumption in this context – implies that there is no ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’ – see e.g. 
Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 23; Noble 2006: 90. I am not directly concerned with this issue here, but see VI:1.3 for 
some related comments.) 
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species, which identifies and makes them what they are qua members of that general type, as 
suggested by the idea of ‘the human genome’ as containing the human essence, in the rhetoric 
of the HGP.39 
Or, when the genome is understood as also defining an individual’s personal identity and 
specific character, as the essence of ‘me’,40 then it is seen as containing an eidos for that 
organism qua individual. This might seem like a contradiction at first: if the genome 
identifies an individual, then how can it also represent a ‘type’, of which, presumably, there 
could be many individual tokens? The answer is quite simple: a given genome – defined as 
some particular full sequence of DNA nucleotides – need not uniquely identify a particular 
spatio-temporal individual. As it happens, most (multicellular) individuals do in fact have a 
unique genetic code, thanks to the effects of genetic recombination in sexual reproduction, 
but, in principle, any number of actual living organisms could be produced (or ‘cloned’) from 
that particular genome.41 In this sense, each ‘individual’ genome represents a type. The 
difference with the species eidos is really just one of level of specificity. Compared with the 
species version, these ‘individual’ types are defined at a very fine-grained level of specificity, 
but they imply this logic of type and token nonetheless.  
The genetic eidos might also be imagined in relation to various other categories as well, at 
various levels of generality – e.g. gender, race, genus, and so on.42 These different versions of 
the genetic eidos are not mutually exclusive – recall, for a start, that Mayr calls the genetic 
code in each zygote “completely individualistic and yet also species-specific”.43 We could 
extend this and imagine one’s particular genome, as a whole, as the eidos for a particular 
organic product that is specifiable in multiple ways: e.g. as mammal, Homo sapiens, male, 
Caucasian, and as having a particular ‘individuality’ (albeit one that could also, in principle, 
                                                          
39 This idea could also be derived from an (albeit misleading and naïve) interpretation of the concept of a genetic 
‘species barcode’ (see Dupré 2012: 116-117). 
40 See again the quote from Gilbert 1992: 96. See also Mauron (2001; 2002) and Scully (2006) on this topic. 
41 There is an everyday example of this: monozygotic (‘identical’) twins are genetically identical in the relevant 
sense (that is, in terms of the nucleic DNA sequence in the parental zygote from which they developed).  
42 Compare comments at the end of I:2.2 regarding different versions of flourishing as properness. 
43 Mayr 1961: 1504. 
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be programmed into any number of other products, all ‘identical’ in terms of their particular 
essence). 
 
2.3. Ontogeny as poiesis 
Naturally, the genome-as-eidos goes hand in hand with a conception of ontogeny as a process 
of poiesis.44 As we’ve seen, in neo-preformationism the proper form of the organism is 
prescribed in advance, encoded in a programme that is transcendent of the process through 
which it unfolds. And the organism’s coming-into-being is the unfolding of that programme 
into concrete reality; a process of “revelation”, to quote Jacob’s colleague, Jacques Monod.45 
In this way, the processes of organismic development – of growth, cellular and systemic 
differentiation, structural transformation, learning, habit and skill formation, and so on – are 
simply the middle term between eidos and telos, the translation of design into product. The 
organism’s becoming is therefore normatively subordinate to the essence it aims to fulfil; it 
takes place for the sake of fulfilment of that essence. In other words, it is understood as a 
form of poiesis. The organism itself, if its development proceeds properly, “thus becomes the 
realization of a programme prescribed by its heredity”, as Jacob puts it.46  
 
2.4. Teleology  
The poietic notion of becoming has a certain kind of teleological, goal-directed, structure, as I 
have discussed already (II:2-4). Mayr and Jacob are open about the importance of this in the 
neo-preformationist conception of ontogeny, but perceive it as having been rendered 
unproblematic by the genetic programme idea. As Jacob puts it, although biology has for a 
long time had an uneasy relationship with the teleological – like “a woman [it] could not do 
without, but did not care to be seen with in public” – the genetic programme concept has now 
“made an honest woman of teleology”.47  
                                                          
44 See also Rehmann-Sutter 2006. 
45 Monod 1971: 87; see also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 32. 
46 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 2 (my italics). 
47 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 8-9. 
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Mayr defines the programme concept in terms of goal-directedness: it is “coded or 
prearranged information that controls a process (or behaviour) leading it toward a goal. The 
program contains not only the blueprint of the goal but also the instructions of how to use the 
information of the blueprint”.48 Rather than ‘teleology’, Mayr calls the goal-directedness of 
the programme ‘teleonomy’ in order to differentiate it from similar ideas, including ones that 
he does not endorse, such as ‘cosmic teleology’.49 The latter is the view of nature/the 
universe as a purposively organised whole, or as containing ascending levels of perfection in 
relation to an over-arching ideal, either diachronically (e.g. evolution by orthogenesis) or 
synchronically (e.g. the scala naturae or ‘great chain of being’).50  
On Mayr’s definition, a process or activity is teleonomic if it “owes its goal-directedness to 
the operation of a program”.51 This includes “[a]ll the processes of individual development 
(ontogeny) as well as all seemingly goal-directed behaviors of individuals […], [because 
they] are characterized by two components: they are guided by a program, and they depend 
on the existence of some endpoint or goal which is foreseen in the program regulating the 
behavior. The endpoint might be a structure, a physiological function or steady state, the 
attainment of a new geographical position, or a consummatory behavioral act”.52 The 
programme exists “prior to the initiation of the teleonomic process”,53 and the genome, seen 
as the entire programme for an organism, thus gives to ontogeny (transcendently, as I put it) a 
pre-given mature form as end to aim at: “[t]he telos of the fertilized egg is the adult into 
which it develops”.54 
In other words, a teleonomic process, for Mayr, reflects the logic of poiesis, as I have defined 
it: it is for the sake of achievement of a goal, a goal that is “forseen” in the plan that guides 
the process: translation of eidos into telos. Thus – it is worth clarifying – when I align the 
                                                          
48 Mayr 1992: 127-128 (italics in original). 
49 Mayr on the various uses of teleological language: see 1961: 1503-1504; 1982: 47-51; 1992; 1998. 
50 Mayr 1982: 305, 48-50; 1992: 133-135. 
51 Mayr 1982: 48. 
52 Mayr 1982: 48 (my italics). 
53 Mayr 1992: 127. 
54 Mayr 1992: 123. 
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genetic programme with, e.g., ‘teleological essentialism’, I do not impute to it anything more 
than Mayr does by calling it teleonomic. What I mean by teleology in the context of 
becoming-as-poiesis is the same as what Mayr calls teleonomy.  
I will say some more shortly (3.4) about why thinkers such as Mayr and Jacob understand the 
programme concept to have made this sort of developmental teleology unproblematic for 
modern life science, and suggest that their optimism is premature. 
 
2.5. Normativity: programme and properness 
As the above suggests, and as explained in Chapter II, poietic thinking, in taking life as its 
object, imposes a particular evaluative or normative framing on our apprehension of the 
organism and its becoming: it brings with it what I have called the logic of properness. This 
normativity is implied by the genetic version of this view, just as it is by essentialist ‘folk 
biology’, the neo-Aristotelian ethics of proper life-form, and Nussbaum’s related idea of 
‘basic capabilities’. 
In the logic of poiesis, the eidos ought to be manifested, and instructions for its manifestation 
ought to be followed, if the product is to be a good example of what it is, if it is to achieve its 
teloi. The eidos provides standards for evaluation of the product itself and, by derivation, the 
production process. This logic is also implicit in genetic essentialism. To quote Jacob again, 
the genetic programme “evokes a series of operations to be carried out”.55 The 
developmental course of the organism can succeed or fail to carry out the operations 
prescribed by its programme, or to realise the phenotypic form implicitly represented in it. 
Genomes carry a message that is supposed to be expressed, and this expression can go wrong; 
the information about the organism’s true nature can be misrepresented in the phenotype, the 
organism can deviate from what it is meant-to-be.56 The other normative aspect implicit in 
these ideas, less often remarked upon, is that it renders development itself simply 
instrumental to production of a properly formed phenotype. The point of producing from a 
                                                          
55 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 9 (my italics). 
56 On the connections between concepts of programme/code/instruction/information in biology, and the kind of 
normativity I am referring to, see also Godfrey-Smith 2007: 107, 113; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 3; Barker 
2015: 43-45; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 12-13, 25, 73-74, 90; 2009: §§3.2.2-3.3; 2011; 2016; Scully 2006; 
Rehmann-Sutter 2008: 39-40. 
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design is to bring about an end-state that realises that design; by itself this gives no reason to 
consider the process as having any intrinsic normative significance, as being undertaken in 
any sense ‘for its own sake’.57 
Neo-preformationism therefore implies an apprehension of the life of the concrete organism 
as a more or less perfect realisation of its genetic essence, which is already to take this kind 
of normative perspective on it. The (transcendent) mode of judgement implied can operate at 
a number of levels (connected to the different levels of eidos specificity discussed above): an 
individual human, for example, can be evaluated in terms of their individual essence, in terms 
of the generic human model of which they are a particular token, or in terms of some other 
category (also compare my discussion at the end of I:2.2 regarding the different possible 
kinds of proper form in terms of which an individual’s flourishing can be framed). In either 
case the concept of the genetic programme implies a sense in which the organism can be 
intrinsically proper or defective, according to norms or criteria derived not from the particular 
existence of the organism itself, but from a plan given to it from outside (transcendent of its 
becoming). 
If we were to begin from this picture of biology in an attempt to think ‘flourishing’ as an 
organic concept of the good then a now-familiar framing of the concept is privileged: 
flourishing as properness, fulfilment of proper form. As we saw in I:2.1, for Foot, “[t]o 
flourish is […] to instantiate the life form of [one’s] species”.58 And as is drawn out by 
Nussbaum’s conception of development (II:4), this implies a view of becoming as 
normatively subordinate to, for the sake of, essence-fulfilment. From the point of view of the 
genetic programme the same basic logic applies: to flourish is to instantiate the kind of 
existence that is instructed by one’s genetic essence, and development is aimed at realising 
this, whatever it may be. In either case, to fail with respect to one’s proper form is to be 
inherently defective, inadequate to one’s essence, an inferior version of the way one is meant 
to be.59 
                                                          
57 Rehmann-Sutter highlights this aspect of the normativity of neo-preformationism (2006: 314, 325-327). 
58 Foot 2001: 91. 
59 See similar comparisons made by Oyama between genetic essentialism and the naturalistic ethics of Mary 
Midgley (Oyama 2000a [1985]: 102-106). 
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The programme metaphor of the genome encourages us to see the normative logic of 
properness as simply part of the given structure of the living world. It validates an idea of 
‘nature’ as something transcendent of our concrete activity and life history which governs 
what it is for living to go well or badly, in the sense of pre-figuring the shape of the ‘proper’ 
and the ‘defective’.60 Neo-Aristotelians do not identify their notion of life-form with the idea 
of the genetic programme, but they share with this idea a way of looking at living beings as 
such: as objects given a proper form, whose becoming is for the sake of instantiating that 
form – what I’ve called the poietic metaphysics of life. This mode of interpretation underlies 
concepts of both the genetic programme and the neo-Aristotelian life-form. I return to these 
comparisons/relations below, Section 5. 
 
2.6. Genetic essentialism is not genetic determinism 
The genetic programme is often aligned with genetic determinism.61 Whilst issues of causal 
determinacy/indeterminacy regarding the role of the genome in ontogeny are important (see 
next chapter), this particular alignment can be something of a red herring for our discussion. 
The preceding comments on the normative character of the genetic programme show why 
genetic essentialism is not, and does not strictly imply, genetic determinism. In fact, it is a 
certain lack of causal determinism that makes the normativity of properness possible in this 
context. Let me explain. 
‘Genetic determinism’ could mean a number of things. For example, it might be the belief 
that DNA – either a ‘gene for’ some specific trait, or the whole genome ‘for’ a particular 
organism – is causally sufficient in bringing about its specified outcome, that it requires the 
input of nothing else in particular. This is surely a very radical notion, and it’s not clear that 
anyone actually believes it, either in scientific or lay spheres. Everyone is familiar with the 
fact that a fertilised egg cell (which is already adding a lot beyond just DNA!) only develops 
at all given certain environmental conditions – seeds don’t grow until you plant and water 
them, eggs don’t turn into chickens if you keep them in the fridge, and so on.  
                                                          
60 See also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 100-106; 2002: 165-167; 2007: 13-14; 2009: §§3.2.2-3.3; 2011; 2016; Scully 
2006; Barnes & Dupré 2008: 220-224; Rehmann-Sutter: 2008; 2010: 24-26. 
61 See e.g. Noble 2006: 3-6. 
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Or, it could mean that for any one genotype there is only one possible phenotypic outcome – 
again, either in terms of some specific trait, or the organism as a whole. That is, given that a 
viable organism develops at all, the emergence of its particular form will be insensitive to 
environmental context. This one genotype-one phenotype view is a more likely candidate. It 
is indeed sometimes suggested in descriptions of the role of the genetic programme in 
development. See again the above quote from Jacob: “In the chromosomes received from its 
parents, each egg […] contains its entire future: the stages of its development, the shape and 
the properties of the living being which will emerge”.62 Related is the idea that, if we had the 
full DNA sequence of an organism, and knew how to ‘de-code’ the representation of the 
phenotypic end-product that it supposedly contains, then we could derive a complete 
description of the future organism from its genotype. Lewontin tells tale that he once heard 
Sydney Brenner, another Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist, “say, in the opening 
address of a scientific congress, that if he had a large enough computer and the complete 
DNA sequence of an organism, he could compute the organism, by which he meant totally 
describe its anatomy, physiology, and behaviour”.63 By inserting Walter Gilbert’s CD, we 
could ‘compute’ Walter Gilbert.64 
It is likely that in much popular understanding of biology variations of this kind of genetic 
determinism are still common.65 But within scientific and philosophical circles, despite 
claims like those just mentioned, it is now all but universally agreed that such a picture (and 
its environmental-determinist opposite) is false, and that any given phenotypic character is 
sensitive to both ‘genes’ and ‘environment’, to various degrees. That is, not only does a 
genetic programme require certain environments in order to unfold at all, but the particular 
forms that do emerge are the products of interaction between genes and environment, of both 
                                                          
62 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 2 (my italics). 
63 Lewontin 2000c: 147; 2000a [1998]: 10; 2000b: vii. Schrödinger, pioneer of the genetic ‘code’ metaphor, 
suggested more or less the same idea back in 1944 (1992 [1944]: 21-22). On this notion of developmental 
‘computability’ in general, see Nicholson 2014b: 166-167. 
64 See also Noble 2006: 3-6, 29, on this view. 
65 See e.g. a recent study by Dar-Nimrod & Heine (2011). 
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‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, as popular discourse would put it. This agreement is sometimes called 
the ‘interactionist consensus’.66   
The interactionist consensus denies the crude genetic determinism just described. But it 
would be wrong to think that it has killed off the essentialist concept of the genetic 
programme. And nor should we expect it to, by itself. This is because the programme 
metaphor does not stand and fall with genetic determinism, and is perfectly consistent with 
(at least a particular way of interpreting) this ‘interactionism’. As mentioned in the previous 
sub-section, instructions, plans, designs, and so on, can be followed or realised to greater and 
lesser degrees; an eidos does not guarantee its own manifestation. Certain influences from 
‘outside’ might be needed to produce the planned outcome, but others can cause deviation 
from the proper form of some trait, or even prevent it from emerging at all. If we look at 
‘interaction’ this way then the essentialist view of genetics remains intact. The crux of this 
view is not an idea about causal efficacy, but the poietic and teleological structure I have 
been discussing.67 The genetic programme does not determine developmental outcomes, it 
determines what the proper developmental outcomes are. Teleological process – at least, 
what I mean by the term here, in line with Mayr’s ‘teleonomy’ – involves foresight of an end, 
pre-designation of an ideal end-state, not, strictly speaking, causal determination of that end.  
Since Jacob would, I expect, also reject the environment-insensitive determinism that I 
imputed to his words above, I think it would be fair to ‘correct’ the quote as follows: “In the 
chromosomes received from its parents, each egg […] contains [a plan for] its entire future 
[as nature has designed it]: the stages of its development, the shape and the properties of the 
living being which will emerge [if this plan is properly realised]”.68 The suggestion of 
determinism in claims such as the original of this quote results from simply assuming that the 
environmental conditions needed for the proper phenotype will be present. In which case the 
                                                          
66 See e.g. Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 13-17, 97-100; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 1-2; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 
2; Barker 2015: 38. 
67 In most uses of the genetic programme concept, it is of course also seen as causally involved in phenotype 
development, e.g. as ‘initiating’, ‘controlling’, or ‘directing’ it. My point here is not to deny this, but to highlight 
the even more fundamental but often hidden teleological/ideational/normative aspects of the programme idea. 
See also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 239 (fn 3); 2002: 165-167; 2009; 2010; 2016. 
68 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 2 (my additions in square brackets). 
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unfolding of the programme appears deterministic in this one genotype-one phenotype way, 
although this is not strictly the view being presented.69   
As mentioned in II:2,70 a certain degree of indeterminism in the relation between essence and 
appearance is in fact crucial to the inherently normative structure of teleological 
essentialism/poietic thinking. If something happens deterministically or inevitably then it 
makes no sense to say either that it should or should not happen. Not only, as Oyama notes, 
does “the absence of perfect outcomes [do] no harm to our belief that a plan underlies the 
variable results”,71 but the potential for imperfect outcomes, for deviation from eidos, is what 
makes the normativity of ‘plan fulfilment’ possible, since it makes the conceptual difference 
between ‘proper’ and ‘defective’ realisation. In the genetic programme idea, it is this implicit 
teleological-essentialist structure and the normative logic that it entails, rather than the 
apparent suggestion of determinism, that is its most fundamental and stubborn 
characteristic.72 As I explain in the next chapter, issues of causal complexity in ontogeny can 
put pressure on the adequacy of ideas like the genetic programme, but what is ultimately 
required to overcome this thinking is a shift in conceptual framing. 
Another way to understand how the genetic programme can survive happily within the 
interactionist consensus is in terms of how the ‘environment’, and organismic interaction 
with it, is understood in the context of ontogeny. As we’ve seen, this consensus recognises 
that the input of environmental conditions is causally important to what actually happens (i.e. 
genetic determinism is false), but the most common versions of ‘interactionism’ nonetheless 
maintain the structure of genetic essentialism. This is in part because ‘environment’ – usually 
meaning anything outside of DNA/genome,73 including the internal milieu of the organism, 
and its interaction with external conditions – is understood as having a fundamentally 
different ontological status to the genome. The genome carries the ‘information’ about or 
                                                          
69 Also, as Godfrey-Smith notes (2007: 112-113), the inference from neo-preformationism to determinism is not 
surprising, because the language of programming and coding suggests more or less determinate outcomes. 
70 Some of the discussion about facts and values, and different meanings of ‘essentialism’, in IV:1-2 is also 
relevant here. 
71 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 90. 
72 See VI:1.3 for more detail. 
73 See e.g. Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 1-2; Griffiths & Gray 1994: 277. 
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‘instructions’ for the organism, whereas the environment is seen as merely a set of ‘assisting’ 
or ‘obstructing’ conditions on the realisation of this content-specific information.74 The 
version of interactionism that presents phenotype as simply a product of interaction between 
‘genes’ and ‘environment’ is not only consistent with this ontological dualism, but 
encourages it, by presenting ontogeny as the coming together of two separate channels of 
influence – the core, essential, informational message, and all the contingent causal influence 
from the outside that can affect in various ways the ‘expression’ of this message, but does not 
change the message itself.75 Genetic essentialism persists as long as we interpret 
interactionism in this dualistic way.76 I return to critique of this picture in Chapter VI. 
 
3. The unfinished Darwinian revolution: developmental Platonism of the 
genetic programme 
3.1. ‘Platonism’ in Mayr 
Where does this leave the idea that Darwinian biology has abolished the metaphysics Mayr 
calls Platonist or typological thinking? It depends what we mean by this, of course. I shall 
now outline the ways in which this metaphysics has and hasn’t truly been left behind, 
focusing on Mayr’s claims and comparing them with the logic of the neo-preformationist 
view of ontogeny that he endorses. 
Mayr aligns a number of things with the thinking he calls interchangeably ‘Platonism’, 
‘typological thinking’, ‘idealism’, or ‘essentialism’:77 
1. Living organisms are manifestations of an underlying eidos; they are ‘appearances’ of 
their essence.78  
                                                          
74 Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 1; Griffiths 2001: 395-396; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 100; Barker 2015: 43-
45. 
75 See e.g. Oyama 2000a [1985]: 2-3, 6-7, 158-162, 174-175. 
76 Oyama calls this version of interactionism ‘developmental dualism’ (e.g. 2000a [1985]: 6). 
77 I focus on claims from: Mayr 1959; 1982: 11, 38-39, 45-47, 87, 92, 129, 255-256, 304-305; 1992; 1995. 
78 See e.g. Mayr 1959: 2; 1982: 38. In Plato (according to Mayr’s interpretation) the eidoi designate ‘types’ – a 
level of classification above individuals, but not specifically what we would now call species, as sub-categories 
of genera. Mayr says that Plato did not make that distinction systematically, and nor did Aristotle (1982: 255). 
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2. Variation between individuals of a type reflects the more or less perfect manifestation 
of their shared eidos.79 
3. Eidoi are “separate from and independent of the phenomena of appearance”.80 “As 
ideas they can exist independent of any objects”.81 
4. Eidoi are fixed, eternal, unchanging across natural history.82  
5. Eidoi are discontinuous – “there is no gradation between types”, there are 
unbridgeable ‘gaps’ between types, and thus no possibility of gradual evolution in 
living forms.83 84 
The final two elements of this picture – historical fixity of, and discontinuity between, types – 
cannot be imputed to genetic essentialism in the Darwinian mould. Given the fact of 
evolution, organic lineages undergo historically continuous change in constitution, both 
genetically and phenotypically. In this sense, types are not fixed across trans-generational 
time, and there are not, as a general rule, unbridgeable gaps between them. One ‘species’ – or 
other taxonomic category – can, over time, gradually evolve into a ‘different’ one without our 
needing to imagine ontological leaps or discontinuities. The implication, of course, is not that 
an organic lineage is composed of a series of essences that pop in and out of existence at 
particular transition points in this continual flow of change, but rather that this is a process in 
which there are no such essences.85 
                                                          
As I have argued already, and shall reinforce in a moment, the level of specificity at which we understand the 
eidos doesn’t matter too much for our purposes, regarding its normative implications for the individual and 
individual becoming. 
79 See e.g. Mayr 1982: 38. 
80 Mayr 1982: 305. 
81 Mayr 1982: 38. 
82 See e.g. Mayr 1959: 2; 1982: 38. 
83 Mayr 1959: 2. 
84 This list is not exhaustive. There are some other things that Mayr includes in ‘Platonism’ that I will not 
discuss here, as they are not directly relevant. In particular: the view that the cosmos was created by a demiurge 
– a creative power (God) modelled on a craftsman or architect (1982: 87, 92, 304-305); and the related notion of 
‘cosmic teleology’ (see above, 2.4). 
85 See e.g. Dupré 2012: 73-74; Barnes & Dupré 2008: 209-210. 
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However, I argue that despite this, when neo-Darwinian biology turns from describing 
evolutionary process to describing individual ontogenetic process the first three elements of 
this picture, which imply a transcendent relationship between an eidos and the individual 
organism, are re-instated fundamentally intact. From the perspective of the individual 
organism and its becoming, the historicisation of living forms does not undermine the 
metaphysics of the Platonic eidos, and this metaphysics is affirmed by the genetic programme 
and the neo-preformationist conception of ontogeny. What we might call ‘historical 
Platonism’ is gone, but a ‘developmental Platonism’ persists,86 as I’ll now explain. 
 
3.2. Essence, appearance, and typological variation 
Regarding point 1, we have seen in Section 2 how the metaphor of the genetic programme 
grasps the organism in terms of a fundamental dualism between essence and appearance. 
What the organism ‘really’ is, its ‘true nature’, is contained within its genetic essence, and the 
concrete organism is the product of the ‘unfolding’ of this essence into reality – a 
‘manifestation’ of it.  
As we’ve also noted, not all instances of life fully achieve essence-realisation – and any not-
yet-mature organism is still in the process of doing so – so, any particular individual at any 
particular time is to be understood as in a state of more or less perfect manifestation of its 
essence (which is also to take a particular kind of normative perspective towards it, as 
discussed in 2.5-2.6). Regarding point 2, this frames the issue of individual variation in a 
particular way. Given any group of individuals understood to bear the same genotype in some 
respect, then any relevant variation between them is implicitly attributed to the more or less 
perfect reflection of this essence – i.e. the approach to variation Mayr calls ‘typological’. 
This could work in a number of different ways. In terms of a species-level eidos we would 
understand phenotypic variation between any bearers of, e.g., ‘the human genome’ to reflect 
various degrees of ‘proper humanness’ (at least variation that relates to traits we take to be 
programmed by this species-general genotype). Or, the essential feature in question could 
relate to individuals of multiple species. If some set of individuals all contain genetic 
programming ‘for’ some particular feature, such as having four legs, then any variation in 
                                                          
86 As suggested by Lewontin 2000a [1998]: 6-10; 2000c: 66-68; and also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 137, 159. 
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actual leg number among them will imply degrees of realisation of this aspect of their genetic 
essence (which might also be part of what it means to be ‘properly dog’, or ‘properly horse’, 
for example). Or, we could take the same approach in terms of the highly specific 
‘individual’ genetic essence. The simplest way to grasp this is to imagine a population of 
genetic clones. The variation between them, with respect to the traits we understand as 
particular to this individual form, will also be analysable as reflecting different degrees to 
which their shared genetic identity has been successfully expressed. Again, these levels of 
analysis are not mutually exclusive. 
Mayr projects an image of biology post Darwin in which so-called ‘populationist’ thinking 
prevails. According to this, the dual reality of essence/appearance, and the interpretation of 
variation as degrees of essence-realisation, are rejected: 
The populationist stresses the uniqueness of everything in the organic world. […] [N]o 
two individuals are alike […] even the same individual changes continuously throughout 
his lifetime and when placed into different environments. All organisms and organic 
phenomena are composed of unique features and can be described collectively only in 
statistical terms. […] Averages are merely statistical abstractions, only the individuals of 
which the populations are composed have reality. […] For the typologist, the type (eidos) 
is real and the variation an illusion, while for the populationist the type (average) is an 
abstraction and only the variation is real. No two ways of looking at nature could be more 
different.87  
Or, as he says elsewhere, “[t]here is no “typical” individual, and mean values are 
abstractions”.88 I agree. Yet, I argue, the very idea of the genetic programme, embraced 
whole-heartedly by neo-Darwinians such as Mayr, works to undermine this shift in thinking. 
It reinstates into the organic world precisely the ‘Platonic’ dualism of transcendent essence 
and derivative appearance; and it thereby allows us to identify, by reference to a given 
genotype, ‘typical’ and ‘defective’ individuals in just the way Mayr purports to reject.89 The 
fact that, from an historical perspective, the points of reference will transform over time, 
much as a car-maker will continuously redesign a particular model, and new models will 
                                                          
87 Mayr 1959: 2 (my italics). 
88 Mayr 1982: 46. 
89 Oyama makes similar points made about the tension between Mayr’s stated anti-essentialism and his 
teleonomic concept of the programme (2000a [1985]: 61-63, see also 159). 
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come into existence and go out of production, does not undermine this basic type-token logic. 
Each particular car is still a manifestation of its particular design, and can be evaluated by 
measurement against this design. 
Read again the first few lines of the block quote above, about individual uniqueness and 
change. Now add in the developmental Platonism of the programme concept and see how 
these claims acquire caveats: no concrete living individual is quite like any other, but, in 
essence, they can be identical (as genetic clones, or tokens of a broader type); individuals 
change continuously, but in essence they remain the same throughout their life (I return to 
this in a moment, 3.3); and as collectivities they can be described in statistical terms, but the 
differences between individuals are also implicitly attributed to the more or less perfect 
realisation of a shared genetic essence, in appropriate circumstances. 
 
3.3. Independence of the programme 
This story repeats regarding point 3, which has also already been briefly addressed (2.2). The 
genetic programme is transcendent of the organism – it is innately given to, and is itself 
unaffected by, the organism’s becoming. As Mayr himself says, invoking the so-called 
‘central dogma’, “the genetic program itself remains unchanged while it sends out its 
instructions to the body”.90 Or, as he puts it in his description of Platonism, the eidos is 
“separate from and independent of the phenomena of appearance”.91 In this sense, regardless 
of the historicisation of the evolutionary point of view, the organism’s eidos is just as fixed, 
in relation to its becoming, as if it were something eternally unchangeable.  
Mayr also says, of Platonic eidoi, that “[a]s ideas they can exist independent of any 
objects”.92 By this he presumably means something like: even if there are no material 
manifestations of an eidos it can still in some sense ‘exist’ – perhaps in the famous ‘realm of 
Forms’, or ‘in the mind of the demiurge’. With respect to a genetic programme, firstly, in a 
straightforward material sense, it can also exist independently of any organismic 
manifestation. Anyone who’s seen modern crime dramas involving forensic investigation 
                                                          
90 Mayr 1982: 56. See footnote 38 above, on the meaning of the ‘central dogma’ here. 
91 Mayr 1982: 305. 
92 Mayr 1982: 38. 
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knows that genetic codes can be left lying around anywhere. On the essentialist 
interpretation, the material DNA swabbed up from crime scenes still ‘contains the 
information’ that is said to be de-coded in development. Secondly, when the genome is 
understood as carrying information in this way, the programme itself is also independent of 
any particular material substrate. It can be stored in, and transferred between, a variety of 
media, such as DNA, an electronic computer, a compact disc – see once again Gilbert’s 
digital vision of the ‘book of life’ – or more traditional formats such as paper and ink.93 In 
this sense, the information that DNA carries can be replicated many times, in multiple 
different specific material instantiations, without itself being affected by the material world 
that it in-forms. This is part of what makes genes potentially ‘immortal’ for Dawkins – 
material DNA is of course perishable, but the ‘plans’ it carries can be written out over and 
over.94 Could a genetic programme exist independently of any objects, simply ‘as an idea’, as 
Mayr says of Platonic eidoi? Well, if there is a God, then I expect he could hold such 
information in mind as well. 
 
3.4. Related issues: matter and form, ‘vitalism’, and Mayr’s Aristotle 
This raises some other issues, and allows us to look at the argument being made here in 
another way. Mayr’s easiness with the teleology (sorry, teleonomy) of the genetic programme 
seems to stem in part from the notion that it is “purely materialistic”.95 This supposedly 
places it outside of the realm of ‘vitalism’, which requires that some non-material agency or 
force (élan vital, nisus formativus, etc.) be added to or infused with the substrate of mere 
matter, in order to guide ontogeny towards its telos.96 Indeed, the genetic programme in its 
natural state is seen as represented in a material entity – DNA. But, as we’ve just seen, there 
                                                          
93 Scientists at the University of Leicester have made the latter into reality, and printed “the entire human 
genome” in 130 hardback volumes, for an educational exhibition to “show just how much information it takes to 
make up one human body”. See: https://www2.le.ac.uk/news/blog/2012/december/you-in-130-volumes-entire-
human-genome-printed-for-exhibition.  
94 See Dawkins 1989 [1976]: Ch 3. See also Dawkins’ description of DNA-in-history as “a river of abstract 
instructions for building bodies, not a river of solid bodies themselves. The information passes through bodies 
and affects them, but it is not affected by them on its way through” (1995: 4). 
95 Mayr 1982: 124. 
96 See e.g. Mayr 1982: 51-53, 90. See also Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 317 for a brief summary of this meaning of 
‘vitalism’. 
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is also a sense in which it is not itself a material entity. If it were, then we could not have 
multiple copies of the same programme in materially different media, since these are, in 
material terms, not identical. Genetic ‘information’ is seen in this sense as floating free of, or 
at least supervening on, materiality.97 For this reason, George C. Williams even places 
genetic information within a special ‘codical domain’ of reality, different and separate from 
the material spatial realm.98 
Regardless of how exactly we see the relation between genetic information and the material 
media it is instantiated in, there is a more important conceptual point here. What we have 
seen in this chapter shows that genetic neo-preformationism shares a conceptual structure 
with what Mayr derides as ‘vitalism’: they both rely on the idea of an ontologically 
independent form-giving element added to a substrate of ‘raw matter’ in order to guide 
ontogeny towards a pre-conceived telos, even if they understand the constitution of this 
element in different ways.99 I will let Mayr make this argument for me, via his reading of 
Aristotle’s biology.  
According to Mayr, “[Aristotle] clearly saw that raw matter lacks the capacity to develop the 
complex form of an organism. Something additional had to be present, for which he used the 
word eidos”.100 This additional something is a “form-giving principle”,101 a communicative 
entity that “[orders] the raw material into the patterned systems of living beings”.102 For this 
reason, Mayr argues103 that Aristotle’s conception of development ought to be seen as 
                                                          
97 See Oyama 2000a [1985]: 198; 2006: 283; 2009: §§3.2.2-3.3; 2010: 410-416; 2016. 
98 Williams 1996: 167-170.  
99 As Oyama puts it, neo-preformationism, as well as both the original version of preformationism and the 
vitalistic epigenesis theory traditionally opposed to it, all agree on the “pre-existence” of form, “whether 
miniaturized and encapsulated, re-created by a vitalistic force, or in-scribed on a molecule. The corollary is that 
the preexisting form must be the “same” as the final one; for the preformationists both were concretely material, 
for the epigeneticists form was first disembodied, then embodied, and for most modern thinkers it is initially 
material but cryptic, then manifested in the phenotype” (Oyama 2000a [1985]: 29, see also 1-3, 24-25, 61-63 87-
90, 158-159; 2009: §3.3; 2010: 410-416; 2016). 
100 Mayr 1982: 88 (my italics). 
101 Mayr 1982: 636. 
102 Mayr 1982: 56. 
103 Following the suggestion of molecular biology pioneer Max Delbrück (1971).  
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equivalent to genetic neo-preformationism: “Aristotle’s eidos is a teleonomic principle which 
performed in Aristotle’s thinking precisely what the genetic program of the modern biologist 
performs”.104 It is “conceptually virtually identical with the ontogenetic program of the 
developmental physiologist”.105 
I agree.106 But, we could add: this notion of eidos, at least in its ‘form-giving’ role, and as 
something ontologically separate and independent from the developing organism itself, also 
reflects precisely the notion of an élan vital or nisus formativus. I would therefore add that, as 
well as reflecting Aristotle’s eidos, the genetic programme implies the conceptual structure of 
the ‘vitalism’ that Mayr disparages (as well as, in similar ways, the developmental 
‘Platonism’ I have been outlining).   
Mayr would no doubt object. Regarding use of the term eidos in Plato and Aristotle – the first 
he rejects, the other he appropriates – he says: “the major meaning of the term is totally 
different in the two authors”.107 One way to see my argument in this chapter is that, from the 
point of view of understanding individual development, they are in fact, conceptually 
speaking, precisely the same, and if the genetic programme is an Aristotelian eidos, as Mayr 
understands it, then it is also a Platonic one.  
What is “totally different” about the eidos of Mayr’s Aristotle and that of Mayr’s Plato? 
There seems to be two main differences. The first is that Aristotle saw individual organisms 
as having unique eidoi, responsible for their “specific individuality”, as well as, like Plato, 
                                                          
104 Mayr 1982: 88. 
105 Mayr 1982: 56. Loewenstein makes the same connection explicit: “In Latin, eidos eventually became 
informatio, from informare: to “give form”, to “shape”, to “guide”. This meaning persisted through medieval 
times in the Indo-European languages, as in Middle French, enfourmer, and Middle English, enfourmen. That 
connotation was lost in modern times, until it was resuscitated for use in physics and eventually found its way 
back to biology [as ‘genetic information’]” (1999: 338). 
106 At least, given Mayr’s reading of Aristotle, I agree. I make no claims here as to the accuracy of Mayr’s 
interpretation of Aristotle himself, nor indeed his interpretation of Plato. This is why I refer to ‘Mayr’s Aristotle’ 
and ‘Mayr’s Plato’. I am concerned with the internal consistency of his perspective, and this question of 
exegetical accuracy makes no difference to my argument. I note, however, that the view of Aristotle’s biology 
presented here is questioned by others – e.g. Rehmann-Sutter (2006: 317-319, 325) advocates a somewhat 
different reading. 
107 Mayr 1982: 11. 
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being tokens of more general species types.108 As I explained above (2.2), this difference is 
just a matter of level of specificity at which we understand the essence, and the same 
teleological-essentialist and transcendent-normative logic is implied in both. 
The second main difference seems to be the notion that Plato’s eidos is ‘external’ to the 
organism, an “outside force”, whereas Aristotle’s is in some sense ‘internal’ to, or part of, the 
organism it in-forms.109 If ‘internal’ here means ‘material’ then, as we’ve already seen, even 
though genetic programmes are represented by material components of the organism they in-
form they are still in a sense themselves independent of this materiality.110 Either way, as I’ve 
suggested, the material-or-not status of the transcendent formative principle is not crucial to 
its conceptual role. The fact that, in the genetic version, it is carried into development via a 
substrate that is in a brute, spatial sense internal to the organism (as opposed to… beamed in 
by a supernatural agency?), makes no difference to the role that it plays in our understanding 
of organismic becoming.111  
More likely is that the difference Mayr is imputing to Plato’s eidos is what I have called a 
transcendent relation to the organism – as implied in points 1-3 of Mayr’s ‘Platonism’, above. 
If so then, as I’ve explained in response to these points, the eidos of Mayr’s Aristotle 
(material or not) and that of Mayr’s Plato are equally ‘external’ to organismic becoming, 
equally ‘outside forces’ imposed onto ‘raw matter’ in order to produce some specific form. 
They are equally transcendent as far as the individual is concerned – principles given to them 
as their essence, prescriptive of proper form, and unaffected by the particularities or activities 
of their life-course; and, therefore, becoming is understood as fundamentally poietic in either 
case.112  
                                                          
108 Mayr 1982: 637. 
109 Mayr 1982: 88. 
110 As it happens, this is probably not what Mayr means, since he also notes that the eidos for Aristotle was 
“nonmaterial” (1982: 637, 56). 
111 Compare my discussion in II:4 of the status of Nussbaum’s ‘basic capabilities’, as involving a vision of 
transcendent ends embodied in the concrete. 
112 A similar distinction is often made between the notions of developmental teleology in Plato and Aristotle: 
that the former is ‘transcendent’ or according to an ‘external model’, whereas the latter is ‘immanent’ or driven 
by an ‘internal principle of change’ (e.g. Walsh 2008: 118-119; Ariew 2002: 8-12; Von Sydow 2012: 71-73). If 
we understand Aristotle’s biology as Mayr and Delbrück do (and I’m not necessarily saying we should), then I 
would repeat my point in this context: as long as the ‘form’ that is realised through ontogeny is independent of 
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3.5. An unfinished revolution 
Darwinian biology sees itself as a revolution against Platonic essentialism. While it has, 
indeed, broken through this metaphysics at the historical level, at the developmental level the 
continued dominance of the genetic programme, and related concepts, prevents its full 
overcoming. The eidoi of genetic neo-preformationism might have been historicised – made 
historically specific, and gradually changeable over trans-generational time; they might be 
more specific than the ‘types’ Plato had in mind (see the notion of individualised genetic 
essences); and they might be carried into life by part of the being they in-form (i.e. DNA), but 
from the perspective of the individual their status has not changed. They are still fixed 
models that determine how the organism is meant to be, as I have explained in this chapter. 
Thus this revolution is yet to complete itself; the relevant conceptual structures have only 
been overcome at one level of analysis.113 
The evolutionary worldview sees living nature as undergoing a continual process of self-
transformation, as gradually adapting itself through variable interaction with the environment 
across time. In this process there is no instruction manual, no pre-given form to be realised, 
and no fixed ends to be reached. Life figures itself out as it goes along. One of the upshots of 
the argument of the next chapter is that this picture of living process, now perfectly natural to 
modern biology at the evolutionary scale, is also reflected at the level of individual 
organismic becoming, contra the view examined in this chapter. Developmental 
constructivism affirms this, and in doing so provides a way for modern biology to overcome 
its internal metaphysical tensions, and complete its anti-essentialist revolution (see VI:3.2). 
                                                          
and pre-exists the process of its realisation, then teleological description of ontogeny is ‘transcendent’ whether 
that form is imposed by a supernatural demiurge or is in some sense ‘internal’ to the organism. A truly 
immanent conception of ontogeny would involve a shift in how we understand the relationship between the 
process of ontogeny and the emergence of form and functionality in the organism. I argue for just such a shift in 
the next chapter (see in particular VI:2.2 and 3.1). 
113 See also Nicholson (2014b: 168-171) for a similar argument about the tension between the Darwinian 
rejection of the traditional theological ‘argument from design’, and the maintenance of the ‘machine concept of 
the organism’ in neo-Darwinism, which relies on notions of design by extrinsic intentional agency. I will not 
discuss these issues further, but I believe they are connected with the argument I have made, and that a full 
understanding of the influence (and contradictions) of a poietic metaphysics in modern biology requires 
uncovering these connections. See also Section 4 in a moment.  
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4. An added complication 
In my analysis of genetic neo-preformationism in this chapter I have at times presented the 
genome as if it played the role of the eidos in this picture. Strictly-speaking, this is to blur the 
lines. The genome, as a sequence of nucleotides, is seen as a representation of the 
plan/instructions for the organism, like the sequence of letters on this page are a 
representation of my ideas. 
This distinction would not need mentioning were it not for the prevalence of another way in 
which genetics often feeds into our normative language about organic form and functionality. 
The context here is so-called ‘genetic diseases’, such as Huntington’s, cystic fibrosis, or 
PKU, in which some specific genetic ‘mutation’ (or often many possible particular genetic 
differences),114 in this case meaning deviation from what is considered the species-normal 
genotype, is strongly correlated with development of a disease.  
In these cases, the ‘defect’ is understood to reside not in the process of translating genetics 
into phenotype, but in the genome itself. The assumption is that the organism’s proper form is 
a phenotype without the disease in question, but in a diseased individual this form is not 
realised because there was a mistake in the programming that was used to produce them. The 
genome in question is a bad representation of the eidos that it is supposed to represent. Let’s 
draw an analogy with flat-pack furniture. In these cases it is like if the cryptic little piece of 
paper that came with my wardrobe components had been mis-printed, so that I was instructed 
to build the item in the wrong way. Even if I properly follow the instructions given, the end-
product would not be as intended by the furniture designers. In this way we can see how the 
eidos itself and the material representation of it might helpfully be distinguished in certain 
cases. 
This raises a question: if, in genetic neo-preformationism, the proper form of an organism is 
not strictly prescribed by their actual genetic sequence, but by the eidos of which this is 
supposed to be a particular representation, then what is the source of this real eidos? There is 
a story to be told here about an implicit idea of ‘nature’ as a quasi-intentional, purpose-giving 
                                                          
114 For discussion of the interpretation of these sorts of ‘mutation’, see e.g. Dupré 2012: 109-110, 137, 249-250; 
Moss 2001. 
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agency or force responsible for the production of organic ‘designs’, and which is the ultimate 
source of the eidoi that are translated into DNA code. I think a lot can be said here to reveal 
the links between poietic thinking in the context of genetics/development and the idea of 
natural selection as a ‘design’ process in modern evolutionary thought, but this would be to 
go further down this rabbit hole than is required for my argument.115 
 
5. Neo-Aristotelian ethics and genetic essentialism 
I have argued in this chapter that the dominant understanding of ontogeny in modern biology, 
based on a neo-preformationist reading of genetics, is an incarnation of the poietic view of 
life outlined earlier. It therefore shares a basic metaphysics with the neo-Aristotelian concept 
of flourishing as natural ‘properness’. It is worth saying something briefly about the status of 
the argument in relation to this philosophical target, in order to head off a likely objection. 
As discussed in Chapter IV, neo-Aristotelian theories of flourishing of the sort addressed in 
this thesis do not – or, at least, can reasonably deny that they do – derive specific content for 
their conceptions of species good from claims about biological or otherwise empirical facts. 
They do not, for example, understand species-form as a statistical generalisation, or the good 
as fundamentally tied to some archetypically ‘biological’ process, such as genetic replication. 
Either way, as I argued, the deeper and more interesting level of connection is instead 
between a general interpretation of living phenomena as such and the form of the properness 
concept itself, which is presupposed as a necessary and natural consequence of the fact that 
the relevant objects of evaluation are living things. However, they might also reasonably 
respond at this point that their notion of a species life-form, essential nature, or “inner 
design” as Thompson puts it,116 does not depend on the validity of the genetic programme 
concept; or that they do not necessarily see a being’s essence as something that is transmitted 
                                                          
115 In an earlier, much longer, version of this chapter I extended the discussion of poietic themes in modern 
biology to address the way in which natural selection is presented within neo-Darwinism as a process of 
‘design’, and thereby a source of intentionality (see Maynard Smith 2000 for a clear example of this conceptual 
connection). For brevity’s sake I have cut this discussion of the interpretation of natural selection from the final 
version, but for related critical discussion of the notion of design in neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory see e.g. 
Nicholson 2013; 2014b; Lewens 2004; Reiss 2009; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 12-13, 31, 44-45, 88-89, 155-157, 
184; Ingold 2013: Ch 5. 
116 Thompson 2008: 13. 
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to and represented in the organism via some aspect of its material constitution, such as DNA 
sequence. And, thus, they might claim, if the genetic programme metaphor misrepresents 
ontogeny (as I argue in the next chapter), their way of viewing living phenomena does not 
necessarily fall with it. This, as I say, would be a reasonable response. None of Nussbaum, 
Foot or Thompson appeal explicitly to some empirical theory about innate constitution, not 
least genetics, as providing reason to think in terms of life-forms.117 And, strictly speaking, 
this response is correct: there is no necessary connection between the neo-Aristotelian life-
form concept and any particular interpretation of the material contents of cell nuclei.  
However, my argument does not rely on the connection being quite so direct. Firstly, I hereby 
assert the somewhat speculative claim that the continued prominence of poietic metaphysics 
in modern biology provides a nourishing context for the properness logic of contemporary 
neo-Aristotelianism. The presupposition that living beings are given models to follow, prior 
to and independent of their concrete history, which provide ends and normative imperatives 
to development, and the general idea connected with this of ‘nature’ as a transcendent source 
of such prescriptions, is all perfectly natural, so to speak, to the dominant language of modern 
biology. This acts at an intellectual-cultural level to naturalise – validate, make normal – the 
metaphysics underlying the normativity of ‘properness’, even if, strictly speaking, this way of 
thinking can be affirmed independently of any particular appeal to biological theory. 
                                                          
117 Nussbaum comes the closest in her notion of ‘basic capabilities’ as innate potentials with particular states of 
realisation, i.e. teloi fore-seen within the innate constitution of the individual, whose fulfilment is the ‘point’ of 
development (see II:4). Nussbaum does mention genetics in this context, but only to point out that genetic 
constitution does not by itself guarantee the proper fulfilment of these inner potentials: “[T]he development of 
basic capabilities is not hard-wired in the DNA: maternal nutrition and prenatal experience play a role in their 
unfolding and shaping”; i.e. this unfolding is “environmentally conditioned” (2011: 23). This is clearly a denial 
of genetic causal determinism, which is to be commended. However, as I discussed above (2.6), this denial 
(which at least puts Nussbaum within the ‘interactionist consensus’) is perfectly consistent with the genetic 
essentialism under scrutiny here. Indeed, the normative character of genetic essentialism derives precisely from 
the fact that proper developmental outcome is not guaranteed, hence the possibility of ‘defective’ existence. I 
argue that if Nussbaum were to embrace the radical aspect shift involved in the constructivist turn (see next 
chapter), then the notion of ‘innate potentials’ that she appeals to, whether understood as represented in DNA or 
not, would collapse (see VI:3.3). 
Thompson, in fact, explicitly rejects the definition of essence in terms of DNA, because it is insufficient to 
specify ‘all the information’ for an organism’s species-typical ‘life-form’ (2008: 55-56). He makes important 
points here, but I feel that the further he continues down the line of bringing context-specificity into the 
construction of organic form, the less viable becomes the central thesis of normative assessment of individuals 
by measurement against a general type that applies in abstraction from actual context. See also footnote 8 in 
III:2, on the assumption of particular context in Foot. 
185 
 
Secondly, and more importantly, my claim is weaker than the one that this hypothetical 
response addresses. My argument is not that neo-Aristotelian properness stands and falls with 
the genetic incarnation of poietic metaphysics, but rather that it relies on the validity of this 
interpretation of living phenomena in general. And, the point is (see VI:3.1), developmental 
constructivism undermines this way of thinking in general. Although it emerges from a 
critique of a particular understanding of genetics (hence the content of this chapter, which 
provides necessary background for the next chapter), developmental constructivism 
encourages us not just to reject the notion of DNA as material representation of a set of 
instructions for ontogeny, but to reject the very notion of ontogeny as a process of essence-
realisation altogether. The genetic programme is just the most prominent manifestation of the 
poietic conception of organismic becoming in modern thinking about life. The most coherent 
picture we have of organismic becoming, which emerges from extending the anti-essentialist 
revolution of Darwinism to the individual life-course, requires a different conceptual framing 
altogether. 
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Chapter VI 
Developmental Constructivism and Becoming as Praxis: Re-
thinking Flourishing via Internal Critique of Modern Biology 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I appeal to a shift in perspective on ontogeny that is occurring in the life 
sciences and connect it with my discussion of flourishing in Part 1. This shift, to what I label 
developmental constructivism (henceforth simply ‘constructivism’),1 is exhibited in a number 
of important theoretical approaches and fields of research that have gained prominence in 
recent decades.2 It involves rejecting the special (essentialist) ontological status often given to 
the genome via metaphors like the programme, as discussed in the previous chapter, and re-
distributing developmental (and evolutionary) significance across an heterogeneous system of 
context-sensitive elements, including the activity of the organism itself. Form and 
functionality is then no longer seen as prescribed by a transcendent plan given to the 
organism, but as continually constructed within each organism’s unique process of becoming. 
In the first section I argue for this ‘constructivist turn’. I am only able to scrape the surface of 
the relevant empirical and theoretical (not to mention historical) matters here, for reasons of 
space. Furthermore, this section contains little original argument. It is a brief survey of some 
                                                          
1 The perspective I refer to as ‘developmental constructivism’ is sometimes also called ‘constructivist 
interactionism’, a ‘constructivist’ or ‘constructionist’ approach to development, or theory of ‘constructive 
development’. My main reference point re this perspective is the work of Susan Oyama (e.g. 2000a [1985]; 
2000b; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001). See also various elements of the work of Richard Lewontin (e.g. 1991; 
2000a [1998]; 2001; Levins & Lewontin 1985); John Dupré (e.g. 2012; Barnes & Dupré 2008; Dupré & 
Nicholson 2018); and Christophe Rehmann-Sutter (e.g. 2006; 2008; 2010). 
2 Developmental constructivism, and related critiques of the genetic programme concept and gene-centrism 
more generally, are central to areas of contemporary biological theory and research such as ‘developmental 
systems theory’ (DST) (e.g. Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001; Oyama 2000a [1985]; 2000b; Griffiths & Gray 
1994; Dupré 2012); ‘Eco-Devo’ and ‘Eco-Evo-Devo’ (e.g. Gilbert & Epel 2009; Gilbert, Bosch & Ledón-Rettig 
2015); the move towards an ‘Extended Evolutionary Synthesis’ (e.g. Laland et al 2015; Pigliucci & Müller 
2010); the conceptual aspects of ‘postgenomic’ research (e.g. Richardson & Stevens 2015; Meloni 2016: Ch 7); 
and certain versions of ‘systems biology’ (e.g. Noble 2006). See also the role of similar ideas in the recent call 
for a turn to ‘process ontology’ in biology (Nicholson & Dupré 2018). 
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of the main reasons for turning from neo-preformationism to a constructivist perspective on 
ontogeny, and for the most part I repeat the arguments of others.  
In the second section I outline the key elements of this constructivist re-conception of 
ontogeny. Then, in the third section, I argue that taking this turn involves a profound shift in 
our understanding of organismic becoming. Rather than simply undermining one particular 
poietic metaphor (i.e. the genetic programme) it requires an entirely different interpretive 
perspective, one which sees the becoming of life as an immanently creative and reflexive – or 
praxic – process. In this way, I argue, we can harness this internal critique of modern biology 
as a resource for re-thinking flourishing in the way proposed in Chapter III.  
 
1. Biology beyond the programme: reasons for the constructivist turn 
1.1. Argument from conceptual adequacy 
I showed in V:2.6 that genetic essentialism is not strictly the same as genetic determinism. It 
only seems to imply determinism when we assume the environmental conditions needed for 
successful essence-realisation. Given that these conditions are not guaranteed, the genetic 
essence can manifest itself to greater and lesser degrees of perfection: it does not causally 
determine its own full realisation. Thus, the simple fact that an organism’s actual 
developmental path is determined by more than just genetics (see the ‘interactionist 
consensus’) does not by itself undermine the notion of the genetic essence. As I explained in 
V:2.6, this notion persists as long as we maintain the dualistic interpretation of 
‘interactionism’ in which developmental influences are divided into two distinct ontological 
categories: the ‘information’ about the organism, or ‘instructions’ for its ontogeny (encoded 
in the genome), and external ‘environment’ – anything other than genetic code – that either 
assists or obstructs the unfolding of the programme.  
Many in recent decades have argued that this picture ought to be rejected, and replaced with 
one in which ontogeny is constructed through interaction between multiple context-sensitive 
elements, none of which uniquely provides ‘the information’ about the forms to be produced; 
that we should think about ontogeny in a way that “does not rely on a distinction between 
privileged, essential causes and merely supporting or interfering causes”, to quote Oyama et 
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al.3 I shall outline some of the reasons for this in this section. But first I’ll say a little about 
the status of the argument.  
In principle, I will allow, any amount of ontogenetic causal complexity and context-
sensitivity can be accommodated within the above dualistic framework, if we are determined 
to preserve it (see final paragraphs of 1.3 below). In practice, however, the more we learn 
about these matters, the less conceptually adequate this dualism becomes, and the more 
conceptual gymnastics are required in order to perpetuate it. So, whilst no single empirical 
fact is a knock-down against this conceptual edifice (at least, I do not rely on such a claim in 
this case), this doesn’t mean that empirical matters are irrelevant. An accumulation of 
observations can put pressure on the key assumptions of a framework and play the role of 
shifting the burden of conceptual justification, as I put it. This is how I see the situation in 
this case. The argument for the constructivist turn ultimately hinges on this issue of 
conceptual adequacy, or coherence in interpretive perspective, rather than simply the 
recognition of some particular empirical facts. 
 
1.2. Plasticity and context-sensitivity ‘all the way down’   
The phenotypic and developmental plasticity of an organism, or part of an organism, is its 
capacity to develop and function in flexible ways in response to different contexts.4 Various 
degrees of plasticity are found across all levels of biological organisation, and it is much 
more important in ontogeny – much more important regarding how the organism can become 
– than one would gather from the rhetoric of the genetic programme, according to which, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, the genome contains (the plan for) the organism’s “entire 
future: the stages of its development, the shape and the properties of the living being which 
                                                          
3 Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 1. 
4 See e.g. Laland et al 2015: 3; Gilbert & Epel 2009: 6-7. 
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will emerge”.5 I’ll outline here how plasticity at various levels of biological organisation puts 
pressure on this idea.6  
At the scale of whole-organism morphology and behaviour there are many cases in the 
natural world of significant developmental variation that correlates primarily with external 
environmental context rather than genetic difference. For example, in many social insect 
species, such as ants, aphids, and honey bees, genetically identical individuals take on 
different functional roles within their colonies (e.g. queen and workers), and can develop 
vastly different physical phenotypes as they grow into these roles.7 Juvenile brown trout 
spawn in freshwater rivers, and are largely indistinguishable both genetically and 
morphologically. At a later stage some migrate to the sea and some stay in the river. The 
former adapt to salt-water, gain a distinctive jaw structure, and often grow to a much larger 
size than their homely siblings. Although commonly distinguished as sea trout and freshwater 
trout, they are in this sense actually developmental variations of the same species.8 In the 
presence of chemicals given off by its major predators, tadpoles of the gray tree frog develop 
different coloured tails and a different muscular structure than they do in the absence of these 
chemicals, changes that better enable them to avoid predation.9 In many species of fish, 
turtles, and alligators the sex of the individual is highly sensitive to developmental 
conditions, such as the temperature at which an egg is incubated. The same egg (‘same’ in 
terms of genetics) incubated within one temperature range will become male, but at another it 
will become female.10 The blue-headed wrasse, among several other fish species, can even 
                                                          
5 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 2. 
6 On the renewed interest in the scope and significance of plasticity in both development and evolution, see e.g. 
West-Eberhard 2003; 2005a; 2005b; Moczek 2012; 2015; Gilbert & Epel 2009: Ch 1; Gilbert, Bosch & Ledón-
Rettig 2015; Laland et al 2015; Dupré 2012: 257-260. 
7 This depends on interaction with a variety of factors such as different pheromonal nest cultures, microbial 
symbionts and sources of food. See variously Gilbert & Epel 2009: 20-21; Griffiths & Knight 1998: 254; 
Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 97; Meloni 2016: 198. 
8 There seems to be a whole host of factors that contribute to the ‘decision’ of some of the trout to migrate to sea 
and some to stay in the river, such as differing metabolic rates and the environmental conditions of early life 
(Caballero, Morán & Marco-Rius 2013). 
9 Gilbert & Epel 2009: 3-5. 
10 Gilbert & Epel 2009: 5, 17-19. 
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change sex during early life depending on the sex of other individuals of its species that it 
encounters.11  
These cases relate to early developmental stages, but phenotypic plasticity is important 
throughout a being’s life. In the case of humans, see for example the way that our digestive 
and immune systems are maintained and adapted through responses to the presence of 
different kinds of bacteria and viruses in the body;12 and the huge scope our brains have for 
structural adaptation through learning throughout adult life.13 The plasticity of living systems 
and behavioural capacities enables the organism to continuously maintain and adapt itself in 
interaction with varying and unpredictable conditions.14  
The more we recognise the importance of environmentally-responsive plasticity in directing 
ontogeny, and its capacity to enable multiple coherent and viable organismic forms, the 
harder it is to hang on to the view that genetics provides fixed instructions for what is to be 
developed, whilst ‘environment’ (everything else) merely provides enabling (or divergence-
producing) conditions. If we want to maintain the structure of this dichotomy at all then, in 
cases like the early developmental examples given above, it makes just as much, if not more, 
sense to reverse the relationship; i.e. to see the pathways taken as ‘instructed’ by the external 
environment, and to relegate genetics to background condition.15 But the better conclusion, as 
I shall explain, is that this is a similarly inadequate description. Either alternative neglects the 
rest of the complex nexus of interactive elements, including the activity of the organism 
itself, through which form and functionality emerges. 
This story gains texture when we look at lower levels of biological organisation. Take the 
process of cell development. Because all the cells in an individual’s body are descended from 
                                                          
11 Gilbert & Epel 2009: 5. 
12 Gilbert & Epel 2009: 5; Dupré 2012: Ch 13. 
13 See e.g. the seminal study by Maguire et al (2000) of the brains of London taxi drivers, which showed growth 
of the posterior hippocampus, a part of the brain associated with spatial awareness and navigation, to be 
positively correlated with length of time in this line of work. 
14 See e.g. Oyama 2000a [1985]: Ch 2; Barker 2015: 55-60, 68-69. 
15 See e.g. Gilbert & Epel 2009: 10. Couldn’t we instead see these developmental variations as programmed by 
genetic instructions that specify different forms relative to different environments? Yes, this option is open to the 
genetic essentialist. I offer critique of this particular idea at the end of 1.3 below. 
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the same parental zygote, they contain the same genetic code.16 Yet we have many different 
kinds of cell in our bodies, with different morphologies and functional capacities – blood 
cells, bone cells, skin cells, neurons, and so on. The production of specific kinds of cell, and 
variation in their properties, depends on many factors other than the DNA sequence the cell 
contains, including chemical structures such as methylation patterns that modify nuclear 
DNA and regulate how the genome of that cell can be used.17 18 This ‘epigenetic’ patterning 
is shaped by a number of contextual factors.19 These include the chemical milieu of the tissue 
or organ in which the cell develops – for example, embryonic skin cells placed in the location 
where an eye is being formed can change their epigenetic patterning and develop into lens 
cells;20 and hormonal signals caused by activity in the nervous system, which is in turn the 
product of sensory interaction with the external environment – for example, cells in the 
hippocampus of a rat’s brain acquire different methylation patterns depending on the extent 
of maternal grooming that the pup experiences during the first week after birth, and these 
patterns can in turn affect nervous system functioning later in life, leading to different 
abilities to deal with stress through adrenal regulation.21 
                                                          
16 This is not strictly true. Firstly, not all cells in the body (‘in’ both spatially and functionally) are descended by 
mitosis from the parental zygote. A huge number within, e.g., a human body belong to different organic lineages 
altogether. These include many microbial symbionts such as bacteria, archaea, and fungi, upon which the 
functional whole of the human being depends. Amazingly, these amount to around 90 percent of the cells and 99 
percent of the genes in the living human organism (Dupré 2012: 220-226; 124-128). Secondly, taking only the 
‘native’ cells in an organism (descended from parental zygote), there are a number of reasons why they could be 
genetically heterogeneous, such as ‘errors’ in DNA copying during mitosis, and various other kinds of genetic 
mosaicism and chimerism, some very common (see Dupré 2012: 119- 122). But these exceptions are beside the 
point here, which is that even genetically identical cells, based on the standard 4-letter representation, can be of 
different kinds, and perform different functions.   
17 Gilbert & Epel 2009: 38-46; Noble 2006: 93-94; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 128-132; Dupré 2012: 114; 122-
124, 158-159, 279-280. 
18 There are many other within-cell factors that are important, including the very physical shape of the genome 
qua material object. The way chromosomes in a particular cell are folded and spooled (in interaction with 
histone proteins, etc.) affects how they can be used (Dupré 2012: 3-4; Barnes & Dupré 2008: 64-65; Sterelny & 
Griffiths 1999: 131). 
19 See in general Gilbert & Epel 2009: Ch 2; Noble 2006: 45-51, 93-94. 
20 Noble 2006: 94. 
21 Gilbert & Epel 2009: 44-45.  
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There are complex cycles of causation and dynamic interaction here, rather than bottom-up 
control by an underlying code. Cell morphology and functionality is constructed out of 
interactions between and across multiple levels of organisation. DNA plays important parts in 
this, e.g. in protein synthesis, to be discussed in a moment. But, again, there seems no better 
reason for attributing to it the special role of ‘informing’ or ‘instructing’ cell development, 
than for awarding that status to, e.g., methylation patterns that affect how the genome is used 
in a particular cellular context, or to the multiple wider factors that shape those patterns, and 
so on.22  
Let’s go down further. One of the central ways the genome is used in the cell is in protein 
synthesis, the area in which the concept of ‘genetic coding’ has been most successful.23 Each 
time a protein is produced, a section of DNA is ‘transcribed’ into a strand of mRNA 
(‘messenger’ RNA), and then this is ‘translated’ into a protein by molecular apparatus in the 
cell cytoplasm called a ribosome.24 The ribosome connects together amino acids, the units of 
protein structure, in a particular order according to the nucleotide sequence of the piece of 
mRNA that is fed into it.25 On the face of it, then, a particular amino acid structure is ‘coded 
for’ by the section of DNA that is used in the process of protein synthesis (i.e. the particular 
‘molecular gene’ transcribed).26 However, even in this narrow context, the notion that gene 
sequences ‘instruct’ a particular end-product is thoroughly misleading.  
                                                          
22 See e.g. Oyama 2000a [1985]: 35-36. 
23 See e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2007 and Griffiths 2001: both are critical of uses of genetic ‘information’ that involve 
a special semantic or essentialist status, yet both allow that the notion of a ‘coding’ relation between DNA and 
proteins has a legitimate basis, due to the determinate (but not one-to-one) chemical ‘mapping’ between DNA 
triplets and amino acids. In what follows I do not deny the mechanical facts appealed to for this claim, but do 
deny that the amino acid structure of the protein synthesised is simply ‘instructed’ by the DNA sequence used, 
since relations at this level can be many-to-many. 
24 The terms in inverted commas here are just a few of the many semantic/intentionalistic/teleological 
metaphors, along with ‘code’, ‘programme’, ‘information’, ‘blueprint’ etc., that are now thoroughly embedded 
in the language of genetics and subtly validate a poietic metaphysics in modern biology. See Oyama (2009; 
2010; 2016) for a more detailed analysis of this ‘language of language’ in biology. 
25 On these processes in general, see e.g. Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 103-104, 124-132. 
26 On the ‘molecular gene’ or ‘reading sequence’ gene concept, see Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 78, 132; 
Orgogozo, Peluffo & Morizot 2016; Dupré 2012: 80, 107-108, 138. 
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It was once thought that RNA was merely an intermediary between DNA code and protein 
structure.27 In fact, whilst it is true that the primary mRNA sequence corresponds one-to-one 
with the base sequence of the strand of DNA transcribed (due to unique chemical bonds 
between the different nucleotides),28 before mRNA is translated into a functional protein 
product there are various mechanisms that ‘edit’ it. Some sections are removed, and the 
remaining sections recombined. This editing and recombination can occur in multiple ways, a 
phenomenon known as ‘alternative splicing’: each ‘splice variant’ makes a different final 
mRNA sequence, specifying a different amino acid structure.29 Further changes can also then 
be made to the chains of amino acid before they are used as functional proteins.30 Also, 
molecular genes sometimes ‘overlap’, in the sense that a certain bit of sequence can be 
transcribed into more than one primary mRNA.31 Therefore, one section of DNA can be 
involved in the production of many, sometimes hundreds of, different proteins.32 
Furthermore, in some cases a single protein is made using DNA sequence from separate 
sections of the genome.33 Thus, the relationships between DNA sequences and proteins are 
not one-to-one, nor even one-to-many, but many-to-many.34 Regulation of protein synthesis 
depends on complex interaction between genome and cellular environment, interaction which 
                                                          
27 Dupré 2012: 1, 81, 138. 
28 See e.g. Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 126. 
29 Noble 2006: 6-10, 30; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 103-104, 124-132.  
30 Dupré 2012: 80, 108, 138, 251. 
31 Dupré 2012: 80, 138; Sterleny & Griffiths 1999: 126. The implication of this, and yet further complications 
(such as the direction in which the DNA sequence is ‘read’), is that what counts as a ‘molecular gene’ depends 
on the particular instance of protein synthesis we are looking at – there is no objectively unique division of the 
genome into discrete molecular genes, such that they can be straightforwardly countable (Dupré 2012: 80-81, 
138-139, 250-251; Sterleny & Griffiths 1999: 132-133). 
32 This is borne out by the fact that there is usually said to be 20-30,000 molecular genes in the human genome, 
whereas we have at least 100,000 different types of protein (Noble 2006: 4; Dupré 2012: 250-251). The number 
of different splice variants a gene has depends on a variety of things, including its size. E.g. the Dscam gene in 
the fruit fly has around 115 exons (sections which correspond to particular amino acids), and can potentially be 
used to make around 38,000 different protein products (Noble 2006: 30). This indeterminacy is common: around 
95% of multiexon molecular genes in the human genome undergo alternative splicing (Pan et al 2008).  
33 Dupré 2012: 80, 108, 251. 
34 Dupré 2012: 80, 108; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 132; Rehmann-Sutter 2008: 39-42. 
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is in turn influenced by wider contextual factors.35 So, again, even at this relatively simple 
level, the ‘specification’ or ‘instruction’ of organic form can be no more meaningfully 
attributed solely to DNA structure than it can to any other aspect of the dynamic system of 
structures and processes through which that form is constructed.36 Once we get up to the scale 
of the whole organism, this many-to-many indeterminacy is hugely amplified, such that the 
notion that we might portion up the genome into a set of ‘genes-for’ phenotypic traits is now 
all but dead.37 
Thus we find context-sensitive plasticity across the levels of biological organisation. DNA 
sequences can be used in multiple ways in synthesis of RNA and proteins, and even the very 
structure of the genome in a cell is modifiable through its relations with the rest of the cell.38 
Even if DNA-amino acid relations were one-to-one, DNA would still not fully determine 
                                                          
35 Noble 2006: 7-8; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 103; Dupré 2012: 81-83, 108, 113-114, 122-124, 134-136, 249-
253; Barnes & Dupré 2008: 45-59. 
36 See Oyama 2000a [1985]: 31-33. Noble makes the salient point that, for these reasons, calling protein 
synthesis ‘gene expression’ is thoroughly misleading because it “gives the impression that the whole process is 
implicit in the gene, or at least in the information that the gene holds, which simply needs to be ‘expressed’” 
(Noble 2006: 6-7). 
37 See e.g. Noble 2006: 8-9, 37; Rehmann-Sutter 2008: 39-42. This is often expressed in terms of the 
impossibility of reducing Mendelian genes – hypothesised discrete ‘factors’ that account for trait differences – 
to specific segments of the genome (e.g. Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 121-124, 132-136; Dupré 2012: 105-111, 
137-139, 249-253; Barnes and Dupré 2008: 47-59). Even the most strongly correlated DNA-phenotype 
relations, which usually involve a disease or other medical disorder, such as cystic fibrosis or PKU, often turn 
out to involve a variety of possible variations in DNA, and for various other reasons it is misleading to call these 
particular changes ‘genes-for’ the diseases in question (Dupré 2012: 109-110, 137, 249-250; Moss 2001). The 
wider point is that, even if there are statistically one-to-one cases of correlation between genotype and 
phenotype differences, the dependence of the development of any trait on multiple layers of mediation between 
DNA and biotic and abiotic ‘environment’ means that we can’t see the whole process of that trait’s development 
as simply dictated by the genomic element in this system (see also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 50-51; Lewontin 
2000b: viii-x). 
38 E.g. through DNA methylation, mentioned above. There are two ways of interpreting this: as an external 
structure added to the underlying 4-letter DNA sequence, or as a modification of that sequence. When a cytosine 
base is methylated, for example, its hydrogen atom is replaced with a methyl group of one carbon and three 
hydrogen atoms, turning it into 5-methylcytosine (e.g. Severin et al 2011). This doesn’t affect its bond with 
guanine, so it is usually said that the DNA sequence remains the ‘same’. Nonetheless, 5-methylcytosine is a 
different chemical structure to cytosine, with different mechanical properties, that affect DNA transcription in 
different ways (Severin et al 2011). The interpretation that sees methylation as merely an external addition 
requires abstracting away these details, such that we label both cytosine and its methylated variant as ‘C’ when 
representing genome structure (Dupré 2012: 123). This is just one example of how a more fine-grained 
description of chemical composition would affect the extent to which we see genomic diversity between cells of 
common zygotic descent (Dupré 2012: 123; Barnes & Dupré 2008: 84-87). 
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protein functionality, which is also flexible – proteins can play multiple roles depending on 
how they interact with each other and their wider material context.39 And this picture repeats 
with increasing complexity as we go up the levels of organisation towards the organism itself, 
as a functionally integrated whole that interacts with a yet wider environment.40 
Each level is ‘blind’, as Denis Noble puts it, to what it does at higher levels, which is 
determined not simply by the properties of the structure in question but by its relations at 
those higher levels.41 DNA doesn’t dictate how it should be translated into proteins, nor what 
those proteins should do, proteins don’t tell the cell what to do, and cells don’t instruct organ 
functionality, and so on.  
The organism itself ‘downwardly’ influences the ongoing interplay across all these lower 
levels.42 It does this through its capacities for sensitive coordinated response to context, open-
ended exploratory developmental processes, and even positive modification of external 
environments (known as ‘niche construction’), which in turn shape the conditions of its own 
continued development and activity.43 The organism is therefore a participant in the process 
of its own development; it actively and flexibly mediates the relations between various 
aspects of the causal nexus through which it continuously comes into in the world. These 
capacities are increasingly being recognised as central to a proper understanding of both 
                                                          
39 Noble 2006: 36-37; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 92; Dupré 2012: 133-134, 140. 
40 See Dupré (2012: 124-126, 151-153, 220-222) for an account of the multicellular organism as a functionally 
and metabolically integrated whole that interacts with its surroundings (also Nicholson 2014a). Such wholes 
need not be genetically homogeneous, for reasons such as those mentioned above in footnotes 16 (microbiome, 
mosaicism etc.) and 38 (ways of interpreting methylation). 
41 Noble 2006: 34. See also Dupré 2012: Ch 8, in which he notes that the capacities of biological entities do not 
simply inhere in their intrinsic material structure, because “aspects of what they are depend on the context with 
which they interact, a context always extending beyond any predetermined boundaries” (142 (my italics)). 
42 On the phenomenon of ‘downward causation’ from whole to parts, which applies at all levels of organisation 
including where the whole is the whole organism, see Dupré 2012: Ch 8, 287-289; Noble 2006: Ch 4.  
43 On the mediation of development by the organism’s sensitive responses to environment, see e.g. Barker 2015: 
47, 53-62; Laland et al 2015: 3-5; West-Eberhard 2005b; Moczek 2012; 2015. On the open-ended and 
exploratory character of much developmental coordination, both internal and external, see e.g. Laland et al 
2015: 5-6; Gerhart & Kirschner 2007; Moczek 2012; 2015. On the mediation of the organism’s development by 
its own action on/modification of the environment, part of what is studied in the growing field of niche 
construction theory, see e.g. Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 4, Barker 2015: 53, 62; Nicholson 2014a: 350; 
Moczek 2012: 115-116; 2015 (on niche construction theory in general, which focuses mostly on the significance 
of organism-environment co-construction for evolutionary process, see e.g. Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman 
2001). 
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development and evolution, due to their potential to enable novel structural and behavioural 
forms, and adaptive innovation in response to novel situations.44 
As a whole, this expanded picture of ontogeny reveals a plasticity of form and functionality, 
and dynamic complexity, for which the notion of the genetic ‘programme’ or ‘blueprint’ 
seems woefully inadequate, as I shall now elaborate.45 
 
1.3. Deflating the genetic essence: the ‘parity thesis’ and the inadequacy of 
dualistic interactionism 
One way that this picture gives the lie to the programme concept is that it implies the 
breakdown of the dualistic version of the ‘interactionist consensus’, for which the organism is 
simply the product of interface between two separate channels of influence, ‘genetic 
information’ and ‘environment’. The idea that DNA is special in providing the ‘programme’ 
for ontogeny, whilst everything else is simply external conditioning, significant only for its 
affecting the more or less perfect realisation of that programme, becomes inadequate to 
reality. 
This is because, for any ‘developmental resource’ within the ‘developmental system’ through 
which the organism becomes,46 the phenotypic ‘meanings’ it provides – what it does, what 
differences it makes, what roles it plays – are not inherent within it, but depend on its 
                                                          
44 Another way to put this is that prior selection on genetic differences underdetermines the possibilities for 
phenotypic response to the environment; developmental plasticity enables novelty because it is a responsive 
capacity of the whole organism with various degrees of open-endedness, rather than just a pre-defined set of 
alternatives encoded in genotype (see more below, towards the end of 1.3). See variously Laland et al 2015: 3-6; 
Linquist et al 2011: 444-445; Gerhart & Kirschner 2007; West-Eberhard 2005b; Barker 2015: Ch 5; Dupré 
2012: Ch 14; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 169-172; Gilbert, Bosch & Ledón-Rettig 2015; Moczek 2012. 
45 Although much of the discussion so far has focused specifically on the idea of DNA as a programme for 
development, the recognition of constructive dynamic interaction across many levels, and across developmental 
time, implies the same deflationary conclusions for various other more liberal construals of the innate 
programme idea, e.g. that a ‘developmental programme’ is distributed across the fertilised zygote as a whole, 
not just localised in the chromosomes. For a good summary of the reasons that this expanded idea, although 
better in some regards, does not overcome the fundamental flaws of the DNA-localised genetic programme, see 
Nicholson 2014b: 167-168; also Oyama 2006: 281-283. 
46 To use the language of developmental systems theory, in which constructivism is central (see e.g. Oyama, 
Griffiths & Gray 2001; Oyama 2000a [1985]: Ch 7). The term ‘system’ here is used somewhat broadly to refer 
to the nexus of heterogeneous interactants involved in any process of ontogeny, however tightly or loosely 
connected, persistent or transient across time, ‘typical’ or ‘atypcial’, etc. (Oyama 2000a [1985]: 141, 202-203).     
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relations with other elements, the ontogenetic history of those relations, and the possibilities 
for ongoing interaction within that relational context. This applies as much to the genome as 
to any other element in this dynamic nexus, from epigenetic cellular mechanisms to the wider 
physical and social environment. 
This implies what is sometimes called the ‘parity thesis’: that there is a fundamental 
ontological parity across the various aspects of a developmental system, with respect to their 
roles in ontogeny.47 All sources of influence on ontogeny are on a par insofar as they are 
dependent on interaction with other elements, their effects are context-sensitive, and given 
the right circumstances they are all capable of making the difference between one outcome 
and another – of ‘specifying’ particular form, if you like. What counts as ‘specifying’ an 
outcome and what counts as ‘background condition’ depends on what we are interested in, on 
where we start from and what we take for granted in our investigation of a process.48 There 
are no grounds for sectioning off any particular element of the developmental nexus as the 
special source of phenotypic prescription or teleological directionality. 
This presents us with a dilemma: either we allow that any sense in which genomes can be 
said to ‘inform’ or ‘instruct’ ontogeny – i.e. as context-sensitive structural or causal 
interactants – can be said equally well of any other source of influence in the developmental 
system; or we simply reject ‘information’ language altogether, as a misleading metaphor that 
sends us astray by suggesting ontologically privileged components that prescribe form to the 
                                                          
47 On the parity thesis (explicit and implicit), see Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 3, 5; Griffiths and Knight 
1998: 254-255; Griffiths 2001: 396; Griffiths & Gray 1994: 277, 284; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 16-18, 35-36, 39-
40, 43, 68, 132, 200-202; Oyama 2000b: 2-3; 2006: 275; Dupré 2012: 134-135, 254-255; Moss 2001: 89-91; 
Godfrey-Smith 2007: 107; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 95, 100-101, 106-107. 
48 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 39-40, 79-80, 93, 130-133, 161-162; Moss 2001: 91; Dupré 2012: 286. 
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rest of the system.49 Whichever horn of this dilemma we choose, it deflates the special status 
given to the genome in genetic essentialism.50 
                                                          
49 This dilemma is implicit in e.g. Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 100-101; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 195-198, 200-202. 
The sense of ‘information’ posited for the first horn of the dilemma would explicitly deny any semantic, 
intentional, or teleological character. Often appealed to is a technical concept derived from communications 
theory in which an event carries information about another event to the extent that it is systematically correlated 
with that event (Griffiths & Gray 1994: 281; Griffiths 2001: 396-397; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 101-102). 
Importantly, in this concept what counts as ‘sender’ and what as ‘channel conditions’ is always reversible. For 
example, we might understand genes as the sender that transmits information about phenotype under the channel 
conditions of some other necessary environmental factors. But we can just as easily view the same situation as 
one in which these non-genetic factors contain information about the phenotype developed, with the genes 
involved providing channel conditions. A related proposal would be to align ‘information’, ‘instruction’ or 
‘specification’ simply with a causal notion, whereby ‘the cause’ of some effect is the difference-maker in a 
causal nexus, when the rest of the causal nexus is assumed as background conditions (see also Dupré 2012: 
286). Neither definition is able to justify the dualism of gene-information/environment-condition, because both 
require ontological parity between all inputs that can affect phenotypic state; every such input is a potential 
source of developmental ‘information’ on these definitions. For more detail on this debate see Griffiths & Gray 
1994: 281-283; Griffiths 2001; Godfrey-Smith 2007; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 100-105; Oyama, Griffiths & 
Gray 2001: 5; Dupré 2012: 134-135, 254-255; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 74-81; 2009: §3.2.2; Barnes & Dupré 
2008: 77-78. 
50 I personally favour the second horn, for the reason that the language of ‘information’, ‘instruction’, and so on, 
always gives the misleading suggestion of semantic/intentional content and teleological direction. Some have 
attempted to embrace these connotations by ‘naturalising’ (as in ‘making compatible with natural science’) the 
idea that genetic information has such a content, thanks to the ‘designing’ agency of natural selection (e.g. 
Maynard Smith 2000; Shea 2013). I am very sceptical of the possibility (and value) of doing so, for reasons 
similar to those of Griffiths 2001; Godfrey-Smith 2007; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 104-105; Oyama 2009; and 
for reasons more specifically to do with the validity of deriving intentional content from natural selection as an 
agent of ‘design’ (see footnote 115 at end of V:4). More to the point, as the arguments in this section should 
make clear, I don’t think there is a need to attempt the ‘naturalisation’ of a semantic notion of genetic 
information. 
I will briefly expand on these points in relation to the theory of Shea (2013). Shea has recently defended the use 
of semantic concepts of genetic information. As best as I can understand him, he argues as follows. Firstly he 
notes, uncontroversially, that particular genotypic differences correlate with particular phenotypic differences. 
In this sense it can be said, again uncontroversially, that the former contain ‘correlational information’ about the 
latter (they can be used to make predictions about the latter – in the same way we could say, I think, that a 
sunrise contains the information that the air temperature will soon increase) (2013: 2). Connected with this (it 
seems) is the claim that genotypes also contain correlational information about the likely environment in which 
the organism will develop, in particular that it is likely to be conducive to the phenotype that is correlated with 
the genotype in question (based on the assumption that the environment is more likely to be similar than 
dissimilar to that in which that genotype has been reproductively successful in the past) (4-7). The next step in 
the argument is to attribute to natural selection the power of designating proper function to the objects of 
selection. On this basis, insofar as a genotype has been ‘selected’ in the past, it can then be said that that 
genotype has the proper (‘adaptive’) function of making the particular difference which made that selective 
difference in the past (see also IV:3 on this notion of function). The conclusion is apparently that: “[previously 
selected] zygotic DNA transmitted down the generations has semantic content. It indicates that environmental 
conditions are conducive to the phenotype, production of which caused that genotype to be selected. [This 
theory] will also attribute imperative contents to zygotic DNA in the same cases: the instruction to produce the 
corresponding phenotype” (7). In other words, selectively-favoured genotypes come to contain ‘representations’ 
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The parity thesis doesn’t claim that all developmental resources play the same role, or are all 
equally important in every case of developmental process; when looking at a particular 
phenomenon different factors will have different explanatory significances. What it does 
assert, to quote Oyama et al, is that “such differences do not justify building theories of 
development and evolution around a distinction between what genes do and what every other 
causal factor does”.51 If we accept this – a key step in the turn to developmental 
constructivism – then the ontological divide set up by what I’ve called dualistic 
interactionism is overrun by the heterogeneous system of interacting elements through which 
                                                          
of the likely developmental environment (but, rather oddly, not representations of the likely phenotypic 
outcome, it seems – although Shea is ambiguous on this); and they contain ‘instructions’ with content like 
‘produce phenotype P (the one that was the reason for this genotype being selectively-favoured in the past)’. 
The mechanisms of development successfully ‘read’ this information (and, presumably, ‘follow’ this 
instruction) if they respond to it by producing the phenotype in question (11). Shea claims that this perspective 
has more explanatory power than one that sees this simply in terms of causal patterns (without added semantic 
concepts) (14-17). I have a number of things to say in response to this perspective, with respect to its 
significance here. Firstly, it is not clear how it is explanatorily more powerful to explain development of P by 
saying that development follows the instruction ‘make P’ than by reference to the particular causal interactions 
between the genetic structures in question and their environment that lead to that outcome. No doubt, the 
development of phenotypes that are conducive to success in the environment they find themselves in is, in part, 
to be explained by the accumulation of well-adapted developmental resources over phylogenetic time, including 
exquisitely refined DNA structures. But if this is all that Shea means, then it adds nothing to frame this fact in 
terms of specific intentional content ‘carried’ by these structures. However, even if it does help with explanation 
in some way that I have not been able to grasp, the question for us here is not just one of explanation, but 
whether this interpretive perspective is metaphysically justified. Central to its apparent justification is the idea 
that natural selection is something that can imbue its objects with intentional content. A key problem with this is 
that it treats natural selection as a unitary ‘force’ or ‘agency’ that acts on particular objects, analogous to an 
intelligent designer or maker of an artefact. This is misleading: natural selection is not itself a force, but, as 
Lewens puts it, a population-level statistical phenomenon (2004: Chs 1-2). What it means for some trait to be 
‘selected’ is for it to contribute to the relative reproductive fitness of its bearers within a population – something 
is not adaptive because nature has selected it. This, I think, undermines the grounds for treating ‘selectively-
favoured’ developmental resources as special (in the sense of containing indicative or imperative content) in 
distinction from any other aspect of the developmental nexus, whether the former are bits of DNA, epigenetic 
states, features of the maternal environment, or whatever (see also English et al 2015 for an ‘informational’ 
treatment of some such extra-genetic factors; although I note that in this paper the authors (of whom Shea is 
one) do not claim anything beyond ‘correlational information’ for these features). Another way to put this is that 
the parity thesis is not overcome by making natural selection part of the history of the developmental resource 
we are interested in. A fuller treatment of these issues would have to consider the nature of natural selection, and 
its different possible interpretations, in more detail (something I decided not to do in this thesis). One final 
caveat: my overall purpose in this part of the thesis is to consider the implications for thinking flourishing of 
embracing the constructivist perspective, given that there are, I think, some very good independent reasons to do 
so. I do not purport to have negated all possible reasons for adopting an opposing perspective – a task which 
would require a more systematic treatment and much more space. 
51 Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 3; see also Griffiths & Knight 1998: 254. 
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life emerges. The parity thesis, at the very least, puts the burden of conceptual justification 
onto those who would wish to maintain this dualism.52 
There are some ways one might attempt to lift this burden, and push back against the de-
privileging of DNA. However, these also rest on shaky ground.  
Firstly, it might yet be argued, isn’t DNA special in that it is the conduit of biological 
‘inheritance’? This is a popular notion. Modern genetics grew out of the attempt to 
understand heredity, to understand how characteristics are ‘passed on’ from one generation to 
the next, to the extent that they are. In this context DNA took on the mantle of the ‘hereditary 
material’ – the entity that ‘transmits’ form from parents to offspring.53 But the question of 
how the characteristics of one generation are ‘passed on’ to the next (to the extent that they 
are) is the question of how form arises in one generation in a similar way as it did in previous 
generations (to the extent that it does).54 This, as should now be apparent, depends on a whole 
host of internal and external developmental resources and influences being reliably 
reproduced across generations, including but not limited to the genome.55 The more reliably 
they are reassembled, they more ‘innate’ or ‘inherited’ the corresponding phenotypic patterns 
seem.56 So, if by ‘conduits of inheritance’ we understand the means by which developmental 
resources are passed on to offspring from previous generations, then it is well established that 
DNA is not unique in this regard.57  
It’s also not true that DNA is, so to speak, the ‘first cause’ of the developmental system, the 
thing ‘there at the start’ from which all else is derived.58 The smallest ‘bottleneck’ in the 
                                                          
52 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 200-202. 
53 Meloni 2016: Ch 2, 138-139; Barnes & Dupré 2008: Chs 1-2. 
54 See e.g. Oyama 2000a [1985]: 43, 138-139, 174-180; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 97. 
55 See e.g. Oyama 2000a [1985]: 38-39, 46-48, 138-139, 141-148, 174-180. 
56 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 52, 142, 144, 174-176. 
57 See Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 3-4; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 43, 49-50, 138-139, 141-148; Griffiths & Gray 
1994: 283-285; Griffiths 2001: 399-403; Dupré 2012: 2, 136, 157-159, 252, 254-258, 279-285; Noble 2006: 41; 
Gilbert & Epel 2009: Ch 2; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 95-97. 
58 Dupré 2012: 136. I would add, even if the earliest stage of an organism was simply a chunk of DNA, why 
limit ‘inheritance’ to what is there at the beginning, if the layers of context ‘added’ to it are just as crucial for the 
direction of ontogeny? 
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reproductive cycle of multicellular organisms is the single-cell zygote, and even at this level 
parents bequeath much more than just DNA. They ‘pass on’, indeed, the whole organised 
cell, complete with a range of chemicals and molecular mechanisms integral in various ways 
to cell and genome functioning, such as histone proteins, DNA methylation patterns, 
organelles such as mitochrondria, ribosomes, cytoplasmic chemical gradients, the cell 
membrane, and many other resources.59 The original cell is not assembled by the zygotic 
genome, and the latter can do nothing outside of this initial, already complex, context.60 
Furthermore, embryos inherit much of importance from the internal maternal environment, 
such as nutrition, warmth, and in many cases symbiotic microbes.61 Many organisms also 
inherit physical and social environments shaped by previous generations, from termite 
mounds and beaver dams to the highly complex technological and cultural structures of the 
human world, with its hospitals, houses, schools, legal systems, economic practices, etc.62 
The trans-generational shaping of external environments, and its significance for both 
development and evolution, is studied under the rubric of ‘niche construction’.63 Recognition 
of the full gamut of ‘extended inheritance’, as this has come to be called, is motivating an 
expanded understanding of evolution as driven by change in the composition of 
developmental systems, rather than simply changes in genes.64 
Whatever our understanding of inheritance, one might still attempt to protect DNA privilege 
by appealing to what is often called the ‘central dogma’. In the broad sense that has become 
                                                          
59 See variously Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 3-4; Griffiths 2001: 400; Dupré 2012: 136, 158, 279-280; 
Noble 2006: 41; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 96; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 145-146. Furthermore, there is growing 
recognition that particular changes in many of these cellular structures can be inherited via the germ line across 
generations (see also Jablonka and Lamb 2005: Ch 4; Meloni 2016: Ch 7). 
60 Dupré 2012: 136; Noble 2006: 41; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 39-40. This fact helps to dispel another potential 
source of genetic privilege: the notion that DNA is unique in being ‘self-replicating’. Firstly, no DNA 
replication can occur without a range of other cytoplasmic mechanisms necessary to perform it, and secondly, 
there are many other cellular structures that, in interaction with other resources, similarly ‘replicate themselves’ 
in the course of ontogeny: again, we find parity here (see Dupré 2012: 254; Griffiths & Gray 1994: 299; 
Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 106-107; Lewontin 2000b: xii-xiii). 
61 On microbial inheritance in the womb see e.g. Funkhouser & Bordenstein 2013. 
62 Dupré 2012: 255, 258, 280-282; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 3-4; Barker 2015: 63-66. 
63 In general see e.g. Laland, Odling-Smee & Feldman 2001. 
64 See Laland et al 2015; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 6; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 27, 44, 138-139, 141-148, 
174-180; Dupré 2012: 2, 254-258, 279-285; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 95, 100. 
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attached to this term, it is the thesis that ‘information flow’ is one-way, from genome to 
organism but not vice-versa.65 This suggests a fundamental asymmetry (non-parity) between 
the role of the genome in ontogeny and the role of any other sources of influence. The genetic 
programme transmits instructions to the organism, but is independent of and unaffected by 
the processes going on outside of it – as Mayr puts it, “the genetic program itself remains 
unchanged while it sends out its instructions to the body” –  whereas any other factors can 
presumably be shaped by context.66 In the previous chapter I referred to this idea in 
describing the genetic programme as ‘transcendent’ of ontogeny (V:2.2, 3.3-3.4). 
What justification is there for this? One way it gains apparent plausibility is by association 
with the more specific thesis that Crick originally labelled the ‘central dogma’ of molecular 
biology: that, roughly, there is no ‘reverse translation’ from proteins to DNA.67 However, this 
specific thesis, even if true,68 does not justify the broader doctrine that renders the genetic 
programme transcendent of ontogeny. We have already seen that there are many ways in 
which the genome is dynamically integrated with other parts of the developmental system. 
The modification of DNA by methylation, for example, literally affects its base structure, if 
we describe this phenomenon in a way that is fine-grained enough (see footnote 38 above). 
Even if we instead insist that methylation is an external structure added to an underlying base 
sequence that remains the same, this and many other contextual factors nonetheless shape 
genome functionality; they co-determine the specific uses to which the genome is and can be 
put within organic processes. We don’t need reverse translation from amino acid sequence to 
DNA, nor modification of DNA sequence of any sort, in order for the developmental 
                                                          
65 See Meloni 2016: 194-195; Dupré 2012: 135, 251. See also V:2.2. 
66 Mayr 1982: 56. See also e.g. Jacob 1993 [1970]: 3; Delbrück 1971: 54-55; Dawkins 1989 [1976]: 23. 
67 Crick 1958: 153; 1970; see also Meloni 2016: 138-139, 194-195. 
68 It probably is true, at least insofar as there is no evidence of amino acid sequence being used to specify either 
RNA or DNA synthesis (i.e. reverse translation) (Meloni 2016: 195). However, there is such a thing as reverse 
transcription of RNA to DNA, e.g. where the appropriately named enzyme reverse transcriptase is used to 
specify DNA from an RNA template (see Baltimore 1970; Temin & Mizutani 1970). I will not weigh in on the 
question of whether or not this transgresses the original meaning of the central dogma (but see e.g. ‘Central 
dogma reversed’ 1970 (non-authored Nature editorial); and Crick 1970). 
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significance of genomic resources to be determined by two-way interaction with context, and, 
in this sense, for the broad sense of the central dogma to be undermined.69  
This is a microcosm of the wider point that, a) if we want to talk meaningfully about the 
genome ‘informing’ development, we must recognise that the ‘content’ or ‘meaning’ of a 
genetic input is the functional and causal roles that it plays within the organism; and b) these 
‘meanings’ are not simply inherent within its intrinsic structure, but are a function of the way 
it is brought into relation with multiple layers of biotic and abiotic context.70 In short, if there 
is a sense in which a genomic resource (or any other influence) imparts information to 
ontogeny, that information does not exist prior to the integration of that resource into a 
developmental system; the ‘information’ is itself constructed through this process.71 The 
“elementary fallacy”, as Ingold helpfully summarises this point, “is to suppose that organic 
form pre-exists the processes that give rise to it”.72 
This again places the genome on a par with other, indisputably context-sensitive 
developmental resources, which are not ashamed of their context-sensitivity. Whether the 
genetic eidos is seen as a set of instructions for guiding developmental processes and/or 
representations of proper phenotypic outcomes, the dynamic embeddedness of the genome in 
ontogeny undermines the border-walls set up to protect its independence. As I said in V:2.2, 
the transcendence of the genetic eidos is essential to it as an idea – it’s not much of an 
essence if its content is determined by the process of its expression. Now we see that this is in 
fact the case, or, more precisely, the language of pre-existing ‘content’ and a subsequent 
                                                          
69 For similar arguments see Meloni 2016: 194-195; Dupré 2012: 81-82, 108, 124, 135-136, 158, 251-252. 
70 I like to think of this as a ‘Wittgensteinian’ reading of the notion of genetic ‘information’. The meaning of a 
symbol is its use in a context; it does not contain that meaning intrinsically (Wittgenstein 1974 [1953]). 
Although the structure of genomic resources no doubt places limits on the kinds of organic use to which they 
can be put, they do not prescribe their own ‘proper’ developmental meaning. The neo-preformationist 
perspective sees DNA ‘symbols’ either as determining their own proper use independently of context, or as 
somehow containing within them descriptions of different possible contexts connected inherently to different 
phenotypic implications (I’ll consider the latter idea again in a moment). See similar arguments in Noble 2006: 
21, 34, 38-39; and Oyama (next footnote). 
71 This idea is what Oyama calls the ‘ontogeny of information’, as in the title of her seminal work in the 
constructivist tradition (2000a [1985]: see e.g. 3-4, 15-16, 23-27, 35, 37-38, 56-57, 68, 76, 80, 130-132, 137, 
156-157, 161-164; see also Lewontin 2000b: xiii-xv; Rehmann-Sutter 2008: 42-43; 2010: 20-24). 
72 Ingold 2011: 8. The context is discussion of developmental constructivism, especially Oyama’s work. 
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process of ‘expression’ no longer applies.73 The developmental significance of genomic 
resources is constructed within the process of ontogeny; it is immanent from organismic 
becoming rather than transcendent of it. This idea, and the parity thesis that it supports, is 
central to the constructivist turn.  
There is another strategy that attempts to skirt this argument and hang on to the essentialism 
of the genetic programme. This is to make the context-sensitivity of ontogeny internal to the 
instructions contained in the programme. This strategy is found in what is sometimes called 
the ‘disjunctive’ or ‘conditional branching’ concept of the genetic programme.74 According to 
this, the genome contains instructions like ‘Develop phenotype P in environment A, and 
phenotype Q in environment B’. For example, we might understand the genome of the red-
eared slider turtle to contain the instruction ‘Develop male phenotype at egg-incubation 
temperature range of 26-28˚C, and female phenotype at 31˚C’.75 This provides a way to 
accommodate the growing recognition of the importance of developmental plasticity whilst 
subtly maintaining the fixity and transcendence of the genetic programme in the background. 
It achieves this by simply defining plasticity as a delineated set of alternatives encoded in the 
genome, rather than an open-ended responsive capacity of the concrete organism.76 By this 
means, I will allow, any amount of context-sensitivity can in principle be accommodated 
                                                          
73 As Coen (1999: 12-15) expresses this same idea, in the context of ontogeny there is no clear separation 
between ‘plan’ and ‘execution’. The very meaning of these terms breaks down, since they assume this 
separation. Similarly, Oyama says that a blueprint or plan “that truly reflects ontogenesis […] is no longer a 
blueprint or plan” (2000a [1985]: 73, see also 135-136; Rehmann-Sutter 2008: 42). See also the same 
conclusions about developmental process in the context of complexity theory, interpreted in terms of the 
immanent/transcendent distinction, in Durie 2002: 363-369. 
74 See e.g. Tooby & Cosmides 1992: 38-40, 45-46; Williams 1996: 62; and for critical discussion of this and 
similar notions, Griffiths 2001: 397; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 104; Barker 2015: 49; Linquist et al 2011: 444-
445; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 66-67, 131. 
75 See Gilbert & Epel: 2009: 17 for relevant data. Since there is a descending ratio of male to female over the 
temperature range 28-31˚C, the genome would presumably also have to contain instructions for gradually 
changing probabilistic outcomes at each point along this range.  
76 Pigliucci, for example, defines phenotypic plasticity as a property of genotypes (2001: 1). We might ask 
whether this wouldn’t be better named ‘genotypic plasticity’, since on this view the phenotype, or the organism 
as a whole, doesn’t itself exhibit any capacity for plastic response, rather its becoming is still merely a passive 
epiphenomenon of the unfolding of conditional genetic instructions. For an analysis of these two ways of 
interpreting developmental plasticity, which finds the reduction of plasticity to a property of genomes 
explanatorily insufficient, see Laland et al 2015: 3-5; also Moczek 2012; 2015. 
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within the programme concept, since we can extend the complexity of such posited 
instructions at will.  
The first thing to say about this is that it rescues (a version of) the programme concept at the 
expense of much of the normative specificity that made it attractive to many in the first place. 
No longer does it affirm Jacob’s idea that the zygote contains the “architectural plan” or 
blueprint for the organism’s “entire future: the stages of its development, the shape and the 
properties of the living being which will emerge”.77 Instead of a single proper form, the 
genetic essence now contains a plurality of proper forms, many ways of ‘getting with the 
programme’, depending on the circumstances. This might be considered enough to 
undermine the notion of the genome as representing what I called in the previous chapter the 
eidos of the individual. Insofar as it no longer involves a singular essential form, this is true. 
Nonetheless, it still subtly conserves the essentialist status of the genome as a transcendent 
prescriptive element, something that remains separate from the rest of the developmental 
nexus, prescribes proper outcomes to the organism (relative to particular environments), and 
can be properly followed or not. In this way it still involves core elements of what I am 
calling the poietic metaphysics of becoming, something which instead, I argue, needs pulling 
up by the roots. 
So, does this ‘disjunctive’ strategy help lift the burden of conceptual justification from the 
essentialist? No: it’s easy to see that arguments from parity apply equally well to the 
disjunctive programme. At the level of protein synthesis, how would this view describe 
multiple splicing? Presumably, each molecular gene with multiple splice variants contains an 
instruction like ‘Make protein 1 in cellular context A, make protein 2 in cellular context B’, 
and so on, and the cell is simply following this instruction when it transcribes the gene and 
splices the corresponding mRNA in a particular way. But, why see things this way, rather 
than seeing the DNA sequence as simply a material resource that can be used in flexible 
ways, and the particular outcome as ‘instructed’ by the contextually-embedded machinery 
that performs the splicing process? There seems no principled reason to prefer the former 
over the latter. Similarly, to return to the reptile sex-determination example, instead of saying 
that the genomes contain disjunctive instructions related to incubation temperatures, we could 
equally say that a particular environmental condition, such as an incubation temperature of 
                                                          
77 Jacob 1993 [1970]: 1-2. 
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28˚C, ‘contains the disjunctive instruction’ ‘Develop male phenotype in the presence of the 
genome of the red-eared slider turtle, and female phenotype in the presence of the genome of 
the alligator snapping turtle’.78 These alternative descriptions are equally adequate, or rather, 
equally inadequate, in that they both neglect the rest of the developmental system that would 
be involved in the ‘following’ of either sort of instruction.  
Furthermore, how far can the disjunctive genetic programme be pushed? Does it contain 
instructions for what to do in all possible environments? What about environments that are 
evolutionarily novel (the rapidly changing human world presents many possible examples)? 
If it does include all possible contingencies, then the programme becomes an essentially 
empty notion: it tells us everything and nothing about how the organism becomes the way it 
does.79 If not – and there seems little reason that novel environments would be represented in 
the genome – then adaptive organismic response to novel situations, and indeed novel 
response to existing situations, are always unprogrammed.80 These sorts of developmental 
response must instead be understood in a different way – as constructed through coordinated 
sensitive interaction with context without being subject to the logic of success or failure in 
terms of transcendent instructions; i.e. as falling outside the normative logic of proper and 
defective essence-realisation. With this the constructivist has their foot in the door. If this 
picture makes sense for cases like this, why insist on its being simply a miraculous exception 
to the rule, fundamentally different to all other developmental processes – the ‘normal’ kind 
that result from following complex genetic instructions?81 I propose, with the constructivist, 
that we instead recognise situated, plastic, constructive interaction to provide a conceptually 
adequate, and indeed simpler, model of ontogenetic process in general.82 
                                                          
78 See again Gilbert & Epel 2009: 17, for relevant data. 
79 See also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 66-67, 131. 
80 On the phenomena of adaptive innovation and developmental novelty, see footnote 44 above.  
81 See also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 196-197. 
82 For similar reasons, McKinnon argues that the reason for rejecting the genetic programme concept is 
ultimately one of parsimony (2005: 114-115). Oyama points out that computer programmes contain complex 
pre-specified conditional rules for controlling the machine’s behaviour precisely because they don’t have the 
coordinated plastic responsiveness of an organism – computer programmes are “ways of telling an inflexible 
machine how to be flexible” (2000a [1985]: 71). By projecting this idea onto the genome we unnecessarily 
conjure up an endless pre-specified complexity lying behind the concrete processes of life, and end up getting 
things inside-out, as it were. Instead of reified ‘rules’ containing “descriptions of all the conditions, parameters, 
and interactions, internal and external to the organism, that constitute the developmental system in transition”, 
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As I’ve mentioned, a determined partisan of the programme concept could in principle 
accommodate any amount of plasticity and context-sensitivity into it, through conceptual 
gymnastics of the sort just considered. However, as Oyama notes, the more ways we can 
interpret a message, the “harder [it is] to consider the several meanings as inherent in the 
message”, i.e. the weaker the idea of genetic preformation becomes.83 Ultimately, the burden 
of explaining why this strategy provides us with a more adequate and coherent picture of 
ontogeny than the constructivist alternative lies with defenders of the genetic programme.84 
The strength of the constructivist perspective comes not just from recognition of any 
particular empirical fact, but from its ability to accommodate the variety and complexity of 
organismic becoming without assuming the dualism of gene-information/environment-
condition, a dualism for which, as we’ve seen, there is scant principled ground. It explicitly 
rejects the programme concept, and the form of interactionism on which it rests,85 in order to 
overcome these philosophical limitations and embrace the expanded view of living process I 
have indicated here.  
 
2. Elements of the constructivist turn 
Much of what is involved in the turn from neo-preformationism to constructivism has been 
outlined by means of the preceding arguments, but I shall now make explicit some of the key 
elements, particularly those that are pertinent to the wider argument of this thesis. 
 
                                                          
what we have instead are emergent regularities from reciprocal interaction across multiple levels, constructed 
and stabilised across time; “rather than assuming that ontogenetic processes fit our notion of programs, we 
should be asking […] whether our notions of programs do justice to ontogenetic processes” (2000a [1985]: 71-
73). 
83 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 23, see also 58. 
84 See also Dupré 2012: 254-255 on this “burden of argument”. 
85 Developmental constructivism is often called ‘constructivist interactionism’ in order to distinguish it from 
what I’ve called dualistic interactionism (e.g. Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 4; Oyama 2000a [1985]: xvii, xx, 
passim; Oyama 2000b: Introduction, passim; 2006: 273). Dupré calls the constructivist approach “proper 
interactionism” for the same reasons (2012: 278). 
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2.1. Genome as resource not programme 
Firstly, it clearly involves a shift in understanding of what kind of thing the genome is, in the 
context of ontogeny. Rather than a unit of coded information and instructions, carried in or 
represented by nucleotide sequence, it is first and foremost a material entity, one that 
provides a resource for the organism’s becoming. It doesn’t transmit an ideal form or set of 
commands, but is a material tool that can be used in flexible ways.86 It is, no doubt, 
important, and exquisitely well-suited to particular organic processes, yet it is one 
developmental resource among many others, and does not stand apart from or above the rest 
of the developmental nexus in a fundamental way, as per the arguments of the previous 
section. 
 
2.2. Immanent construction of form and functionality 
How, and what, the organism becomes, the particular way in which it produces, maintains, 
and transforms itself as a more or less coherent whole of structural and functional relations, is 
uniquely constructed within the process of becoming. The particular organisation of each 
being’s way of living is not revealed through the teleological unfolding of a pre-given order, 
but emerges from a continual process of constructive interaction across multiple levels.87 This 
doesn’t mean that ‘anything is possible’, but nor is the proper shape of the life prescribed in 
advance. More specifically, the possibilities for viable, coherent functional organisation are 
not unlimited, but constraints on possibility are themselves contingent and changing products 
of the relationality that emerges within the particular set of developmental conditions.88 This 
means that judgements about functionality and malfunctionality, beneficial and detrimental 
conditions and changes, and similar normative dimensions, must refer to the particular 
organism within the context of its environment and ontogenetic history; they cannot be 
                                                          
86 See e.g. Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 5; Griffiths & Stotz 2013: 223; Laland et al 2015: 7; Barnes & Dupré 
2008. For a slightly different but complementary view, of the genome as an element in the developmental 
system that can respond in flexible ways to its environment, see Keller 2014; 2015. 
87 See e.g. Oyama 2000a [1985]: 137-139, 158-162, 169. 
88 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 125-126, 132, 137, 139-140, 169; 2007: 8-9; Dupré 2012: 259. 
209 
 
deduced simply from ideas about what is species-typical, or assumptions about 
correspondence (or lack thereof) with a genotypic blueprint.89  
This is also not to say that form miraculously arises from nothing. Each life begins from a set 
of initial materials, structures and conditions which can combine and interact with each other 
in particular ways. This initial set of conditions, from the particular properties of the zygotic 
milieu to the ecologically and historically specific states of the physical and social 
environment, is in each case unique in its particular combination. This unique nexus 
represents a range of developmental resources, from which the organism emerges through a 
gradual process of interaction and integration. Ontogenetic process, as Oyama puts it, is not 
“special creation from nothingness, but always from the conditional transformation of prior 
structure”.90 As organismic structure is transformed through interaction with existing 
conditions it creates the new conditions under which continued existence and transformation 
takes place. The interactive and developmental possibilities (and limits) at any point are 
dependent on the current state of the developmental nexus, which is a product of the 
particular history of interactivity, within the organism and between organism and 
environment, up until that point.91 Different possible developmental trajectories represent 
different ways the organism can integrate and transform the resources at its disposal over the 
course of its becoming.  
Thus, ontogeny is not the imposition of a pre-arranged order onto inert and structureless 
matter,92 but neither is it a totally spontaneous generation from the ether. Rather, it is the 
gradual and ongoing construction of a contingent functional order from a definite set of 
material structures and circumstances, dynamically integrated. A way of living is not 
(transcendently) given to the process of becoming as an end for it to produce, but emerges 
(immanently) within it, as this process goes along. In this sense ontogeny is most coherently 
                                                          
89 See also Oyama 2000a [1985]: 65-66, 137-138, 148-149, 186-187. 
90 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 4, see also 26-27, 29-30; 2010: 403-407. 
91 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 26-27, 37, 92, 132-133, 135-136, 161-162, 169; Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 4; 
Rehmann-Sutter 2008: 42-45. 
92 The materials of life, internal and external, are not inert, amorphous, or chaotic, lacking any ‘order’, but are 
structured in various ways and have particular reactive properties, etc. (Oyama 2000a [1985]: 26, 38, 40-41, 
158-159; 2009: §3.3.2; 2010: 403-407; Noble 2006: 29-37; Dupré 2012: 113-114). 
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understood not as reflecting the transcendent teleology of poiesis, but the immanent ‘self-
creativity’ of praxis, as described in II:3 and III:1.93 I return to this below, 3.1. 
 
2.3. Organismic becoming is continual 
As this suggests, the notion of a final state of ‘completion’, of essence-realisation or being-at-
telos, after which the rest of life is either stasis or degeneration, misrepresents the becoming 
of the organism as a whole.94 Organismic becoming is the ongoing construction and re-
construction of a living organisation throughout its temporal persistence. Oyama again: “The 
dance [of ontogeny] continues throughout the life cycle,95 and everything that occurs in that 
                                                          
93 There is a theoretical elephant in the room that cannot be ignored any longer. This is the theory of biological 
‘autopoiesis’, originally introduced by Maturana & Varela (see 1980 [1972]: 78-84; the idea has become central 
to the enactivist school of philosophy of mind – see e.g. Thompson 2007: 91-107). The term is used to refer to 
systems of interdependent processes which collectively constitute and continually maintain the whole system, 
organisms and cells being archetypal examples in this literature. They are called ‘auto-poietic’ because they are 
seen as making themselves. That is, we might say, they are ‘self-creative’. Yet, surely this notion is 
fundamentally opposed to the kind of self-creativity I am talking about because, given the terminology, the logic 
of these systems is poietic? Actually, I think much of so-called autopoiesis theory is thoroughly compatible with 
a constructivist theory of development, and that they are in many ways making similar points (see also Oyama 
2007: 10-12). The only thing I have reason to take issue with here is the word. It suggests – at least given the 
way I have specified the meaning of poiesis here – a pre-formed but latent ‘self’ that engages in a teleological 
process of production by which it makes itself actual, by which it generates a concrete instantiation of itself in 
the world. This is in fact very close to the conception of development we get from neo-preformationism. But it 
is precisely not what exponents of autopoiesis theory mean by the term. Maturana & Varela explicitly deny that 
the organic systems they are referring to are guided by a “purposeful driving component that [attains] expression 
through the realization of [its form]”, or possess “an integral project or program represented and realized in and 
through […] structural organisation” (1980 [1972]: 74, 85). For this reason they argue that teleology, in the 
sense of process guided by fore-sight of an end (see also Mayr’s ‘teleonomy’, V:2.4) can be eliminated from 
what they call ‘autopoietic’ systems (1980 [1972]: xix, 85). In all these respects constructivism is in agreement. 
For this reason, I suggest only that the term ‘autopoiesis’ has been somewhat inappropriate from its inception. 
94 See also Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 320. 
95 Constructivists often talk of the organism as having a ‘life cycle’ (see also e.g. Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 
2001: 1-4), or even being a life cycle (e.g. Dupré & Nicholson 2018: 25). This locution is derived, and I think 
somewhat misappropriated, from a related point about organic lineages. The point is that a lineage is not merely 
a series of static mature forms, but a series of overlapping whole temporal trajectories, i.e. the careers of 
members of that lineage (and evolution is change in the average patterns of these trajectories, not merely change 
in the typical structure of mature form). The individual temporal parts of this series are connected by acts of 
reproduction, and from this we can abstract the notion of a ‘reproductive cycle’ that begins and ends at these 
points. (That this is typically what is being thought of here is revealed by the fact that descriptions of ‘the life 
cycle’ of some species usually stop, or rather begin again, at the point of reproduction – see again Dupré & 
Nicholson 2018: 25, for example). This is helpful for understanding evolution, but I think it can be misleading 
to say that the organism has or is a life cycle. The individual organism has a beginning and an end, temporally 
speaking, and can be identified with the career in between. Through reproduction it can play a role in continuing 
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cycle, from the first moments to the moment of death, from the most permanent structure to 
the most evanescent, from the most typical feature to the most divergent, is constructed from 
[interaction between developmental resources]”; the organism “does not have a final form, 
encoded before its starting point and realized at maturity. It has, if one focuses finely enough, 
as many forms as time has segments”.96  
The ongoing-ness of ontogeny does not mean that the organism is constantly undergoing 
radical transformation in structure; it is also evident in how life sustains more or less 
persistent structures. The point is that stability in living form is not achieved by crystallising a 
static structure; it is itself actively maintained or constituted by ongoing process. The most 
basic illustration of this is metabolism, the processes by which an organism constantly 
exchanges energy and matter with its surroundings (e.g. eating, digesting, defecating) in order 
to maintain a steady state of low entropy. If this ceases for long enough, the organism 
collapses into thermodynamic equilibrium with its environment, which entails the 
disintegration of structural and functional organisation altogether (i.e. death).97 Metabolism 
enables organisms to hold off this disintegration by constantly renewing and replacing their 
constituent material parts. This occurs whether the part in question is also undergoing 
structural change or not. What this means is that, unlike man-made machines, which tend to 
have a stable arrangement of parts undergoing the gradual linear process of entropy increase 
(manifested as decay, corrosion, etc.), but which otherwise maintain a fixed structure without 
doing anything, living beings must be continually acting in order to exist.98 The stability of a 
                                                          
the reproductive ‘cycle’ of the lineage, but it is not itself cyclical (it’s hard even to imagine what this could 
mean – perhaps the so-called immortal jellyfish (Turritopsis dohrnii) is an example of an organism that can 
itself constitute a repeating life cycle). I would probably replace the term ‘life cycle’ in quotes like the present 
one with ‘life course’. This is clearly what Oyama has in mind here – that which continues “from the first 
moments to the moment of death”. 
96 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 26-27. There is an important point suggested here about the relation between life and 
time. The neo-preformationist idea that we can simply ‘compute’ the organism from its genetic essence (see 
V:2.6) abstracts the organism from temporality in a certain way. It makes the temporal process of becoming 
accidental to the organism’s being, merely a function of the teleological unfolding of the essence into reality. 
On the constructivist view this is wrong; the organism’s particular history of becoming, and therefore its real 
temporal duration, is essential to its identity at a fundamental level (see also Oyama 2007: 6-7). There is a 
connection here with the philosophy of Henri Bergson (e.g. 1944 [1911]) that I would like to explore in future 
work (see e.g. Durie 2002 on this and a number of similar connections with Bergson). 
97 See e.g. Dupré & Nicholson 2018: 22-24; Dupré 2012: 223-224. 
98 See e.g. Dupré & Nicholson 2018: 22; Dupré 2012: 71, 141-142. To put this difference another way, the 
relation between structural organisation and activity is one of reciprocal dependence in an organism, whereas it 
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multicellular organism as a whole “derives from the continuous regeneration of its tissues, 
which are themselves maintained by the incessant renewal of their cells, which are in turn 
stabilized by the ongoing replenishment of their molecular constituents”, etc.99 For living 
things both change and stability are dynamic in this sense, constituted by process.100 To put 
this another way, their being is inseparable from their doing.101 And this doing is a continual 
becoming and re-becoming, construction and re-construction, that endures from start to 
end.102 
 
2.4. Participation of the organism in its own becoming  
As we’ve seen, the flip-side of the deflation of genetic hegemony is the re-distribution of 
developmental significance across the heterogeneous nexus of interacting elements and 
processes through which the organism emerges. Importantly this includes the organism itself, 
as a functionally integrated whole, and a sensing, acting being. In neo-preformationist 
thinking, the organism effectively drops out of view as something of distinct interest in 
explaining and understanding ontogeny, it becomes merely a passive epiphenomenon of the 
unfolding of the programme in interface with the everything else of ‘the environment’.103 
Once we take the constructivist turn we can see that the organism as a whole participates, in 
various ways, in its own becoming.104  
                                                          
is linear in a man-made machine: the activity of a car, for example, depends on its structure, but its structure 
does not depend on its continual activity. 
99 Dupré & Nicholson 2018: 22-23.  
100 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 37. See also the related importance of plasticity and sensitivity in the maintenance of 
robust stability of form, e.g. Barker 2015: 58-59, Ch 5; Oyama 2000a [1985]: Ch 2, 151, 182-183. 
101 See also Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 321-323, 328-329; Jonas 2001 [1966]: 76 (fn 13). 
102 The image of someone treading water comes to mind here. When you tread water you keep yourself in a 
steady state of being-at-the-surface by constantly swimming upwards towards the surface. Your condition is 
rather one of continual becoming-at-the-surface, we might say. 
103 See Oyama 2000a [1985]: 162. 
104 See also Nicholson 2014a on the twentieth century ‘eclipse’, and current ‘return’, of the organism as a 
distinct component of the ontology of biology, due in part to the emerging turn to constructivism. 
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Organisms shape their own developmental trajectory through their various capacities to 
interact with and alter internal and external states.105 Both by constituting an organised whole 
through which sub-systems and components are functionally integrated and continuously re-
constructed, and by interacting plastically with the external environment, e.g. sensitively 
responding to varying conditions, exploring and experimenting with different environmental 
relations, and positively modifying external conditions (see ‘niche construction’),106 the 
developing organism, say Oyama et al, “functions as a resource for its own further 
development. [It] helps determine which other resources will contribute to that development, 
as well as the impact they will have”.107  
In other words, what an organism can do, how it can live, and the way in which states of the 
world and states of itself are significant to it in this regard, is shaped by its own history of 
interaction with and mediation between developmental resources. Thus, at a fundamental 
level, organismic becoming is characterised by a certain reflexivity in which activity, 
possibility, and the organism’s ‘parameters of significance’ are inter-related. This power of 
the organism to shape its way of life in these respects is not a fixed quantity or simple on/off 
property. The different sensory, cognitive, and physical capacities of the particular organism, 
and the different conditions in which it lives, affect the ways in which, and the degree to 
which, the organism can actively ‘participate’ in the process of its own becoming. I return to 
this in relation to the notion of ‘self-creative freedom’ below (3.3). 
 
2.5. Beyond traditional dichotomies 
What we can now see is that the phenomenon of life as such represents a concrete denial of 
the dualisms of essence/appearance, plan/execution, instruction/condition, type/token, etc. 
Before elaborating on the philosophical significance of this further, it is worth noting a 
number of other popular and inter-related conceptual oppositions that also break down once 
we take the constructivist turn. In particular, ‘nature’ vs ‘nurture’, the ‘innate’/‘inherited’ vs 
                                                          
105 To paraphrase the description of ‘constructive development’ in Laland et al 2015: 6. 
106 See also footnotes 42-44 above (downward causation, active plasticity/niche construction, adaptive novelty, 
etc.) 
107 Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 5; see also Oyama 2007. 
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the ‘acquired’, and the metaphors of ‘hard-wiring’ and ‘blank slate’. The constructivist turn is 
not merely a swing from the first term to the second in each of these, from the view that 
everything is essentially innate or hard-wired prior to development to the view that the 
organism is essentially a formless lump of wax that can be sculpted in any way by 
environmental forces. And neither is it merely a middle-ground or ‘bit of both’ solution to 
these oppositions – this is what we get from the standard gene/environment version of 
interactionism discussed earlier. Rather than merely perpetuating the oppositions in one of 
these ways, it presents an overcoming of them altogether, by undermining their shared 
assumptions.108  
What both sides of these traditional dichotomies tend to assume is a picture of the organism 
as inert matter passively moulded by some separately identifiable forces or agencies, whether 
genetic information, environmental conditioning, or some combination of the two. Instead, 
for the constructivist, the organism creates itself through the active integration of a 
multiplicity of developmental resources, resources which gain particular phenotypic 
significance through this process. In this way, traits are neither innately pre-formed nor 
simply ‘acquired’ from outside, nor a bit of both, but rather constructed through ontogeny.109  
The denial of ‘nature’ as hard-wiring or programming does not entail the converse image of a 
blank slate open to anything ‘nurture’ (or culture) wants to imprint on it.110 Both ideas see 
plasticity as simply the extent to which the organism can be passively shaped by external 
influences, at one extreme more or less denying it, at the other extending it indefinitely. 
Rather, plasticity is the capacity of the organism to interact with and respond to its context, 
shaping itself and its environment in flexible but contingently constrained ways. To 
paraphrase Gillian Barker, what is wrong with the ‘blank slate’ idea is not that it posits 
openness where there is none, but that it misrepresents this openness as mere passive 
                                                          
108 On the overcoming of these oppositions through constructivism, see variously Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 
2001: 2; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 5, 16, 43, 52, 93, 103, 125-126, 128, 132, 138, 141-145, 148, 158-159, 174-179; 
Dupré 2012: 259-260, 278, 285. 
109 On the innate/acquired distinction in particular, see Oyama, Griffiths & Gray 2001: 2; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 
5, 16, 43, 52, 138, 141-145, 159, 174-179. In the sense just described, we could say that all traits are acquired 
in ontogeny, but this would involve quite a different sense of ‘acquired’ to that usually opposed to ‘inherited’, 
i.e. ‘given from outside’ rather than from ‘inside’ (see Oyama 2000a [1985]: 141, 144-145). 
110 As is often suggested by evolutionary psychologists who employ ideas of genetic programming, e.g. Pinker 
2002. 
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malleability – susceptibility to external impression – rather than coordinated sensitive 
responsiveness; and what is wrong with the converse notion of ‘hard-wiring’ is not that it 
posits stability where there is none, but that it misrepresents this stability as fixed and rigid 
rather than robustly maintained through continual re-construction and adaptivity.111 
Oyama proposes a re-definition of the terms ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’.112 Instead of opposing 
each other as essential form and external conditioning, or two alternative channels of 
phenotypic determination, they become related to each other as product and process. An 
organism’s ‘nature’ is its particular form and functional organisation, characteristics and 
capacities. This is the product of an ongoing process of ‘nurture’, i.e. constructive 
development, and is thus temporally emergent and subject to change: “Never static, a nature 
emerges in time and space, […]. Nature thus has no existence prior to or separate from the 
concrete living organism in its concrete, often living, surroundings: no Platonic ideals here, 
no underlying reality more basic than the being itself”.113 And, as we’ve seen, this 
relationship is reflexive. An organism’s nature at any one time is the product of its nurture up 
until that point, but also constitutes part of the nexus through which nurture continues: it 
functions as a resource for subsequent interactive possibilities as well as the context within 
which other resources gain significance.114 One way to understand the shift in thinking 
involved in the constructivist turn is that it treats ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ in a similar way: in 
the context of life, rather than ‘becoming’ denoting the process by which a pre-given being 
(proper form) becomes manifest, the organism’s being is that which continually emerges 
within its becoming, within its ongoing, reflexive, self-creativity. This is not simply a 
privileging of process over product, but a radical shift of view that turns on the way in which 
the process in question (organismic becoming) is itself conceived. In particular, I argue, it 
involves a movement from the metaphysics of poiesis to that of praxis.  
                                                          
111 Barker 2015: 62, see also 39-40, 45. For more detail on Barker’s attempt to overcome this dichotomy, and on 
how certain tensions which remain in her view could be dissolved by a more explicit embrace of the 
constructivist perspective, see my review essay ‘The changing space between politics and biology’ (Griffiths 
2017). 
112 See Oyama 2000a [1985]: 125, 128, 141, 148; 2000b: 48-49; 2002: 163-164; 2010: 406-407. 
113 Oyama 2002: 164. 
114 Given this ongoing reflexivity, the term ‘product’ can be misleading insofar as it suggests the poietic notion 
of a process completed in the production of an end separable from its performance. This is of course not what is 
meant here. 
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3. Life without essence: re-framing becoming, re-thinking flourishing 
There are three elements of the argument of Part 2 of this thesis remaining to be made 
explicit. Firstly, just indicated, that the constructivist turn is more than just critique of a 
particular set of metaphors in modern biology; it requires a more fundamental and general 
shift in our apprehension of living phenomena, one that dissolves the view of becoming as 
poiesis altogether and replaces it with one of becoming as praxis. Secondly, to wrap up the 
sub-narrative of these final two chapters, that this turn provides an internal critique of modern 
biology that completes the Darwinian revolution against Platonic essentialism, by bringing 
the metaphysics of organismic becoming into line with that of historical evolutionary process. 
Thirdly, that this shift in thinking about development can also be harnessed to look outward 
from biology toward the basic evaluative categories through which we understand ourselves, 
and to motivate the kind of shift between concepts of flourishing proposed in Chapter III. 
These are the respective subjects of the remaining three sub-sections.  
 
3.1. Poiesis to praxis: transforming the logic of life 
Developmental constructivism, at least as I have presented it here, emerges from critique of 
genetic essentialism or neo-preformationism. But it is more than simply the negation of this 
particular tendency in modern biology. Rather, it undermines the poietic framing of life in 
general, whether based on ideas about programmes in DNA, membership of a natural ‘type’ 
that prescribes a model for life, teleological vital forces, or whatever. This is because it 
reveals the conceptual structures of the poietic view to be inadequate to the reality of 
organismic becoming. It achieves this in part by providing an alternative general picture of 
ontogeny, one which is able to accommodate its dynamic complexity more fully. This picture 
invokes a fundamentally different conceptual framing, which, as suggested at the end of 2.5, 
can be understood in terms of the logic of praxis. I shall now summarise this way of 
understanding the nature and philosophical significance of the constructivist turn in 
contemporary biology. 
In II:3 I divided the concepts of poiesis and praxis into two different dimensions, with respect 
to which they contrast with each other (dimension 1: productive vs performative; dimension 
2: planned vs improvisational – taken here in reverse order). Firstly, regarding the relation 
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between the process and the ‘form’ of its product, we have seen the praxic overcoming of the 
poietic in the context of biological theory at many points in this chapter. The notion of the 
innate genetic programme that sends out instructions to the body whilst sequestered from 
outside influence, and the corresponding logical separation between transcendent ‘plan’ and 
concrete ‘execution’, becomes inadequate to organic reality. This picture is replaced with the 
developmental construction of the organism’s form and functionality through a process of 
contingent interactivity across many levels, an immanent process of ‘self-creativity’ 
(summarised in 2.2). This is well captured by Oyama’s re-definition of ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’, 
and my corresponding articulation of the being/becoming distinction, as at the end of 2.5.115  
Life creates itself through interaction with particular resources and circumstances, and its 
possibilities are contingently constrained by the ways in which these can be integrated, but it 
does so without the prescription of a proper form laid out in advance, from which it ought not 
to deviate. Life is in this sense improvisational.116 It figures itself out as it goes along, each 
step building on and re-integrating the product of the last. Becoming is this process of finding 
a way in the world. Re-orienting our thinking in this way doesn’t just undermine the genetic 
essence, it dissolves the whole poietic conceptuality that connects it – or any other version of 
the transcendent eidos – with the concrete phenomena of life. The essentialist mystique 
around DNA, and the scientific language that buttresses it, is simply the most up-to-date, 
apparently hi-tech, version of this way of interpreting the living world. Different versions of 
the same idea, none of which do justice to this world, says Oyama, will reconstruct 
themselves “as long as coming into being is understood as the instantiation of pre-existing 
form”.117 I quite agree. By revealing ontogeny to reflect the logic of praxis, constructivism 
disrupts the conceptual assumptions on which any version of this idea rests. 
Secondly, regarding the relation between the process and its ‘end’, the dimension of the 
poiesis/praxis distinction derived more directly from Aristotle’s use of this language, we can 
see how the constructivist turn also takes us beyond the poietic to the praxic. We have seen in 
this chapter (summarised in 2.3) that the notion of development as a limited process of 
                                                          
115 It is also well captured by Coen’s analysis of ontogeny by analogy with artistic creativity (1999: Ch 1). 
116 Scully (2006: 363 (fn 6)) also suggests the analogy of musical improvisation for the constructivist 
understanding of development. 
117 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 159-160 (my italics). 
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‘unfolding’ that lies between start point and completion of a finished phenotype, also 
becomes inadequate to the reality of the ongoing and active persistence of organic being 
through interaction across many levels, from basic metabolic exchange, to the responsive 
adaptivity of immune and nervous systems, to sensitive interaction with an external niche, 
and so on. “Far from being confined to the transitive intervals between genotype and 
phenotype”, says Ingold, “life carries on in the unfolding of the relational matrices wherein 
organic forms are generated and held in place”;118 it does not merely “connect a point of 
origin with a final destination, but rather […] keeps on going, finding a way through the 
myriad of things that form, persist and break up in its currents”.119 
Thus, instead of the separation of process and ‘end’ that characterises poiesis – process 
completed in an end-product beyond the process – we begin from a view of becoming as the 
continual, reflexive, and active constitution of living existence, and this as something that 
carries on as long the temporal duration of the life in question. In this sense becoming is not 
to be seen as merely ‘for the sake of’ something external to itself, like building a house is. 
Rather, like a musical performance, its activity is inseparable from that which it produces. In 
a certain sense it is therefore undergone ‘for the sake of’ itself; its own fulfilment, or ‘end’, 
lies in creating and sustaining the living existence from which it is itself inseparable. The 
sense of this is difficult to articulate because the language of ‘ends’, and what a process is 
‘for’, is constantly tempting us back into the poietic view by conjuring up the fore-sight of 
the eidos.  
Christophe Rehmann-Sutter, the only other that I know of to explicitly interpret the turn from 
neo-preformationism to constructivism in terms of poiesis and praxis, focuses on this 
process/end dimension of the distinction, and attempts to articulate something similar. He 
also observes that living existence is constituted by its ongoing activity, making it 
fundamentally different to the given, passive being of an inanimate object. Living existence is 
what he calls “active presence”, being in the world that is performed, rather than simply 
                                                          
118 Ingold 2011: 8-9 (my italics).  
119 Ingold 2011: 4 (my italics). Ingold does not put the issue in terms of the poiesis/praxis distinction, but there 
are many similarities. His work over several decades “has been driven by an ambition to […] replace the end-
directed or teleonomic conception of the life-process with a recognition of life’s capacity continually to overtake 
the destinations that are thrown up in its course”, to replace what I am calling the poietic view of living with one 
of living as a process of, as he says here, “finding a way” in the world (2011: 3-4). 
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produced.120 Given this, he argues, we can view developmental processes not merely as 
means to the formation of finished end-products, but as “act[s] of being”,121 acts which 
constitute “the being’s continuous presence in the world”.122 In this sense, “in each moment 
of their developmental processes [organisms] remain present as the intrinsic ends of these 
processes”.123 And this means that there is no particular stage in life that is ontologically 
privileged as reflecting the organism’s essence or as completed phenotype: “The 
development of an organism is nothing less than a continuous and changing presence in the 
world”.124 For Rehmann-Sutter this is a conception of becoming as “organic praxis”.125 
This is not to deny that certain organic processes can be abstracted so as to resemble acts of 
poiesis in this sense, processes completed in end-products that exist beyond their production. 
The generation of protein molecules, cells, organs, and so on, or the transformations in bodily 
structure that many organisms undergo at regular stages of life, can be viewed in such a way. 
However, the crux of the praxic perspective is precisely that this is an artificially limited view 
of things. A fuller understanding places such entities and structures, and the processes by 
which they are made, in a wider context, in which they become subordinate aspects of the 
ongoing praxis of the organism. As soon as they are ‘finished’ – if ever there is some such 
identifiable point – they are re-incorporated into processes of metabolism, systemic 
interactivity, functional regulation, and so on, and these productions are therefore merely 
constitutive moments in the continuing ‘active presence’ of the organism as an integrated 
whole. Likewise, this is not to deny that organisms engage in similarly abstractable poietic 
processes in the world around them. Humans in particular live in a world constituted by 
objects, structures, and institutions made for that world, entities which exist beyond the 
                                                          
120 Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 322-323, see also 328-329. 
121 Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 318. 
122 Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 314, 320. 
123 Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 320; see also 2008: 44-45, 48. 
124 Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 320. 
125 Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 313. Rehmann-Sutter focuses on what I called in II:3 ‘dimension 1’ of the 
poiesis/praxis distinction, but he also implicitly brings in dimension 2 when he, e.g., bolsters his concept of 
development as ‘active presence’ by appealing to the constructivist argument that no pre-established plan is 
needed for the emergence of developmental trajectory, contra the notion of the genetic programme (2006: 321-
322, 325-327). In this way he also invokes the improvisational ‘immanent creativity’ aspect of becoming-as-
praxis. 
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particular processes of their being contrived and fabricated. However, the point is again to 
recognise the subordination of such phenomena to a wider context of praxis: these acts of 
poiesis and the world they create do not stand apart from human life simply as its ‘outcomes’. 
Rather, they are conditions of, and through their use and modification are continually folded 
back into, the ongoing praxis of human life.126 
 
3.2. Completing the Darwinian revolution? 
I shall now wrap up a key sub-narrative of these final two chapters. As argued in Chapter V, 
modern neo-Darwinian biology provides us with a somewhat schizophrenic view of the living 
world. On the one hand, it proclaims a revolution against ‘Platonic essentialism’, citing the 
continuous and unplanned historical transformation of life as evidence against the 
metaphysics of fixed transcendent ‘types’, of which individuals are mere token appearances, 
and more or less perfect manifestations. On the other hand, as soon as we switch from talking 
about evolutionary process to developmental process, precisely this metaphysics is re-instated 
through the dominant concepts of genetic programme, information ‘expression’, phenotypic 
instruction, and so on.127 I argue that the shift in thinking at the heart of the constructivist 
turn, as described over the previous few pages, represents the overcoming of this equivocal 
view, and thus the completion of the anti-essentialist revolution of post-Darwinian biology. 
(At least, since I cannot foresee where this unfolding of thought will take us next, I would 
settle for the claim that it constitutes a necessary dialectical step in the articulation of this 
revolution.)  
The reasons for this can be presented in terms of the poiesis/praxis analysis outlined just now. 
In the standard picture of evolutionary process we start from a population of individuals 
characterised by a certain scope for variability.128 This variability enables different ways of 
coping with and responding to environmental conditions, and through differential 
reproduction the population maintains its existence as well as transforming itself across trans-
                                                          
126 See a similar analysis of the ontological priority of ‘growing’ over ‘making’ in Ingold & Hallam 2014: 3-6. 
127 See similar claims in Lewontin 2000a [1998]: 6-10; 2000c: 66-68; Oyama 2000a [1985]: 137, 159; 
Rehmann-Sutter 2006: 323-327. 
128 See e.g. Mayr’s ‘populationist’ evolutionary theory (1959; 1982; 1992; 1995). 
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generational time. This process is unplanned and has no ideal form as an end point – it is not 
the poietic unfolding of a pre-given design. On the contrary, it proceeds, as we might now 
say, in a markedly praxic manner – continuously responding to existing contingencies 
through a gradual and improvisational process, figuring itself out as it goes along, within a 
flexible space of interactive possibilities.  
Oyama notes this idea in Jacob’s description of evolution as “tinkering, or “bricolage”. 
Rather than working from a “preconceived plan” as an engineer would, it improvises and 
makes do, in a “series of contingent events””.129 She points out how this is also a fitting 
description of constructive development, and thus instead of distinguishing evolution from 
development on these grounds, as does Jacob, we should recognise “that both processes show 
the contingent quality of tinkering, in the sense not of randomness or disorder but rather of 
subtle and opportunistic dependence on particular conditions and materials. […] Rather than 
the directedness of planned activity, it is such inspired tinkering that characterizes life 
processes, the marvelous results notwithstanding”.130  
The internal tensions of the neo-Darwinian view arise, at least in part, from the fact that for 
evolutionary process it rejects the logic of poiesis, and embraces that of praxis, whilst 
maintaining the opposite metaphysics at the developmental level. Through the constructivist 
turn these two realms of living process are instead brought into a certain metaphysical 
alignment with one another, as forms of immanent praxis at different scales.131 Embracing 
this shift in conception of ontogeny therefore ought not to be seen as an heretical reaction 
against Darwinian biology, but rather as a continuation of its unfinished revolution against 
what I have labelled the poietic metaphysics of life, with its transcendent eidoi, dualism of 
essence/appearance, typological interpretation of variation, and view of becoming as 
teleological ‘revelation’. Constructivism opens up the conceptual space of modern biology in 
a way that allows it to purge these lingering poietic tropes, and render its thinking more 
coherent with its self-image. 
                                                          
129 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 46 (internal quotes from Jacob 1982: 33-37). 
130 Oyama 2000a [1985]: 46 (my italics); see also 2006: 273-274. 
131 Although, no doubt, there remain important differences, and they are not perfect analogies. I will not pursue 
this issue further here. 
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The main argument for developmental constructivism remains that given in Section 1 of this 
chapter, regarding the inadequacy of genetic essentialism/dualistic interactionism, and the 
need for a perspective that accommodates the plasticity and dynamicity of ontogeny more 
adequately. However, we can add to this the virtue of greater intellectual coherence that 
comes from bringing developmental and evolutionary thinking into line with each other in the 
way just described. Although, it must be admitted, this argument operates at a more rhetorical 
level, by appealing to the irony of a neo-Darwinian position that preaches the death of 
‘Platonism’ but subtly resurrects its core elements when theorising development. 
 
3.3. Re-thinking ‘flourishing’ as an organic concept of the good 
At this point the reader is invited to turn back to the start of Chapter III, and see how what 
was introduced at that point as a proposal – to explore the potential for a way of thinking 
‘flourishing’ grounded on becoming as praxis rather than as poiesis – can now be read as a 
move that is also motivated by embracing the implications of the constructivist turn in 
biological theory. In this way, the discussion of the last two chapters regarding the nature of 
ontogeny provides an intellectual resource for our attempt to consider ‘flourishing’ as an 
‘organic concept of the good’ – as a way of structuring normative thinking about ourselves 
through the affirmation of human ‘organic facticity’, the fact of our being living beings. It 
provides a resource both for the task of interrogating the metaphysical assumptions of the 
neo-Aristotelian properness concept, and for thinking our way out of this view from the 
ground up, as it were. I shall now outline the key aspects of this argument. 
The first key point to make explicit is the negative implications for the properness 
perspective. As we saw in Chapter II, the neo-Aristotelian concept of flourishing as 
properness, at least as expressed by Foot/Thompson and Nussbaum, is taken to be a logical 
consequence of the fact that the relevant objects of evaluation are living things. The 
normative logic of properness is understood to be presupposed by this fact. The upshot of the 
analysis throughout this thesis is that this normative logic is not simply given by the 
phenomena of life as such, but arises from viewing these phenomena in a particular way, one 
that, as I have argued, centres on the interpretive lens of poiesis. The assumption of a 
necessary and natural link between living phenomena and this particular normative logic 
relies on, and is validated by, a poietic metaphysics of life. The upshot of the present chapter 
in this regard is the disruption of this metaphysical validation. The view of organismic 
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becoming invoked by the properness concept, we see now, is inadequate to its subject-matter. 
The constructivist turn undermines the poietic metaphysics assumed by this neo-Aristotelian 
position, and thus severs the assumed logical link between living as an object of evaluation 
and the structure of the properness perspective. Therefore, regardless of whether critics are 
correct to present particular neo-Aristotelians as deriving the content of their conceptions of 
the good from claims about biology – recall that in Chapter IV I allowed to the neo-
Aristotelian the response that they are not correct to do so – the form of the concept of 
flourishing that underlies this view, which does rely on assumptions about living nature as 
such, is itself undermined by biological considerations.  
Secondly, at the same time as doing this negative work, the constructivist turn provides us 
with an alternative metaphysics of becoming, centred on the interpretive lens of praxis. This 
opens up the possibility for a positive re-thinking of flourishing as an organic concept of the 
good. That is, it enables us to remain within the general philosophical space occupied by the 
standard neo-Aristotelian approach – that constituted by the conceptual interplay between the 
apprehension of living phenomena as such and the basic normative structures brought to bear 
in relation to them – but at the same time it motivates us to organise this space in a very 
different way. In particular, I argue that it provides ground for the perspective on flourishing 
that I have attached to the label ‘self-creativity’.  
I will not repeat the work of Chapter III here, but ought to make explicit some connections 
with aspects of the constructivist perspective as presented in this chapter.  
Firstly, as discussed above (e.g. 2.2, 2.5), in the constructivist view the particular ‘nature’ or 
‘being’ of the living individual is not given to it as a proper form to manifest, whether 
through genetic programmes (neo-Darwinism/preformationism), an ‘inner design’ borne in 
virtue of membership of a natural type (Thompson), or some innate teleological ‘basic 
capabilities’ (Nussbaum). Rather it is uniquely constructed within the organism’s unique 
history of becoming. The individual’s particular way of existing in the world is the ongoing 
achievement of a continual process of constructive improvisation and negotiation, both 
internally in terms of the way its parts ‘fit together’ to form a functional whole, and in terms 
of how it creates and maintains itself through relations with the wider environment. What this 
means is that the normative dimensions relevant to evaluation of the organism’s conditions, 
relations, capacities, and processes of change in itself and in the world around it, are 
contingent on its particular history and context. The way in which different things matter for 
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that particular living subject cannot simply be assumed or inferred from an idea of a proper 
form given by, e.g., membership of a ‘type’, or even something like an individualistic ‘true 
self’. Its particular ‘parameters of significance’ emerge with the ongoing becoming of the 
being itself, and must be understood in this context. In this way, the constructivist turn entails 
the structure of the self-creative concept of ‘being-well’ outlined in Chapter III. What was 
presented there as a general way of framing this concept, and thus of approaching normative 
issues from health and disability to the expression of individuality, is now given a specific 
underpinning through our understanding of biological ontogeny.  
To reiterate some relevant points about the status of this idea: This is not primarily a claim 
about which particular norms will be part of any being’s ‘good’, but a claim about the genesis 
of those norms. It also does not mean that what matters must be unique to the particular 
individual – beings that emerge in interaction with similar conditions and developmental 
resources (e.g. members of the same biological lineage or species, or the same culture, etc.) 
can, all else equal, be expected to develop similar parameters of significance. In this way, 
generalisations (e.g. about how humans usually live) can play a legitimate role in certain 
kinds of normative and even political reasoning. The point is to recognise that the legitimacy 
of any such generalisations, when they are legitimate, is contingent on the particularities of 
the individuals they refer to. They cannot be transformed into facts about what is necessarily 
part of an individual’s being-well given their inclusion in some group about which these 
generalisations are being made. 
Secondly, whereas the properness view (reflecting the logic of poiesis) understands becoming 
simply as the process whereby a proper form is manifested, and thus as evaluable for the sake 
of that end-state, the logic of praxis opens up another dimension of life-evaluation, through 
which we can understand the concept of ‘becoming-well’ in a particular way. In this 
dimension we consider becoming as intrinsically evaluable, in terms of the performance of 
the process itself rather than simply its outcomes; as evaluable in some sense ‘for its own 
sake’. This is specifically motivated within the constructivist view of ontogeny by the way 
that it recognises organismic becoming to be the ongoing and active constitution of being, 
rather than simply the means by which a separable end-product is made (see above, 2.3, 3.1). 
Constructivism reveals a fundamental reflexivity between living being and living becoming: 
life is something in which ‘product’ and ‘process’ are continually folding into one another. In 
the ‘self-creativity’ of this process the ‘self’ that is created does not stand apart from the 
process of creativity, but is emergent from and continually re-incorporated into it. Therefore, 
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insofar as ‘life’ is what we are interested in evaluating through the concept of ‘flourishing’, 
we ought to understand the processes through which one’s way of being is created and 
maintained not as merely precursory to life, but as integral to it, and as intrinsically 
significant regarding what it is to live well.132 
In short, if we view life through the lens of praxis, as motivated by the constructivist 
conception of ontogeny, then we will see becoming as the immanent process of figuring out a 
coherent way in the world, as life goes along. Starting from this basis, and applying it to our 
way of thinking ‘life as a whole’, we ought to re-think flourishing in the following way. At 
one level of analysis, we will see the norms relevant to a being’s existence as contingent on 
the particular history of becoming through which that being has emerged. And at another 
level of analysis we will also be concerned to articulate some way of evaluating the 
individual’s ongoing process of becoming itself. The latter is what I hope to have provided 
via the concept of ‘self-creative freedom’ outlined in Chapter III. I said there that the 
conditions and capacities of a being’s existence affect the power that it has to explore and 
interact with the world, and to thereby actively engage in its own continual process of finding 
a way in life. This seems to me like the best way to approach the question of how life qua 
becoming-as-praxis might, in itself, be gone about well or badly. That is, not in the sense of 
something that ought to be gone about in some particular way, but as something that can be 
gone about to various degrees richly, openly, and autonomously, or in contrast narrowly and 
restrictively. In this way we will see the extent of this kind of freedom as itself a parameter of 
what it is to flourish, and as something in relation to which we can understand changes in 
life-conditions to be beneficial or detrimental. 
This idea can be connected with the notion of the ‘participation’ of the organism in its own 
becoming that arises from constructivist theory (above, 2.4). At the most basic level this 
refers to the fact that the organism as a functional whole forms part of its own developmental 
nexus by providing the context in which other resources gain developmental significance. 
This quickly gains complexity when we investigate the ways in which development can be 
                                                          
132 Which is more important, being-well or becoming-well? Due to their fundamental interrelatedness, I’m not 
sure that this question admits of a general answer. One of the epigraphs to this thesis captures the sentiment of 
this well: “If it is better to travel than to arrive, it is because travelling is a constant arriving, while arrival that 
precludes further travelling is most easily attained by going to sleep or dying” (Dewey 1922: 82). 
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shaped by how the organism senses, responds to, and interacts with its environment, 
including the ways it can act on its surroundings so as to shape the context within which it 
lives. Different such capacities, as well as different conditions in the world through which 
these capacities are used, entail different degrees of what I call self-creative freedom – the 
openness and autonomy through which a living being improvises its way through life.  
The most complex and powerful self-creative capacities that exist in the living world (that we 
are aware of) no doubt reside in the human realm. Through our cognitive powers of 
deliberation, planning, and judgement (or practical reasoning), our artistic and technological 
capabilities, and ability to construct our own environment in a multitude of ways – 
physically, culturally, institutionally – we are (to make a generalisation about statistical 
normality, not to identify an essence) capable of participating in our own becoming to a very 
great degree. With this comes a higher degree of what I have called ‘normative autonomy’ – 
the extent to which one’s parameters of significance ‘come from oneself’, rather than being 
imposed from outside. In this way, we can understand autonomy not as something that arises 
uniquely with a special quality of human mind that divides us from the contingency of the 
organic world, but as grounded in and continuous with the character of life as such, although 
manifested to varying degrees and in various ways across the living world.133 These ‘human’ 
capacities for greater self-creative freedom are not good (for us) because they make our lives 
properly human. Rather, they constitute a greater ‘fullness of life’ itself, a greater degree of 
active openness to the world. They are not a requirement for realising our essence, but are, as 
J. S. Mill suggested, a “privilege”.134  
  
                                                          
133 See similar comments about human autonomy in the context of the active and constructive capacities of life 
in Dupré 2012: Ch 16. See also similar comments on ‘control’ by Oyama, for whom control is not a way of 
standing outside of the world but is the degree to which you can sensitively re-arrange it and yourself through 
interaction, to meet particular ends. It emerges not from independence, but interdependence. And, the “special 
talent” that evolved in humans is to “spin webs of interrelatedness unprecedented in their variation, complexity, 
and ramification” through, e.g., our greater cognitive and technological abilities (Oyama 2000a [1985]: 188-
189). See also Coen’s comment that seeing ontogeny as a constructive process enables us to see human 
creativity “from a new perspective; not as an isolated feature of human activity, but as something that is itself 
grounded in the way we develop” (1999: 14). 
134 Mill 1991 [1859]: 64. 
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Conclusion 
 
The main conclusions and central claims of this thesis have just been elaborated, in the final 
section of Chapter VI, so here I shall just say a little about the limitations of the overall 
argument, and indicate some ways in which I hope its main philosophical contributions can 
be developed further. 
There are certain limitations to the reach of my argument in this thesis. Firstly, I am not 
claiming that developmental constructivism, simply as a theoretical approach to biology, 
requires us to adopt my ‘self-creative’ perspective on the human good. One might accept the 
main claims of this conception of ontogeny and yet, for example, reject the notion that our 
being as living beings has any relevance at all to the question of the good, perhaps because 
the reality this question addresses is strictly transcendent of the world of ‘mere nature’. I do 
not pretend to have a knock-down response to this. All I care to do is re-iterate that, as stated 
in the Introduction (0:3.1), this thesis begins from the assumption that human existence is 
fundamentally embedded in the world of living nature, and that ‘what it means to be human’, 
and what it means to live well as one, are issues deeply intertwined with what it means for 
humans to be living organisms, as opposed to rocks, or computers, or gods. This thesis is 
specifically an exploration of the possibilities for normative understanding of ourselves given 
the assumption of this intertwining. This is why I am, a) drawn to an interrogation of the neo-
Aristotelian attempt to think flourishing as an organic concept of the good; and b) motivated 
to articulate an alternative way of doing so, given that the picture of life inherent in this 
approach breaks down in the face of the reality of organismic becoming. In this respect I 
hope to have shown a way of throwing out the bathwater (of transcendent normativity) 
without discarding the baby (of our being as living beings).  
Secondly, and in a similar vein, even given this orientation I am not claiming that any 
particular empirical facts can, by themselves, do for us the kind of normative work I have 
presented here. What I have been exploring are the implications of different ways of 
interpreting empirical reality, and the ways in which different modes of interpretation can 
bring with them certain normative structures. However, this does not cast us utterly adrift 
from the world we are endeavouring to understand. As I have argued, in Chapter VI in 
particular, the choice between different modes of interpretation, or metaphysical frameworks, 
is not simply arbitrary in relation to the phenomena we are interpreting. In the debate between 
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neo-preformationism and constructivism, we see a complex dialectic between observation 
and interpretation, through which one set of concepts and metaphors shows up as inadequate 
to the reality we encounter, and gives way to a different lens for bringing that reality into 
view. Furthermore (as outlined in 0:3.2-3.3), I do not take this level of analysis to be merely 
an ‘added extra’ to the real work of science, which simply states the facts as they are, via 
some kind of ‘view from nowhere’. To view the world is always to apprehend it from 
somewhere, and to grasp it intellectually is to bring to bear some conceptual framing, by 
means of which we attempt to make sense of reality. And this is not a problem, it is part of 
what it is to experience, observe, explain, and gain understanding. So, I do not purport to 
have achieved some simple deduction from brute empirical fact to normative assertion. This 
thesis self-consciously dwells within a space of interpretation in which the way we observe 
the world is not artificially separated from the way in which we categorise and conceptualise 
the entities with which we are dealing. And this space of interpretation can, especially when 
the objects of understanding are ourselves, bring with it certain ways of structuring the kind 
of evaluative thinking we take to be appropriate.  
A work such as this, which sits in the in-between space where disparate fields meet, 
inevitably touches on a variety of issues and points in a number of directions. The most direct 
contribution I hope to have made is to show a new way of negotiating the relation between 
the philosophy of flourishing and the understanding of biology. I hope to have shown that 
articulating ‘the good’ in terms of the form of one’s living, the going-well or doing-well of 
life, contains a number of interpretive possibilities. In particular, beginning from this general 
perspective need not tie us down to the – admittedly tempting – logic whereby we raise an 
image of ‘nature’ as an agency independent of ourselves that prescribes a model to life. 
Whether this picture emerges by abstracting a species-general ‘life-form’ and turning it back 
on individuals as a transcendent standard, by invoking the existence of ‘innate potentials’ 
aimed at specific realisations, or by imagining the process of organic development as the 
revelation of an ‘inner design’ (whatever its material vehicle), it is a picture demanded more 
by our metaphysical prejudices than by the world of living nature in which we find ourselves. 
And it is the dynamicity, contingency, and creativity of this world that shows us why denying 
this picture need not send us into nihilism. By rejecting the logic of pre-given proper form we 
lose the existential comfort of a world in which there is some way one is ‘meant to be’, but 
we gain the solidarity of a world in which all life is engaged in the process of finding its way, 
a process within which meaning is created, rather than merely uncovered. It is a 
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groundlessness that comes with a certain vertigo, but, when seen in this way, can also be 
emancipatory. Reference to the ‘biological’ comes into play not as an insinuation of fatalism 
or essentialism, but an affirmation of the ground of freedom and creativity. 
I see this re-orientation towards our organic facticity as having value beyond just the debate 
about neo-Aristotelian meta-ethics and its reliance-or-not upon certain assumptions about 
biology. Although the implications for social and political thinking have remained largely in 
the background here, I hope to have laid the groundwork for a new approach to issues such as 
the nature and value of freedom, and the question of how social structures can enhance or 
impinge upon it; and the basis of respect for individuality and diversity in society. Taking the 
kind of perspective advocated here demands that we withhold judgement about the intrinsic 
value of particular ways of being, insofar as we lack awareness of the context of becoming 
and the relations with the world through which that way of being exists. It encourages a 
mindfulness of the diversity of ways in which particular things can matter across lives that 
might otherwise look quite similar. This is a lesson to be held in mind when dealing with 
issues as various as the needs of those differently (or ostensibly dis-)abled; the variety of 
practices and meanings through which different cultures organise themselves; and also the 
fact that membership of a culture, just as of a species, does not mean normative subordination 
of the individual to its standards. At the same time as ensuring a respectful space for 
particularity, the ongoing and improvisational nature of becoming recognised in this view 
will remind us that what matters can change, and can change in ways that are not entirely 
transparent to, or under the control of, the individual themselves. So respect for particularity 
ought not to simply imply quietism about the good. Instead, we will recognise the imperative 
to expand horizons of possibility wherever we can, so as to enable individuals to find their 
own way in life as openly and richly as possible. 
As well as developing these connections further in future work, I also hope to explore how 
the conception of organismic becoming as praxis ought to shape our understanding of life 
beyond the human realm, and our action upon it. Although not discussed at all in this thesis, 
the realm of the ecological/environmental has remained in my peripheral vision. I think that 
taking up this view could provide a fruitful way of combatting the excesses of our modern 
instrumental attitude to nature, our vision of the living world and its materials as simply a 
resource for our exploitation. The praxic view sees life as such as a fount of self-creative 
power, the ‘active presence’ of which ought to be respected as having intrinsic significance, 
as a locus of meaning-unto-itself. 
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